Posted on Apr 20, 2017
What was the most significant event on April 4 during the U.S. Civil War 2017 update??
2.18K
25
4
10
10
0
In the Civil War, rivers were significant obstacles. Controlling fording sites and ferries in addition to bridges gave the defender a significant advantage. Meanwhile the attacker used cavalry to find sites and secure them with artillery and infantry help. Engineers were employed for building pontoon bridges, improving the fording sites and the roads that approached the rivers. Engineers used timber or stone and gravel to firm up dirt roads which became muddy morasses after rains or thousands of feet and animal hoofs moving over them.
Bypassing strongpoints has been a military strategy and tactic since ancient warfare. A good defense should be built so that it could not be flanked easily. Anchoring a defense on a mountain range or swiftly flowing and wide-enough river that it could not be damned or artillery lobbed over it are good examples. The French failed to do this in the Great War [Argonne Offensive] and in WWII twice [bypassing the Maginot line in 1940 and sweeping through the Argonne/Ardennes in late 1944].
In 1863, Maj Gen US Grant was systematically working his way south down the Mississippi River. The defenses of Vicksburg were formidable. U.S. Grant took advantage of his naval gunboat and transport advantage and moved the bulk of his army below Vicksburg “by marching them from Milliken’s Point to New Carthage – both on the western side of the Mississippi. Sent to see if this was even possible was General John McClernand and his XIII Corps. They had started off on March 31 under the watch of General Peter Osterhaus, a Prussian who graduated from the Berlin Military Academy and served in the Prussian Army before emigrating to America.” Just as Prussians helped us in the Revolutionary War, some Prussians helped the Federal forces during the Civil war.
In 1864, the Federal Army re-designated d'Afrique Corps units which were manned by colored soldiers and Caucasian officers into US Army colored infantry regiments:
1st Corps d'Afrique Engineer Regiment was organized April 28, 1863 on re-designated 95th U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment on April 4, 1864.
2nd Corps d'Afrique Engineer Regiment was organized August 15, 1863 on re-designated 96th U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment on April 4, 1864.
3rd Corps d'Afrique Engineer Regiment was organized August 26, 1863 on re-designated 97th U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment on March 11, 1864.
4th Corps d'Afrique Engineer Regiment was organized September 3, 1863 on re-designated 98th U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment on March 11, 1864.
5th Corps d'Afrique Engineer Regiment was formed from the 15th Corps d'Afrique Infantry Regiment on February 10, 1864 and re-designated 99th U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment on April 4, 1864.
Thursday, April 4, 1861: Virginia totters on the edge. “Union sympathy in the deeper South was gone. The trip Lamon and Hurlbut made to Charleston proved that. But what about Virginia? The border state had been holding an on again, off again secession convention since early January. Lincoln, wishing to take the true pulse of nationalism in Virginia, sent George W. Summers, a Unionist, to the convention. Summers, knowing that an important vote (the vote) would soon be coming, sent John B. Baldwin in his stead.
Baldwin arrived in Washington in the morning on this date, and met with Lincoln right away. The President told his visitor that he had come three or four days too late, though Baldwin left as soon as he was summoned. What Lincoln meant was that it was too late to do any good.
The Secession Convention in Virginia was an embarrassment to Lincoln, who thought that the Unionists should adjourn it before more of their ilk switched sides.
Virginia’s Unionists were barely that. They were tottering on the edge just as much as their state was. More than Union, they wanted peace. If appeasing the Southern states – The Confederacy – would keep the peace, they felt, then conciliation and compromise was needed.
But the compromise that the South wanted was exactly what Lincoln could not give. Fort Sumter and Pickens, said Baldwin, must be abandoned as a gesture of peace; the administration’s policy must be one of peace.
Lincoln then asked what might happen if Sumter were resupplied with only provisions – no troops, no aggressive maneuvers, just supplies? That wouldn’t work, Baldwin insisted, it would never be allowed. Once shots were fired, no matter who shot first, the Upper South, including Virginia, would secede.
