Posted on Nov 4, 2016
What was the most significant event on September 12 during the U.S. Civil War?
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In 1861, CSA General Robert E. Lee was defeated at Cheat Mountain in western Virginia because he relied on an unreliable officer – Col Rust. By 1862, Robert E. Lee had learned much as had his subordinate commanders and the men of the Army of Northern Virginia. In western Virginia, his forces had closed in on the Federal units defending Harpers Ferry, West Virginia.
In 1862, the Natchez Daily Courier reported: “Arrest of a Young Lady. Miss Green, a loyal young lady in one of the northwestern counties in Virginia, was arrested and put in jail in Buckhannon, Upshur county, on a charge of cutting telegraph wires in the Yankee army. When interrogated, she confessed she had cut the wires, and said that she would do so again if set at liberty, at the same time refusing to take the oath of Yankee servitude. One end of the wire cut was found stuck in the ground several inches, and when asked why she did that, she replied that a great many Yankees had been killed, and as that wire pointed the way they had gone, it would doubtless be used to know; if there was room for any more.”
In 1863, Northern Georgia and eastern Tennessee were the scenes of numerous skirmishes. Sites where official skirmishes occurred included Rheatown, Tenn., and Leet’s Tanyard, Alpine, the LaFayette Road, and Dirt Town in Georgia.
The bungled affair at Cheat Mountain on Thursday, September 12, 1861. “The Confederate plan of attack at Cheat Mountain in Western Virginia was, by dawn, ready. Each of the five brigades were in position and the Union forces on Cheat and at Elkwater, seven miles to the west, were completely unaware that General Lee was about to attack them.
General Lee had put his faith in an untried brigade commander, Col. Rust, to give the signal when to attack. It was on the sound of Rust’s assault upon the Union right flank on Cheat Mountain that the other four brigades were to begin their own movements forward.
Rust, determined to prove himself, roused his men and lead them towards the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike, behind the Union right flank, capturing two Union pickets and some wagons. The prisoners, lying, told him that there were 5,000 Federal troops in the fort (there were only about 3,000).
Now sure of what to do, Rust rode to a clearing to see the Union fortifications for himself. Before him was a formidable bastion with a blockhouse, trenches and wooden spikes sticking out of the earthen walls of the fort. He concluded that it was “madness” to attack.
Thinking that Rust’s force was only a scouting party, two companies from Indiana (probably no more than 100 men) were sent forward from the fort to investigate how many Rebels were in the woods. The Indiana boys advanced into the wilderness and fired a volley into the woods at the unknown number of Confederates. With that, Rust’s brigade of 1,600 broke and ran. The ground was littered with their accouterments as the greatly-outnumbered Indiana troops gave chase.
Just above Elkwater [near Salt Lick on the map], General Lee waited for Rust’s signal, which did not come. Lee, who was with Donelson’s brigade to the left flank of the Union troops at Elkwater, realized that the element of surprise was gone and so Lee ordered the brigade to retire back to camp.
On their way down the valley, they stumbled upon a company of Federal troops who immediately put up a heavy resistance. Each side hammered away at the other until more Confederate troops scrambled towards the action. The Union troops, wildly outnumbered, retreated towards another Union detachment, a couple of miles west of Cheat Fort.
The other Union detachment was exchanging shots with Confederate troops in Anderson’s brigade, who were also waiting for Col. Rust’s signal. The retreating Union company had run into the rear of Anderson’s troops and began firing volleys into them, scattered cooks, slaves and staff. Both Union detachments, still greatly outnumbered, made quick time back to the confines of the fort.
The two other Confederate brigades under Loring (facing Elkwater) and Jackson (facing Cheat Fort) were still waiting for Rust’s signal. It never came and they remained in their positions.
The strange day was hardly a battle. A few sharp skirmishes, loosely tied together and lots of waiting and wondering occupied both sides even after dark.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/the-bungled-affair-at-cheat-mountain/
Harpers Ferry was in no shape to be defended on Friday, September 12, 1862. “General John Wool had lost track of his men. The Union commander of the Middle Department, comprising Pennsylvania, New Jersey and the Maryland counties along the B&O Railroad, was headquartered in Baltimore, while his troops in Harpers Ferry were quickly being surrounded by invading Confederate forces.
“You can put any of my troops under McClellan’s command,” wrote Wool to General-in-Chief Henry Halleck. The problem was, Wool had no real idea how many troops he had. He speculated that Harpers Ferry had seven or eight thousand. McClellan, who had already asked Halleck for the use of the Harpers Ferry garrison, supposed their number to be closer to 25,000. In truth, it was around 14,000, but as the sun rose over South Mountain and Maryland Heights, just east of the town, it didn’t really matter.
Commanding the troops in question was General Dixon Miles, a career military officer pushing sixty. Miles had been first ignorant and then unreasonably optimistic over the reports of Rebels approaching Maryland Heights. He estimated only ten regiments opposed him. In truth, there were nearly ten times that number closing in around him.
“I expect this will be the last you hear of me until this affair is over,” wrote Miles to Halleck. “All are cheerful and hopeful. Good-bye.”
General Miles had reason to be hopeful. He believed only two brigades of infantry and some artillery were approaching him. His force, perhaps double that figure, could hold off such a raid.
What Miles failed to notice was Stonewall Jackson’s force to the north, 12,000-strong. He also never noticed General John Walker’s 3,400 men approaching Louden Heights to the south. And though he allowed that a few more regiments of Rebels had joined the ten regiments after dusk, he had no idea that they were actually joined by six other brigades under Lafayette McLaws.
Jackson was just entering the abandoned Martinsburg to the north, and Walker was about to ascend Louden Heights as McLaws made his move. As his division drew closer, he peeled off brigades to close Solomon’s, Brownsville, and Crampton’s Gaps. Another plunged toward the Potomac, hitting Point of Rocks. Each sealed off any possible Federal escape route towards Washington.
The main Confederate thrust came from Kershaws Brigade, stumbling its way across the crest of Elk Ridge. When they approached the thin Union lines atop Maryland Heights – an extension of the ridge – they met with equally thin resistance. Greeting them were the greenest of troops, having been in blue for barely three weeks. Most of Miles’ men were in the town itself.
Though unexperienced, their fortifications and a handful of reinforcements (bringing their number to around 1,700 men), was enough to keep Kershaw too unsure to commit his roughly 2,000 veterans.
General Lee’s Special Order 191 required directed McLaws to be upon Maryland Heights, which he had technically accomplished. For Walker, he was to be upon Louden Heights, “if practicable.” By nightfall, he was at Hillsborough, and ready to move the next morning for the Heights. Jackson, though remembered as running a day behind, was actually just where the Order required him to be. On the morning of September 12, he was supposed to “take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg.”
Before noon, this was accomplished. He sent A.P. Hill’s Division ahead, towards Harpers Ferry. The rest of his command would follow the next day.
General George McClellan, commanding Army of the Potomac, believed the Rebel army of General Lee might be slipping away, to recross the Potomac River back into Virginia. “From all I can gather,” he wrote his wife this afternoon,” secesh is skedaddelling & I don’t think I can catch him unless he is really moving into Penna [….] I begin to think that he is making off to get out of the scrape by recrossing the river at Williamsport.”
More or less, however, he knew the approximate route that General Lee had taken. The enemy was “moving in two directions. Viz. on the Hagerstown and Harpers Ferry roads.”
As the day wore on and his men marched into Frederick, occupying the former camps of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, McClellan began to think of Harpers Ferry. He had heard no firing from that direction, and assumed all to be well enough. Due to Miles’ last dispatch, he knew that the Rebels were closing in, but figured that the garrison “if they fight at all,” could hold out until he could relieve them.
General Ambrose Burnside commanded the right wing of McClellan’s Army of the Potomac. His cavalry had been skirmishing with their Rebel counterparts all day. From the intelligence he could gather, he believed that Lee was headed into Pennsylvania (which was actually Lee’s ultimate goal). From McClellan, he heard that the Rebels were moving towards Harpers Ferry and upon Gettysburg, but doubted that.
“I can hardly understand how they can be moving on these two latter roads at the same time,” wrote Burnside to Halleck. “If they are going into Pennsylvania they would hardly be moving upon the Harper’s Ferry road, and if they are going to recross, how could they be moving upon Gettysburg!”
Of course, that was precisely what the Confederates were doing, though they had no intension of recrossing and staying in Virginia.
General Hooker, commanding a corps under Burnside, put it more bluntly: “It is satisfactory to my mind that the rebels have no more intention of going to Harrisburg than they have of going to heaven.”
Whether the Rebels were moving farther northward into Pennsylvania or returning to Virginia, nobody seemed to have a clue. Soon, however, that would all change.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/harpers-ferry-in-no-shape-to-defend-itself-mcclellan-clueless-to-many-things/
Pictures: 1862-09 Harpers Ferry Map; 1863-09-12 Chattanooga, in Harper's Weekly; 1861-09-12 Battle at Cheat Mountain Map; cavalry battle
A. 1861: Confederate defeat at Cheat Mountain, western Virginia. Location: Pocahontas County. CSA Gen. Robert E. Lee directed his first offensive of the war against Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds’s entrenchments on the summit of Cheat Mountain and in the Tygart Valley. The Confederate attacks were uncoordinated, however, and the Federal defense was so stubborn that Col. Albert Rust (leading the attacks) was convinced that he confronted an overwhelming force. He actually faced only about 300 determined Federals. Lee called off the attack and, after maneuvering in the vicinity, withdrew to Valley Head on September 17.
Estimated Casualties: 170 total (US 80; CS 90)
B. 1862: Battle of Harpers Ferry. CSA Maj Gen Thomas Stonewall Jackson’s division left Frederick, Maryland on Sept. 10, and fighting began on September 12 on Maryland Heights. Jackson coordinated an attack that began with Gen. Lafayette McLaws placing artillery on Maryland Heights, aimed for an attack against both Bolivar Heights and Camp Hill. The troops defending Maryland Heights - Col. Thomas H. Ford’s 126th New York Volunteers - had only been in the army for 21 days and were no match for the seasoned veterans of CSA Brig Gen Joseph B. Kershaw’s and CSA Brig Gen William Barksdale’s brigades.
C. 1863: Chickamauga Campaign. Realizing that part of his force had narrowly escaped a Confederate trap, Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans abandoned his plans for a pursuit and began to concentrate his Army of the Cumberland scattered forces. As he wrote in his official report, it was "a matter of life and death." On September 12, he ordered Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook XX Corps, and Brig. Gen. Robert B. Mitchell Cavalry Corps to move northeast to Stevens Gap to join with Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas XIV Corps, intending for this combined force to continue northeast to link up with Crittenden. The message to McCook took a full day to reach him at Alpine and the route he selected to move northeast required three days of marching 57 miles, retracing his steps over Lookout Mountain.”
