What if the military has been focusing on the wrong thing this whole time?

LTC Yinon Weiss — Fri, 21 Nov 2014 13:44:11 -0500

I just posted this article in Small Wars Journal. I invite you to post your comments there as well...

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-if-the-military-has-been-focusing-on-the-wrong-thing-the-whole-time

For over a decade, and ever since the United States began the endeavor of creating a stable Iraq and Afghanistan, the dogmatic military view has essentially been “We will train our allies until they are able to secure their own nation.” With conflict in Afghanistan lasting over 13 years, and with the recent tragic losses of momentum, equipment, and territory in Iraq, it is apparent that things are not going as was hoped by many. Going back to my time training Iraqi Commandos as a US Special Forces officer, I have had one question that always lingered in the back of my mind:

“We are investing hundreds of billions of dollars in training our allies, so how is our enemy able to achieve so much success when no major power is training them?”

In other words, despite the seemingly successful training of the Iraqi Army, why are they unable to stand up to forces like ISIS, who are not trained by any major power? Similarly, why is training the Afghan Army considered the yardstick of success, when there is no major power similarly training the Taliban? If training is the key to success, how is the other side surviving and even thriving when we have been training our allies for over a decade?

The problem may be rooted in the fact that the US military, and even its Special Forces, has largely been focused on tactical and technical training. We measure our allies’ capabilities through the lens of traditional American military metrics; whether they can organize at the squad, platoon, company, or battalion level, etc. As has been recently shown in Iraq, where the Iraqi Army has surrendered despite outnumbering and outgunning their enemies, these metrics have been a failure. Is it possible we have been focusing on the wrong thing this whole time?

Evans Carlson was the first commander of the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion in World War II, charged with leading early guerilla operations against the Japanese while the US was still building up its conventional force in response to Pearl Harbor. So important was his mission that his second in command was James Roosevelt, the sitting President’s oldest son. Evans studied guerilla warfare during his time as a liaison to the Chinese Communist Army in the 1930s, and through his previous experience in Nicaragua. Evans believed that the key to his men’s success was “a broad and deep political education system designed to give men something to fight for, live for, and if necessary, die for.” This belief system is something the US military instills in all of its members. Each year thousand of young Americans volunteer to serve overseas, to be far away from their families, ready to fight for our nation’s causes, and to make the ultimate sacrifice if necessary. Teamwork, purpose, and a belief in something bigger than yourself is instilled in our young service members during basic training, and throughout the course of their military careers. It is this complete commitment to success, and to each other, not our GPS guided bombs, which makes the American military such a formidable force. Yet, when it comes to building our allies military, we do almost none of this. We have failed to impart in them the very element which has made us so successful. Instead, we focus on the important but somewhat superficial measures of how well they can organize in a formation, how well they can patrol in a street, and how well they can write an operations order.

We continue to measure progress by how well trained our allies are, but no amount of training can replace the determination and the willingness to fight for a cause. That determination is something our enemies have. It's also something the US Armed Forces have. However, it's something we have failed to give to our allies.

In Iraq I trained a crack commando Iraqi unit. Every day we trained for hours on end, teaching them to shoot better, to maintain their equipment better, and to plan and communicate their operations better. All basic tenets of a functional combat unit. When we did missions together, they performed well. Years after we left, would they hold up to an aggressive and determined enemy? Recent history shows that it's unlikely. Even when Iraqis significantly outnumbered their enemy, were better equipped, and were better "trained,” they were not prepared to fight.

Perhaps "training" is an easy political concept for our leaders to sell to the American people of what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, I would argue that no amount of training, no matter how well we train our foreign allies to aim their AK-47, will be enough to defeat an enemy if there is no fundamental and cultural trust and commitment to that cause. To defeat such a determined enemy, we must indoctrinate our allies with the same will and desire that we have in our own US military, or at least on par with their enemy. These are qualities much more difficult to measure than whether one can operate at a platoon, company, or battalion levels - metrics the U.S. Army loves to measure.

