What are your thoughts on the article, "What ISIS really wants?"

2015-02-18T11:59:07-05:00

Informative article with a lot of good information...

http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/

What ISIS Really Wants

The Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a key agent of the coming apocalypse. Here’s what that means for its strategy—and for how to stop it.

Response by Cpl Private RallyPoint Member made Aug 22 at 2014 12:56 PM

2014-08-22T12:56:29-04:00

Interesting roller coaster ride trying to read this. It moves logically and emotionally throughout, making it an interesting read. This quote stands out for me "there are literally millions of disgruntled, dysfunctional, pissed off veterans" I immediately envisioned SSG Robin Rushlo and his hat. I would say if ISIS were to take on the U.S. on our soil , all veterans should be issued one of those hats.

Response by MSG Wade Huffman made Aug 22 at 2014 1:17 PM

2014-08-22T13:17:30-04:00

Well... maybe not quite so"'Subtle" after all!

Response by SSG Private RallyPoint Member made Aug 22 at 2014 2:09 PM

2014-08-22T14:09:04-04:00

ISIS will never attack us on our soil with a conventional or militia type army. Why would they? They have learned that terrorist type attacks are what work best against our conventional military, and that is mostly because our population is fickle. They are smart enough to know that terrorist attacks on our soil will make it almost all but impossible for us to get heavily involved. Therefore, I feel as if these empty threats are largely to appease their followers and to fuel their wrath. They couldn't even make it to the U.S. with an 80,000 person military if they decided to give it a shot. As I said, they know that as long as our civilian population sits here safely they will never give complete support to wipe out their organization. Even after 9/11 support for military action wavered quickly. Without that type of event there is nothing to bring us together with complete American support.

Response by SGT Ben Keen made Aug 22 at 2014 3:17 PM

2014-08-22T15:17:25-04:00

The only problem with Nick's argument is this. The ISIS and other terrorist organizations can attack us on our soil. Sure, they will not come over in a large group with trucks and tanks and whatnot. They will attack us much like they did on 9/11. It will be planned in the shadows and done in one swift attack while we continue to figure out what is going on.

Response by LTC Paul Labrador made Aug 22 at 2014 11:11 PM

2014-08-22T23:11:07-04:00

My question is if ISIS are so unafraid of America, then why cover your face? Scared we might actually come after you if we can ID you???? Coward.

Response by MSgt Private RallyPoint Member made Aug 22 at 2014 11:34 PM

2014-08-22T23:34:38-04:00

Many Americans are prepared for any hostiles on our soil. As Clint would say "Go ahead make my day". Got to use all those rounds eventually!

Response by 1LT Nick Kidwell made Aug 23 at 2014 12:11 AM

2014-08-23T00:11:01-04:00

I do take exception that the original writer of this article claims that the Geneva Conventions do not apply. They may not WANT them to, but they do and should.

The Geneva Conventions apply to any armed conflict, whether the enemy is a member of a nation's military or an "irregular," or even a terrorist.

Even more so if they are detained. I've read that bit several times over.

Response by SSG Private RallyPoint Member made Aug 23 at 2014 11:49 AM

2014-08-23T11:49:48-04:00

'Murica!!

Response by Cpl Matthew Wall made Aug 27 at 2014 3:26 PM

2014-08-27T15:26:43-04:00

Gotta love it when a Marine gets pissed off.

Response by Cpl Dennis F. made Sep 7 at 2014 10:13 PM

2014-09-07T22:13:53-04:00

http://youngcons.com/kurds-are-sending-all-female-units-to-fight-isis-the-reason-why-is-awesome/

Not so subtle!

Kurds are sending all-female units to fight ISIS, the reason why is AWESOME - Young Conservatives...

Jihadists believe that if they are killed by a woman then they will not go to heaven. From theWSJ: Battle-hardened after two years fighting Islamic State and other Islamist rebel groups in the multi-sided Syrian civil war, Kurdish guerrillas linked to the PKK have in recent weeks made a series of military gains that have …

Response by SGT Private RallyPoint Member made Sep 9 at 2014 12:37 PM

2014-09-09T12:37:05-04:00

Best thing I've read all day.

Response by PO1 Steven Kuhn made Sep 16 at 2014 2:46 PM

2014-09-16T14:46:01-04:00

And I am one of them. Locked and loaded at all times...

Response by LTC Yinon Weiss made Feb 18 at 2015 1:12 PM

2015-02-18T13:12:56-05:00

That was by far the most informative article I have read about ISIS. It's long, but worth the read. It certainly brings to light why we should treat ISIS differently from Al Qaeda, or any other extremist group for that matter.

