Posted on Jun 7, 2015
50 years ago today, June 7, in sunny Vietnam-land - Where were you?
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Big News Day!
General Westmoreland reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Viet Cong were stronger than ever and that ARVN was taking heavy casualties and suffering from a high rate of desertions and an unwillingness to take the offensive.
Westmoreland said, "I see no course of action open to us except to reinforce our efforts in SVN South Vietnam with additional U.S. or third country forces as rapidly as is practical."
He asks for a 35 battalion U.S. / 3rd Country force and identified 9 additional battalions which may be required at a later date.
This gave rise to the “44 battalion” debate within the Johnson administration, a discussion of how many U.S. combat troops to commit to the war.
Westmoreland felt that the South Vietnamese could not defeat the communists alone and he wanted U.S. combat troops to go on the offensive against the enemy.
His plan was to secure the coastlines, block infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into the south, and then wage a war of attrition with “search and destroy” missions into the countryside, using helicopters for rapid deployment and evacuation.
Westmoreland had some supporters in the Johnson administration, but others of the president’s advisers did not support Westmoreland’s request for more troops, because they disagreed with what would be a fundamental change in the U.S. role in Vietnam.
In the end, Johnson acquiesced to Westmoreland’s request; eventually there would be over 500,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam.
General Westmoreland reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Viet Cong were stronger than ever and that ARVN was taking heavy casualties and suffering from a high rate of desertions and an unwillingness to take the offensive.
Westmoreland said, "I see no course of action open to us except to reinforce our efforts in SVN South Vietnam with additional U.S. or third country forces as rapidly as is practical."
He asks for a 35 battalion U.S. / 3rd Country force and identified 9 additional battalions which may be required at a later date.
This gave rise to the “44 battalion” debate within the Johnson administration, a discussion of how many U.S. combat troops to commit to the war.
Westmoreland felt that the South Vietnamese could not defeat the communists alone and he wanted U.S. combat troops to go on the offensive against the enemy.
His plan was to secure the coastlines, block infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into the south, and then wage a war of attrition with “search and destroy” missions into the countryside, using helicopters for rapid deployment and evacuation.
Westmoreland had some supporters in the Johnson administration, but others of the president’s advisers did not support Westmoreland’s request for more troops, because they disagreed with what would be a fundamental change in the U.S. role in Vietnam.
In the end, Johnson acquiesced to Westmoreland’s request; eventually there would be over 500,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam.
Posted in these groups: 
Vietnam War
Military History
Vietnam War Military History
Posted 9 y ago
Responses: 20
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Gen Westmorland was one of the reasons we lost the Vietnam War. His strategy to fight a war of attrition with search and destroy operations reflected his WWII/Korean War mentality. The most important element of any counterinsurgency war is to protect the population not simply try and decimate the enemy. You can never kill enough of them. General Abrams knew this but by the time he took command it was too late. Gen Petreaus knew this and used it with the surge in Iraq to win the war before President Obama withdrew all the U.S. troops and snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Winning counterinsurgency wars requires sufficient boots on the ground for a long as it takes. Otherwise, don't bother.
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Sgt David G Duchesneau
With all due respect Colonel, contrary to popular belief, we did not lose the Vietnam War. We were ordered to withdraw and to Stand Down and that is what we did. The whole thing was so political and if our Military Leaders would of let us do our jobs and fight that freaking War, we would of pushed the NVA back to Hanoi. By the way Sir, Welcome Home!
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Sgt David G Duchesneau
All I know is that we never lost a major battle. Yes the media claimed that we were losing the war, but those ass wipes weren't anywhere around us in the field. How in hell could they know what we were doing up on the DMZ and that whole I Corps area. I never saw Walter Cronkite up where I was. Shit, I was in Nam for two years and I never saw him anywhere. In my second book, which is almost completed, I talk about this very thing, "Did we actually lose the Vietnam War?" I can assure you that it's an eye opener.
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LTC Ed Ross
I share your thinking but it doesn't matter how it ended, when it was over and done with we were gone and the Vietnamese were in control. Anyway you cut it, we lost. Until we learn to accept that we did lose and why we lost we will keep on losing counterinsurgency wars. I am a proud Vietnam War combat veteran. My comrades and I fought hard and made great sacrifices. Those who died did not die in vein. But We do not honor their memories by deceiving ourselves.