D. 1864: CSA General Nathan Bedford Forrest was having internal problems. Forrest had given General Orders Number 73 to Brigadier-General Chalmers. It stated that regiments under Chalmers’ commands were to organize into a brigade, “to be designated as Rucker’s brigade.” Well like in the North, the South believed in seniority, too, and General E. W. Rucker was not senior; or so Colonels J.J. Neely, Stewart, Green, Duckworth and Allen thought. Forrest, himself not being a schooled military man, he wanted Rucker to lead, so Rucker was chosen senior or not. The colonels asked Rucker not to accept the position, advising him “for the sake of the country,” to decline the commission. This just made Forrest furious. Forrest suspends all of them from their commands, puts them under arrest, charges them with inciting to mutiny, and courtmartialed them; except Duckworth. Duckworth, he sends to fight in Mobile. The regiment is now under Lt. Col. W. F. Taylor (CSA).
FYI SGT Mark Anderson PO3 Edward Riddle Maj William W. 'Bill' Price COL (Join to see) SSgt David M.] SPC Maurice Evans SPC Jon O. SGT Jim ArnoldAmn Dale PreisachCW4 (Join to see) Sgt Jerry GenesioSSG (Join to see)LTC John Griscom LTC Thomas Tennant LTC David Brown LTC (Join to see) CWO3 (Join to see) SGT John " Mac " McConnell SFC (Join to see) CPL Ronald Keyes Jr
In 1862, the Natchez Daily Courier reported: “Arrest of a Young Lady. Miss Green, a loyal young lady in one of the northwestern counties in Virginia, was arrested and put in jail in Buckhannon, Upshur county, on a charge of cutting telegraph wires in the Yankee army. When interrogated, she confessed she had cut the wires, and said that she would do so again if set at liberty, at the same time refusing to take the oath of Yankee servitude. One end of the wire cut was found stuck in the ground several inches, and when asked why she did that, she replied that a great many Yankees had been killed, and as that wire pointed the way they had gone, it would doubtless be used to know; if there was room for any more.”
In 1863, Northern Georgia and eastern Tennessee were the scenes of numerous skirmishes. Sites where official skirmishes occurred included Rheatown, Tenn., and Leet’s Tanyard, Alpine, the LaFayette Road, and Dirt Town in Georgia.
The bungled affair at Cheat Mountain on Thursday, September 12, 1861. “The Confederate plan of attack at Cheat Mountain in Western Virginia was, by dawn, ready. Each of the five brigades were in position and the Union forces on Cheat and at Elkwater, seven miles to the west, were completely unaware that General Lee was about to attack them.
General Lee had put his faith in an untried brigade commander, Col. Rust, to give the signal when to attack. It was on the sound of Rust’s assault upon the Union right flank on Cheat Mountain that the other four brigades were to begin their own movements forward.
Rust, determined to prove himself, roused his men and lead them towards the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike, behind the Union right flank, capturing two Union pickets and some wagons. The prisoners, lying, told him that there were 5,000 Federal troops in the fort (there were only about 3,000).
Now sure of what to do, Rust rode to a clearing to see the Union fortifications for himself. Before him was a formidable bastion with a blockhouse, trenches and wooden spikes sticking out of the earthen walls of the fort. He concluded that it was “madness” to attack.
Thinking that Rust’s force was only a scouting party, two companies from Indiana (probably no more than 100 men) were sent forward from the fort to investigate how many Rebels were in the woods. The Indiana boys advanced into the wilderness and fired a volley into the woods at the unknown number of Confederates. With that, Rust’s brigade of 1,600 broke and ran. The ground was littered with their accouterments as the greatly-outnumbered Indiana troops gave chase.
Just above Elkwater [near Salt Lick on the map], General Lee waited for Rust’s signal, which did not come. Lee, who was with Donelson’s brigade to the left flank of the Union troops at Elkwater, realized that the element of surprise was gone and so Lee ordered the brigade to retire back to camp.
On their way down the valley, they stumbled upon a company of Federal troops who immediately put up a heavy resistance. Each side hammered away at the other until more Confederate troops scrambled towards the action. The Union troops, wildly outnumbered, retreated towards another Union detachment, a couple of miles west of Cheat Fort.
The other Union detachment was exchanging shots with Confederate troops in Anderson’s brigade, who were also waiting for Col. Rust’s signal. The retreating Union company had run into the rear of Anderson’s troops and began firing volleys into them, scattered cooks, slaves and staff. Both Union detachments, still greatly outnumbered, made quick time back to the confines of the fort.
The two other Confederate brigades under Loring (facing Elkwater) and Jackson (facing Cheat Fort) were still waiting for Rust’s signal. It never came and they remained in their positions.
The strange day was hardly a battle. A few sharp skirmishes, loosely tied together and lots of waiting and wondering occupied both sides even after dark.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/the-bungled-affair-at-cheat-mountain/
Harpers Ferry was in no shape to be defended on Friday, September 12, 1862. “General John Wool had lost track of his men. The Union commander of the Middle Department, comprising Pennsylvania, New Jersey and the Maryland counties along the B&O Railroad, was headquartered in Baltimore, while his troops in Harpers Ferry were quickly being surrounded by invading Confederate forces.
“You can put any of my troops under McClellan’s command,” wrote Wool to General-in-Chief Henry Halleck. The problem was, Wool had no real idea how many troops he had. He speculated that Harpers Ferry had seven or eight thousand. McClellan, who had already asked Halleck for the use of the Harpers Ferry garrison, supposed their number to be closer to 25,000. In truth, it was around 14,000, but as the sun rose over South Mountain and Maryland Heights, just east of the town, it didn’t really matter.
Commanding the troops in question was General Dixon Miles, a career military officer pushing sixty. Miles had been first ignorant and then unreasonably optimistic over the reports of Rebels approaching Maryland Heights. He estimated only ten regiments opposed him. In truth, there were nearly ten times that number closing in around him.
“I expect this will be the last you hear of me until this affair is over,” wrote Miles to Halleck. “All are cheerful and hopeful. Good-bye.”
General Miles had reason to be hopeful. He believed only two brigades of infantry and some artillery were approaching him. His force, perhaps double that figure, could hold off such a raid.
What Miles failed to notice was Stonewall Jackson’s force to the north, 12,000-strong. He also never noticed General John Walker’s 3,400 men approaching Louden Heights to the south. And though he allowed that a few more regiments of Rebels had joined the ten regiments after dusk, he had no idea that they were actually joined by six other brigades under Lafayette McLaws.
Jackson was just entering the abandoned Martinsburg to the north, and Walker was about to ascend Louden Heights as McLaws made his move. As his division drew closer, he peeled off brigades to close Solomon’s, Brownsville, and Crampton’s Gaps. Another plunged toward the Potomac, hitting Point of Rocks. Each sealed off any possible Federal escape route towards Washington.
The main Confederate thrust came from Kershaws Brigade, stumbling its way across the crest of Elk Ridge. When they approached the thin Union lines atop Maryland Heights – an extension of the ridge – they met with equally thin resistance. Greeting them were the greenest of troops, having been in blue for barely three weeks. Most of Miles’ men were in the town itself.
Though unexperienced, their fortifications and a handful of reinforcements (bringing their number to around 1,700 men), was enough to keep Kershaw too unsure to commit his roughly 2,000 veterans.
General Lee’s Special Order 191 required directed McLaws to be upon Maryland Heights, which he had technically accomplished. For Walker, he was to be upon Louden Heights, “if practicable.” By nightfall, he was at Hillsborough, and ready to move the next morning for the Heights. Jackson, though remembered as running a day behind, was actually just where the Order required him to be. On the morning of September 12, he was supposed to “take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg.”
Before noon, this was accomplished. He sent A.P. Hill’s Division ahead, towards Harpers Ferry. The rest of his command would follow the next day.
General George McClellan, commanding Army of the Potomac, believed the Rebel army of General Lee might be slipping away, to recross the Potomac River back into Virginia. “From all I can gather,” he wrote his wife this afternoon,” secesh is skedaddelling & I don’t think I can catch him unless he is really moving into Penna [….] I begin to think that he is making off to get out of the scrape by recrossing the river at Williamsport.”
More or less, however, he knew the approximate route that General Lee had taken. The enemy was “moving in two directions. Viz. on the Hagerstown and Harpers Ferry roads.”
As the day wore on and his men marched into Frederick, occupying the former camps of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, McClellan began to think of Harpers Ferry. He had heard no firing from that direction, and assumed all to be well enough. Due to Miles’ last dispatch, he knew that the Rebels were closing in, but figured that the garrison “if they fight at all,” could hold out until he could relieve them.
General Ambrose Burnside commanded the right wing of McClellan’s Army of the Potomac. His cavalry had been skirmishing with their Rebel counterparts all day. From the intelligence he could gather, he believed that Lee was headed into Pennsylvania (which was actually Lee’s ultimate goal). From McClellan, he heard that the Rebels were moving towards Harpers Ferry and upon Gettysburg, but doubted that.
“I can hardly understand how they can be moving on these two latter roads at the same time,” wrote Burnside to Halleck. “If they are going into Pennsylvania they would hardly be moving upon the Harper’s Ferry road, and if they are going to recross, how could they be moving upon Gettysburg!”
Of course, that was precisely what the Confederates were doing, though they had no intension of recrossing and staying in Virginia.
General Hooker, commanding a corps under Burnside, put it more bluntly: “It is satisfactory to my mind that the rebels have no more intention of going to Harrisburg than they have of going to heaven.”
Whether the Rebels were moving farther northward into Pennsylvania or returning to Virginia, nobody seemed to have a clue. Soon, however, that would all change.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/harpers-ferry-in-no-shape-to-defend-itself-mcclellan-clueless-to-many-things/
Pictures: 1862-09 Harpers Ferry Map; 1863-09-12 Chattanooga, in Harper's Weekly; 1861-09-12 Battle at Cheat Mountain Map; cavalry battle
A. 1861: Confederate defeat at Cheat Mountain, western Virginia. Location: Pocahontas County. CSA Gen. Robert E. Lee directed his first offensive of the war against Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds’s entrenchments on the summit of Cheat Mountain and in the Tygart Valley. The Confederate attacks were uncoordinated, however, and the Federal defense was so stubborn that Col. Albert Rust (leading the attacks) was convinced that he confronted an overwhelming force. He actually faced only about 300 determined Federals. Lee called off the attack and, after maneuvering in the vicinity, withdrew to Valley Head on September 17.