Response by Capt Lance Gallardo made Feb 19 at 2015 11:09 AM

2015-02-19T11:09:05-05:00

From Larry Kaifesh's Facebook Page. Larry is a Marine Infantry Officer, Reserve Colonel, and was recently a Republican candidate for US Congress (8th District, Illinois), Posted yesterday 2-18-2015.

Listening to Obama talk about the threat of Violent Islamic Fundamentalists (the most accurate term for those beheading / burning non-believers around the world today) has not inspired trust and confidence. It does not appear that he understands the threat nor will promote a concise plan targeted at a well defined enemy. Instead either out of naivety or deliberate deception he says, “ISIL is not Islamic,” they are “violent extremists,” and takes an apologist approach seeking justification for the Violent Islamic Fundamentalists because Christians conducted the Crusades to gain back the land they were stripped of by violent Muslims prior.
I took some notes on the speech given today by Obama and was perplexed, for some of the words were strong, but actions and previous words have stood in conflict. For example, I heard the following:
- We can’t shy away from the truth.
- We must talk honesty and clearly.
- When the truth is out, we will be successful.
- We have to be honest with ourselves.
Because of the above listed statements, we must recognize the Ideological War that is being raged against us by Violent Islamic Fundamentalists (VIFs). VIFs are intolerant of the non-believers, inflict violence against the non-believers and believe there will only be peace in the world when the world becomes Islamic. We will never win a War of Ideas with bombs and bullets alone but right now bombs and bullets should be leading the way! Once there is a lull in the violence and the VIFs have been eviscerated, eliminating the motivation of intolerant violence will need to be addressed through coordinated operations focused on information, education, reformation and when needed, elimination.
This is not a war against Islam, for Islam will be in the lead if there is to ever be victory in this War of Ideas.

Response by SFC Mark Merino made Feb 19 at 2015 12:23 PM

2015-02-19T12:23:43-05:00

SSG Private RallyPoint Member Reading this lengthy but informative article reinforces the first rule of combat.....Know thy enemy. Great intel, brother. My head still hurts from trying to get inside the ISIS frame of mind. The very notion of offering jobs as an option to undermine their commitment is laughable. Winning their hearts and minds is easily accomplished. We can all cut off our own heads to assuage their anger.

Response by Capt Lance Gallardo made Feb 19 at 2015 9:01 PM

2015-02-19T21:01:26-05:00

Awesome! The Germans thought we would be soft, they found out otherwise.

The Japs thought the same thing, and we exterminated them pretty much without mercy where ever we found them.

So let ISIS and their minions be lulled into a false sense of superiority. They will find out the hard way (they always do), that Americans are some of the most vicious, and gangsta, and cowboy stomping killers (when we have to be) the world has ever seen.

I guess ISIS never heard that the most dangerous fighter in the world is a well trained, well equipped and supported, pissed off 18 year old Marine or Soldier. But they will find that out soon I am sure.

Response by SPC David S. made Feb 20 at 2015 1:14 AM

2015-02-20T01:14:09-05:00

....is what ISIS should get

ADJUST FIRE
IMMEDIATE SUPPRESSION, GRID BV 749 948, OVER.

Response by MAJ Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 23 at 2015 10:52 PM

2015-02-23T22:52:19-05:00

And it keeps going and going.

Response by MAJ Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 27 at 2015 2:54 AM

2015-02-27T02:54:32-05:00

ISIS is coming

Response by MAJ Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 27 at 2015 3:01 AM

2015-02-27T03:01:42-05:00

ISIS has burned another 50 people alive including security forces, in al-Anbar - Allen West...

BREAKING: ISIS has burned another 50 people alive in the al-Anbar. Kurds were included in this last act of brutality.

Response by MAJ Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 27 at 2015 10:22 AM

2015-02-27T10:22:51-05:00

Here's some visual context of what ISIS is striving to reclaim.

Response by CPT Aaron Kletzing made Feb 27 at 2015 10:26 AM

2015-02-27T10:26:19-05:00

Wow, I thought this was an excellent article and worth reading over again. Thanks for sharing with all of us.

