Hide and Seek … The Deadly Game Facing the DoD

2018-01-18T11:01:27-05:00

As the military starts the process of making up for lost time and opportunity in the modernization of the force, I think that special attention needs to be paid to an old system and process that needs to be made new again. I am speaking about the need for ground forces, to re-learn the skill of camouflage and concealment for their equipment and installations.

During the entire duration of the Cold War, our forces in NATO were trained and equipped with camouflage systems that were state of the art … low visibility paints, painted in “Woodland” patterns on the vehicles, Command Posts at all levels that were covered in 3-D camouflage netting when they could not be hidden in a barn … and so on. We trained to deploy these net systems quickly and efficiently; however, if you have ever been a crewman on an M577 Command Post Vehicle or the driver of a 5-Ton Cargo Truck, you know that “quick and efficient” were not terms that were often used in conjunction with these net systems. In fact, I do not think we can include most of the expletives that were offered by those Cold War warriors here. But, we used the nets and the paint and the main means of concealment and deception because we knew the enemy we faced had the means and the technology to detect us … he had an air force, some emerging satellite capability, and ground sensors such as newly developing NOD’s at his disposal; and, if he could detect us, then he could find us and kill us. Our camouflage systems were intended to reduce the risk of detection through observation and sensors. So, with great pain and strain, we did what we had been trained as soldiers to do. Hide in plain sight.

But, the Cold War came to an end and the military continued to train in the way it had since the end of World War II. That is, until Desert Storm. We deployed to the desert to fight a war that was completely different than our NATO experience in terms of terrain and threat. When we first went to the desert, there was a threat that we could be attacked from the air… but, that threat seemed to fade quickly as the buildup in the desert continued. The reliance on vehicles painted tan that would blend with the operational terrain seemed to be enough; given that the Iraqi air force never got off the ground. Iraqi technology was inferior and our own technology to “see” the threat before they could “see” us was far superior. No need for all those pesky camo nets. They were there; but, we did not need to use them.

Then 9/11 … Afghanistan and then Iraq. We knew the threat and their capabilities in Iraq. And, as for Afghanistan, the threat posed by the Taliban was probably equal to a military of the early 19th century. In neither case was there a threat from the air … and therefore, no requirement to hide from collection sensors of any sophistication nor the need to disguise where we were and what we were doing. Some net systems were deployed to the theaters; and in the field, warriors continued to learn the benefits of being able to conceal themselves from observation … thru an evolution of camouflage patterns and materials for uniforms to help with the task. However, our logistics installations and vehicle parks were not camouflaged. There was no attempt at masking the movement of our convoys or hiding them from air observation, or satellite detection, radar, IR, or Near IR because there was no appreciable threat.

Fast forward to 2018 … the near peer threats are changing at lightning speed. From the 19th century Taliban to North Koreans with nuc’s and an air force, along with Russians in the Baltic and Ukraine, the Chinese in the South China Sea, and the Iranians all over the globe. And, they are all equipped with very competent air forces, UAV’s for surveillance, satellite imagery produced by highly sophisticated radars and ground sensors to see in the night … as well as IR, Near IR, Radar and the newest technology on the street, SWIR. We could once say that “We Owned the Night” and we did … but, today anyone can purchase a NOD on the internet and that is part of the technology gap that has opened, and we are falling further behind our near peer threats at a rapid rate.

So, with sensors looking for us from space to the ground and all the environment in between, what must we do to close that detection gap?

We must go back to the lessons learned in WWII and our Cold War experience. We must deny the threat the ability to find us. Today, that means that we must have a solution that can defeat and degrade a variety of sensors and technologies that we face in our near peer threats. It’s no longer a case of simple concealment. It is a complex process that needs to be relooked and addressed by the Department’s leadership. Failing to do this will result in a scenario that yields those famous words: ’You go to war with the equipment you have … not the equipment you would like to have.’