Estimated Casualties: 170 total (US 80; CS 90)
B. 1862: Battle of Harpers Ferry. CSA Maj Gen Thomas Stonewall Jackson’s division left Frederick, Maryland on Sept. 10, and fighting began on September 12 on Maryland Heights. Jackson coordinated an attack that began with Gen. Lafayette McLaws placing artillery on Maryland Heights, aimed for an attack against both Bolivar Heights and Camp Hill. The troops defending Maryland Heights - Col. Thomas H. Ford’s 126th New York Volunteers - had only been in the army for 21 days and were no match for the seasoned veterans of CSA Brig Gen Joseph B. Kershaw’s and CSA Brig Gen William Barksdale’s brigades.
C. 1863: Chickamauga Campaign. Realizing that part of his force had narrowly escaped a Confederate trap, Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans abandoned his plans for a pursuit and began to concentrate his Army of the Cumberland scattered forces. As he wrote in his official report, it was "a matter of life and death." On September 12, he ordered Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook XX Corps, and Brig. Gen. Robert B. Mitchell Cavalry Corps to move northeast to Stevens Gap to join with Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas XIV Corps, intending for this combined force to continue northeast to link up with Crittenden. The message to McCook took a full day to reach him at Alpine and the route he selected to move northeast required three days of marching 57 miles, retracing his steps over Lookout Mountain.”
D. 1864: CSA General Nathan Bedford Forrest was having internal problems. Forrest had given General Orders Number 73 to Brigadier-General Chalmers. It stated that regiments under Chalmers’ commands were to organize into a brigade, “to be designated as Rucker’s brigade.” Well like in the North, the South believed in seniority, too, and General E. W. Rucker was not senior; or so Colonels J.J. Neely, Stewart, Green, Duckworth and Allen thought. Forrest, himself not being a schooled military man, he wanted Rucker to lead, so Rucker was chosen senior or not. The colonels asked Rucker not to accept the position, advising him “for the sake of the country,” to decline the commission. This just made Forrest furious. Forrest suspends all of them from their commands, puts them under arrest, charges them with inciting to mutiny, and courtmartialed them; except Duckworth. Duckworth, he sends to fight in Mobile. The regiment is now under Lt. Col. W. F. Taylor (CSA).
FYI SGT Mark Anderson PO3 Edward Riddle Maj William W. 'Bill' Price COL (Join to see) SSgt David M.] SPC Maurice Evans SPC Jon O. SGT Jim ArnoldAmn Dale PreisachCW4 (Join to see) Sgt Jerry GenesioSSG (Join to see)LTC John Griscom LTC Thomas Tennant LTC David Brown LTC (Join to see) CWO3 (Join to see) SGT John " Mac " McConnell SFC (Join to see) CPL Ronald Keyes Jr
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Sherman and Grant plan their next moves on Monday, September 12, 1864. “The exodus of people is progressing and matters coming into shape,” wrote William Tecumseh Sherman to General Grant. Sherman had ordered a week-long truce in order to empty the city of Atlanta of civilians. This not only saved a few lives (in the mind of Sherman, at any rate), but more importantly, it allowed the Federal army time to plan its next move without the probability of enemy involvement.
Sherman’s ordered evacuation pertained to all civilians, no matter where their sympathies might lie. Those loyal to the North could go north, and those loyal to the South could go south – but mostly, they just had to leave.
The efforts to exchange prisoners had made some headway, with Sherman suggesting that both sides simply exchange the last 2,000 prisoners taken. A neutral camp would soon be established at the town of Rough and Ready. But that wasn’t really such a big deal to Sherman. He was looking ahead and trying to figure out what Grant wanted him to do.
On the 10th, Grant allowed Sherman to rest his men, but told him that it was “desirable that another campaign should be commenced” as soon as they were in order. “We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. If we give him no peace while the war lasts, the end cannot be distant.” Here Grant suggested that they move Edward Canby’s troops near New Orleans “to act upon Savannah whilst you move on Augusta.”
Hood’s Army of Tennessee had been battered, but it was still a formidable foe. There was no way for Sherman to simply stroll across Georgia. And so to take Savannah, Grant suggested Canby and his disposable force of 15,000. Canby could gather, he told Sherman, upwards of 30,000 men to operate against Savannah once the enemy in the far west figured out its next phase of operation.
But already Sherman wanted details. “I don’t understand whether you propose to act against Savannah direct from Fort Pulaski or by way of Florida or from the direction of Mobile.” If the city could be taken “by a sudden coup de main it would be valuable.”
In his reply, Grant lamented that the Confederates moving toward Missouri under Sterling Price had thrown a wrench into the works. If not for Price, Canby and Sherman could both have sent 12,000 men to Mobile (Sherman’s would come from those stationed along the eastern bank of the Mississippi). “With these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one-half to Mobile and the other half to Savannah.”
If that had been able to happen, Sherman would have had enough troops “so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of supplies.” But that did not happen. Sterling Price’s raid, mostly forgotten by history, had changed everything.
And so Grant could do little more than send a staff officer to visit Sherman “not so much to suggest operations for you as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be ready.” Grant selected October 5th as the earliest any of the armies, including the Army of the Potomac before Petersburg, Virginia, would move.
As far as Grant and Petersburg were concerned, Grant wished to extend his left toward the railroad to Lynchburg, cutting deeper west. At the same time, he wanted to send as many as 10,000 men against Wilmington, North Carolina. In conjunction with the Navy, “the ironclads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/sherman-and-grant-plan-their-next-moves/
Below are several journal entries from 1862 and 1863 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. In 1862, Hooker protested to McClellan the reassignment of division commander John Reynolds to command militia in Pennsylvania at the height of the Maryland Campaign. Meanwhile, CSA Gen Robert E. Lee explained his intentions to move on Hagerstown to CSA President Jefferson Davis.
Friday, September 12, 1862: Maj Gen Joseph Hooker to Maj Gen George B. McClellan "a scared Governor ought not to be permitted to destroy the usefulness of an entire division of the army, on the eve of important operations....It is satisfactory in my mind that the rebels have no more intention of going to Harrisburg than they had of going to heaven. It is only in the United States that atrocities like this are entertained."
Friday, September 12, 1862: CSA Gen Robert E. Lee to CSA President Jefferson Davis "Before crossing the Potomac, I considered the advantages of entering Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge. In either case it was my intention to march upon this town [Hagerstown]"
Friday, September 12, 1862: George Michael Neese, of the Confederate artillery, is on the march in Maryland, and finds the inconvenience of traveling so quickly as to outmarch the commisary wagons and their rations, and so they forage in the surrounding farms: “September 12 —We had nothing to eat yesterday, and, contrary to general orders, our lieutenant told us last night that if we could find corn or potatoes that we might take enough to satisfy the requirements of the inner man. We soon found both corn and potatoes, twin brothers in diet that can be so happily devoured without bread. It is wonderful and almost inconceivable what an amount of corn and potatoes a soldier can engulf in his internal arrangements when they are properly adjusted by healthy, honest hunger after an all-day’s march without a morsel to check the shrinkage of his musculo-membranous reservoir.”
Saturday, September 12, 1863: Gen. Rosecrans begins to wax wary, sending orders to Gen. Granger, in command of his reserves, to move forward and reinforce the Union center. At this point, Rosecrans apparently has little idea where the Rebels are: “HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Chattanooga, September 12, 1863-11.45 a. m. Major-General GRANGER,Bridgeport, Ala.: “The enemy has concentrated in vicinity of La Fayette and attacked one of General Thomas’ columns yesterday, between Dug and Stevens’ Gaps, with superior force. We are concentrating the army to support General Thomas and fight a general battle. Send an order to General Ling to hasten his march and join General Thomas at the earliest possible moment by way of Stevens’ Gap. Come to this place immediately with Steedman’s division. Move in light marching order by the shortest route, and direct your trains to follow. If all reports are true, we have not a moment to lose. The Shellmound brigade (McCook’s) should move at once.
J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier-General, Chief of Staff.”
Pictures: 1863 Hilton head signal station; 1862-09 Union Camp at Harpers Ferry; 1863-09 Army of Cumberland Supplies arrive by train; 1861-09-12 third Arkansas Regt civil war
A. Thursday, September 12, 1861: Confederate defeat at Cheat Mountain, western Virginia. Location: Pocahontas County. Principal Commanders: Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee and Col. Albert Rust [CS]
Description: Gen. Robert E. Lee directed his first offensive of the war against Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds’s entrenchments on the summit of Cheat Mountain and in the Tygart Valley. The Confederate attacks were uncoordinated, however, and the Federal defense was so stubborn that Col. Albert Rust (leading the attacks) was convinced that he confronted an overwhelming force. He actually faced only about 300 determined Federals. Lee called off the attack and, after maneuvering in the vicinity, withdrew to Valley Head on September 17. In October, Lee renewed operations against Laurel Mountain with the troops of Floyd and Loring, but the operation was called off because of poor communication and lack of supplies. Lee was recalled to Richmond on October 30 after achieving little in western Virginia.
Estimated Casualties: 170 total (US 80; CS 90)
B. Friday, September 12, 1862: First day of the Battle at Harpers Ferry, Western Virginia.
Battle of Harpers Ferry. CSA Maj Gen Thomas Stonewall Jackson’s division left Frederick, Maryland on Sept. 10, and fighting began on September 12 on Maryland Heights. Jackson coordinated an attack that began with Gen. Lafayette McLaws placing artillery on Maryland Heights, aimed for an attack against both Bolivar Heights and Camp Hill. The troops defending Maryland Heights - Col. Thomas H. Ford’s 126th New York Volunteers - had only been in the army for 21 days and were no match for the seasoned veterans of CSA Brig Gen Joseph B. Kershaw’s and CSA Brig Gen William Barksdale’s brigades.
Details: Col. Dixon Miles, over 60 years old and close to retirement, estimates that no more than two brigades of Confederate troops with artillery are approaching Harper’s Ferry, and he has at least twice that number, with his 14,000-man garrison. He does not realize that Gen. McLaws is occupying Maryland heights with six brigades, rather than two, and that Gen. Walker was occupying Loudon Heights with another 3,400 men. On this date, Stonewall Jackson, with the remaining 12,000 men of his command, has just taken Martinsburg, a key point that controls the B & O Railroad. He sends A.P. Hill’s division on to Harper’s Ferry, the rest to follow tomorrow.
