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We are having a difficult time beating the enemy who wear sandals. The current paradigm is to smash a country with huge conventional army, rebuilding the country, training the military, and propping up a democratic government. That is victory but not necessarily a lasting victory. I think we are looking at the military problem in different ways considering we have a multitude of metrics to describe victory.
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
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Absolutely we need to look at new paradigms. I think we should be looking at how we have found it difficult to defeat these low-tech insurgents in low-intensity conflicts and see what lessons THEY can teach us. That is, how can we apply guerrilla and insurgent tactics to our concept of modern and large-scale war.
For one, I see the need to be able to fight in much smaller units than we have been. The army is just now getting down to brigade-sized elements but I think they missed the point. The fight in low-intensity conflicts is at the squad and platoon level, and rarely maybe the company level. The idea of that paradigm applied to large-scale conflict works as well. The Battle of Debecka Pass in Iraq is a great example. Using small, well-trained units armed with superior technology as a "force-multiplier" to defeat a more heavily armed and numerically superior enemy.
Another lesson learned from the insurgencies that applies to both types of conflicts is the use of vehicles. The insurgents have rarely used vehicles allowing them to strike and displace repeatedly meeting back at a rally point later (or not at all). They also found numerous ways to destroy any vehicle we brought to bear. In certain situations bringing over-whelming armor to bear will certainly win the day. But that also means you are tied to those vehicles and vehicles are easy to track and spot. We need units that remain committed and capable to fighting and engaging on foot (this is supposed to be the light-infantry, but that rarely happens).
There are many other lessons as well but basically I think our new paradigm should be along the lines of "out G-ing the G" to qoute Hackworth, and applying guerrilla tactics to conventional warfare (or just having the infantry read their 7-8's again).
For one, I see the need to be able to fight in much smaller units than we have been. The army is just now getting down to brigade-sized elements but I think they missed the point. The fight in low-intensity conflicts is at the squad and platoon level, and rarely maybe the company level. The idea of that paradigm applied to large-scale conflict works as well. The Battle of Debecka Pass in Iraq is a great example. Using small, well-trained units armed with superior technology as a "force-multiplier" to defeat a more heavily armed and numerically superior enemy.
Another lesson learned from the insurgencies that applies to both types of conflicts is the use of vehicles. The insurgents have rarely used vehicles allowing them to strike and displace repeatedly meeting back at a rally point later (or not at all). They also found numerous ways to destroy any vehicle we brought to bear. In certain situations bringing over-whelming armor to bear will certainly win the day. But that also means you are tied to those vehicles and vehicles are easy to track and spot. We need units that remain committed and capable to fighting and engaging on foot (this is supposed to be the light-infantry, but that rarely happens).
There are many other lessons as well but basically I think our new paradigm should be along the lines of "out G-ing the G" to qoute Hackworth, and applying guerrilla tactics to conventional warfare (or just having the infantry read their 7-8's again).
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MAJ Ken Landgren
Very well said. The British used regiments to fight many insurgencies. They lived, slept, and fought with the locals who were fighting the insurgents. Eventually they were able to find the insurgents on their own turf and kill them. Not that expensive and not that big of an impact on the local area.
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MAJ Ken Landgren you are absolutely correct. We should have learned this after the Vietnam conflict. Low Tech enemy doesn't mean an automatic Slam dunk win. We need to change tactics, A LOT.
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MAJ Ken Landgren
1. George Washington fought a guerilla and conventional war. 2. He built up the army to a peer sized army. 3. Most of the Americans were passionate about the cause. 4. The fledgling government was rational and supported the army.
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Here is a new paradigm for you ..
You pick a fight with me?
And I will pour out mine indignation upon thee,
I will blow against thee in the fire of my wrath,
and deliver thee into the hand of brutish men,
and skilful to destroy.
Ezekiel 21:31
You pick a fight with me?
And I will pour out mine indignation upon thee,
I will blow against thee in the fire of my wrath,
and deliver thee into the hand of brutish men,
and skilful to destroy.
Ezekiel 21:31
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