What are the feelings over the National Guard losing all of their attack helicopter assets.

The attack/recon mision is being completely taken away from the NG/Reserve and they are recieving UH/LUH aircraft that will better fit what should be their mission.....as briefed in congress.

1SG, I'll have to disagree with you a bit here. I understand the confusion about the dual missions of the National Guard having been a member for many years. But to say that the primary mission of the NG is "NOT to seek and destroy" is simply incorrect. Like the Army Reserve, the NG is a Reserve component of the Army. Its missions are the same as the missions of the Active Army. In fact, some years ago it was reported that a "significant" percentage of the Army's combat strength was in the NG. In contrast, the Army Reserve has been re-organized over the years to provide more of the combat support and combat service support to the Active component. But the NG remains a viable combat force to stand side by side with the Active component. As far as the other mission, the State mission, yes, this is the role that many associate with a National Guard unit. And having worked hurricanes, tornadoes, and other natural disasters, I can tell you it is a rewarding part of the job.

Hope that helps to understand the dual missions of the NG!

Force structure changes are a fact of life unfortunately, especially in an age of slashing budgets, changing political philosophies, and national interests. As a Guardsman I saw a battalion go from Combat Engineer, to PATRIOT Missile, to Military Police (which seems like a PERFECT role for the NG, given their dual mission; I would say the same about the combat engineer MOS's).

As far as the NG losing its attack helicopter forces, I agree with SSG Spencer above: if the powers-that-be want the NG to be an effective organization in the area of attack helicopter missions, they need to give them the equipment and the training and maintenance budget and resources to be viable on the battlefield. Apparently someone has a different plan for the helicopter forces of the NG.

What I find most interesting is that force structure changes are forecast several years out. I've always wondered how the wizards in Washington can tell the future enough to know "we don't need attack helicopters in the NG anymore" (for example). This is what I saw up close in Alabama: the smart guys eliminated a lot of the "fully manned, fully trained, and fully equipped" engineer units in Alabama a few years before the GWOT, in favor of the Patriot missile. Within 10 years the Patriot missile was gone, NEVER having lived up to its potential; while among the early units in Iraq in 2003 were ENGINEERS and ARMOR (two elements the smart guys in Alabama had just gotten rid of). "It's a mystery wrapped up in an enigma" to me.