Ironically, since Longstreet is marching to Hagerstown, and scouts have pushed up into Pennsylvania, Union observers and generals assume that Lee is invading Pennsylvania; since Jackson has crossed the Potomac to go get Harper’s Ferry, others assume that he is retreating. McClellan assumes this. He writes to his wife, "From all I can gather, secesh is skedaddelling & I don’t think I can catch him unless he is really moving into Penna [....] I begin to think that he is making off to get out of the scrape by recrossing the river at Williamsport." Confusion begins to rule the Federal communications, since it surely is impossible that Lee is both "skedaddling" and invading Pennsylvania both. But that is precisely where his troops are heading. A puzzled and frustrated Gen. Burnside, commanding McClellan’s Right Wing, telegrams "I can hardly understand how they can be moving on these two latter roads at the same time. If they are going into Pennsylvania they would hardly be moving upon the Harper’s Ferry road, and if they are going to recross, how could they be moving upon Gettysburg!"
C. Saturday, September 12, 1863: Chickamauga Campaign. Realizing that part of his force had narrowly escaped a Confederate trap, Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans abandoned his plans for a pursuit and began to concentrate his Army of the Cumberland scattered forces. As he wrote in his official report, it was "a matter of life and death." On September 12, he ordered Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook XX Corps, and Brig. Gen. Robert B. Mitchell Cavalry Corps to move northeast to Stevens Gap to join with Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas XIV Corps, intending for this combined force to continue northeast to link up with Crittenden. The message to McCook took a full day to reach him at Alpine and the route he selected to move northeast required three days of marching 57 miles, retracing his steps over Lookout Mountain.”
Details: On the evening of the 11th, Negley barely escaped without too much of a fight. The next morning (on this date), after Thomas was brought up to speed on what was before him, he sent Rosecrans an almost optimistic message. He explained that he was moving forward nearly his entire corps to come to Negley’s side. Convinced that a large chunk of Bragg’s army was at Dug Gap and La Fayette, he also gave some advice: “If a force could be thrown in from Chattanooga in his (the enemy’s) rear, it would be difficult for him to escape.”
To Rosecrans, Thomas was almost optimistic. He explained that he was moving forward nearly his entire corps to come to Negley’s side. Convinced that a large chunk of Bragg’s army was at Dug Gapa and La Fayette, he also gave some advice: “If a force could be thrown in from Chattanooga in his (the enemy’s) rear, it would be difficult for him to escape.”
To his own staff, however, Thomas expressed quite a different opinion. “Nothing but stupendous blunders on the part of Bragg can save our army from total defeat. I have ordered Negley to fall back from McLemore’s Cove, and I believe we may be able to save this corps. But Bragg is also in position to strike McCook and Crittenden before they have a chance to extricate themselves.”
Though General Rosecrans was finally convinced that Bragg had made it to La Fayette, he believed Negley had retreated “more through prudence than compulsion.” However, Rosecrans was also certain that the Confederates were already evacuating the town and about to make haste for Rome, Georgia. In this he was mistaken.
Thomas was mostly correct in his assertion that while his own corps was saved by holding a fine defensive position at Stephen’s Gap, both McCook on his right and Crittenden on his left were in a bit of trouble. He tried to take care of McCook’s Corps by suggesting that he close in on Thomas’. This was a lovely notion, but with the Rebels holding La Fayette (and not merely using it as a road of escape), the move would be exceedingly difficult and would require a day or two of backtracking. General Philip Sheridan, commanding a division in McCook’s Corps put it best. “This is all wrong,” he told one of his officers. “We have no business here, we ought to be in Chattanooga.” Still, by staying put, McCook was safer than not, and that’s basically what he did.
Crittenden’s XXI Corps, however, was dangling. He had moved two divisions to Lee & Gordon’s Mill, but a third, under John Palmer had caught the eye of Braxton Bragg.
Before the dawn, Bragg had ordered corps commander Leonidas Polk to send a division under Benjamin Cheatham north toward Rock Spring where Palmer’s Federal Division was isolated. A little while later, Bragg sent two other divisions. One was Thomas Hindman’s, fresh from the nonbattle of the previous day, and the other was from W.H.T. Walker’s Reserve Corps. Bragg was excited about the prospects, but realized that time was slipping away. The troops had to march eight miles to get into position, and if Hindman’s speed the day before was any indication, things would need to be hastened.
The previous day was, of course, still on Bragg’s mind. He had neglected to give Hindman specific orders until it was too late (and those were ignored anyway). He would not make the same mistake again. To General Polk, he directly ordered him to attack the errant Federal division with everything he had the next morning.
D. Monday, September 12, 1864: It seems that General Forrest (CSA) is having internal problems. On August 30th, Forrest gave oral commands to Brigadier-General Chalmers, today the orders came written as General Orders Number 73. It stated that regiments under Chalmers’ commands were to organize into a brigade, “to be designated as Rucker’s brigade.” Well like in the North, the South believed in seniority, too, and General E. W. Rucker was not senior; or so Colonels J.J. Neely, Stewart, Green, Duckworth and Allen thought. Forrest, himself not being a schooled military man, he wanted Rucker to lead, so Rucker was chosen senior or not. The colonels asked Rucker not to accept the position, advising him “for the sake of the country,” to decline the commission. This just made Forrest furious. Forrest suspends all of them from their commands, puts them under arrest, charges them with inciting to mutiny, and courtmartialed them; except Duckworth. Duckworth, he sends to fight in Mobile. The regiment is now under Lt. Col. W. F. Taylor (CSA). The final results of this were, Colonel J.J. Neely was dismissed from service, and Stewart, Duckworth, Allen and Green were suspended from their commands on October 18, 1864.
1. Thursday, September, 12, 1861: The greatest fear in Washington was the possible secession of Maryland. Orders were quietly issued by Abraham Lincoln to Secretary of War Simon Cameron, for the arrest of Maryland legislators who are openly pro-South. The gentlemen were quietly arrested. They were taken for confinement to Ft. Warren in Boston Harbor.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-twenty-two
2. Friday, September 12, 1862: Pres. Lincoln, even more frustrated, telegrams Gen. McClellan, "Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt."
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+12%2C+1862
3. Friday, September 12, 1862: Frankfort, Kentucky, the state capital, is occupied by Confederate troops and Gen. Edmund Kirby-Smith.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+12%2C+1862
4. Friday, September 12, 1862: If, Gen. George McClellan had no idea where Robert E. Lee and his army were located, the state officials in Pennsylvania had good idea, that he was headed for them. On the assumption that Lee would try to stay some distance away from the McClellan’s army made this a fairly logical possibility. Orders were issued in Harrisburg and Philadelphia today to box up the state’s documents, bonds, archives and treasury and ship them to New York for safekeeping. A fair number of politicians decided to ride along on the train--just to keep the records safe, of course.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-74
5. Friday, September 12, 1862: The Natchez Daily Courier reported: “Arrest of a Young Lady. Miss Green, a loyal young lady in one of the northwestern counties in Virginia, was arrested and put in jail in Buckhannon, Upshur county, on a charge of cutting telegraph wires in the Yankee army. When interrogated, she confessed she had cut the wires, and said that she would do so again if set at liberty, at the same time refusing to take the oath of Yankee servitude. One end of the wire cut was found stuck in the ground several inches, and when asked why she did that, she replied that a great many Yankees had been killed, and as that wire pointed the way they had gone, it would doubtless be used to know; if there was room for any more.”
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-74
6. Friday, September 12, 1862: Maj Gen Joseph Hooker "a scared Governor ought not to be permitted to destroy the usefulness of an entire division of the army, on the eve of important operations....It is satisfactory in my mind that the rebels have no more intention of going to Harrisburg than they had of going to heaven. It is only in the United States that atrocities like this are entertained."
Hooker protesting to McClellan the reassignment of division commander John Reynolds to command militia in Pennsylvania at the height of the Maryland Campaign. From The Maryland Campaign of September 1862 Vol. 1 South Mountain. Edited by Tom Clemens. New York: Savas Beatie, 2010. Page 204
http://southfromthenorthwoods.blogspot.com/2011/09/september-12-1862-voices.html
7. Friday, September 12, 1862: CSA Gen Robert E. Lee "Before crossing the Potomac, I considered the advantages of entering Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge. In either case it was my intention to march upon this town [Hagerstown]"
Lee to Davis explaining his intentions to move on Hagerstown. From Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee & Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 by Joseph L. Harsh. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1999.
http://southfromthenorthwoods.blogspot.com/2011/09/september-12-1862-voices.html
8. Friday, September 12, 1862: George Michael Neese, of the Confederate artillery, is on the march in Maryland, and finds the inconvenience of traveling so quickly as to outmarch the commisary wagons and their rations, and so they forage in the surrounding farms: “September 12 —We had nothing to eat yesterday, and, contrary to general orders, our lieutenant told us last night that if we could find corn or potatoes that we might take enough to satisfy the requirements of the inner man. We soon found both corn and potatoes, twin brothers in diet that can be so happily devoured without bread. It is wonderful and almost inconceivable what an amount of corn and potatoes a soldier can engulf in his internal arrangements when they are properly adjusted by healthy, honest hunger after an all-day’s march without a morsel to check the shrinkage of his musculo-membranous reservoir.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+12%2C+1862
9. Saturday, September 12, 1863: Gen. Rosecrans begins to wax wary, sending orders to Gen. Granger, in command of his reserves, to move forward and reinforce the Union center. At this point, Rosecrans apparently has little idea where the Rebels are: “HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Chattanooga, September 12, 1863-11.45 a. m. Major-General GRANGER,Bridgeport, Ala.: “The enemy has concentrated in vicinity of La Fayette and attacked one of General Thomas’ columns yesterday, between Dug and Stevens’ Gaps, with superior force. We are concentrating the army to support General Thomas and fight a general battle. Send an order to General Ling to hasten his march and join General Thomas at the earliest possible moment by way of Stevens’ Gap. Come to this place immediately with Steedman’s division. Move in light marching order by the shortest route, and direct your trains to follow. If all reports are true, we have not a moment to lose. The Shellmound brigade (McCook’s) should move at once.
J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier-General, Chief of Staff.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+12%2C+1863
10. Saturday, September 12, 1863: Northern Georgia and eastern Tennessee were the scenes of numerous skirmishes. They didn’t amount to much unless you added them all up together. Sites where official skirmishes occurred included Rheatown, Tenn., and Leet’s Tanyard, Alpine, the LaFayette Road, and Dirt Town in Georgia.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-126
11. Monday, September 12, 1864:
12.