There had been rumors of Lincoln offering to surrender Sumter if Virginia would stay in the Union (trading a fort for a state), but they had since proved to be unprovable. [1]
The vote that would take Virginia out of the Union was put before the Secession Convention. It was rejected 88 to 45, keeping the state true to the Union. For the time being, anyway. [2]
[1] Lincoln and the Decision for War by Russell McClintock – completely from Baldwin’s own testimony in 1866.
[2] Days of Defiance by Maury Klein.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/virginia-totters-on-the-edge-orders-for-sumter/
Friday, April 4, 1862: McClellan’s first good day is also his last. “Though the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley and south of Washington had fallen back, Lincoln was still apprehensive over covering the capital. The Rebels had fallen back to Fredericksburg, Orange Court House and Mount Jackson (in the Valley), but Washington wasn’t fully aware of how many were where. So worried and so in the dark were Lincoln and most of his Cabinet, that he ordered the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac to remain in Washington, while the rest of the Army (sans Fifth Corps in the Valley) marched out from Fortress Monroe on the Virginia Peninsula.
The order was specific and condemning. “The President, deeming the force to be left in front of Washington insufficient to insure its safety,” wrote Adjutant-General Thomas to McClellan, “has directed that McDowell’s army corps should be detached from the forces operating under your immediate direction.”
While not an outright claim that McClellan had disobeyed the President’s order to ensure Washington’s security, it made it clear that he wasn’t happy with McClellan and that McDowell’s Corps was no longer under his (McClellan’s) “immediate direction.”
But perhaps “immediate direction” wasn’t sufficient. If McDowell wasn’t under McClellan’s immediate direction, did it then mean that McDowell would soon be released to once again fall under McClellan’s direction?
To answer this question, Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton took it a step farther by carving out two new departments, focusing McClellan’s command to the Virginia Peninsula. First, the Department of the Shenandoah, comprised of the Shenandoah Valley, would be commanded by General Nathaniel Banks, retaining the Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomac as an independent command. While McClellan wasn’t expecting to have Banks with him on the Peninsula, neither was he expecting to lose him entirely.
Second, and most importantly, the Department of the Rappahannock was to be commanded by General Irvin McDowell. Not only was McDowell and his First Corps plucked away from McClellan, the Army of the Potomac and the Peninsula Campaign, it was now also an independent command covering the capital and the ground south. [1]
Meanwhile, General McClellan was busy readying his men to strike out towards Yorktown. Just thirty-six hours after he personally arrived at Fortress Monroe, his Army of the Potomac, now 66,700-strong, was on the move.
Opposing this Federal horde was the small Confederate Army of the Peninsula, under General “Prince” John Bankhead Magruder. Magruder was charged with stalling the largest army ever assembled on the continent with only 13,000 men.
On this day, everything seemed to be working well for General McClellan. He had not yet received the news that General McDowell would not be joining him and on the Peninsula, Magruder’s advance troops were giving up ground that he (McClellan) thought they would hotly contest. Confederate prisoners had related that Magruder had but 8,000 troops. McClellan’s own intelligence, usually bizarrely inaccurate, was as close as it would ever be to reality, giving the enemy figure at 15,000. Either way, McClellan was certain that he could do as he pleased in front of Yorktown. [2]
All of this great fortunate had bloomed from what seemed like a rocky start. When McClellan arrived at Fortress Monroe, his original plan was to have the Navy support his advance along the James and York Rivers, and finally help in the bombardment of Yorktown and the Rebel fort at Gloucester, across the river.
The Navy, however, was worried about the CSS Virginia, still at large, so could not commit to the joint Army-Navy plan that McClellan originally had in mind. But no matter, the focus of the plan was Yorktown. If the fort at Gloucester could be taken out, Yorktown would undoubtedly fall. [3]
Blissfully ignorant of the goings on in Washington, McClellan wired General McDowell and the division commanders of the First Corps of his plans to sack Gloucester. He fully expected to see McDowell himself either this evening or the next morning. As for the First Corps, McClellan wanted it to land up the York River from Gloucester cutting the town off from its line of supply. [4]
On the first day of campaigning, all seemed to be going very well for General McClellan.
[1] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 11, Part 3, p66; 67-68.
[2] To the Gates of Richmond by Stephen W. Sears, Mariner Books, 1992.