Even special operations training of our allies has focused on tactical skills such as raids, ambushes, and surgical strikes. Those are important skills, but there is no equivalent body teaching that to ISIS and they regularly outpower and overwhelm the forces trained by the United States. We need to acknowledge that tactical training of a force will never, by itself, prepare them for combat effectiveness. If we ever want our allies to truly be in charge of their own defense, we need to focus on building forces with the desire to win, and with the willingness to die. This is not just about “winning hearts and minds” – this is shaping them. That kind of training happens through years of communication and cultural investment at all levels, and not by spending even more time shooting paper targets at a flat range.

To be successful, we must not only train our allies on how to aim their rifles, but also develop their willingness to employ that weapon. The former is much easier to measure, but the latter is much more important for success.

What if the Military Has Been Focusing on the Wrong Thing the Whole Time? | Small Wars Journal

For over a decade, and ever since the United States began the endeavor of creating a stable Iraq and Afghanistan, the dogmatic military view has essentially been “We will train our allies until they are able to secure their own nation.” With conflict in Afghanistan lasting over 13 years, and with the recent tragic losses of momentum, equipment, and territory in Iraq, it is apparent that things are not going as was hoped by many. Going back to...

Response by CW5 Sam R. Baker made Nov 21 at 2014 1:49 PM

CW5 Sam R. Baker — Fri, 21 Nov 2014 13:49:49 -0500

Excellent point!

Response by SGT Jon Henri Matteau made Nov 21 at 2014 2:05 PM

SGT Jon Henri Matteau — Fri, 21 Nov 2014 14:05:39 -0500

If our attention had been focussed on the actual war on on terror instead of being distracted by that tragic and unnecessary invasion in Iraq, things might be alot different. For one: ISIS wouldn't exist,two: the IED technology more than likely would not have improved so quickly,three: never mind the 4500 military casualties and 100000 of civilians and contractors.

Response by CPT Aaron Kletzing made Nov 21 at 2014 2:45 PM

CPT Aaron Kletzing — Fri, 21 Nov 2014 14:45:45 -0500

Good point here: "We continue to measure progress by how well trained our allies are, but no amount of training can replace the determination and the willingness to fight for a cause. That determination is something our enemies have."

Response by LTC Michael W. made Nov 21 at 2014 4:03 PM

LTC Michael W. — Fri, 21 Nov 2014 16:03:51 -0500

MAJ Weiss,

My compliments to you. For me, this is a well-written article for audiences of the various profession of arms backgrounds. Afghanistan stabilization has serious problems because it is one of the most corrupt nations. The culture sees corruption as a way of life, and something like integrity is either stupid, alien, or worse, punished. Likewise, ISIS/L possesses many of the same traits. The article's narrative raises the important question of re-thinking the metric development process itself regarding various complexities of ISIS/L without throwing the baby out with the bathwater since it takes into account the people murdered by them or restoring the displaced and then sticking around to ensure our efforts endure.

Response by SFC Mark Merino made Nov 21 at 2014 4:11 PM

SFC Mark Merino — Fri, 21 Nov 2014 16:11:24 -0500

There is no amount of money that can pay for the will to fight, unless you are dealing with mercenaries. If a country is unwilling to fight and die for a cause they believe in, aren't we merely providing a skill set to someone not in need of them? When the foreign presence is removed from an indiginous people how is success to be determined? Do we assume that we had the full support of their government in the first place and that they would follow someone else's playbook on their own?
Our military is the finest in the world. Their mission: Close with and destroy the enemy. Was the mission successful? That answer continues to change as the original mission continues to be questioned. If we continue to redefine the original mission, then we will continue to question the success or lack thereof. Ask yourself, what is the enemy doing that is considered "superior" to the Iraqi people than living under this new regime in Iraq? Is the will of the Iraqi government so weak that they are incapable of defeating an inferior, less equipped fighting force? Are the people so unwilling to support their own government that this latest group of extremists can slaughter them wholesale? The names of the fighters keep changing but the problem seems to persist. Am I incapable of understanding the big picture because I am looking at the problem through the eyes of an American and using American thinking to solve non-American issues? Perhaps. Again, how do we go about trying to define success? If we are waiting on peace in the Middle East I think we will be waiting a while.