A Thursday, September 12 - September 15,1861: Battle of Cheat Mountain. Other names: Cheat Summit, Fort Milroy Joseph Reynolds [US] defeats Robert E. Lee [CS]
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186109
A+ Thursday, September 12 - September 15, 1861: Battle of Cheat Mountain. Location: Pocahontas County. Principal Commanders: Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee and Col. Albert Rust [CS]
Description: Gen. Robert E. Lee directed his first offensive of the war against Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds’s entrenchments on the summit of Cheat Mountain and in the Tygart Valley. The Confederate attacks were uncoordinated, however, and the Federal defense was so stubborn that Col. Albert Rust (leading the attacks) was convinced that he confronted an overwhelming force. He actually faced only about 300 determined Federals. Lee called off the attack and, after maneuvering in the vicinity, withdrew to Valley Head on September 17. In October, Lee renewed operations against Laurel Mountain with the troops of Floyd and Loring, but the operation was called off because of poor communication and lack of supplies. Lee was recalled to Richmond on October 30 after achieving little in western Virginia.
Estimated Casualties: 170 total (US 80; CS 90)
https://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/wv005.htm
B Thursday, September 12 - September 15, 1862: Battle of Harpers Ferry. Stonewall Jackson takes 12,000 prisoners.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186209
B+ Thursday, September 12 - September 15, 1862: Battle of Harpers Ferry. CSA Maj Gen Thomas Stonewall Jackson’s division left Frederick, Maryland on Sept. 10, and fighting began on September 12 on Maryland Heights. Jackson coordinated an attack that began with Gen. Lafayette McLaws placing artillery on Maryland Heights, aimed for an attack against both Bolivar Heights and Camp Hill. The troops defending Maryland Heights - Col. Thomas H. Ford’s 126th New York Volunteers - had only been in the army for 21 days and were no match for the seasoned veterans of CSA Brig Gen Joseph B. Kershaw’s and CSA Brig Gen William Barksdale’s brigades.
B++ Friday, September 12, 1862: Col. Dixon Miles, over 60 years old and close to retirement, estimates that no more than two brigades of Confederate troops with artillery are approaching Harper’s Ferry, and he has at least twice that number, with his 14,000-man garrison. He does not realize that Gen. McLaws is occupying Maryland heights with six brigades, rather than two, and that Gen. Walker was occupying Loudon Heights with another 3,400 men. On this date, Stonewall Jackson, with the remaining 12,000 men of his command, has just taken Martinsburg, a key point that controls the B & O Railroad. He sends A.P. Hill’s division on to Harper’s Ferry, the rest to follow tomorrow.
Ironically, since Longstreet is marching to Hagerstown, and scouts have pushed up into Pennsylvania, Union observers and generals assume that Lee is invading Pennsylvania; since Jackson has crossed the Potomac to go get Harper’s Ferry, others assume that he is retreating. McClellan assumes this. He writes to his wife, "From all I can gather, secesh is skedaddelling & I don’t think I can catch him unless he is really moving into Penna [....] I begin to think that he is making off to get out of the scrape by recrossing the river at Williamsport." Confusion begins to rule the Federal communications, since it surely is impossible that Lee is both "skedaddling" and invading Pennsylvania both. But that is precisely where his troops are heading. A puzzled and frustrated Gen. Burnside, commanding McClellan’s Right Wing, telegrams "I can hardly understand how they can be moving on these two latter roads at the same time. If they are going into Pennsylvania they would hardly be moving upon the Harper’s Ferry road, and if they are going to recross, how could they he moving upon Gettysburg!"
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+12%2C+1862
C Saturday, September 12, 1863: Realizing that part of his force had narrowly escaped a Confederate trap, Rosecrans abandoned his plans for a pursuit and began to concentrate his scattered forces. As he wrote in his official report, it was "a matter of life and death." On September 12, he ordered McCook and the cavalry to move northeast to Stevens Gap to join with Thomas, intending for this combined force to continue northeast to link up with Crittenden. The message to McCook took a full day to reach him at Alpine and the route he selected to move northeast required three days of marching 57 miles, retracing his steps over Lookout Mountain.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chickamauga
C+ This Is All Wrong, We Have No Business Here – Stumbling Toward Chickamauga on Saturday, September 12, 1863. “Convinced that Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee was retreating in despair to Rome, Georgia, William Rosecrans had wanted to cut it off and trap them before they could get to La Fayette, thirty miles south of Chattanooga. Rosecrans had ordered his Army of the Cumberland to concentrate on La Fayette, but things hadn’t gone as planned.
On Rosecrans’ right, Alexander McCook’s XX Corps held the town of Alpine. It wasn’t quite on the road from La Fayette to Rome, but it was close enough for the time being. His left was under the XXI Corps, headed by Thomas Crittenden, who had captured Chattanooga. From there, he followed Bragg’s retreating Confederates, but had thus far tangled only with cavalry.
More than anything, it was the center that was keeping Rosecrans up at night. General George Thomas commanded the 23,000 men of the XIV Corps. He was an incredibly well respected senior commander whom almost everyone, including Rosecrans, admired. This was probably why it was so difficult for Rosecrans to wrap his head around just why it was taking Thomas so long to get to La Fayette.
On the 10th, Thomas had pushed forward James Negley’s Division, through Stephen’s Gap and McLemore’s Cove, past Davis’ Crossroads and up towards Dug Gap before they ran into Confederates under D.H. Hill. In fact, it was Hill’s entire corps. On Negley’s left was two other divisions led by Thomas Hindman. Negley took it upon himself, after discovering that multitudes of Rebels could very easy close in on him, to withdraw his troops to Thomas’ main body.
On the evening of the 11th, Negley barely escaped without too much of a fight. The next morning (on this date), after Thomas was brought up to speed on what was before him, he sent Rosecrans an almost optimistic message. He explained that he was moving forward nearly his entire corps to come to Negley’s side. Convinced that a large chunk of Bragg’s army was at Dug Gap and La Fayette, he also gave some advice: “If a force could be thrown in from Chattanooga in his (the enemy’s) rear, it would be difficult for him to escape.”
To Rosecrans, Thomas was almost optimistic. He explained that he was moving forward nearly his entire corps to come to Negley’s side. Convinced that a large chunk of Bragg’s army was at Dug Gapa and La Fayette, he also gave some advice: “If a force could be thrown in from Chattanooga in his (the enemy’s) rear, it would be difficult for him to escape.”
To his own staff, however, Thomas expressed quite a different opinion. “Nothing but stupendous blunders on the part of Bragg can save our army from total defeat. I have ordered Negley to fall back from McLemore’s Cove, and I believe we may be able to save this corps. But Bragg is also in position to strike McCook and Crittenden before they have a chance to extricate themselves.”
Though General Rosecrans was finally convinced that Bragg had made it to La Fayette, he believed Negley had retreated “more through prudence than compulsion.” However, Rosecrans was also certain that the Confederates were already evacuating the town and about to make haste for Rome, Georgia. In this he was mistaken.
Thomas was mostly correct in his assertion that while his own corps was saved by holding a fine defensive position at Stephen’s Gap, both McCook on his right and Crittenden on his left were in a bit of trouble. He tried to take care of McCook’s Corps by suggesting that he close in on Thomas’. This was a lovely notion, but with the Rebels holding La Fayette (and not merely using it as a road of escape), the move would be exceedingly difficult and would require a day or two of backtracking. General Philip Sheridan, commanding a division in McCook’s Corps put it best. “This is all wrong,” he told one of his officers. “We have no business here, we ought to be in Chattanooga.” Still, by staying put, McCook was safer than not, and that’s basically what he did.
Crittenden’s XXI Corps, however, was dangling. He had moved two divisions to Lee & Gordon’s Mill, but a third, under John Palmer had caught the eye of Braxton Bragg.
Before the dawn, Bragg had ordered corps commander Leonidas Polk to send a division under Benjamin Cheatham north toward Rock Spring where Palmer’s Federal Division was isolated. A little while later, Bragg sent two other divisions. One was Thomas Hindman’s, fresh from the nonbattle of the previous day, and the other was from W.H.T. Walker’s Reserve Corps. Bragg was excited about the prospects, but realized that time was slipping away. The troops had to march eight miles to get into position, and if Hindman’s speed the day before was any indication, things would need to be hastened.
The previous day was, of course, still on Bragg’s mind. He had neglected to give Hindman specific orders until it was too late (and those were ignored anyway). He would not make the same mistake again. To General Polk, he directly ordered him to attack the errant Federal division with everything he had the next morning.
Direct orders or not, things again went sour. Hindman tarried, though in his defense, Bragg once more issued him vague and discretionary orders, allowing him to march when his men were “refreshed” (though he never specified what it was they did that made them less than fresh). They would not show up until 4:30am the next day (the 13th). Walker’s troops, however, arrived at 8pm (on this date).
General Polk did not like what he saw. Scouts had reported that Palmer’s isolated Union division wasn’t quite as isolated as first suspected. He believed that Crittenden’s entire corps was within two or three miles of his point of attack, and wrote Bragg for reinforcements.
Bragg didn’t exactly acquiesce, but allowed Polk to turn his new position into a defensive one if he were attacked earlier than he launched his strike. He vowed to send more troops the next day, though he doubted very much that Crittenden’s entire corps had come up from Chattanooga so soon.
Palmer’s Union division had indeed been isolated and General Crittenden took notice. He ordered the troops west to join the rest of the corps at Lee & Gordon’s Mills. When Polk would finally send his scouts forward in the late morning of the 13th, he would find the former enemy position barren.
This was more luck than anything on Crittenden’s part. He gave no credence whatsoever to the idea that Bragg might actually attack him. “It has always been the plan of the enemy to make stubborn defenses on a retreat,” he wrote to James Garfield, Rosecrans’ Chief of Staff, “I do not yet believe that there is a strong force of infantry in the vicinity of La Fayette.”
