China’s Espionage Against Taiwan

2014-12-15T02:41:31-05:00

The Jamestown Org has an interesting article on Chinese espionage

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=43161&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=333ecd02ba016121367a0b2481951ac9

China’s Espionage Against Taiwan (Part II): Chinese Intelligence Collectors

Chinese intelligence operations have long been understood in the West as somehow different than more familiar forms of espionage: inscrutable, undirected and largely run by amateurs. Like most modern states, China, however, has entrusted intelligence to professional organizations. This second installment on China’s espionage against Taiwan explores the organizational landscape of Chinese intelligence with a focus on their relationship to Beijing’s policymaking on Taiwan affairs. It provides four brief sketches of the Ministry of State Security, the Second Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department, the United Front Work Department and the Liaison Office of the PLA General Political Department. These institutions span the breadth of the Chinese state, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA, complicating efforts to neutralize Beijing’s intelligence and united front work.

The Ministry of State Security (MSS)

Founded in the 1983, the MSS has long focused on Taiwan. The Ministry’s first publicized successes dealt with breaking several Taiwanese espionage rings in the mainland during the 1980s (Xinhua, November 22, 1984; Xinhua, January 12, 1987). Although the MSS now manages 32 provincial-level departments and countless local-level bureaus, state security originally included the central ministry and a mere handful of provincial-level departments. Based on provincial leadership listings, some of the earliest departments included Shanghai, Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangsu—namely the ones with military units facing Taiwan. Moreover, the Minister of State Security has had a place on the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group since the 1980s; however, the minister did not gain a position on the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group until the late 1990s. [1]

The MSS’s Taiwan operations are run out of its 15th Bureau, which maintains a public face as the Institute of Taiwan Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Oriental Press [Hong Kong], December 13, 2013; The Straits Times, December 7, 2000). Yu Keli ran the bureau for years and was a familiar feature of China’s Taiwan policy landscape, but he handed leadership over to successor Zhou Zhihuai earlier this year (China Academy of Social Sciences, May 26). The academic cover has allowed MSS officers to travel to Taiwan to exploit opportunities for exchanges and meetings as well as to play host to a wide variety of foreign visitors. This does not necessarily mean that anything nefarious or improper occurred, but rather that the MSS exploits the opportunity to go behind the headlines, press statements and policy papers to get the kind of background information only available through personal interactions.

Below the central level, each provincial-level unit and many localities have MSS departments that conduct intelligence and security operations. Their responsibilities extend from counterespionage to event security to investigations (China News Service, May 4; Guangdong Provincial Government, September 16, 2010; Caijing, July 24, 2009). Their externally focused operations, however, are more difficult to track. Public reporting on espionage cases often vaguely refers to MSS officials outside Beijing, local security officials or local government officials (Wen Wei Po [Hong Kong], September 22; Taipei Times, January 5, 2013). These officers are more likely to be from the local state security office rather than ministry headquarters, because they have responsibility for tracking and investigating the Taiwanese in their jurisdiction. Definitive answers, however, are hard to find.

Although the MSS’s intelligence collection on dissidents, counterintelligence, technology and foreign policy is well-documented, the Taiwan cases demonstrate that ...

Now what I want to know is why the Chinese are allowed to use professionals who act like professionals, get professional results, and are treated like professionals? Is it all Obama's fault?

single | The Jamestown Foundation

On July 27, 2015, The Jamestown Foundation hosted former Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense, Admiral Ihor Kabanenko, and Vice President of Kyiv-based high-technology firm KM Core, Bohdan Kupych....

Response by SPC Phillip Ludlow made Dec 15 at 2014 2:57 AM

2014-12-15T02:57:45-05:00

china's always seemed to have a less linear attitude towards warfare. Take Unrestricted Warfare February 1999, for example. Its primary concern is how a nation such as China could defeat a technologically superior opponent (such as the United States) through a variety of means. Rather than focusing on direct military confrontation, this book instead examines a variety of other means. Such means include using International Law (see Lawfare) and a variety of economic means to place one's opponent in a bad position and circumvent the need for direct military action.(wikipedia)

more info -------> http://cryptome.org/cuw01.htm

Response by Capt Daniel Goodman made Mar 8 at 2018 3:12 AM

2018-03-08T03:12:31-05:00

That's a big shock...that whole Commie madhouse is just simply major NAD news....

Response by Capt Daniel Goodman made Mar 8 at 2018 3:13 AM

2018-03-08T03:13:04-05:00

Sorry for typo, major bad news, it jas been ever since Mao, ChouP, and Deng...

Response by Capt Daniel Goodman made Jul 12 at 2018 5:25 AM

2018-07-12T05:25:33-04:00

Those Commie yo-yos have been after that place since the end of WW2, they'll never get it, no way, no how, those Taiwanese are REAL serious about keeping those Commie dingalings off that island, ain't never gonna happen, period...they can try all of that garbage they want, they're never gonna win, cut and dry, that is it, the end, finis, QED....