In addition, my opinion is not designed in any way to take away from the courage, great works, and sacrifices made by our miliitary.

Response by CPT Aaron Kletzing made Nov 21 at 2014 5:43 PM

CPT Aaron Kletzing — Fri, 21 Nov 2014 17:43:06 -0500

Chances are that if we are looking in hindsight at Iraq and thinking, "HAVE WE BEEN focusing on the wrong thing?" -- that at many points over the past decade-plus of war, some leaders must have thought, "WAIT, ARE WE ABOUT TO focus on the wrong thing?" These are two different points along the spectrum of time, and it makes me wonder whether back in 2004 (for example) some senior leaders were questioning core tenets of our strategy, yet were muted or were unable to substantiate their argument. I don't know enough to take a stance on either end. It really is a provocative thought.

Response by 1SG(P) Private RallyPoint Member made Nov 21 at 2014 5:50 PM

1SG(P) Private RallyPoint Member — Fri, 21 Nov 2014 17:50:40 -0500

I think we put too much of the COIN burden on DoD. We almost see it solely as a DoD problem and not a JIIM problem. I think in many areas the military does an outstanding job of what it does best, kinetics. The previous COIN manual defined it as a "national imperative" requiring the coordination of many of a host nation's agencies and resources. I believe the same goes for us as well. Where our nation often fails is expecting the military to do ALL of the heavy lifting. The military is only one, albeit a large, aspect of these security issues. One of the smarter NCOs I've worked for recommended this book to me. We have a successful historic example. Unfortunately I doubt we have the national will or patience to do it right:

http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/149581.The_War_of_the_Running_Dogs

The War of the Running Dogs

Only three short years after the end of the Japanese occupation, war came again to Malaya. The Chinese-backed guerrillas called it the Wa...

Response by LTC Private RallyPoint Member made Nov 22 at 2014 3:01 AM

LTC Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 22 Nov 2014 03:01:35 -0500

If we would have kept our focus on Afghanistan rather than invading Iraq on a semi-loose connection could we have retained the initiative better in one theater rather than sharing the focus between two?
What would the butterfly effect be for where we are now as a military, nation, and world? I think those that influenced the policy makers at the time lacked the gumption to say this is not a coherent plan, and we need more time to flesh this out prior to starting something. I know I am throwing stones, but looking back there are plenty of holes in the initial planning for Iraq and the attention it diverted away from other areas of need.

Response by LCpl Steve Wininger made Nov 22 at 2014 12:30 PM

LCpl Steve Wininger — Sat, 22 Nov 2014 12:30:03 -0500

LTC Yinon Weiss I totally agree with you. An excellent example of what you are saying is the Kurds in the North, especially women. They prove that a willingness to fight, and die if they must, can turn the tide of battle. These women have proven to be a major hurdle for ISIS in Northern Iraq.

weapons, technology and superior tactics are nothing if no one is willing to do what it takes to defeat the enemy.

I think this article sums up what determination and willingness to fight can achieve

http://online.wsj.com/articles/kurdish-women-fight-on-front-line-against-islamic-state [login to see]

Response by COL Ted Mc made Nov 23 at 2014 12:37 PM

COL Ted Mc — Sun, 23 Nov 2014 12:37:52 -0500

Ive already responded in Small Wars, so I won't repeat myself (much).

The issue is the difference between "military effectiveness" and "military efficiency".

Of the two - if you can only have one, go for "effectiveness".

Ideally, go for both. Both the USMC and the Canadian Army tend toward the first.

Response by LTC Private RallyPoint Member made Nov 25 at 2014 12:07 AM

LTC Private RallyPoint Member — Tue, 25 Nov 2014 00:07:13 -0500

There was an interesting article in the NY Times the other day about the waning of a nation/army's focus over the duration of a large conflict. I will post the article if I find it.
There are a couple of the main points that I think need to be highlighted. One, the continue shift in focus from Afghanistan to Iraq to Afghanistan and now seemingly back to Iraq. Two, the stovepipping of the DIME model for the whole of government approach, where it seems we are disconnected on even the smallest things like aid to the populace.
If we can't get these things working in harmony, I'm not even saying that they need to be synced up, how are we ever going to safely and successfully extract ourselves from a conflict going forward?

