How can the US Air Force increase combat capability across multiple weapon systems using operations reconnaissance?

SPC Dr. Ernest Rockwell — Mon, 30 Nov 2015 07:49:36 -0500

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/bookinfo.asp?bid=573

This paper uses nontraditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (NTISR), now known in tactics, techniques and procedures as operations reconnaissance, as a case study to increase combat capability across multiple weapon systems within the Air Force. NTISR demonstrates how one capability can flex to bridge gaps across several doctrinal functions and mission sets. It also provides an argument for the development of future technologies within extant fiscal constraints, revealing a requirement to shift the acquisition weight of effort away from traditional niche assets to those that support true multirole capabilities.

Response by SrA Daniel Hunter made Nov 30 at 2015 9:28 AM

SrA Daniel Hunter — Mon, 30 Nov 2015 09:28:12 -0500

We will have to get Congress out of the procurement business.

Response by Col Joseph Lenertz made Nov 30 at 2015 9:46 AM

Col Joseph Lenertz — Mon, 30 Nov 2015 09:46:18 -0500

The paper makes some strong and valid points regarding the need to make better use of OPSRECCE assets. I think we (the AF) have been forced many times to turn niche assets into multi-role assets (the author's own B-1 being used for CAS in Afghanistan comes to mind)...so the movement from niche to multi-role is not new. A couple points: There is a newer version of AFTTP 3-3.AOC (31 Jan 2014) but it still offers no update on how to best interleave OPSRECCE prioritization (historically via the ISRD creating the JIPCL) with the strike prioritization (via CPD creating the JIPTL) for the JFACC. Though the author makes a good case for the XCAS model, particularly for relatively permissive environments, he doesn't mention 5th gen aircraft, their superior OPSRECCE capabilities and how as these platforms become a larger portion of the force, that will make the need for a new combined process even greater. I'm not sure an XCAS model will serve us in kicking down the door of a near-peer competitor.

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made Nov 30 at 2015 1:35 PM

MAJ Ken Landgren — Mon, 30 Nov 2015 13:35:09 -0500

We also need smart people to figure out cultures and what causes them to change.

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made Nov 30 at 2015 4:03 PM

MAJ Ken Landgren — Mon, 30 Nov 2015 16:03:55 -0500

We need cultural intelligence.

Response by TSgt Private RallyPoint Member made Dec 2 at 2015 9:20 AM

TSgt Private RallyPoint Member — Wed, 02 Dec 2015 09:20:44 -0500

It is a good article and a strong thesis about current capability, cost, and information integration. I am more curious about the concept on the maintenance of the pod and upgrading cost to current aircraft. Not to mention concepts of maintenances on the aircraft used and repair schedule to accomplish more time in the air. You can add almost anything to a B-1 but if it cant integrate to its computer because of power draw or information flow will the be more of a bottle neck in regards to new XR pods? A B-1 is first generation stealth that isn't utilized in this aspect more of a fast bomber and the START treaty reduced some of the B-1 capabilities. I know the treaty is more for Nuclear reduction but some of its connection points where removed to fulfill the USA's side. We can go into deeper discussion on collection PODs and other aircraft that's not an issue its the improvement and maintenance cost to upgrade any aircraft that can carry current or new versions. The article does a cost comparison to the F-35 but doesn't give cost for development, integration systems improvement, maintenance for current aging aircraft, and sortie generation rates to increase information collection. I am only a maintainer so I am more apt to think about how to get an aircraft into the air, than what it does when its there.