[3] The Peninsula Campaign of 1862; A Military Analysis by Kevin Dougherty, University Press of Missouri, 2005.
[4] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 11, Part 3, p68.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/mcclellans-first-good-day-is-also-his-last/
Friday, April 4, 1862: Bad Roads, Bad Weather and Bad Marching Plague the Rebels Before Shiloh
Such good fortune did not extend to the Confederates trying to march upon General Grant at Pittsburg Landing, along the Tennessee River. Generals Johnston and Beauregard, commanding the Army of Mississippi, had wished to march on the 3rd and attack on the 4th. As early as the previous evening, it was clear that such a plan was unrealistic. Marching would have to continue on this date (the 4th) and an attack could be made on the 5th.
The problems of the previous day continued. General Bragg, commanding a corps, found the roads that he was to use to be impassible and so used the roads that General Hardee and his corps were to occupy. Hardee agreed to wait for Bragg, but somehow General Polk’s Corps got ahead of Bragg, which had to stop to let Bragg’s Corps march by. [5]
Somehow or another, the entire Confederate Army of Mississippi was where it was supposed to be by midnight. The various corps and divisions, being but eight miles from the Union position, were poised to attack the next morning.
Methodist Shiloh Meeting House, surrounded by Sherman's tents.
The soldiers, who would probably be back on the march before dawn, did what they could to rest as the dark heavens rained down upon them in torrents. They had few blankets, fewer tents and scant rations. They were muddy, soaked, freezing and hungry. If they could sleep at all, they’d have to get up and do it all over again the next day. [6]
Union General Grant, at his headquarters in Savannah, ten miles north of Pittsburg Landing, seemed to suspect little. True, there was word of a Confederate advance possibly trying to get around the position at Pittsburg Landing to attack the relatively light troops across the river from Savannah, but Grant paid it little mind. Just to be safe, he ordered additional troops to that location. In a message to General Sherman, commanding at Pittsburg Landing, Grant revealed that he “looked for nothing of the kind” when it came to a Confederate attack. Still, he cautioned Sherman to be on the look out.
In fact, Grant had no idea that Johnston and Beauregard had left their base at Corinth, twenty-five miles to the south. [7]
[5] Army of the Heartland; The Army of Tennessee 1861-1862 by Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Louisiana State University, 1967.
[6] Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862 by O Edward Cunningham, Savas Beatie, 2007.
[7] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 10, p91; 93.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/mcclellans-first-good-day-is-also-his-last/
Pictures: 1862-04-04 Artillery enroute to Shiloh; 1863-04-23 confederate artillery versus union cavalry photo; 1863-04 Vicksburg's Defenses Map; 1861-04 Fort Sumter, with Charleston in the background
A. 1861: Orders for Fort Sumter, “Major Anderson’s letter to Washington informing them that he had but a week’s worth of rations finally found its way to Lincoln’s desk. Astounded that he had such little time, the President sent orders to Gustavus Fox (now in Washington again) that he was to head up the expedition to “succor Fort Sumter.”
The letter ordered Fox to “take charge of the transports in New York having the troops and supplies on board to the entrance of Charleston Harbor.” He was to first attempt to land the supplies and if attacked, “place both troops and supplies in Fort Sumter.” [3]
The President (via Secretary of War Simon Cameron) then shot off a letter to Anderson asking him to hold on until the 11th or 12th, when the expedition to resupply the fort was to be attempted. The decision to surrender or hold out prior to the resupplying would be up to Anderson. [4]
Orders to resupply both Fort Pickens in Pensacola and Fort Sumter in Charleston had been given, but was it now too late?
B. 1863: Federal troops nearly secure New Carthage, Louisiana. Maj Gen John McClernand noted that there was more than enough dry land around New Carthage to camp an entire army. Getting the men there, however, was no easy task. Then five escaped slaves arrived and led a Federal force to capture a boat capable of transporting the Federal soldiers. The rebels got wind of the operation and tried to corner the Federals. But the Federals were able to dislodge themselves and the boat, making it back to New Carthage without injury. The winds of war were favoring US Grant and it seemed he would be able to get the bulk of his army below Vicksburg by marching them from Milliken’s Point to New Carthage – both on the western side of the Mississippi.
