Advise and Assist… Again?

1SG Steven Stankovich — Wed, 24 Sep 2014 09:26:30 -0400

I read an article titled “Dempsey: Half of Iraqi Army not OK as US Partners” (http://rly.pt/1Dxjxvy) and it really got me thinking. In it, GEN Dempsey concluded only 26 of the 50 Iraqi Army Brigades are capable partners for the U.S. With that in mind, I do not ever see a time in the future where U.S. elements partner alongside Iraqi elements in training and exercises at JMRC or a venue like that. What I do see is a step back to the Military Training Teams (MTTs), Border Transition Teams (BTTs), Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs), etc. that were utilized to advise, assist and train the Iraqi security forces. Some of these were very successful. Most were not.

I was the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of a Border Transition Team for the 6th Iraqi Border Police. They were headquartered in Sinjar in northwestern Iraq. Our team was the fifth team to fall in on this unit. It was a long year, much like it was a long year for many who deployed and did this sort of mission. My point is this. We were the fifth team to train this particular unit. Were they any more capable of securing their border after a year with us? I don’t think so. Were they any more capable after completing a year with the team that replaced us? Again, I don’t think so. Evidence is the amount of contraband, weapons, and foreign fighters that move freely across the border between Syria and Iraq.

We now have about 1,600 military advisors on the ground again in Iraq with more being identified. These folks will not have a “combat role.” That phrase always gets to me. Every time you go outside of the wire, you assume a combat role. To prepare for anything shy of that is inviting disaster. These advisors are out there with their Iraqi counterparts without the aid of dedicated Quick Reaction Force (QRF), without the aid of dedicated infantry, armor, or field artillery support. They not only have to be cognizant of the ISIS and the external threat that those forces possess, but they also have to sleep with one eye open because the insider threat is as real as it ever was.

GEN Dempsey said that this is about “training them in protected locations and then enabling them (Iraqi security forces)” so that they can “fight the fight” required to beat ISIS militants back across the border into Syria. Are U.S. trainers the answer? What improvements in training aids, or additional resources, will these trainers have that my team and the many others who have done this mission in the past didn’t have? Would you volunteer to deploy on one of these training teams?

Response by SFC Private RallyPoint Member made Sep 24 at 2014 11:04 AM

SFC Private RallyPoint Member — Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:04:53 -0400

I would have to agree with your position that without the ground, air, or indirect fire support it will be an ill-fated trip. Having partnered with HNSF in both Iraq, Afghanistan, and numerous partnerships in USAREUR; advising a foreign partner seems to not increase capacity, capability, nor power projection capability. Months on end seem to blend into quelling internal conflict in their organization or the ever present "we need money for X, Y, or Z." I think you are correct in response to MAJ Young, their individual goals/agendas override any concept of stability, as they are lost to the concept of "common" goals.
This is not to say that there have not been successes in this area, although I would say limited and very specifc success. The largest issues I see/have seen as an OC/T at the National Training Center, is a misson command and command relationship between the SFAAT and a parent organization. The morning mash-up of leaders are great bases of experience, but lack the "doers" to be markedly successful are virtually nonexistent from my foxhole. We cannot talk, advise or train our way out of this fight in my opinion. Just my two cents, warranted or not. Cheers team.

Response by MSgt Guillermo Ybarra III (HVAC Recruiter) made Sep 24 at 2014 11:33 AM

MSgt Guillermo Ybarra III (HVAC Recruiter) — Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:33:16 -0400

wow!

Response by MSgt Guillermo Ybarra III (HVAC Recruiter) made Sep 24 at 2014 11:48 AM

MSgt Guillermo Ybarra III (HVAC Recruiter) — Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:48:05 -0400

This is an awesome read! Very informative!

Response by SSG Private RallyPoint Member made Sep 24 at 2014 12:38 PM

SSG Private RallyPoint Member — Wed, 24 Sep 2014 12:38:10 -0400

In the language of todays political arena the term "advise and assists" translates to "these people have no frickin clue what they're doing, nor do they have any real desire to do it, so we're going to send our people over their to do it all for them while they "assist" us."

Response by PO1 Steven Kuhn made Sep 24 at 2014 12:48 PM

PO1 Steven Kuhn — Wed, 24 Sep 2014 12:48:53 -0400

I served in Jedda, Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm Desert Shield. Muslims (at least the men - cause the women love us) are taught to hate us from infancy. The mindset of any Muslim working honestly and peacefully beside an unclean infidel would be akin to a southerner working alongside a slave as an equal before the civil war (and thanks to the Democrats aka the KKK, well into the 1960's). The brainwashed hatred instilled in them from an early age makes it hard to indoctrinate them in anything remotely resembling truth. Islam is not a religion, but a political engine, so even if we have Muslim allies all we are doing is helping one radical sect of Islam against another. Until Peaceful Islam shows itself and cleans up the mess I think we need to be wary of ANY Muslim since their Quran says they are allowed to lie and deceive non-Muslims and are ordered to conquer them. Let Allah sort them out while we focus on America!

Response by SFC Dr. Joseph Finck, BS, MA, DSS made Sep 24 at 2014 1:33 PM

SFC Dr. Joseph Finck, BS, MA, DSS — Wed, 24 Sep 2014 13:33:51 -0400

MSG Steven Stankovich,

This is incredibly interesting. I served in Iraq in 2007 - 2008 and my finding was a shell or movie set as opposed to substance in the IPs and Military of Iraq.