Response by CPT Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 27 at 2015 10:52 AM

2015-02-27T10:52:43-05:00

I thought it was a very well done article that covered the nuances of the Da'esh doctrine and strategy rather well. I think the media seems to over simplify their values, beliefs and agenda. They don't understand Da'esh's apocolyptic beliefs that they are bringing about the coming of the Mahdi and that their own death is a central part of the plan. You cannot effectively fight that which you do not understand. This article went a long way to further our understanding of them. I think it is an excellent reference for understanding why Da'esh does what it does. Crucifixions, beheadings, and slavery all part of the plan. Da'esh's quest for legitimacy in the Islamic world is their achilles heel. Once we can stop their expansion, they will start to become delegitimized and I think they will eventually rot from within.

Response by Cpl Mark McMiller made Feb 27 at 2015 2:34 PM

2015-02-27T14:34:59-05:00

It doesn't matter what they want. They are evil scumbags that deserve to die. Just kill them.

Response by COL Sam Russell made Nov 19 at 2015 4:01 PM

2015-11-19T16:01:07-05:00

When this article first came out last February, CJTF-OIR posted it to their Facebook page. I forwarded a copy to my one of college roommates who is a Mideast scholar. Dr. Peter Moore had also served as a guest speaker at USARCENT's LDESP in 2013 where I reconnected with him after 25 years. He recommended the following article, The un-Islamic State, as perhaps a more informative assessment of ISIS and its political realities.

The full report (three pages) can be viewed as a pdf here: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/994925a7601a87b8e975f56619967fa2.pdf

And, Pete's credentials can be viewed at: http://politicalscience.case.edu/faculty/pete-moore/