Though he was farther away from La Fayette than any of the other corps commanders, and though he had been warned by Rosecrans that not only was Bragg in La Fayette, but that “there is far more probability of his attacking you than that he is running,” Crittenden completely refused to believe it.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/this-is-all-wrong-we-have-no-business-here-stumbling-toward-chickamauga/
Monday, September 12, 1864: It seems that General Forrest (CSA) is having internal problems. On August 30th, Forrest gave oral commands to Brigadier-General Chalmers, today the orders came written as General Orders Number 73. It stated that regiments under Chalmers’ commands were to organize into a brigade, “to be designated as Rucker’s brigade.” Well like in the North, the South believed in seniority, too, and General E. W. Rucker was not senior; or so Colonels J.J. Neely, Stewart, Green, Duckworth and Allen thought. Forrest, himself not being a schooled military man, he wanted Rucker to lead, so Rucker was chosen senior or not. The colonels asked Rucker not to accept the position, advising him “for the sake of the country,” to decline the commission. This just made Forrest furious. Forrest suspends all of them from their commands, puts them under arrest, charges them with inciting to mutiny, and courtmartialed them; except Duckworth. Duckworth, he sends to fight in Mobile. The regiment is now under Lt. Col. W. F. Taylor (CSA). The final results of this were, Colonel J.J. Neely was dismissed from service, and Stewart, Duckworth, Allen and Green were suspended from their commands on October 18, 1864.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-179
Monday, September 12, 1864: President Abraham Lincoln notifies Lieut. General Ulysses S. Grant (US) of his concern over Major General Philip H. Sheridan’s lack of progress in the Shenandoah Valley. Grant was not worried as he knew General Early (CSA) had 20,000 men to face a Union force of 43,000 men.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-179
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Sherman’s ordered evacuation pertained to all civilians, no matter where their sympathies might lie. Those loyal to the North could go north, and those loyal to the South could go south – but mostly, they just had to leave.
The efforts to exchange prisoners had made some headway, with Sherman suggesting that both sides simply exchange the last 2,000 prisoners taken. A neutral camp would soon be established at the town of Rough and Ready. But that wasn’t really such a big deal to Sherman. He was looking ahead and trying to figure out what Grant wanted him to do.
On the 10th, Grant allowed Sherman to rest his men, but told him that it was “desirable that another campaign should be commenced” as soon as they were in order. “We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. If we give him no peace while the war lasts, the end cannot be distant.” Here Grant suggested that they move Edward Canby’s troops near New Orleans “to act upon Savannah whilst you move on Augusta.”
Hood’s Army of Tennessee had been battered, but it was still a formidable foe. There was no way for Sherman to simply stroll across Georgia. And so to take Savannah, Grant suggested Canby and his disposable force of 15,000. Canby could gather, he told Sherman, upwards of 30,000 men to operate against Savannah once the enemy in the far west figured out its next phase of operation.
But already Sherman wanted details. “I don’t understand whether you propose to act against Savannah direct from Fort Pulaski or by way of Florida or from the direction of Mobile.” If the city could be taken “by a sudden coup de main it would be valuable.”
In his reply, Grant lamented that the Confederates moving toward Missouri under Sterling Price had thrown a wrench into the works. If not for Price, Canby and Sherman could both have sent 12,000 men to Mobile (Sherman’s would come from those stationed along the eastern bank of the Mississippi). “With these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one-half to Mobile and the other half to Savannah.”
If that had been able to happen, Sherman would have had enough troops “so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of supplies.” But that did not happen. Sterling Price’s raid, mostly forgotten by history, had changed everything.
And so Grant could do little more than send a staff officer to visit Sherman “not so much to suggest operations for you as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be ready.” Grant selected October 5th as the earliest any of the armies, including the Army of the Potomac before Petersburg, Virginia, would move.
As far as Grant and Petersburg were concerned, Grant wished to extend his left toward the railroad to Lynchburg, cutting deeper west. At the same time, he wanted to send as many as 10,000 men against Wilmington, North Carolina. In conjunction with the Navy, “the ironclads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/sherman-and-grant-plan-their-next-moves/
Below are several journal entries from 1862 and 1863 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. In 1862, Hooker protested to McClellan the reassignment of division commander John Reynolds to command militia in Pennsylvania at the height of the Maryland Campaign. Meanwhile, CSA Gen Robert E. Lee explained his intentions to move on Hagerstown to CSA President Jefferson Davis.
Friday, September 12, 1862: Maj Gen Joseph Hooker to Maj Gen George B. McClellan "a scared Governor ought not to be permitted to destroy the usefulness of an entire division of the army, on the eve of important operations....It is satisfactory in my mind that the rebels have no more intention of going to Harrisburg than they had of going to heaven. It is only in the United States that atrocities like this are entertained."
Friday, September 12, 1862: CSA Gen Robert E. Lee to CSA President Jefferson Davis "Before crossing the Potomac, I considered the advantages of entering Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge. In either case it was my intention to march upon this town [Hagerstown]"
Friday, September 12, 1862: George Michael Neese, of the Confederate artillery, is on the march in Maryland, and finds the inconvenience of traveling so quickly as to outmarch the commisary wagons and their rations, and so they forage in the surrounding farms: “September 12 —We had nothing to eat yesterday, and, contrary to general orders, our lieutenant told us last night that if we could find corn or potatoes that we might take enough to satisfy the requirements of the inner man. We soon found both corn and potatoes, twin brothers in diet that can be so happily devoured without bread. It is wonderful and almost inconceivable what an amount of corn and potatoes a soldier can engulf in his internal arrangements when they are properly adjusted by healthy, honest hunger after an all-day’s march without a morsel to check the shrinkage of his musculo-membranous reservoir.”
Saturday, September 12, 1863: Gen. Rosecrans begins to wax wary, sending orders to Gen. Granger, in command of his reserves, to move forward and reinforce the Union center. At this point, Rosecrans apparently has little idea where the Rebels are: “HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Chattanooga, September 12, 1863-11.45 a. m. Major-General GRANGER,Bridgeport, Ala.: “The enemy has concentrated in vicinity of La Fayette and attacked one of General Thomas’ columns yesterday, between Dug and Stevens’ Gaps, with superior force. We are concentrating the army to support General Thomas and fight a general battle. Send an order to General Ling to hasten his march and join General Thomas at the earliest possible moment by way of Stevens’ Gap. Come to this place immediately with Steedman’s division. Move in light marching order by the shortest route, and direct your trains to follow. If all reports are true, we have not a moment to lose. The Shellmound brigade (McCook’s) should move at once.
J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier-General, Chief of Staff.”
Pictures: 1863 Hilton head signal station; 1862-09 Union Camp at Harpers Ferry; 1863-09 Army of Cumberland Supplies arrive by train; 1861-09-12 third Arkansas Regt civil war
A. Thursday, September 12, 1861: Confederate defeat at Cheat Mountain, western Virginia. Location: Pocahontas County. Principal Commanders: Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee and Col. Albert Rust [CS]
Description: Gen. Robert E. Lee directed his first offensive of the war against Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds’s entrenchments on the summit of Cheat Mountain and in the Tygart Valley. The Confederate attacks were uncoordinated, however, and the Federal defense was so stubborn that Col. Albert Rust (leading the attacks) was convinced that he confronted an overwhelming force. He actually faced only about 300 determined Federals. Lee called off the attack and, after maneuvering in the vicinity, withdrew to Valley Head on September 17. In October, Lee renewed operations against Laurel Mountain with the troops of Floyd and Loring, but the operation was called off because of poor communication and lack of supplies. Lee was recalled to Richmond on October 30 after achieving little in western Virginia.
Estimated Casualties: 170 total (US 80; CS 90)
B. Friday, September 12, 1862: First day of the Battle at Harpers Ferry, Western Virginia.
Battle of Harpers Ferry. CSA Maj Gen Thomas Stonewall Jackson’s division left Frederick, Maryland on Sept. 10, and fighting began on September 12 on Maryland Heights. Jackson coordinated an attack that began with Gen. Lafayette McLaws placing artillery on Maryland Heights, aimed for an attack against both Bolivar Heights and Camp Hill. The troops defending Maryland Heights - Col. Thomas H. Ford’s 126th New York Volunteers - had only been in the army for 21 days and were no match for the seasoned veterans of CSA Brig Gen Joseph B. Kershaw’s and CSA Brig Gen William Barksdale’s brigades.
Details: Col. Dixon Miles, over 60 years old and close to retirement, estimates that no more than two brigades of Confederate troops with artillery are approaching Harper’s Ferry, and he has at least twice that number, with his 14,000-man garrison. He does not realize that Gen. McLaws is occupying Maryland heights with six brigades, rather than two, and that Gen. Walker was occupying Loudon Heights with another 3,400 men. On this date, Stonewall Jackson, with the remaining 12,000 men of his command, has just taken Martinsburg, a key point that controls the B & O Railroad. He sends A.P. Hill’s division on to Harper’s Ferry, the rest to follow tomorrow.
Ironically, since Longstreet is marching to Hagerstown, and scouts have pushed up into Pennsylvania, Union observers and generals assume that Lee is invading Pennsylvania; since Jackson has crossed the Potomac to go get Harper’s Ferry, others assume that he is retreating. McClellan assumes this. He writes to his wife, "From all I can gather, secesh is skedaddelling & I don’t think I can catch him unless he is really moving into Penna [....] I begin to think that he is making off to get out of the scrape by recrossing the river at Williamsport." Confusion begins to rule the Federal communications, since it surely is impossible that Lee is both "skedaddling" and invading Pennsylvania both. But that is precisely where his troops are heading. A puzzled and frustrated Gen. Burnside, commanding McClellan’s Right Wing, telegrams "I can hardly understand how they can be moving on these two latter roads at the same time. If they are going into Pennsylvania they would hardly be moving upon the Harper’s Ferry road, and if they are going to recross, how could they be moving upon Gettysburg!"
C. Saturday, September 12, 1863: Chickamauga Campaign. Realizing that part of his force had narrowly escaped a Confederate trap, Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans abandoned his plans for a pursuit and began to concentrate his Army of the Cumberland scattered forces. As he wrote in his official report, it was "a matter of life and death." On September 12, he ordered Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook XX Corps, and Brig. Gen. Robert B. Mitchell Cavalry Corps to move northeast to Stevens Gap to join with Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas XIV Corps, intending for this combined force to continue northeast to link up with Crittenden. The message to McCook took a full day to reach him at Alpine and the route he selected to move northeast required three days of marching 57 miles, retracing his steps over Lookout Mountain.”
Details: On the evening of the 11th, Negley barely escaped without too much of a fight. The next morning (on this date), after Thomas was brought up to speed on what was before him, he sent Rosecrans an almost optimistic message. He explained that he was moving forward nearly his entire corps to come to Negley’s side. Convinced that a large chunk of Bragg’s army was at Dug Gap and La Fayette, he also gave some advice: “If a force could be thrown in from Chattanooga in his (the enemy’s) rear, it would be difficult for him to escape.”
To Rosecrans, Thomas was almost optimistic. He explained that he was moving forward nearly his entire corps to come to Negley’s side. Convinced that a large chunk of Bragg’s army was at Dug Gapa and La Fayette, he also gave some advice: “If a force could be thrown in from Chattanooga in his (the enemy’s) rear, it would be difficult for him to escape.”
To his own staff, however, Thomas expressed quite a different opinion. “Nothing but stupendous blunders on the part of Bragg can save our army from total defeat. I have ordered Negley to fall back from McLemore’s Cove, and I believe we may be able to save this corps. But Bragg is also in position to strike McCook and Crittenden before they have a chance to extricate themselves.”