C. 1864: Federal victory at the Battle of Elkin's Ferry. Maj Gen Frederick Steele sent Colonel William McLean across with two regiments and a section of artillery to establish a bridgehead and reconnoiter enemy positions. McLean’s total force numbered about 2,000 men. After clashing with Confederate skirmishers, McLean ordered Lieutenant Colonel Francis M. Drake to position six companies of infantry and a section of artillery astride the road leading from Elkin's Ferry. His caution was prudent, for on the morning of April 4, Confederate General John S. Marmaduke arrived with two brigades of cavalry and a section of artillery to attack the Union forces.
For two hours Drake’s 300 men held out against 1,200 enemy troopers but eventually, the Union left gave way, leaving the artillery exposed. The Federals’ guns, however, were saved when some of McLean’s reserves came up and repelled several enemy charges. Eventually, 2,000 Union reinforcements under the command of General Samuel Rice arrived on the scene. Realizing that the odds were against him, Marmaduke retired from the field of battle, leaving the rest of Steele’s force free to complete the crossing of the Little Missouri River.
From beginning to end, the battle lasted about five hours and produced 92 casualties (although estimates vary). The Union force apparently lost 38 men, while the Southerners suffered 54 some casualties.
D. 1865: CSA General Robert E. Lee is waiting for supplies that do not arrive at Amelia Court House to feed his army. Lee’s route toward North Carolina is blocked by Major General Philip H. Sheridan as his forces arrives at Jetersville, which is southwest of Amelia Court-House and his men block the Danville Railroad. Meanwhile, Major General George G. Meade is closing in from the east.
FYI LTC Stephen C. Maj William W. "Bill" Price Capt Seid Waddell Capt Tom Brown 1stSgt Eugene Harless SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL SFC William Farrell] SSgt Robert Marx LTC Trent Klug MAJ (Join to see) LTC John Griscom MSgt James Parker CPT Kevin McComas SPC Maurice Evans SFC Ralph E KelleyMaj John Bell MAJ (Join to see)LTG Benjamin Freakley
Bypassing strongpoints has been a military strategy and tactic since ancient warfare. A good defense should be built so that it could not be flanked easily. Anchoring a defense on a mountain range or swiftly flowing and wide-enough river that it could not be damned or artillery lobbed over it are good examples. The French failed to do this in the Great War [Argonne Offensive] and in WWII twice [bypassing the Maginot line in 1940 and sweeping through the Argonne/Ardennes in late 1944].
In 1863, Maj Gen US Grant was systematically working his way south down the Mississippi River. The defenses of Vicksburg were formidable. U.S. Grant took advantage of his naval gunboat and transport advantage and moved the bulk of his army below Vicksburg “by marching them from Milliken’s Point to New Carthage – both on the western side of the Mississippi. Sent to see if this was even possible was General John McClernand and his XIII Corps. They had started off on March 31 under the watch of General Peter Osterhaus, a Prussian who graduated from the Berlin Military Academy and served in the Prussian Army before emigrating to America.” Just as Prussians helped us in the Revolutionary War, some Prussians helped the Federal forces during the Civil war.
In 1864, the Federal Army re-designated d'Afrique Corps units which were manned by colored soldiers and Caucasian officers into US Army colored infantry regiments:
1st Corps d'Afrique Engineer Regiment was organized April 28, 1863 on re-designated 95th U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment on April 4, 1864.
2nd Corps d'Afrique Engineer Regiment was organized August 15, 1863 on re-designated 96th U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment on April 4, 1864.
3rd Corps d'Afrique Engineer Regiment was organized August 26, 1863 on re-designated 97th U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment on March 11, 1864.
4th Corps d'Afrique Engineer Regiment was organized September 3, 1863 on re-designated 98th U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment on March 11, 1864.
5th Corps d'Afrique Engineer Regiment was formed from the 15th Corps d'Afrique Infantry Regiment on February 10, 1864 and re-designated 99th U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment on April 4, 1864.