The technology is available to start meeting this challenge. The requirements for an improved camouflage net system are being addressed by the US Army’s Natick Laboratories with the pending award of Phase I contracts for the new Ultra Lightweight Camouflage System (ULCANS). The new requirements call for a 2-D net system, much easier to deploy and recover than the old 3-D net system discussed earlier. The capabilities and requirements for the performance of the ULCANS System are sensitive and we cannot go into the details at this time ... in this paper.

Along with the advances anticipated in the ULCANS System, there is an opportunity to provide significantly improved camouflage, concealment and detection avoidance for vehicles and personnel when stationary and on the move. Here is where we lag. The technology, which is proven in the field, has yet to be made a requirement for our ground combat and logistics forces. Tanks, APC’s, JLTV’s and GMV’s, vehicles across the entire fleet can be kitted with solutions that will reduce their visual, IR Near IR, SWIR and Radar signatures when stationary or on the move. Early discussions with elements of the DoD have shown that there is a recognition of the problem and real need to start moving in the direction of providing solutions to the force; but, so far, DoD has not released a requirement. And, we all know what that means.

The same is true for dismounted forces. There are technology solutions available today that can make a soldier literally disappear from the view of an IR device, or provide snipers concealment in a manner that will make them undetectable by those seeking them with sensors out on the battlefield. These and other solutions are the game changers that our warriors will need to stay ahead of the threats.

It is imperative to overall survival of our fighting forces to be prepared for the next conflict by looking forward and not back. The last war we fought is over and we need to prepare for an enemy that is better equipped and “technology-ed up” than any we have faced in the last 15 years. I know that some will point out that the current budgets do not support this … but, the budget to close the gap between today’s peer threat and our ability to defeat and degrade must be a significant part of what we are looking to fix. The solution does not cost a great deal of money in the great scheme of things. The threat is here today, and we need to get the leaders moving on making new solutions a requirement … before DoD is in a game of catch up!

Response by LTC Jeff Shearer made Jan 18 at 2018 11:09 AM

2018-01-18T11:09:46-05:00

Marc, I could not agree more! It is hard to kill what you cant see and dont know is there

Response by Sgt Tee Organ made Jan 18 at 2018 11:41 AM

2018-01-18T11:41:15-05:00

I was like 2 minutes late for formation and the Gunny said "OK Organ you know the drill 50 pushups." He didn't specify so I did 50 Marine Corps push ups. He I guess figured I was down there longer than I needed to be and asked How many you do I said 35, He said you taking an awful long time, "I said Marine Corps pushups right 4 count?" He laughed and shook his head.

Response by Sgt Tee Organ made Jan 18 at 2018 11:53 AM

2018-01-18T11:53:23-05:00

Add to that... Deception, the art of altering terrain and familiar shapes to make things look like other things.

Response by 1LT Vance Titus made Jan 18 at 2018 12:47 PM

2018-01-18T12:47:36-05:00

Don't forget to use the God-given gift of the color blind personnel in the unit. I failed the flight school color test. My first flight into the Ahsau Valley I knew why. I could not see the yellow smoked popped for landing against the triple canopy jungle. However, I could see every camouflaged gun emplacement on every fire base we flew over. The pilot had no idea what I was seeing.

Response by COL John McClellan made Jan 18 at 2018 1:24 PM

2018-01-18T13:24:38-05:00

Good read, thx! It's not just a matter of camouflage technology - nets or otherwise, though - it's largely a matter of how we operate within a given theater and conflict. So... if we are occupying a number of fixed bases, with known transportation routes, a la in Iraq during the counterinsurgency... well, camouflage nets won't help - the population and the enemy know where to find us. In those NATO days we were out "in the field" in the woods with the unit in a perimeter, as part of a "mobile defense" in which we relocated every 48-72 hours; or - on the attack and moving "forward." So, the type of operations we envision are the starting point I'd say.