Though General Rosecrans was finally convinced that Bragg had made it to La Fayette, he believed Negley had retreated “more through prudence than compulsion.” However, Rosecrans was also certain that the Confederates were already evacuating the town and about to make haste for Rome, Georgia. In this he was mistaken.
Thomas was mostly correct in his assertion that while his own corps was saved by holding a fine defensive position at Stephen’s Gap, both McCook on his right and Crittenden on his left were in a bit of trouble. He tried to take care of McCook’s Corps by suggesting that he close in on Thomas’. This was a lovely notion, but with the Rebels holding La Fayette (and not merely using it as a road of escape), the move would be exceedingly difficult and would require a day or two of backtracking. General Philip Sheridan, commanding a division in McCook’s Corps put it best. “This is all wrong,” he told one of his officers. “We have no business here, we ought to be in Chattanooga.” Still, by staying put, McCook was safer than not, and that’s basically what he did.
Crittenden’s XXI Corps, however, was dangling. He had moved two divisions to Lee & Gordon’s Mill, but a third, under John Palmer had caught the eye of Braxton Bragg.
Before the dawn, Bragg had ordered corps commander Leonidas Polk to send a division under Benjamin Cheatham north toward Rock Spring where Palmer’s Federal Division was isolated. A little while later, Bragg sent two other divisions. One was Thomas Hindman’s, fresh from the nonbattle of the previous day, and the other was from W.H.T. Walker’s Reserve Corps. Bragg was excited about the prospects, but realized that time was slipping away. The troops had to march eight miles to get into position, and if Hindman’s speed the day before was any indication, things would need to be hastened.
The previous day was, of course, still on Bragg’s mind. He had neglected to give Hindman specific orders until it was too late (and those were ignored anyway). He would not make the same mistake again. To General Polk, he directly ordered him to attack the errant Federal division with everything he had the next morning.
D. Monday, September 12, 1864: It seems that General Forrest (CSA) is having internal problems. On August 30th, Forrest gave oral commands to Brigadier-General Chalmers, today the orders came written as General Orders Number 73. It stated that regiments under Chalmers’ commands were to organize into a brigade, “to be designated as Rucker’s brigade.” Well like in the North, the South believed in seniority, too, and General E. W. Rucker was not senior; or so Colonels J.J. Neely, Stewart, Green, Duckworth and Allen thought. Forrest, himself not being a schooled military man, he wanted Rucker to lead, so Rucker was chosen senior or not. The colonels asked Rucker not to accept the position, advising him “for the sake of the country,” to decline the commission. This just made Forrest furious. Forrest suspends all of them from their commands, puts them under arrest, charges them with inciting to mutiny, and courtmartialed them; except Duckworth. Duckworth, he sends to fight in Mobile. The regiment is now under Lt. Col. W. F. Taylor (CSA). The final results of this were, Colonel J.J. Neely was dismissed from service, and Stewart, Duckworth, Allen and Green were suspended from their commands on October 18, 1864.
1. Thursday, September, 12, 1861: The greatest fear in Washington was the possible secession of Maryland. Orders were quietly issued by Abraham Lincoln to Secretary of War Simon Cameron, for the arrest of Maryland legislators who are openly pro-South. The gentlemen were quietly arrested. They were taken for confinement to Ft. Warren in Boston Harbor.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-twenty-two
2. Friday, September 12, 1862: Pres. Lincoln, even more frustrated, telegrams Gen. McClellan, "Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt."
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+12%2C+1862
3. Friday, September 12, 1862: Frankfort, Kentucky, the state capital, is occupied by Confederate troops and Gen. Edmund Kirby-Smith.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+12%2C+1862
4. Friday, September 12, 1862: If, Gen. George McClellan had no idea where Robert E. Lee and his army were located, the state officials in Pennsylvania had good idea, that he was headed for them. On the assumption that Lee would try to stay some distance away from the McClellan’s army made this a fairly logical possibility. Orders were issued in Harrisburg and Philadelphia today to box up the state’s documents, bonds, archives and treasury and ship them to New York for safekeeping. A fair number of politicians decided to ride along on the train--just to keep the records safe, of course.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-74
5. Friday, September 12, 1862: The Natchez Daily Courier reported: “Arrest of a Young Lady. Miss Green, a loyal young lady in one of the northwestern counties in Virginia, was arrested and put in jail in Buckhannon, Upshur county, on a charge of cutting telegraph wires in the Yankee army. When interrogated, she confessed she had cut the wires, and said that she would do so again if set at liberty, at the same time refusing to take the oath of Yankee servitude. One end of the wire cut was found stuck in the ground several inches, and when asked why she did that, she replied that a great many Yankees had been killed, and as that wire pointed the way they had gone, it would doubtless be used to know; if there was room for any more.”
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-74
6. Friday, September 12, 1862: Maj Gen Joseph Hooker "a scared Governor ought not to be permitted to destroy the usefulness of an entire division of the army, on the eve of important operations....It is satisfactory in my mind that the rebels have no more intention of going to Harrisburg than they had of going to heaven. It is only in the United States that atrocities like this are entertained."
Hooker protesting to McClellan the reassignment of division commander John Reynolds to command militia in Pennsylvania at the height of the Maryland Campaign. From The Maryland Campaign of September 1862 Vol. 1 South Mountain. Edited by Tom Clemens. New York: Savas Beatie, 2010. Page 204
http://southfromthenorthwoods.blogspot.com/2011/09/september-12-1862-voices.html
7. Friday, September 12, 1862: CSA Gen Robert E. Lee "Before crossing the Potomac, I considered the advantages of entering Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge. In either case it was my intention to march upon this town [Hagerstown]"
Lee to Davis explaining his intentions to move on Hagerstown. From Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee & Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 by Joseph L. Harsh. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1999.
http://southfromthenorthwoods.blogspot.com/2011/09/september-12-1862-voices.html
8. Friday, September 12, 1862: George Michael Neese, of the Confederate artillery, is on the march in Maryland, and finds the inconvenience of traveling so quickly as to outmarch the commisary wagons and their rations, and so they forage in the surrounding farms: “September 12 —We had nothing to eat yesterday, and, contrary to general orders, our lieutenant told us last night that if we could find corn or potatoes that we might take enough to satisfy the requirements of the inner man. We soon found both corn and potatoes, twin brothers in diet that can be so happily devoured without bread. It is wonderful and almost inconceivable what an amount of corn and potatoes a soldier can engulf in his internal arrangements when they are properly adjusted by healthy, honest hunger after an all-day’s march without a morsel to check the shrinkage of his musculo-membranous reservoir.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+12%2C+1862
9. Saturday, September 12, 1863: Gen. Rosecrans begins to wax wary, sending orders to Gen. Granger, in command of his reserves, to move forward and reinforce the Union center. At this point, Rosecrans apparently has little idea where the Rebels are: “HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Chattanooga, September 12, 1863-11.45 a. m. Major-General GRANGER,Bridgeport, Ala.: “The enemy has concentrated in vicinity of La Fayette and attacked one of General Thomas’ columns yesterday, between Dug and Stevens’ Gaps, with superior force. We are concentrating the army to support General Thomas and fight a general battle. Send an order to General Ling to hasten his march and join General Thomas at the earliest possible moment by way of Stevens’ Gap. Come to this place immediately with Steedman’s division. Move in light marching order by the shortest route, and direct your trains to follow. If all reports are true, we have not a moment to lose. The Shellmound brigade (McCook’s) should move at once.
J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier-General, Chief of Staff.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+12%2C+1863
10. Saturday, September 12, 1863: Northern Georgia and eastern Tennessee were the scenes of numerous skirmishes. They didn’t amount to much unless you added them all up together. Sites where official skirmishes occurred included Rheatown, Tenn., and Leet’s Tanyard, Alpine, the LaFayette Road, and Dirt Town in Georgia.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-126
11. Monday, September 12, 1864:
12.
A Thursday, September 12 - September 15,1861: Battle of Cheat Mountain. Other names: Cheat Summit, Fort Milroy Joseph Reynolds [US] defeats Robert E. Lee [CS]
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186109
A+ Thursday, September 12 - September 15, 1861: Battle of Cheat Mountain. Location: Pocahontas County. Principal Commanders: Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee and Col. Albert Rust [CS]
Description: Gen. Robert E. Lee directed his first offensive of the war against Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds’s entrenchments on the summit of Cheat Mountain and in the Tygart Valley. The Confederate attacks were uncoordinated, however, and the Federal defense was so stubborn that Col. Albert Rust (leading the attacks) was convinced that he confronted an overwhelming force. He actually faced only about 300 determined Federals. Lee called off the attack and, after maneuvering in the vicinity, withdrew to Valley Head on September 17. In October, Lee renewed operations against Laurel Mountain with the troops of Floyd and Loring, but the operation was called off because of poor communication and lack of supplies. Lee was recalled to Richmond on October 30 after achieving little in western Virginia.
Estimated Casualties: 170 total (US 80; CS 90)
https://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/wv005.htm
B Thursday, September 12 - September 15, 1862: Battle of Harpers Ferry. Stonewall Jackson takes 12,000 prisoners.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186209
B+ Thursday, September 12 - September 15, 1862: Battle of Harpers Ferry. CSA Maj Gen Thomas Stonewall Jackson’s division left Frederick, Maryland on Sept. 10, and fighting began on September 12 on Maryland Heights. Jackson coordinated an attack that began with Gen. Lafayette McLaws placing artillery on Maryland Heights, aimed for an attack against both Bolivar Heights and Camp Hill. The troops defending Maryland Heights - Col. Thomas H. Ford’s 126th New York Volunteers - had only been in the army for 21 days and were no match for the seasoned veterans of CSA Brig Gen Joseph B. Kershaw’s and CSA Brig Gen William Barksdale’s brigades.
B++ Friday, September 12, 1862: Col. Dixon Miles, over 60 years old and close to retirement, estimates that no more than two brigades of Confederate troops with artillery are approaching Harper’s Ferry, and he has at least twice that number, with his 14,000-man garrison. He does not realize that Gen. McLaws is occupying Maryland heights with six brigades, rather than two, and that Gen. Walker was occupying Loudon Heights with another 3,400 men. On this date, Stonewall Jackson, with the remaining 12,000 men of his command, has just taken Martinsburg, a key point that controls the B & O Railroad. He sends A.P. Hill’s division on to Harper’s Ferry, the rest to follow tomorrow.