Response by SP5 Michael Rathbun made Nov 25 at 2014 2:02 PM

SP5 Michael Rathbun — Tue, 25 Nov 2014 14:02:02 -0500

Good piece.

It is worthy of note that there is more to a successful military unit than the usual "Equpment, training, leadership, morale and esprit de corps". The culture in which the members grew up is also profoundly important.

It took us a couple of hundred years to start to figure out a popular democracy (we're still working on it). Others simply don't have the background concepts as part of their thought structure. I am reminded of the morning when I asked my RVN students (I was teaching electronics of various sorts) about the personalities and issues in the upcoming election, which was supposed to be the reason we were having so many disruptive attacks of different sorts.

Only one of them knew what "election" meant. As I explained the system, their original outburst of laughing was slowly replaced by thoughtful or alarmed expressions as the enormity of the concept burst upon them.

"Look, it takes ten or twenty years before a new province chief has grabbed enough wealth that he doesn't bother us much any more. So you are telling us that under this system we're going to have a new province chief EVERY THREE YEARS?!"

Any number of the allies we train may nod and smile and then go forth and do something and/or become something quite different from what we had hoped, especially if much of what we gave them was incomprehensible in their cultural context.

(Some of my consulting clients in the Gulf would nod, smile, undo all my work and look for a way to get a consultant in that did not tell them things they did not wish to hear.)

Response by Capt Jeff S. made Nov 26 at 2014 12:46 PM

Capt Jeff S. — Wed, 26 Nov 2014 12:46:51 -0500

I think we overlook the impact that their religion plays in to all this. We are dealing with Muslims whose loyalties are questionable at best because they follow a religion characterized by the violent acts of its followers and whose holy book describes their god Allah as the greatest of deceivers.

Their religious beliefs hamstring them from wanting to kill their fellow Muslim brothers... a crime which might send them to hell. Some are torn between wanting to be good Muslims and cooperating with Infidels. Nobody questions the religious zealotry of those in ISIS. They are simply being good Muslims and doing what good Muslims do -- emulating their prophet Muhammed, fighting, raping and pillaging in the name of their "peaceful" religion. They don't fear dying for their cause, and they have no qualms about killing anyone who is cooperating with the infidels, whereas the people we train seem to be reluctant to go after their more radical brethren. They are unworthy Allies who can't be trusted because at any time they might switch allegiances and try to shoot you in the back.

This soldier has his Iraqi police pegged and calls them out for being a bunch of pussies. They seem to make every excuse as to why they aren't doing more to combat those seeking to overthrow the Iraqi gov't. I guess it's something best seen on video, so here goes... Enjoy:

Soldier Insults Iraqi police

A Soldier puts Iraqi police in formation and gives them an ass chewing. It's funny, how he pretty much calls them pussies and tells them to fight their own d...

Response by SGT Steve Oakes made Nov 26 at 2014 3:36 PM

SGT Steve Oakes — Wed, 26 Nov 2014 15:36:54 -0500

I have come to believe that many of the challenges we face as a Nation are our own doing. I submit that it is our open immigration policy that is causing many of these countries to become destabilized.
As I see it. Most of the best and brightest from places like Iraq come here instead of staying home and addressing the problems in their own country. This leaves behind two kinds of people. Those who are not intelligent, and/or educated enough to get out, and there fore not able to effect change. Then there are the ones that our forces are dealing with now. The power hungry madmen that hijack an otherwise peaceful religion, and use it to incite people to fight to the death to further their goals.
IMHO there are two ways to end the troubles in the Middle East.
1) Take the gloves of and wage total war against these enemies. Not this P.C. ,politicians trying to keep everyone happy to get reelected bullshit we have been doing. Go over in force. If they are not on our side kill or capture them. Public opinion be damned. Opinion of the other nations be damned. If you do not like the way we are doing it you should have stepped up and done something. Collateral damage, oh well! If you don't put your IED factory in a school it would not get bombed in an air strike. I don't remember us not bombing war material factories in Germany because a school or church was near by.
2) Stop letting everyone that could effect positive change come here. Close the boarders and worry about what is wrong here. Encourage our allies to do the same. If they know there is nowhere else to go. Maybe they will put more effort into fixing there own country, instead of coming here and trying to change ours to be more like theirs. If their country and couture are so great that we should emulate them. Then surely it should be worth them fighting for.
Some of you may find my position a bit hard. It is. But war is not supposed to be pretty, or be dictated by public opinion, or a politicians aspirations to get reelected. It is about forcing another nation or in this case group of people, to surrender to our will. It is not to be entered into lightly. Nor is it to be waged so. Public opinion and politicians decide to go to war. It is then supposed to be up to the Military to go out and wage and win it.

