SSG Blake Miles 768491 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>&#39;This was not what the Originals had in mind. &#39;That&#39;s not how things work around here. If you want to get work done, you&#39;ve gotta coordinate through us first. We say whether or not your plan is legit. WE say what can and will get done in our AO.&#39;<br /><br /><a target="_blank" href="http://www.havokjournal.com/culture/special-forces-and-a-story-of-two-hills-a-cautionary-tale/">http://www.havokjournal.com/culture/special-forces-and-a-story-of-two-hills-a-cautionary-tale/</a> "Special Forces And A Story of Two Hills: A Cautionary Tale" - What is your take on this? 2015-06-24T21:36:41-04:00 SSG Blake Miles 768491 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>&#39;This was not what the Originals had in mind. &#39;That&#39;s not how things work around here. If you want to get work done, you&#39;ve gotta coordinate through us first. We say whether or not your plan is legit. WE say what can and will get done in our AO.&#39;<br /><br /><a target="_blank" href="http://www.havokjournal.com/culture/special-forces-and-a-story-of-two-hills-a-cautionary-tale/">http://www.havokjournal.com/culture/special-forces-and-a-story-of-two-hills-a-cautionary-tale/</a> "Special Forces And A Story of Two Hills: A Cautionary Tale" - What is your take on this? 2015-06-24T21:36:41-04:00 2015-06-24T21:36:41-04:00 CAPT Kevin B. 768515 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>Reminds me of McNamara and the Whiz Kids. They knew better. We&#39;ve been repeating the same mistake for the past 15 years. Response by CAPT Kevin B. made Jun 24 at 2015 9:43 PM 2015-06-24T21:43:22-04:00 2015-06-24T21:43:22-04:00 SPC Ryan D. 768546 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>I&#39;d say there are always two sides to a story, and this tale only told one. Response by SPC Ryan D. made Jun 24 at 2015 9:59 PM 2015-06-24T21:59:02-04:00 2015-06-24T21:59:02-04:00 1SG Private RallyPoint Member 768552 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>Village Stability Operations is not for personnel who don&#39;t want to engage.<br />It is the military equivalent of a cop walking the beat. Get to know who&#39;s who in the neighborhood and you notice things that seem off. People tell you things because they have become accustomed to your presence, and view you as part of the community.<br /><br />This is a work of fiction, but I watched many conventional units at the tactical level make this mistake time and again. As it was my job to get in the weeds with the locals, their own lack of engagement caused them to miss opportunities when they arose. I can&#39;t count the number of times my observations and analysis was dismissed by combat arms guys that didn&#39;t &quot;get it&quot;.<br />Someday we&#39;ll figure it out. Response by 1SG Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 24 at 2015 10:02 PM 2015-06-24T22:02:15-04:00 2015-06-24T22:02:15-04:00 SSgt Dale W. 768632 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>I love to figure out the moral of the story when reading fables. Here&#39;s my take on this:<br /><br />1. To make lasting friendships and build trust we have to be engaged with those around us.<br />2. Fear of failure or fear of losing what we have can cause us to miss opportunities.<br />3. Listen to the newb&#39;s. Sometimes they really do have good ideas.<br />4. Fortune can favor the bold.<br /><br />These lessons are not limited to this scenario. They can be applied throughout our lives and endeavors. Response by SSgt Dale W. made Jun 24 at 2015 11:06 PM 2015-06-24T23:06:13-04:00 2015-06-24T23:06:13-04:00 CW3 Private RallyPoint Member 771358 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>This fictional story can be applied to so many situations:<br />Conventional vs. unconventional thinking ...not forces. I saw plenty of &quot;conventional&quot; units thinking outside of the box. This can also be applied to risk aversion by commanders, group think by any unit, a lack of energy displayed by over-deployed units and over-deployed leaders, and failure by the majority of us to truly understand the cultures we were working among to list a few. The question now becomes after the Iraq and Afghanistan wars how will we address ISIS when the time comes? Will we deploy, set up FOBs all over, spend all of our time and money keeping an immense amount of infrastructure running, or will we actually learn from the past decade? Time will tell Response by CW3 Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 25 at 2015 9:35 PM 2015-06-25T21:35:48-04:00 2015-06-25T21:35:48-04:00 1SG Dean Mcbride (MPER) (CPHR) 8426322 <div class="images-v2-count-0"></div>I read the entire thing and found it to be written by somebody that does not have a clue about the mission of a Special Forces ODA (Operational Detachment &quot;A&quot;). A Teams are force multipliers. To think that a team would hunker down and dig in while ignoring the local population is absurd! 1st SGT Healy has the right thoughts... It sounds like conventual units failing on Village Stability Operations. An interesting example is the true story of &#39;12 Strong,&#39; - Special Forces Horse soldiers were first to enter Afghanistan and succeeded in winning over the local population and indigenous forces. After they were replaced by conventional units, their work went to &quot;crap&quot; and evolved into the overall Afghanistan debacle. Response by 1SG Dean Mcbride (MPER) (CPHR) made Aug 17 at 2023 9:32 AM 2023-08-17T09:32:43-04:00 2023-08-17T09:32:43-04:00 2015-06-24T21:36:41-04:00