Text of the article, The un-Islamic State, by Mouin Rabbani follows:
Introduction
Since the Islamic State (IS) movement seized control of Iraq’s second city of Mosul in early June 2014 it has achieved unprecedented levels of success in Iraq and Syria, seized territory in Lebanon, and expanded to the border regions of most surrounding states. As a result the international community, which had virtually forgotten about Iraq and was growing increasingly uninterested in Syria, put these conflicts back at the top of its agenda virtually overnight. The U.S. is once again engaged in hostilities in Iraq and considering direct, less covert means of involvement in Syria, as are a number of its partners. Regional governments, which had previously seen the IS as either a distant threat or useful proxy, seem to be overcoming their differences to confront what is perceived to be a common and growing challenge.
Much has been written about the IS’s genesis, ideology, objectives and practices. Most of these characterise it as a puritanical movement that represents either an extremist incarnation of Islamic orthodoxy or a radical distortion of it. The more pertinent observation that the IS represents a thoroughly modern project and that explanations for its existence are primarily to be found in the political landscape in which it operates rather than Islamic theology is less frequently made.
Origins and development of the IS movement
The IS’s roots are located in the 2003 U.S. occupation of Iraq and the Syrian crisis a decade later. The U.S. administration in Iraq systematically dismantled the Iraqi state and its institutions and replaced them with a sectarian political system and conflict that reproduced itself throughout government institutions. Unsurprisingly, Iraqi politics gradually came to be dominated by fundamentally incompatible identity-based political forces rather than national ones competing on the basis of different political programmes. While the supremacy of Islamist parties among the disenfranchised Sunni community was not a foregone conclusion, the increasingly religious milieu of the Arab world in recent decades, the increasingly Islamist character of opposition politics in the region (both of which are to some extent a legacy of the cold war), and the prominence of Islamist militias in the struggle against both the occupation and the new regime in Baghdad contributed to these parties’ ascendancy.
Similar dynamics were at work in the ranks of the armed Syrian opposition in the period 2011-13, where – as in Iraq – those with the most effective military forces also obtained the greater share of foreign funding, weapons and skilled cadres. Locally, endemic socioeconomic decay, particularly rampant youth unemployment and its debilitating impact on individual lives; a deep-seated sense of perpetual injustice; and the opportunity to redress these realities while simultaneously affirming a sense of self-worth and improved opportunities – all with a bit of adventure thrown in – ensured a steady supply of recruits.
What made Iraq and Syria, rather than more conservative societies like Jordan and Saudi Arabia or polarised polities like Lebanon and Palestine conducive to the emergence of such movements was the withdrawal and in some regions collapse of the state. A similar process can be observed today in Libya and, to a lesser extent, Yemen. Indeed, the breakdown of central authority and the absence of national institutions with sufficient legitimacy to address grievances and mediate political conflict have not only empowered subnational phenomena like sectarianism and tribalism as social defence mechanisms, but provided militias adopting such agendas with the space to develop and opportunity to expand.
Nevertheless, this does not explain why the IS in particular succeeded where others failed – or, rather, was able to seize the initiative and dominate or eliminate so many of its competitors. Here ideology and the particular variant of Islam promulgated by the IS are largely negligible factors. Rather, this phenomenon can primarily be attributed to the movement’s thoroughly contemporary rather than atavistic modus operandi . Firstly (and unlike so many of its competitors, whose raison d’etre is confrontation with the state, or what might be called a conventional guerrilla insurgency), from the outset the IS – as its name suggests – has pursued a strategy of establishing and consolidating a political entity in regions where the former state no longer functions or can be expelled. It is in this respect a fundamentally political rather than religious project – even though the IS insists the two are inseparable.
Secondly – and closely related to the first – the IS strategy has focused on obtaining the resources and means required to function as a state. For it, control of territory; the provision of governance, administration and services; and the regulation of society and the economy are core functions. Territorial expansion is not prioritised and pursued for its own sake as with many of its competitors,
but rather pursued only when there is a reasonable prospect that such territory can be integrated, defended and governed. While the IS’s proclamation of a caliphate in late June 2014 was motivated by a host of factors, not least among them a determination to settle accounts with al-Qaeda, subordinate other participants in the Iraqi Sunni rebellion and Syrian armed opposition to its will, and, of course, capitalise on its spectacular successes of the previous months, its willingness to take a step eschewed by similar movements reflects the reality that statehood is germane to the IS project.
The IS movement: strategy and objectives
Much has been written about the background to the IS’s recent sudden expansion and the interplay in this respect between the Syrian and Iraqi arenas, and there has been an equal amount of speculation about where it might seek to expand next. Its current response to the latter question – i.e. Arbil, the capital of the Kurdish region of Iraq – seems in light of the consequences somewhat out of character. Unless, that is, speculation is correct that it deliberately sought to provoke Western intervention in order to profit from direct conflict in the knowledge that the U.S. and its allies lack the will to repeat the invasion of Iraq and the means to defeat it in Syria. To the question “Baghdad or Damascus?” the response is almost certainly “neither”. The former is too heavily defended, the latter too distant, and both are the seats of central authority.
A no less interesting question is whether the recent vast expansion of IS territory, and therefore of assets at potential risk, might motivate the movement to deal more pragmatically with the world around it and perhaps even attempt to come to informal or other understandings with adversaries to enable it to consolidate its position and govern more effectively. In this respect some have looked to Lebanon’s Hizbullah and more recently the Palestinian organisation Hamas as examples of radical, armed Islamist movements that have either achieved or seek conventional forms of legitimacy after attaining significant political power and the responsibilities of governance. An initial informal non-aggression pact between the IS and Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which allowed the latter to seize Kirkuk and expand its territory by some 40% while the IS consolidated its hold on Iraq’s Arab Sunni heartland, seemed to suggest this could be a possibility.