Thursday, April 4, 1861: Virginia totters on the edge. “Union sympathy in the deeper South was gone. The trip Lamon and Hurlbut made to Charleston proved that. But what about Virginia? The border state had been holding an on again, off again secession convention since early January. Lincoln, wishing to take the true pulse of nationalism in Virginia, sent George W. Summers, a Unionist, to the convention. Summers, knowing that an important vote (the vote) would soon be coming, sent John B. Baldwin in his stead.
Baldwin arrived in Washington in the morning on this date, and met with Lincoln right away. The President told his visitor that he had come three or four days too late, though Baldwin left as soon as he was summoned. What Lincoln meant was that it was too late to do any good.
The Secession Convention in Virginia was an embarrassment to Lincoln, who thought that the Unionists should adjourn it before more of their ilk switched sides.
Virginia’s Unionists were barely that. They were tottering on the edge just as much as their state was. More than Union, they wanted peace. If appeasing the Southern states – The Confederacy – would keep the peace, they felt, then conciliation and compromise was needed.
But the compromise that the South wanted was exactly what Lincoln could not give. Fort Sumter and Pickens, said Baldwin, must be abandoned as a gesture of peace; the administration’s policy must be one of peace.
Lincoln then asked what might happen if Sumter were resupplied with only provisions – no troops, no aggressive maneuvers, just supplies? That wouldn’t work, Baldwin insisted, it would never be allowed. Once shots were fired, no matter who shot first, the Upper South, including Virginia, would secede.
There had been rumors of Lincoln offering to surrender Sumter if Virginia would stay in the Union (trading a fort for a state), but they had since proved to be unprovable. [1]
The vote that would take Virginia out of the Union was put before the Secession Convention. It was rejected 88 to 45, keeping the state true to the Union. For the time being, anyway. [2]
[1] Lincoln and the Decision for War by Russell McClintock – completely from Baldwin’s own testimony in 1866.
[2] Days of Defiance by Maury Klein.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/virginia-totters-on-the-edge-orders-for-sumter/
Friday, April 4, 1862: McClellan’s first good day is also his last. “Though the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley and south of Washington had fallen back, Lincoln was still apprehensive over covering the capital. The Rebels had fallen back to Fredericksburg, Orange Court House and Mount Jackson (in the Valley), but Washington wasn’t fully aware of how many were where. So worried and so in the dark were Lincoln and most of his Cabinet, that he ordered the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac to remain in Washington, while the rest of the Army (sans Fifth Corps in the Valley) marched out from Fortress Monroe on the Virginia Peninsula.
The order was specific and condemning. “The President, deeming the force to be left in front of Washington insufficient to insure its safety,” wrote Adjutant-General Thomas to McClellan, “has directed that McDowell’s army corps should be detached from the forces operating under your immediate direction.”
While not an outright claim that McClellan had disobeyed the President’s order to ensure Washington’s security, it made it clear that he wasn’t happy with McClellan and that McDowell’s Corps was no longer under his (McClellan’s) “immediate direction.”
But perhaps “immediate direction” wasn’t sufficient. If McDowell wasn’t under McClellan’s immediate direction, did it then mean that McDowell would soon be released to once again fall under McClellan’s direction?
To answer this question, Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton took it a step farther by carving out two new departments, focusing McClellan’s command to the Virginia Peninsula. First, the Department of the Shenandoah, comprised of the Shenandoah Valley, would be commanded by General Nathaniel Banks, retaining the Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomac as an independent command. While McClellan wasn’t expecting to have Banks with him on the Peninsula, neither was he expecting to lose him entirely.
Second, and most importantly, the Department of the Rappahannock was to be commanded by General Irvin McDowell. Not only was McDowell and his First Corps plucked away from McClellan, the Army of the Potomac and the Peninsula Campaign, it was now also an independent command covering the capital and the ground south. [1]
Meanwhile, General McClellan was busy readying his men to strike out towards Yorktown. Just thirty-six hours after he personally arrived at Fortress Monroe, his Army of the Potomac, now 66,700-strong, was on the move.
Opposing this Federal horde was the small Confederate Army of the Peninsula, under General “Prince” John Bankhead Magruder. Magruder was charged with stalling the largest army ever assembled on the continent with only 13,000 men.