Response by LTC Private RallyPoint Member made Jan 18 at 2018 5:21 PM

2018-01-18T17:21:09-05:00

This post brings back memories of numerous night TOC jumps. We had detailed SOPs for setting up everything in the dark, including the nets. On one jump, the battalion commander felt he needed to show his support for the troops by “helping” them set up. I advised him against it, but he insisted. He comes back to the vehicle 10 minutes later and said the NCOIC ordered him away because he was fucking everything up by inserting himself into a smoothly run procedure.

But in Europe we never went anywhere in our jeeps (it was an airborne unit, not mech)without the net on the hood. And if we stopped for more than a few minutes, we popped up a pole or two for hasty concealment, and then expanded it if we stayed longer.

Response by CW4 Guy Butler made Jan 18 at 2018 6:02 PM

2018-01-18T18:02:33-05:00

Log bases are going to be a real challenge; current log packages are built predominately around containerized loads. CONEXs, whether on the ground or moving via PLS, are going to be a pain to hide in bulk.

Response by SSG Edward Tilton made Jan 19 at 2018 1:02 PM

2018-01-19T13:02:50-05:00

The big threat to the military is congress. They mess with the pay and benefits and equipment is either excess or doesn't work

Response by SSG Dave Johnston made Jan 21 at 2018 10:36 PM

2018-01-21T22:36:51-05:00

I remember seeing a Cartoon in the "Officers" Magazine, can't remember who published it but, the cartoon showed a F-16 ready for takeoff and the pilot was radioing the tower for maintenance to fix a flat on the front landing gear caused by a local native with a spear...

It's kind of hard to hide from the locals once you're in place, and you can rarely tell which ones are bought and paid for by your enemy. Now days with it being possible to place a GPS Tracker almost anywhere on a vehicle what will any 'camo' do for the soldier or the unit? I'm a product of the Cold War, and remember 'dearly' how much fun "camo" was, put it up, take it down, insure that my Cracker Box could clear without dragging it down the German Forest lanes... I've often wondered if anyone considered "Doc" and their "evac" vehicles and the necessity of "Doc" having to move his vehicle more often than anyone except for "Top" and how that effects a units concealment; hummmm?

Response by SGT James Clark made Jan 25 at 2018 6:32 PM

2018-01-25T18:32:25-05:00

This sir was a good read and I believe our military needs the best of everything out there.

Response by CW2 Private RallyPoint Member made Jan 27 at 2018 10:55 AM

2018-01-27T10:55:25-05:00

I've been saying this for years, we have forgotten how to fight a symmetric war. Our armored divisions don't know tank vs tank warfare, scouts can't even vehicle ID, javeling gunners are few and far between. The basics of each MOS were cast aside to prep for counter IED training and reflexive fire, its the reason so many other MOS' can claim "we did the same thing as the Infantry" no body wanted to, but we needed ground troops to enter and clear buildings. I really hope we get back to the basics before the next war against a formidable opponent comes, it's been a long time since the Thunder Run.

Response by PO1 Kevin Dougherty made Jan 31 at 2018 12:09 AM

2018-01-31T00:09:19-05:00

Great read, interesting stuff, even for an old Coastie. We didn't give much thought to camouflage, face it, there is nothing subtle about a white ship on a grey or blue ocean.... or a black ship ... orange ... actually I guess the intent was to stand out and be obvious.

Response by SGT Jeffrey Dennis made Feb 1 at 2018 7:03 PM

2018-02-01T19:03:22-05:00

Camoflauge, Cover, Concealement, light discipline, OPSEC, ComSec. The Army needs to do better in all of that.

Response by SFC Ralph E Kelley made Feb 5 at 2018 3:16 PM

2018-02-05T15:16:16-05:00

I remember making "Snowsuits" out of XXX bedsheets and draping worn out mattress covers around our M113s APCs and M551 Sheridans in the snows of West Germany. It's nice to have all the camo systems but at the end it's all about "Leadership".
I did enjoy the post, which is what I would like to see more of this kind on this forum.

Response by CSM Charles Hayden made Feb 15 at 2018 1:02 AM

2018-02-15T01:02:51-05:00

SSG Dave Johnston German Forest Lanes?