Response by 1SG Eric Rice made Nov 29 at 2014 9:06 AM

1SG Eric Rice — Sat, 29 Nov 2014 09:06:45 -0500

Sir,
You are right on the money regarding the will to fight. If I chose this profession for the money then I would have left a long time ago. The question is what is the best method of instilling the will to fight?

During the American Revolution there were many people afraid to fight the British for freedom and it took a select few to muster the courage of many. The people of Iraq and Afghanistan need to find their select few to lead their revolution. Freedom is a powerful incentive but they must be willing as our fore fathers were.

Response by SFC Private RallyPoint Member made Nov 30 at 2014 1:12 AM

SFC Private RallyPoint Member — Sun, 30 Nov 2014 01:12:27 -0500

One of the major problems, sir, is that we don't even understand our "allies" well enough to reach them on a deeper than superficial level. How can we have the kind of influence on their hearts and minds if we don't even know or agree with what they want for themselves and each other. They aren't going to have our brand of governance or democracy if they have democracy at all. They have to have their own brand. Perhaps we can't help them get that. Perhaps we can. I suspect that if we will ever manage it, we will have to get out of our own way to do so.

Response by PV2 Abbott Shaull made Dec 26 at 2014 6:48 PM

PV2 Abbott Shaull — Fri, 26 Dec 2014 18:48:36 -0500

I think you hit the nail on the head on why we have failed in Vietnam also. We only did half of the training. We didn't instill the pride into the soldiers that was need in order to fight for their Country and into their Leadership.

Response by SFC Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 21 at 2015 11:18 PM

SFC Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 21 Feb 2015 23:18:27 -0500

LTC Yinon Weiss One may also try to compare similar situation in Japan, Germany, or Korea to Iraq's. Like other posters have stated, religion sects play a huge role in this part of the world, not just this country. The corruption level of the government is another contributing factor. Until they can resolve the differences between Shia and Sunni, they can't start working toward true peace.

Response by MAJ Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 21 at 2015 11:23 PM

MAJ Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 21 Feb 2015 23:23:06 -0500

I served as an Advisor in Afghanistan in 07-08 and completed the Advisor course which was at Fort Riley at the time and I found that although they were capable fighters at the company level and to a degree at the BN level they had similar issues that we also saw in Vietnam. The advisor's performance was related to the unit he advised (Unrealistic expectation), we became just as much an enabler as we were an advisor (CAS, MEDEVAC etc.), and want has always been a problem is their ability to sustain themselves. This is do to corruption, lack of internal resources and an inability to forecast out or even understand the concept of looking beyond today and tomorrow and consider next month or next year. We also found ourselves not letting them fail and we learned quickly to let them fail when we could so they could learn. I can go on for a long time on just the Advisor piece, but the main point is that we greatly assisted them in sustainment at a minimum and enabled them greatly in providing indirect fire, CAS and MEDEVAC. Now we expect them to go out and fight often without that and sustain large operations or even small units when too many of us held their hand or also when they are too corrupt not pillage off themselves.

Response by SGM Mikel Dawson made Feb 22 at 2015 8:37 AM

SGM Mikel Dawson — Sun, 22 Feb 2015 08:37:37 -0500

Without reading any other posts, I'll venture to say I will mirror others.

This situation is no different than Vietnam. The NVA / VC had a much more will to fight for what they believed in. The VC (mostly living in the south) were tired of the powers to be and were more open to what the north had to offer. It is clear they had a much more will to win than the south. We(U.S.) did not loose Vietnam.