Ironically, since Longstreet is marching to Hagerstown, and scouts have pushed up into Pennsylvania, Union observers and generals assume that Lee is invading Pennsylvania; since Jackson has crossed the Potomac to go get Harper’s Ferry, others assume that he is retreating. McClellan assumes this. He writes to his wife, "From all I can gather, secesh is skedaddelling & I don’t think I can catch him unless he is really moving into Penna [....] I begin to think that he is making off to get out of the scrape by recrossing the river at Williamsport." Confusion begins to rule the Federal communications, since it surely is impossible that Lee is both "skedaddling" and invading Pennsylvania both. But that is precisely where his troops are heading. A puzzled and frustrated Gen. Burnside, commanding McClellan’s Right Wing, telegrams "I can hardly understand how they can be moving on these two latter roads at the same time. If they are going into Pennsylvania they would hardly be moving upon the Harper’s Ferry road, and if they are going to recross, how could they he moving upon Gettysburg!"
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+12%2C+1862
C Saturday, September 12, 1863: Realizing that part of his force had narrowly escaped a Confederate trap, Rosecrans abandoned his plans for a pursuit and began to concentrate his scattered forces. As he wrote in his official report, it was "a matter of life and death." On September 12, he ordered McCook and the cavalry to move northeast to Stevens Gap to join with Thomas, intending for this combined force to continue northeast to link up with Crittenden. The message to McCook took a full day to reach him at Alpine and the route he selected to move northeast required three days of marching 57 miles, retracing his steps over Lookout Mountain.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chickamauga
C+ This Is All Wrong, We Have No Business Here – Stumbling Toward Chickamauga on Saturday, September 12, 1863. “Convinced that Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee was retreating in despair to Rome, Georgia, William Rosecrans had wanted to cut it off and trap them before they could get to La Fayette, thirty miles south of Chattanooga. Rosecrans had ordered his Army of the Cumberland to concentrate on La Fayette, but things hadn’t gone as planned.
On Rosecrans’ right, Alexander McCook’s XX Corps held the town of Alpine. It wasn’t quite on the road from La Fayette to Rome, but it was close enough for the time being. His left was under the XXI Corps, headed by Thomas Crittenden, who had captured Chattanooga. From there, he followed Bragg’s retreating Confederates, but had thus far tangled only with cavalry.
More than anything, it was the center that was keeping Rosecrans up at night. General George Thomas commanded the 23,000 men of the XIV Corps. He was an incredibly well respected senior commander whom almost everyone, including Rosecrans, admired. This was probably why it was so difficult for Rosecrans to wrap his head around just why it was taking Thomas so long to get to La Fayette.
On the 10th, Thomas had pushed forward James Negley’s Division, through Stephen’s Gap and McLemore’s Cove, past Davis’ Crossroads and up towards Dug Gap before they ran into Confederates under D.H. Hill. In fact, it was Hill’s entire corps. On Negley’s left was two other divisions led by Thomas Hindman. Negley took it upon himself, after discovering that multitudes of Rebels could very easy close in on him, to withdraw his troops to Thomas’ main body.
On the evening of the 11th, Negley barely escaped without too much of a fight. The next morning (on this date), after Thomas was brought up to speed on what was before him, he sent Rosecrans an almost optimistic message. He explained that he was moving forward nearly his entire corps to come to Negley’s side. Convinced that a large chunk of Bragg’s army was at Dug Gap and La Fayette, he also gave some advice: “If a force could be thrown in from Chattanooga in his (the enemy’s) rear, it would be difficult for him to escape.”
To Rosecrans, Thomas was almost optimistic. He explained that he was moving forward nearly his entire corps to come to Negley’s side. Convinced that a large chunk of Bragg’s army was at Dug Gapa and La Fayette, he also gave some advice: “If a force could be thrown in from Chattanooga in his (the enemy’s) rear, it would be difficult for him to escape.”
To his own staff, however, Thomas expressed quite a different opinion. “Nothing but stupendous blunders on the part of Bragg can save our army from total defeat. I have ordered Negley to fall back from McLemore’s Cove, and I believe we may be able to save this corps. But Bragg is also in position to strike McCook and Crittenden before they have a chance to extricate themselves.”
Though General Rosecrans was finally convinced that Bragg had made it to La Fayette, he believed Negley had retreated “more through prudence than compulsion.” However, Rosecrans was also certain that the Confederates were already evacuating the town and about to make haste for Rome, Georgia. In this he was mistaken.
Thomas was mostly correct in his assertion that while his own corps was saved by holding a fine defensive position at Stephen’s Gap, both McCook on his right and Crittenden on his left were in a bit of trouble. He tried to take care of McCook’s Corps by suggesting that he close in on Thomas’. This was a lovely notion, but with the Rebels holding La Fayette (and not merely using it as a road of escape), the move would be exceedingly difficult and would require a day or two of backtracking. General Philip Sheridan, commanding a division in McCook’s Corps put it best. “This is all wrong,” he told one of his officers. “We have no business here, we ought to be in Chattanooga.” Still, by staying put, McCook was safer than not, and that’s basically what he did.
Crittenden’s XXI Corps, however, was dangling. He had moved two divisions to Lee & Gordon’s Mill, but a third, under John Palmer had caught the eye of Braxton Bragg.
Before the dawn, Bragg had ordered corps commander Leonidas Polk to send a division under Benjamin Cheatham north toward Rock Spring where Palmer’s Federal Division was isolated. A little while later, Bragg sent two other divisions. One was Thomas Hindman’s, fresh from the nonbattle of the previous day, and the other was from W.H.T. Walker’s Reserve Corps. Bragg was excited about the prospects, but realized that time was slipping away. The troops had to march eight miles to get into position, and if Hindman’s speed the day before was any indication, things would need to be hastened.
The previous day was, of course, still on Bragg’s mind. He had neglected to give Hindman specific orders until it was too late (and those were ignored anyway). He would not make the same mistake again. To General Polk, he directly ordered him to attack the errant Federal division with everything he had the next morning.
Direct orders or not, things again went sour. Hindman tarried, though in his defense, Bragg once more issued him vague and discretionary orders, allowing him to march when his men were “refreshed” (though he never specified what it was they did that made them less than fresh). They would not show up until 4:30am the next day (the 13th). Walker’s troops, however, arrived at 8pm (on this date).
General Polk did not like what he saw. Scouts had reported that Palmer’s isolated Union division wasn’t quite as isolated as first suspected. He believed that Crittenden’s entire corps was within two or three miles of his point of attack, and wrote Bragg for reinforcements.
Bragg didn’t exactly acquiesce, but allowed Polk to turn his new position into a defensive one if he were attacked earlier than he launched his strike. He vowed to send more troops the next day, though he doubted very much that Crittenden’s entire corps had come up from Chattanooga so soon.
Palmer’s Union division had indeed been isolated and General Crittenden took notice. He ordered the troops west to join the rest of the corps at Lee & Gordon’s Mills. When Polk would finally send his scouts forward in the late morning of the 13th, he would find the former enemy position barren.
This was more luck than anything on Crittenden’s part. He gave no credence whatsoever to the idea that Bragg might actually attack him. “It has always been the plan of the enemy to make stubborn defenses on a retreat,” he wrote to James Garfield, Rosecrans’ Chief of Staff, “I do not yet believe that there is a strong force of infantry in the vicinity of La Fayette.”
Though he was farther away from La Fayette than any of the other corps commanders, and though he had been warned by Rosecrans that not only was Bragg in La Fayette, but that “there is far more probability of his attacking you than that he is running,” Crittenden completely refused to believe it.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/this-is-all-wrong-we-have-no-business-here-stumbling-toward-chickamauga/
Monday, September 12, 1864: It seems that General Forrest (CSA) is having internal problems. On August 30th, Forrest gave oral commands to Brigadier-General Chalmers, today the orders came written as General Orders Number 73. It stated that regiments under Chalmers’ commands were to organize into a brigade, “to be designated as Rucker’s brigade.” Well like in the North, the South believed in seniority, too, and General E. W. Rucker was not senior; or so Colonels J.J. Neely, Stewart, Green, Duckworth and Allen thought. Forrest, himself not being a schooled military man, he wanted Rucker to lead, so Rucker was chosen senior or not. The colonels asked Rucker not to accept the position, advising him “for the sake of the country,” to decline the commission. This just made Forrest furious. Forrest suspends all of them from their commands, puts them under arrest, charges them with inciting to mutiny, and courtmartialed them; except Duckworth. Duckworth, he sends to fight in Mobile. The regiment is now under Lt. Col. W. F. Taylor (CSA). The final results of this were, Colonel J.J. Neely was dismissed from service, and Stewart, Duckworth, Allen and Green were suspended from their commands on October 18, 1864.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-179
Monday, September 12, 1864: President Abraham Lincoln notifies Lieut. General Ulysses S. Grant (US) of his concern over Major General Philip H. Sheridan’s lack of progress in the Shenandoah Valley. Grant was not worried as he knew General Early (CSA) had 20,000 men to face a Union force of 43,000 men.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-179
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SMSgt Lawrence McCarter LTC Trent Klug SFC Bernard WalkoSSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr CPL Ronald Keyes Jr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy SFC David Reid, M.S, PHR, SHRM-CP, DTMSgt Christopher Collins SPC (Join to see) SPC Gary C. PO3 Lynn Spalding
Sherman and Grant Plan their Next Moves
September 12, 1864 (Monday) “The exodus of people is progressing and matters coming into shape,” wrote William Tecumseh Sherman to General Grant. Sherman had ordered a week-long truce i…
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LTC Stephen F.
You are very welcome my deceased friend and brother-in-Christ SP5 Mark Kuzinski I am thankful that you are joyfully resting in peace in the presence of our LORD God. I lift your grieving widowm Diana Kuzinski to the LORD as HE prompts me.
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LTC Stephen F. I am going with the:
1861: Confederate defeat at Cheat Mountain, western Virginia. Location: Pocahontas County. CSA Gen.
1861: Confederate defeat at Cheat Mountain, western Virginia. Location: Pocahontas County. CSA Gen.
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LTC Stephen F.
Thank you my friend and brother-in-Christ SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL for letting us know that you consider September 12, 1861 the "confederate defeat at Cheat Mountain, western Virginia. Location: Pocahontas County. CSA Gen. Robert E. Lee directed his first offensive of the war against Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds’s entrenchments on the summit of Cheat Mountain and in the Tygart Valley. The Confederate attacks were uncoordinated, however, and the Federal defense was so stubborn that Col. Albert Rust (leading the attacks) was convinced that he confronted an overwhelming force. He actually faced only about 300 determined Federals.' to be the most significant event of September 12 in the US Civil War.
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