Posted on Oct 16, 2014
SFC Steven Harvey
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Let me take a moment to say that I only see my sphere and scope of the Army. I am sure there are other units out there that are still knowledgeable and have exceptional signal leaders. I also want to mention that in no way is this a direct reflection on units as a whole including my own.
If you’re not Signal (specifically 25N, 25Q & possibly 25S, 25B) you might not understand what I am saying.

Anyone who was in during MSE should distinctly remember ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program). When WIN-T replaced MSE that standard that so many of us knew went away. There are justifiable reasons for this; speed of change, complexity of equipment and new MTOE standards. I understand why it was never redone to work with WIN-T.

What I do not understand is why the very fundamentals of our jobs have been forgotten. How no one understands the value of crew drills (or even knows what it is), cross training, proper grounding procedures, site security & defense, equipment preparation, convoy operations, site briefs, night time operations, tactical vs. strategic site layouts, HCLOS is never used, no networking standards are ever used, priorities of work, PACE plans, tactical discipline, jumping, recovery operations, what the DC power cable is and why you need it (completely serious) and maintenance (for instance know why keeping your generator level is important) to just get started.

I was on a Special Duty assignment for 6 years and left big Army when WIN-T was just being implemented. So I am out of the “know” so to speak as to what happened during this time frame. I have been seeing it lately from a position where I oversee many different teams and units.

There are so many other things such as the “tricks of the trade” that are known by older guys like duct taping tent stakes to a wooden sledge hammer to prevent your sledge from breaking.

I have been talking with many of my peers over the last month and even some Warrants and Officers. This appears to be larger than just what I see in my area of influence, and there are others who have went a step farther than me and actually acted on this topic such as this website: http://www.signal-chief.com. There Chief Troy discusses broader issues and tries to present units with lessons learned prior to deploying. While he does a remarkable job and has exceptional insight, I want NCOs to tell me what happened to where the rubber meets the road: signal team leaders.

This concerns me greatly because quite frankly this is what I was raised on and it’s what I know. If we have to do another invasion like OIF1, where we are not on a FOB for the entire deployment and the hazards are more than the occasional mortar round then NCOs I’ll be blunt.

It’s not going to turn out well.

Our chiefs are going to lose their #### on NCOs and Soldiers, NCOs will be getting relief of causes, and whole units will probably get bad images.

I don’t blame these young soldiers, and I really don’t want to blame the NCOs (and sometimes can’t because they themselves were never properly trained).

So help me out, what’s your take on this.
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Responses: 35
SFC Peter Cyprian
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SSG Harvey, I totally get what you are saying. I watched it happening before my very eyes just before I retired. I honestly believe it started near the end of MSE and DGM. We evolved from packet switching to having routers in our shelters.....routers that we were not allowed to even touch- even though it was a key component of our shelter! Yeah, we could put the HSMUX and HSMUX 2 cards in and they would even let us do the jumpers, but that router was OFF LIMITS. As a CCNA I was outraged at this. As MSE and DGM went away and the Win-T came into its own, this mentality increased. I used to have a label for this- the "mouse clicker and button pusher syndrome". All the troops knew is that "on this screen I click here, then push this button". Did they know wtf they just did? Nope. Did they do it right? Yes, but if you have no clue WHAT you just did (besides the physical action of clicking and pushing), how effective and technically proficient are you?? I would correct this anytime I ran across it, but I felt like the guy dog paddling against the raging current. Do the troops at least know the fundamentals of electronics? Networking? GROUNDING (great point btw)? Do they know the difference between a power ground and a signal ground? Do they understand what the PEP and the SEP are grounded separately? I could go on all night but I think you "get it" and are on the same page. It needs to be fixed- that's a fact.
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1SG Signal Support Systems Specialist
1SG (Join to see)
9 y
Roger.

I try to teach actual troubleshooting. Some of them get it. Some of them have to be taught logic first, because it's not taught in schools (supposed to be one of the 7 Liberal Art, and one of the Trivium, what is supposed to be the basis of elementary education, at that).