Iraq is the same. Too many's loyalties are with a religious sect, a tribal leader, not the nation as a whole. I could see that in 2003 when I was there. You can have all the equipment, training in the world, yet if you're heart and soul isn't in it, you don't believe in what you're fighting for, you will loose. Our own country is a good example. We were up against the power house of the world at the time. Yes we received training and help from others, but in the end it was the will of the soldiers and people supporting the soldiers how the war was won.
Afghanistan is no different. If we'd look at history, we'd stayed out. Once we leave it is only a matter of time before that country slips away to something else.

Response by CPT Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 22 at 2015 9:38 AM

CPT Private RallyPoint Member — Sun, 22 Feb 2015 09:38:31 -0500

The very first module I had in ROTC was about ethics and values. The Army Values and the Warrior Ethos, how many times is that reiterated in Basic Training?

If you focus on training people HOW to fight, but they don't know WHY to fight, someone else will give them the why.

Probably not people that like America very much.

Response by Capt Richard I P. made Feb 22 at 2015 12:21 PM

Capt Richard I P. — Sun, 22 Feb 2015 12:21:50 -0500

LTC Yinon Weiss Great article, not sure how I missed it when first posted. I will cynically point out that imbuing a foreign force with a will to fight-and win is a Sisyphean task. It's been a while since I read it but it's either Galula or Kilcullen that writes the goal of the counter-insurgent is to create a HN force that most closely resembles the insurgent. In the end most counter-insurgents end up making copies of themselves, not the insurgents who are clearly better suited to combat in their environment. I mean this in all ways -uniforms, tactics, motivation, operations and strategy.

Response by CPT Jack Durish made Feb 22 at 2015 2:00 PM

CPT Jack Durish — Sun, 22 Feb 2015 14:00:18 -0500

Once upon a time, America bred warriors. We suckled on duty, honor, and country. Slow to anger, suspicious of foreign entanglements, and acculturated to a fierce sense of individualism. We were also wise enough to know that we could not breed these qualities into the old world anymore than we could make them accept our love of self-government. Those who wanted to be like us came here. Those who feared us, stayed there.

That's no longer as evident as it once was. Our children are embarrassed by our patriotism. They scoff at our ideas of American exceptionalism. How can we expect others to embrace it? Fortunately, there are some Americans who still grow up with it. We see them in our ranks today and can point with pride to their service. They win, not just because they have superior weapons and superior training, but rather because of their superior will and willingness.

It takes time. It'll take time for us to regain the spirit, if ever. How can we expect others to embrace it in just a few months or a few years. It took generations for it to diminish. It will take generations for it to recover.

Response by PO1 Brian Austin made Nov 19 at 2015 6:25 PM

PO1 Brian Austin — Thu, 19 Nov 2015 18:25:26 -0500

If they don't have the "will" all the training in the world will be for naught.

When their first allegiance is to their tribe and religion, it's hopeless, IMO. Saddam was secular and held them together through brute force. Now that he's gone, Iraq is fractured along ethnic, religious and tribal lines.

Same will happen with Afghanistan when (if ever) we leave. Though it's pretty much there already. They'll go back to their 7th century living. The nickname "Graveyard of Empires" was given for a reason. Apologies for digressing. :)

Response by LTC Private RallyPoint Member made Nov 19 at 2015 7:03 PM

LTC Private RallyPoint Member — Thu, 19 Nov 2015 19:03:59 -0500

As a former MiTT member in Iraq, I can definitely agree with this. Two points we always worked on my team and only partially succeeded on were: an Iraqi solution to an Iraqi problem and having to get them to want to do it. Solving their problems for them, the American solution to everything, and forcing the to do things via a childish reward system, the way many teams accomplished things prior to 2009, could not develop into a long term solution for the "Iraq question."

Response by SSG Private RallyPoint Member made Nov 19 at 2015 9:13 PM

SSG Private RallyPoint Member — Thu, 19 Nov 2015 21:13:07 -0500

This is the kind of crap that happens when you stupid people vote for a guy that is a dumbass with no idea of foreign affairs or how to fight a war. You thought it was time the nation try out a black person to be your commander a chief .That's working really well now right?