On this day, everything seemed to be working well for General McClellan. He had not yet received the news that General McDowell would not be joining him and on the Peninsula, Magruder’s advance troops were giving up ground that he (McClellan) thought they would hotly contest. Confederate prisoners had related that Magruder had but 8,000 troops. McClellan’s own intelligence, usually bizarrely inaccurate, was as close as it would ever be to reality, giving the enemy figure at 15,000. Either way, McClellan was certain that he could do as he pleased in front of Yorktown. [2]
All of this great fortunate had bloomed from what seemed like a rocky start. When McClellan arrived at Fortress Monroe, his original plan was to have the Navy support his advance along the James and York Rivers, and finally help in the bombardment of Yorktown and the Rebel fort at Gloucester, across the river.
The Navy, however, was worried about the CSS Virginia, still at large, so could not commit to the joint Army-Navy plan that McClellan originally had in mind. But no matter, the focus of the plan was Yorktown. If the fort at Gloucester could be taken out, Yorktown would undoubtedly fall. [3]
Blissfully ignorant of the goings on in Washington, McClellan wired General McDowell and the division commanders of the First Corps of his plans to sack Gloucester. He fully expected to see McDowell himself either this evening or the next morning. As for the First Corps, McClellan wanted it to land up the York River from Gloucester cutting the town off from its line of supply. [4]
On the first day of campaigning, all seemed to be going very well for General McClellan.
[1] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 11, Part 3, p66; 67-68.
[2] To the Gates of Richmond by Stephen W. Sears, Mariner Books, 1992.
[3] The Peninsula Campaign of 1862; A Military Analysis by Kevin Dougherty, University Press of Missouri, 2005.
[4] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 11, Part 3, p68.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/mcclellans-first-good-day-is-also-his-last/
Friday, April 4, 1862: Bad Roads, Bad Weather and Bad Marching Plague the Rebels Before Shiloh
Such good fortune did not extend to the Confederates trying to march upon General Grant at Pittsburg Landing, along the Tennessee River. Generals Johnston and Beauregard, commanding the Army of Mississippi, had wished to march on the 3rd and attack on the 4th. As early as the previous evening, it was clear that such a plan was unrealistic. Marching would have to continue on this date (the 4th) and an attack could be made on the 5th.
The problems of the previous day continued. General Bragg, commanding a corps, found the roads that he was to use to be impassible and so used the roads that General Hardee and his corps were to occupy. Hardee agreed to wait for Bragg, but somehow General Polk’s Corps got ahead of Bragg, which had to stop to let Bragg’s Corps march by. [5]
Somehow or another, the entire Confederate Army of Mississippi was where it was supposed to be by midnight. The various corps and divisions, being but eight miles from the Union position, were poised to attack the next morning.
Methodist Shiloh Meeting House, surrounded by Sherman's tents.
The soldiers, who would probably be back on the march before dawn, did what they could to rest as the dark heavens rained down upon them in torrents. They had few blankets, fewer tents and scant rations. They were muddy, soaked, freezing and hungry. If they could sleep at all, they’d have to get up and do it all over again the next day. [6]
Union General Grant, at his headquarters in Savannah, ten miles north of Pittsburg Landing, seemed to suspect little. True, there was word of a Confederate advance possibly trying to get around the position at Pittsburg Landing to attack the relatively light troops across the river from Savannah, but Grant paid it little mind. Just to be safe, he ordered additional troops to that location. In a message to General Sherman, commanding at Pittsburg Landing, Grant revealed that he “looked for nothing of the kind” when it came to a Confederate attack. Still, he cautioned Sherman to be on the look out.
In fact, Grant had no idea that Johnston and Beauregard had left their base at Corinth, twenty-five miles to the south. [7]
[5] Army of the Heartland; The Army of Tennessee 1861-1862 by Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Louisiana State University, 1967.
[6] Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862 by O Edward Cunningham, Savas Beatie, 2007.