The kid brother; the one that re-upped for Nam - told of ‘his’ Reckless Rifle 106/105 Gun Jeep being trapped amongst trees in a German Forest. With no way to extricate the jeep from the confines of the tree mass it had been maneuvered into - the jeep’s crew had to cut down a tree! Of course, there was Hell to pay later!

11H Drivers were usually daring City boys w/o regard for their equipment. Soldiers from the farm were usually more cautious, deliberate and considerate of their equipment!

Response by CH (MAJ) Tom Conner made Feb 22 at 2018 1:55 AM

2018-02-22T01:55:58-05:00

Excellent observation! There are several things and trainings cast aside during the Gulf War/Iraq/Afghanistan era that the Armed Forces must resurrect before North Korea, China, or someone else with an Army attacks. Starting in Basic Combat Training.

Response by MSG Danny Mathers made Mar 8 at 2018 4:01 PM

2018-03-08T16:01:52-05:00

Technology has a lot of tools that Soldiers can use. However, those things need power sources. I learned while in a Tier I unit that mastering the basics was the most critical factor. Once you master the basic fundimentals, you have the ability to do most anything. I remember when I was in Germany, the german army appeared unprofessional. However, in the field they could hide an entire Mech Company on grassy hills and make them invisable 300 meters away with just simple nets and pieces of grasses. I learned that in Iraq as a security manager working with former SAS operators they did wonders with 20 year old technology. Technology at the basic soldier level with his ass in the grass, sand, dirt or mud is another battery to carry. When I was on active duty, I hated all the damn batteries we had to carry in training and on operations. 20 pounds of batteries in a ruck standing in the door at 18,000 feet in the dark is no fun jump. Technical gadjets add up when everything you have for life support is in a ruck sack. Food and water is consumeable, batteries are not and gadjets are accountable. Technology provides all the good things the colonel writes about when you don't have to hump it. I agree with all his other points. Individual camo is simple, use both natural and man made materials for the terrain works against sets of eyes; Ask any sniper that has conducted stalks. He who has the biggest FLIR will find you if you are above ground. Hell, what do I know, I just old retired NCO. There maybe be only drones and robots fighting wars 20 years from now. Opinions vary........

Response by SSG Private RallyPoint Member made Mar 8 at 2018 4:26 PM

2018-03-08T16:26:22-05:00

We need to figure out force fields and cloaking devices and we'll be good to go.

Response by PV2 Ross Bryan made Mar 29 at 2018 4:26 PM

2018-03-29T16:26:02-04:00

THIS REMINDS ME OF MY UNCLE DURING WW2 ! HE WAS A GRADUATE WITH AN DEGREE IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND WHEN HE JOINED UP HE WENT TO BE A COMMISIONED OFFICER ! HE WAS REJECTED ACCOUNT OF BEING COLOR BLIND!
HOWEVER HE WAS RETAINED AS AN ENLISTED MAN DOING ELECTRICAL WORK
OF SOME SORT! ELECTRICAL WORK INVOLVE USING COLORS FOR ELECTRICAL WIRE IDENTIFICATION! MY GRANDMOTHER WAS TOTALLY PISSED AS THE MILITARY REJECTED HIM AS AN OFFICER BUT USED HIM IN THE SAME TYPE WORK AS AN ENLISTED GRUNT!

Response by SFC Quinn Chastant made Apr 7 at 2018 10:25 AM

2018-04-07T10:25:23-04:00

Trying to maintain the appearance of an organic footprint versus a mechanical on for some forces is quite difficult dependent upon the intelligence gathering capabilities directed against you.
Camo, cover, and concealing are good but our RF signatures, Sound Discipline, light discipline across all frequencies, all need addressing. I participated in a night movement where the navigation aid used was sound. The noise one unit was generating was more than enough for us to maintain our orientation across a few kilometers of broken terrain. Add that radar disruptive coatings may help with airborne sensors. But noise discipline is essential when discounts are hunting.