Response by COL Mark Mitchell made Nov 26 at 2015 4:40 PM

COL Mark Mitchell — Thu, 26 Nov 2015 16:40:16 -0500

Yinon, you're correct about the insufficiency of tactical training. At the most fundamental level, victory in battle is about imposing your will through violence and the destruction of your enemy's will to fight. It presumes the existence of a unified, collective political will--something that is simply not present in Afghanistan or Iraq. The poor performance of many unit reflects this absence of a unified political will. The will may be present when US advisors are fighting alongside these units but that is more a reflection of our will rather that the true will of these Iraqi or Afghan units. I would add also that we do not sufficiently emphasize or resource institution building. Without the necessary institutions to train, educate and inculcate soldiers and leaders and sustain combat power, all of the tactical training I the world is worthless. In the absence of these institutions, the half life of unit effectiveness is measured in months, maybe weeks.

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made Nov 26 at 2015 6:09 PM

MAJ Ken Landgren — Thu, 26 Nov 2015 18:09:24 -0500

I believe the militaries in Afghanistan and Iraq have a lack of passion necessary to fight for the nation effectively. George Washington was able to win against a superior foe because his soldiers believed in a cause to rid the nation of English, and they were prepared to die for it. George Washington provided the requisite leadership.

Response by CPT Private RallyPoint Member made Nov 26 at 2015 6:14 PM

CPT Private RallyPoint Member — Thu, 26 Nov 2015 18:14:10 -0500

LTC Yinon Weiss I think you are spot on. Even a well equipped and well trained army will not fight for a government they do not support or feel an allegiance or alliance to. They see that their government as being corrupt and unable to or unwilling to function as a government should therefore they have no loyalty to it. One cannot buy or supply loyalty, experience, camaraderie, or morale it must be felt from the depths of the person. Perhaps it can taught, perhaps some are born with it (those that become soldiers) or perhaps it comes with something called National Pride. It's true weapons and money do not win wars, Men and Women do.

Response by SGT Mary G. made Apr 12 at 2021 5:08 PM

SGT Mary G. — Mon, 12 Apr 2021 17:08:04 -0400

Good article. Consider that it may not be the well trained SMs who have a motivation problem.
No doubt the people who have been trained have a rank structure that leads up to top levels of government. When those governments have an attitude of "why take responsibility as long as the U.S.A. is willing to, including the cost of doing so", then it . . . rolls downhill.
Perhaps it would behoove us to realize that some nations consider ours to not yet be out of its adolescent years comparative to their empires in past millenia which have risen and fallen, and to which they are, proudly, heir. People in many of the Grand Daddy nations have started thinking the U.S.A. may need some "tough love" - for their our own good, and ours.

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made May 1 at 2021 10:37 PM

MAJ Ken Landgren — Sat, 01 May 2021 22:37:49 -0400

Let's take the Taliban. The Center of Gravity is their ideology of Sharia Law. That is their source of power. The ideology leads to a cause. The cause is to fight the Afghan governmental forces and terrorize civilians. A cause must have means to support the cause. Their means is control rural Afghanistan. Attack when it is unexpected. Don't fight huge conventional decisive battles. Blend with the mountains and people. Control the people they live with.

Ideology is a must. The American ideology was freedom from England hence we fought the revolutionary war.

I consider Iraq a win now. I think Iraq can protect itself and Iraq is understands to a degree of national identity. What the Iraqi government must do is to provide good governance, support the people, and to ensure their military becomes stronger. It takes years to grow a military to become effective. It needs generals who are strategic thinkers. Brigade, battalion, company commanders who can command their units to fight and fight well.

What Afghanistan needs is a good government that supports its people. People who are passionate about democracy, and a military that continues to get stronger. It needs real tigers, not paper tigers.

My prediction is Afghanistan will face a civil war for several years. The challenge to the Taliban is they don't have a conventional sized army, spread out, and I don't think they want to fight large conventional battles that would decisively engage them. The Afghan government don't have the forces to sweep the whole country to find and kill the Taliban. I think the Afghans in Taliban contolled areas don't want to get involved, but they are pushed to support the Taliban.