Does it matter that there are so many differences in how government agencies mark & handle classified info?

Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen - While I cannot report on current practices . . . you might take note of IG's audit reports in the attached documents . . . which focused on our practices at USDOS INR HQ Washington DC . . . which did not even begin to touch on our practices at remote sites operating in more exposed less secure locations. Warmest Regards, Sandy :)

http://www.govexec.com/federal-news/2000/05/lawmakers-urge-state-to-make-security-a-top-priority/6562/
https://oig.state.gov/system/files/7784.pdf
https://oig.state.gov/system/files/210775.pdf
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/state-oig-email.pdf

Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen - Nice paper describing agency operational purposes and cultural differences that impact routine practices re classification and management of their classified materials. Warmest Regards, Sandy :)

"In short, the missions of the CIA and the State Department differ, so we should not be surprised that they have different cultures and procedures, both formal and informal, including with regard to classification. The simple fact is that classification often stands between diplomats and getting work done. For the CIA, however, classification is often a necessary precondition for getting work done. Unless you want a State Department so secure that it is ineffective, or a CIA so leaky that it is ineffective, these differences are a good thing."

http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/were-hillary-clintons-emails-classified-where-you-stand-depends-on-where-you-sit/

Thanks for all the links/articles. All seem to indicate just how confusing this issue can be.

Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen - I suspect the real key is to be aware of the formal and informal rules, customs, and practices of your agency . . . and to engage your brain to assess whether those protocols appropriately facilitate the mission of your agency and preclude potentially damaging risks derived from inappropriate disclosure to unauthorized personnel within and beyond your agency. For example, if you are a Marine standing the night watch in the embassy maybe best not to let some russian floozy into the code room. If you have notebook computer loaded with military personnel records or nuclear secrets probably best to ensure the hard drive is encrypted and the system kept under lock and key . . . preferably in a "spy proof" dual combination safe . . . in an electronically audited access controlled room. If clear text is accessible in the SCIF on an accessible data port then maybe forbid personnel to bring uncontrolled recordable media into the room. But, if your job is soliciting foreign diplomats, liaison officers, and technical personnel for info don't over classify the prerequisite information required to elicit missing data from them and/or to cross correlate previously acquired data with one or two independent sources. The world is no longer black and white. Cleared personnel must be taught to recognize the opportunities and risks . . . and to use common sense to protect our most high classified national assets. Warmest Regards, Sandy

Good info. Like most EOs there is lots of room for interpretation though.

You are a Lt COL. Where is that room? It is pretty straight forward and this dumb old enlisted man understood it, even the changes updated to include new technologies.