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SSG Lloyd Becker BSBA-HCM, MBA
Gen Sinlaub was talking the same language as Westmoreland and he got releaved of command.
Viet Nam was a politicians' war. Militarily, we did not lose the battle, or the war; and the "war" was a conflict then and I still take exception to the re-naming.
The question one must ask is this. If Viet Nam is a war, then what about Korea? Congress still has not declared it a war, yet, it is called one (unofficially).
Gen Westmoreland and Sinlaub had the plans to push the NVA back to where they came from, while leaving their dead behind. To this day, I believe Gen Westmoreland got the shaft. As we in the Army call it, the Big Green Weenie.
Viet Nam was a politicians' war. Militarily, we did not lose the battle, or the war; and the "war" was a conflict then and I still take exception to the re-naming.
The question one must ask is this. If Viet Nam is a war, then what about Korea? Congress still has not declared it a war, yet, it is called one (unofficially).
Gen Westmoreland and Sinlaub had the plans to push the NVA back to where they came from, while leaving their dead behind. To this day, I believe Gen Westmoreland got the shaft. As we in the Army call it, the Big Green Weenie.
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What I find interesting in this is that, JFK wanted to pull out completely from Viet Nam. Shortly after the assasination, LBJ signed the Executive Order committing troops to Viet Nam.
This question always raises a nasty head in a conversation; exactly, what did LBJ have to gain from committing troops to Viet Nam? After all, JFK wanted out. Shouldn't LBJ follow suit? If he would have followed suit, a lot of us would not have been to Viet Nam, to include me.
Some say, LBJ was part of the plot to kill JFK. Why else, the motorcade was mapped out, whether in New Orleans, or Dallas.
This question always raises a nasty head in a conversation; exactly, what did LBJ have to gain from committing troops to Viet Nam? After all, JFK wanted out. Shouldn't LBJ follow suit? If he would have followed suit, a lot of us would not have been to Viet Nam, to include me.
Some say, LBJ was part of the plot to kill JFK. Why else, the motorcade was mapped out, whether in New Orleans, or Dallas.
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SPC Jan Allbright, M.Sc., R.S.
Now that's really interesting!
Here is what I found out there....
The debate endures because JFK expressed support for both his dovish policy option (withdrawal without victory) and his hawkish option (escalation until victory). But overall, Galbraith notes that on a series of foreign policy decisions in his first two years and half years in office, JFK rejected the recommendation of his hawkish advisers. He sees JFK’s unfinished Vietnam policy in 1963 as
“part of a larger strategy, of a sequence that included the Laos and Berlin settlements in 1961, the non-invasion of Cuba in 1962, the Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Kennedy subordinated the timing of these events to politics: he was quite prepared to leave soldiers in harm’s way until after his own reelection. His larger goal after that was to settle the Cold War, without either victory or defeat—a strategic vision laid out in JFK’s commencement speech at American University on June 10, 1963.”
http://jfkfacts.org/assassination/experts/was-jfk-going-to-pull-out-of-vietnam/
Here is what I found out there....
The debate endures because JFK expressed support for both his dovish policy option (withdrawal without victory) and his hawkish option (escalation until victory). But overall, Galbraith notes that on a series of foreign policy decisions in his first two years and half years in office, JFK rejected the recommendation of his hawkish advisers. He sees JFK’s unfinished Vietnam policy in 1963 as
“part of a larger strategy, of a sequence that included the Laos and Berlin settlements in 1961, the non-invasion of Cuba in 1962, the Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Kennedy subordinated the timing of these events to politics: he was quite prepared to leave soldiers in harm’s way until after his own reelection. His larger goal after that was to settle the Cold War, without either victory or defeat—a strategic vision laid out in JFK’s commencement speech at American University on June 10, 1963.”
http://jfkfacts.org/assassination/experts/was-jfk-going-to-pull-out-of-vietnam/
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Going to boot camp NTC San Diego. Start of a 24 year trip that took me around the world twice , two trips to Vietnam and half way around the world four times
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