So we don't troubleshoot and fix problems anymore. We re-image and replace components. IF, that is, if we are allowed. In which case we have to exercise the warranty and send it away to be fixed.
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SSG Cnd Analyst
SSG (Join to see)
>1 y
I know for fact as of September 2014, it was being taught in the WIN-T school at Fort Gordon for 25N, but I can't speak for the other MOSs, but they clearly articulated that you will forget a lot of what you have learned and you will need unit-level training to put all the pieces together. However, we were introduced and practiced troubleshooting on Routers and Switches.
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SP5 Michael Rathbun
SP5 Michael Rathbun
>1 y
All of our routers were dudes moving plugs around on a patch. System was remarkably resilient.
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SFC Platoon Sergeant
SFC (Join to see)
>1 y
Korea... You will get all that and then some as far as crew drills and competitive teams
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LTC Stephen C.
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Edited 5 y ago
Imagesuu4aep0g
I had an SF signal detachment (two platoons) in the '73-'74 timeframe. We were still using the obsolete but reliable AN/GRC-9 (the old Angry 9). In many instances, voice transmissions were ruled out by distance, and SF communicators relied on continuous wave radio operation, using International Morse Code. The CW key was clipped to the operator's thigh and power was provided by a hand cranked generator. (Internet photo)

SFC Steven Harvey SFC John Gates SFC Peter Cyprian and SSG (Join to see) Sgt Tom Cunnally
SFC Robert Giffin, thought this might interest you.
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LTC Stephen C.
LTC Stephen C.
9 y
You knew I was an antique when I threw that photo of the Angry 9 up there, SP5 Michael Rathbun!
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SFC Mike Cook
SFC Mike Cook
9 y
HF truly is a lost art form. When I got to 4th BDE, 101. Only one unit was able to successfully run their HF; which they did in spectacular fashion I will add. After about a year all of their knowledgeable people rotated out and it was lost. When you get the right people in there running it, HF is absolutely magic.
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SGT Michael Touchet
SGT Michael Touchet
9 y
Inside ratt rig with ugc 74
This is what I started with in 1986 a Radio Teletype Rig (RATT) which featured the AN/GRC 106 HF Radio.
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Sgt Tom Cunnally
Sgt Tom Cunnally
8 y
67b1d795
In 1st Radio CO FMF quit using the Angry 9 in 1956 & replaced by Collins Radio Receivers and Transmitters mounted in the back of Jeeps and in the Comm Vans. We also carried the PRC 10- 15 with a whip antenna, headset/ handset and their battery packs. We used mostly voice comm but when restricted by distances we switched to Morse Code and tried to maintain @ 10 words a minute.
Most of the Radio Operators in the 1st Radio Co attended the ASA Radio School at Fort Devens MA (26 week course) & the Navy DF School at the Naval Training Center in Charleston SC (10 week course) and Marine Corps Crypto School Camp Lejeune NC (10 Week course) Marines who had been in Korea loved the Angry 9 used in 1950- 1953 because it worked in the cold temps even up a the Frozen Chosin to power their comm equipment. 1st RAD went to Vietnam in 1962 & grew to Battalion size a few years later and it operated out of Pleiku SVN... I missed Vietnam unfortunately
Here's 1st Rad training in Vieques prior to Vietnam. The training in Vieques was to test radio equipment in simulated combat ops & support 1st ANGLICO & 1st Recon comm ops. Many of the guys in this photo were with the 1st sub unit to go to Vietnam in 1962.
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MAJ G2 Systems Chief
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We lost many of those skills because that responsibility was taken out of our hands, or we simply didn't allocate the time to continue to teach it. As the war progressed, technology upgrades poured in, and as the theater developed we lost sight of a lot of the basics (not just signal). Home station train ups became so time sensitive that it seemed like leader development (which comes back to most of the OP's issues) took a back seat to reset, upgrade, train enough for NTC and deploy again. It seemed like you had just enough time to do it once and move on to the next event. In theater there was a contractor to install your equipment for you, fix your broken toys, and commercial telecomm and shore power gradually replaced tactical equipment.

I was an MSE platoon leader in 2004 in Iraq. My battalion commander regularly came around and played stump the chump with the PLs to spot check they were doing things like routine maintenance and understood the basics. I needed an extra kick in the pants since I went from the schoolhouse to leading one of his platoons without being around for the pre-deployment training.

Now that deployments have slowed down quite a bit and our equipment is becoming more "army green" we're relearning how to do it all ourselves again. The contract maintenance is gone and we have more than enough time for leaders to crawl and walk through every step of the process. There's definitely now no excuse for not doing.
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SFC Mike Cook
SFC Mike Cook
9 y
Completely agree with you on the contractors sir. While it was nice to have a "factory trained" rep on site He became the "go to guy" instead of the "ok this is beyond my ability" guy. That was greatly a product of "lives are on the line and we have to have this up now"! However, this also was a failure of leadership as well. While deployed, I frequently sent my guys out with the contractor to 1. Act as a liaison between the contractor and the unit. And 2. (and more importantly) to look over his shoulder, ask questions and figure it out. If my Soldiers were not doing something mission related, they were working on the equipment with the contractor. Learning it. Not enough Senior NCOs were doing this in my opinion. Some were, just not enough.
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