[7] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 10, p91; 93.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/mcclellans-first-good-day-is-also-his-last/
Pictures: 1862-04-04 Artillery enroute to Shiloh; 1863-04-23 confederate artillery versus union cavalry photo; 1863-04 Vicksburg's Defenses Map; 1861-04 Fort Sumter, with Charleston in the background
A. 1861: Orders for Fort Sumter, “Major Anderson’s letter to Washington informing them that he had but a week’s worth of rations finally found its way to Lincoln’s desk. Astounded that he had such little time, the President sent orders to Gustavus Fox (now in Washington again) that he was to head up the expedition to “succor Fort Sumter.”
The letter ordered Fox to “take charge of the transports in New York having the troops and supplies on board to the entrance of Charleston Harbor.” He was to first attempt to land the supplies and if attacked, “place both troops and supplies in Fort Sumter.” [3]
The President (via Secretary of War Simon Cameron) then shot off a letter to Anderson asking him to hold on until the 11th or 12th, when the expedition to resupply the fort was to be attempted. The decision to surrender or hold out prior to the resupplying would be up to Anderson. [4]
Orders to resupply both Fort Pickens in Pensacola and Fort Sumter in Charleston had been given, but was it now too late?
B. 1863: Federal troops nearly secure New Carthage, Louisiana. Maj Gen John McClernand noted that there was more than enough dry land around New Carthage to camp an entire army. Getting the men there, however, was no easy task. Then five escaped slaves arrived and led a Federal force to capture a boat capable of transporting the Federal soldiers. The rebels got wind of the operation and tried to corner the Federals. But the Federals were able to dislodge themselves and the boat, making it back to New Carthage without injury. The winds of war were favoring US Grant and it seemed he would be able to get the bulk of his army below Vicksburg by marching them from Milliken’s Point to New Carthage – both on the western side of the Mississippi.
C. 1864: Federal victory at the Battle of Elkin's Ferry. Maj Gen Frederick Steele sent Colonel William McLean across with two regiments and a section of artillery to establish a bridgehead and reconnoiter enemy positions. McLean’s total force numbered about 2,000 men. After clashing with Confederate skirmishers, McLean ordered Lieutenant Colonel Francis M. Drake to position six companies of infantry and a section of artillery astride the road leading from Elkin's Ferry. His caution was prudent, for on the morning of April 4, Confederate General John S. Marmaduke arrived with two brigades of cavalry and a section of artillery to attack the Union forces.
For two hours Drake’s 300 men held out against 1,200 enemy troopers but eventually, the Union left gave way, leaving the artillery exposed. The Federals’ guns, however, were saved when some of McLean’s reserves came up and repelled several enemy charges. Eventually, 2,000 Union reinforcements under the command of General Samuel Rice arrived on the scene. Realizing that the odds were against him, Marmaduke retired from the field of battle, leaving the rest of Steele’s force free to complete the crossing of the Little Missouri River.
From beginning to end, the battle lasted about five hours and produced 92 casualties (although estimates vary). The Union force apparently lost 38 men, while the Southerners suffered 54 some casualties.
D. 1865: CSA General Robert E. Lee is waiting for supplies that do not arrive at Amelia Court House to feed his army. Lee’s route toward North Carolina is blocked by Major General Philip H. Sheridan as his forces arrives at Jetersville, which is southwest of Amelia Court-House and his men block the Danville Railroad. Meanwhile, Major General George G. Meade is closing in from the east.
FYI LTC Stephen C. Maj William W. "Bill" Price Capt Seid Waddell Capt Tom Brown 1stSgt Eugene Harless SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL SFC William Farrell] SSgt Robert Marx LTC Trent Klug MAJ (Join to see) LTC John Griscom MSgt James Parker CPT Kevin McComas SPC Maurice Evans SFC Ralph E KelleyMaj John Bell MAJ (Join to see)LTG Benjamin Freakley
Civil War
Naval/Maritime History
Military History
American History
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 4
2
2
0
2
2
0
2
2
0
Engineer work was crucial to both Armies. While engineer units were not as prevalent as they are in the modern army, Regular troops and slave or hired Labor often did a lot of the engineer work such as digging earthworks contructing Abatis, Gabions and Chevueax de Frixe. It was the lack of and tardiness of the arrival of Pontoon units that led to the Federal Debacle at Fredricksburg in Dec 1862.
(2)
(0)
Read This Next
Continue with Facebook 
Continue with Google