Response by Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen made Apr 8 at 2018 8:15 PM

2018-04-08T20:15:17-04:00

An overall fault of fighting a war for 20+ years against an opponent with less than equal capabilities. As budget issues arose, programs that included things like camouflage, concealment and detection fell to the budget ax. Lack of foresight on our part, but the sad thing is that proponents of these programs must now fight for attention and budgets.

Response by SGT Jennifer Rixe made Apr 11 at 2018 2:37 AM

2018-04-11T02:37:02-04:00

Very good read, excellent points, and valid justification!

Response by MSG Thomas Currie made Apr 14 at 2018 11:49 AM

2018-04-14T11:49:04-04:00

It's not just that we have abandoned camouflage nets. We have a ground force that mostly has never even considered a "peer threat" and that has led to some rather peculiar decisions about our equipment. Take a look at the Stryker family of vehicles - we have committed a significant portion of our force structure to units designed around equipment that was specifically designed to never face any peer or even "near peer" threat. It's not just the lack of armor on these cute little wheeled vehicles, take a closer look at any of the Stryker vehicles, these are vehicles that rely entirely on high tech systems for their survivability, yet there are essential components of those systems located on the exterior of the vehicle, not protected by even what little armor the Stryker does have. The Stryker is a reasonable vehicle only in an environment where the enemy has neither air nor artillery capabilities. How many threats really have neither air nor artillery. Perhaps we can "control the sky" against most threats, but can our air superiority ensure that "the threat" won't be able to get even a single BM-21 within 30Km of a Stryker unit?

Response by SSgt William Blanshan made Apr 15 at 2018 3:57 PM

2018-04-15T15:57:11-04:00

Cover and concealment. You never see death until he's tapping on your shoulder.

Response by SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth made Jul 30 at 2018 6:07 AM

2018-07-30T06:07:47-04:00

Excellent share sir.

Response by LTC Private RallyPoint Member made Sep 24 at 2018 5:15 PM

2018-09-24T17:15:26-04:00

I can’t disagree with the concept of beefing up our camouflage and concealment skills. I also understand how the type of operations envisioned will have an impact on how those skills are renewed and developed. There is also no doubt that the art of camouflage and concealment has to be extended into the electromagnetic spectrum if we want a chance of survival in future battlefields… whether they are insurgencies or full-blown “NATO vs Warsaw Pact” equivalent fights, like the old “Fulda Gap scenarios”.
The question I have is how we are going to pay for the sorely needed upgrades/training/equipment/etc.
“Back in the day”, we had a robust economy, we were the “economic motor” of the world, everybody owed US money and there seemed to be no limit to our financial prowess. Today, income taxes barely cover interest on the multi-trillion dollar debt, Social Security and Medicare/Medicaid. Everything else, from the DOJ to the DOD, and everything in between, runs on debt. So any initiatives in equipment, procedures, training or anything else require even more debt. We depend, since 1965-1971 on a fiat money system which does nothing to solidify our financial posture. So the question is really not what we will do, once the political will is there to do it. It is rather, can we afford it? Can we do it without “breaking” our own backs?
I suppose we could default on our debt… and hope for a better future than Zimbabwe or Argentina. Today this seems pretty far-fetched. But then, I don’t doubt that it seemed far-fetched for the Romans, or Ottomans, or French, or the many other empires that succumbed to debt and became hell-holes for a couple of generations until they got their act together on a much smaller scale.
We know we have a lot of things to fix and that we have too many paper-pushers handling procurement with their own post-retirement employment in mind, as opposed to the best interests of the troops. The HMMWV procurement story is a good example. We need money to improve our troops’ and our systems’ survivability. We better give some thought to that. If we don’t, well end up identifying lots of stuff that “needs to get done” but we’ll have no way to do it.

Response by SFC Melvin Brandenburg made Jul 7 at 2019 10:20 AM

2019-07-07T10:20:01-04:00

Excellent article