Yet the IS is fundamentally different in character and agenda from these other movements, and to extrapolate IS policies on the basis of the trajectory of other militant Islamists would be akin to inferring Khmer Rouge conduct from the record of the Bolsheviks after they established the Soviet Union. The tacit alliance with Iraq’s Kurds was thus exceptionally short-lived and no more stable than the IS’s periods of coexistence with other elements of the Syrian armed opposition. To return to the Soviet analogy, the brief dalliance with the KRG might be compared to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, although the IS’s strategic calculations in this instance more closely reflect those ascribed to Hitler, with the KRG fulfilling the role of Stalin.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the IS phenomenon is that its vision of an Islamic state that correctly applies the pristine and unadulterated practices its leaders ascribe to the religion’s inaugural practitioners would almost certainly be disavowed by the latter as a monumental parody. Indeed,
from what is known about the statecraft of the Prophet Muhammad and the first caliphs, they would in all likelihood have rather quickly run afoul of the IS’s caliphate. No less importantly, the fulfilment of the IS’s programme requires the systematic dismantling (and in too many cases the physical demolition) of 14 centuries of Islamic civilization and tradition.
Few of the ideas promulgated by the IS are without theological foundation, nor are its practices entirely without precedent. Nevertheless, it can hardly claim to be rooted in well-established Muslim tradition or jurisprudence and should therefore be primarily understood as a thoroughly modern interpretation and application of a faith whose imagined past is a projection backwards of contemporary agendas rather than a revival of early Islamic rule. The IS’s reclamation of Islam’s essence is thus on a par with the Khmer Rouge’s insistence that it represented the pure soul
of communism.
Similar to the Khmer Rouge, and returning once again to the comparison with other Islamist movements, IS branding is in significant part based on a categorical rejection of either compromise or concession to an imperfect world, or a gradualist approach to achieving its objectives. The pragmatism and interaction with existing states and institutions exhibited by other Islamist movements is therefore something the IS has condemned not only when in opposition, but more importantly after achieving power. Although the movement derives its theological roots from 18th-century Wahhabi doctrines that serve as the state ideology of Saudi Arabia and have for several decades been energetically disseminated throughout the Muslim world, the IS rejects the Saudi state as a distortion of Wahhabi tenets.
As attested by the rapidity and ferocity with which the IS has eliminated the presence of minorities in areas under its rule, suppressed erstwhile Sunni allies in Iraq and Syria, and criminalised tradition and local custom, initial postcombat statements reassuring populations under its control that their rights would be respected pursuant to traditional Islamic practice have proven to be nothing more than a tactic to encourage a false sense of security and thus prevent the premature emergence of significant
resistance to its designs.
Conclusion: future prospects
Under the circumstances the assumption that history is on the verge of repeating itself and that the IS will be removed much as its Iraqi precursor led by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi was defeated by foreign-sponsored local forces seems to be far-fetched. The IS movement is no longer a clandestine insurgent group that can be evicted by stronger militias and prevented from resurrection by internal security forces, but – not unlike the KRG – an increasingly conventional military force that can only be dislodged by taking physical control of its fiefdom. The coalition that occupied Iraq in 2003 appears to have little appetite for a rematch, and should its position change it is inconceivable that a renewed foreign occupation of Iraq will not make an already catastrophic situation more so.
Additionally, the IS appears to have rather methodically put to sleep most of the leaders of the previous Awakening movement and potential kingpins of a new one. This notwithstanding, mechanisms to empower a cowed population to assert itself without exposing its members to mass slaughter need to be examined. On a related note, the risk that any operation to suppress the IS will degenerate into a sectarian campaign to blunt Sunni aspirations has already been realised and needs to be addressed. In the current highly polarised environment, subcontracting Iraqi national security functions to sectarian Shia militias is a particularly dangerous approach that is liable to have a lasting disastrous impact.
Secondly, as many analysts have pointed out, there is a fundamental contradiction in Western policy towards Iraq and Syria. Seeking to strengthen the government opposed to the IS in Iraq while acting to weaken its counterpart in Syria may serve any variety of policy objectives, but defeating the IS is not one of them. Similarly, given the near-apocalyptic perceptions of the IS that have gripped Western capitals in recent months, the approach of continued demurral and deflection concerning the extent to which the policies of regional allies have empowered and assisted IS needs to be revised. One might also note that complacency towards the propagation of takfiri thought – the Islamic counterpart of George W. Bush’s belief that one is “either with us or with the terrorists” – is particularly hazardous, given the heterogeneous societies of the Levant and Iraq.
In the short term there are no easy responses to the challenges posed by the IS. Military containment may succeed, but to do so it needs to be led by local and regional forces rather than those who have already brought Iraq to the brink of dissolution. Even limited U.S. military intervention is likely to bolster the IS at least as much as it weakens it. Secondly, policy towards the Syrian crisis requires a comprehensive review. One need not endorse the Assad regime’s brutal policies or assist with their implementation in order to recognise that the regime is a reality in the Middle East that will continue to exist at least until a political transition commences in Syria. Those who freely treat with Omar Bashir, Nouri al-Maliki, Binyamin Netanyahu and Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi lack persuasive grounds for rejecting engagement with Bashar al-Assad on matters of common concern.
Thirdly, neighbouring states need to be dealt with as participants in a potential solution rather than part of an existing problem. This applies equally to Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, who, along with others, should be encouraged – and if necessary pressured – to revise policies that enable and empower the IS by design or default.
Finally – and crucially – political transition must be actively pursued, not only in Syria, where it has been reduced to a slogan for regime change, if not regime suicide, but equally in Iraq. Only the emergence of institutions enjoying sufficient popular – and not necessarily electoral – legitimacy
can address deep-seated grievances and peacefully resolve the conflicts that allow movements such as the IS to thrive, and thereby reassert governance and authority on a national scale that ultimately forms the only durable solution to this challenge.

NOREF - The un-Islamic State

There are no quick or simple solutions to the challenges posed by the IS. Those being considered, particularly Western military intervention, are almost guaranteed to make a catastrophic situation worse, while a strategy that relies on disaffected Sunni tribes and sectarian Shiite militias is unlikely to succeed.