The concept of advise and assist has been used to death and not in a good way. During Viet Nam we had Military Assistance Command - Vietnam which was a similar concept utilizing Special Forces advisors to train and patrol with friendly forces. What happens when these friendly forces are attacked and our "advisors" are with them? It is no less combat than any other situation. You could not be more correct, "everytime you go outside of the wire, you assume a combat role. To prepare for anything shy of that is inviting disaster."

Our forces no matter where they are and no matter the mission should have the best force protection, intelligence, support, and reinforcements possible. I will never disagree that our forces must follow the guidance of elected leaders. But our elected leaders must also heed what senior military professionals report, advise, and request.

This is a great topic and I thank you for asking the hard question and creating such a valid and timly discussion.

SFC Joseph M. Finck USA (Ret)

Response by LTC Charles Sherman made Sep 24 at 2014 4:32 PM

LTC Charles Sherman — Wed, 24 Sep 2014 16:32:30 -0400

What could go wrong?

Response by SSG Pete Fleming made Sep 24 at 2014 5:15 PM

SSG Pete Fleming — Wed, 24 Sep 2014 17:15:40 -0400

LTC Charles Sherman, asked a valid question "what could go wrong?"

What Could Go Wrong? - The Girobabies (Official Video)

LYRICS
Stabbed in the back, Hit with the sack
The social not working , Kicked out your flat
Under arrest, Under attack
Walk under a ladder with a magpie and a cat
Tug of war tussle with the mental muscle
Must muster something above the lack-luster

Such is life, Stick a grin on it

What could possibly go wrong? - Everything
What could possibly go wrong? - Anything
What could possibly go wrong? - Everything
Every day is a Friday the 13th
the rage from within, The lies and the spin
What could possibly go wrong? - Everything

We burnt the bridge- It hit the skids and we`re glad it did

such is life, Stick a grin on it

If it can go wrong, It will go wrong
It wont be long till it all goes wrong x2
Someone give me something familiar
Nothing feels much realer than failure

Such is life, Stick a grin on it

What could possibly go wrong? - Everything
What could possibly go wrong? - Anything
What could possibly go wrong? - Everything
Every day is a Friday the 13th
the rage from within, The lies and the spin
What could possibly go wrong? - Everything

We burnt the bridge- It hit the skids and We`re glad it did

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cban5ZHvVng

What Could Go Wrong? - The Girobabies (Official Video)

available on FREE DL at or on a pay-what-you-want basis http://thegirobabies.bandcamp.com/track/what-could-go-wrong LYRICS Stabbed in the back, Hit with the ...

Response by SPC Michael Hunt made Sep 24 at 2014 10:00 PM

SPC Michael Hunt — Wed, 24 Sep 2014 22:00:15 -0400

What's happening is precisely what should be happening.

Response by SFC Private RallyPoint Member made Sep 25 at 2014 5:48 PM

SFC Private RallyPoint Member — Thu, 25 Sep 2014 17:48:27 -0400

Are U.S. trainers the answer? The US military comprises the finest force ever to exist on our planet. If there is a military answer (and that is a big if), we are certainly it. With that said, it might be worth an independent review of all the officers O6 and above who were involved in Iraq 2003-2011- if those names appear on the current roster of potential "shot-callers" for our current engagement, it begs the question how we expect success to rise from demonstrated inability. Are our young Staff Sergeants and Captains part of the solution? Perhaps. Are our seniors? History would suggest they are not.

What improvements in training aids, or additional resources, will these trainers have that my team and the many others who have done this mission in the past didn’t have? I say with biting sarcasm that we have all had a moment to rapidly click through our AR 350-1 training and guess at the answers, so we should all be infinitely more qualified to carry out the mission- but the reality is that there are no improvements. We closed the book, sold off our "excess" military equipment, and reduced both our budget and manning.

Would you volunteer to deploy on one of these training teams? Absolutely. Despite my lack of confidence in the outcome of the primary mission, as an intelligence professional the secondary objectives of conducting projects alongside allied forces and against state-actors with a stake in the ISIL situation will always appeal to me. To put that in perspective however, I would also volunteer for the old OSS function of MI, dropping off in a number of complicated areas with limited oversight and strategic goals (and believe such a role would be far more effective than compound-and-FOB living but far too risky for CRM) - so I hardly speak for the rest of my rank or corps.

Response by Cpl Peter Martuneac made Sep 27 at 2014 7:43 AM

Cpl Peter Martuneac — Sat, 27 Sep 2014 07:43:47 -0400

Insanity is doing the same thing over and over, expecting different results. We sunk trillions of dollars, thousands of men and women, and years of our time into helping Iraq, and at the very first sign of trouble they throw down their arms and flee. Let em sink or swim, I say.

Response by SPC Private RallyPoint Member made Sep 27 at 2014 2:50 PM

SPC Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 27 Sep 2014 14:50:32 -0400

In my opinion I would be especially careful in who we train. Due to lesions learned

Response by PO3 Anthony Farhner made Sep 27 at 2014 4:00 PM

PO3 Anthony Farhner — Sat, 27 Sep 2014 16:00:33 -0400

With all due respect, why not assist the Iraqis in fortifying their border with Syria with outposts and installations from Zakho all the way to the point where Syria-Iraq and Jordan share a border. Interconnect them with roadways, mobile anti-air sites and mobile artillery along with infantry patrols. Minefields would be effective along with fields of other "booby-traps", tank and vehicle pits. I know fortifications are "expensive to maintain" but would it not be money well spent to ensure the national security of a sovereign nation from marauding terrorists like ISIS and Al-Queda. Once the static defenses are in place they are low maintenance deterrents.