Posted on Jan 8, 2017
What was the most significant event on September 28 during the U.S. Civil War?
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Repercussions for lost battles have occurred most likely since Armies first fought each other. In ancient days and in WWII Germany, General Officers paid with their lives on many occasions.
By the time of the US Civil War, tribunals, court martials and the like were used against General officers who lost battles. In 1863 after the Battle of Chickamauga [September 18-20, 1863] Corps commanders Maj Gen. Alexander McCook and Maj Gen. Thomas Crittenden were relieved of command despite the protests of their commanding officer, the very capable, Maj Gen. William Rosecrans.
In 1864, CSA resident Jefferson Davis approved General John Bell Hood's request to relieve Lieutenant-General Hardee from duty as commander of the Army of Tennessee. He was replaced by Lieutenant-General P.G.T. Beauregard
Deception in the civil war included Quaker Guns which was a euphemism since Quakers were opposed to warfare. Quaker gun was a deception tactic that was commonly used in warfare during the 18th and 19th centuries. Although resembling an actual cannon, the Quaker gun was simply a wooden log, usually painted black, used to deceive an enemy.
Saturday, September, 28, 1861: Quaker Guns, friendly-fire and the hills above Washington. “It had been over two months since the Confederate victory at Bull Run. Since then, General Joseph E. Johnston had struggled to keep his Confederate Army of the Potomac afloat, while rebuilding and reorganizing it. Thousands of recruits had joined its ranks, swelling its numbers to over 40,000 men.
Prior to the battle in July, Generals Johnston and Beauregard commanded independent armies, the Army of the Shenandoah and Army of the Potomac, respectively. Over time, both of the Armies were merged into one, the Army of the Potomac, under the nominal command of Johnston, from the Army of the Shenandoah. Beauregard commanded the First Corps, consisting of 24,000 men, mostly from his old Army of the Potomac, while General Gustavus Woodson Smith took the reigns of the old Army of the Shenandoah.
General Johnston’s concern, aside from feeding his legions, was military strategy. While the main body of the Army was anchored at Centreville, Beauregard’s Corps had moved to Fairfax, with regiments as close to Washington as Munson’s Hill, which overlooked the capital. Beauregard pushed for the entire Army move north to Fairfax, but Johnston insisted that it was not yet strong enough to move anywhere.
Beauregard’s advanced location made Johnston nervous. He described their position as defensively unsound. Either of their flanks could be assailed by Union General McClellan’s troops. He asked, on September 26, for either Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin or President Davis himself to come to Fairfax “to decide definitely whether we are to advance or fall back to a more defensible line.” [1]
Before he received a reply, Johnston ordered the defenses closest to Washington to be abandoned. By dawn of this date, most of Beauregard’s troops had vacated Munson’s and Upton’s Hills. They retired to Centreville, leaving a few companies of J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry to act as a rear guard.
Munson’s Hill, which could be clearly seen from the capital, had been a constant reminder of the defeat at Bull Run. The hill was lined with what appeared to be rifle pits and large cannons. Above the artillery, floated a large Confederate Flag. General McClellan had been planning on capturing the hills and had twice sent heavily-armed reconnaissance parties to probe the Rebel lines. This was probably what convinced General Johnston to vacate Munson’s Hill.
Knowing that the Confederates had abandoned the hills west of Washington, General McClellan crossed the Potomac to see for himself. Now assured that it was safe, he ordered the brigades of Richardson and Wadsworth, both having skirmished with the Rebels for the past few weeks, to advance and take the hills.
A local woman informed Richardson that while it seemed as if the hills were vacant, two Confederate regiments were hidden in the fortifications and six others were nearby. This stopped everything. The Union picket lines encircled the hills, were scattered in houses, buildings and a school. For hours they waited, but no command came. There was some minor skirmishing with some Confederate cavalry, but the two regiments supposedly manning the Confederate works never showed themselves.
Someone, not Richardson, yelled “Forward!” and nearly his entire brigade advanced upon Munson’s Hill. Unable to stop them, Richardson followed. Meanwhile, Wadsworth’s brigade also moved forward.
Both brigades discovered that the local woman was lying. No Confederates, not even the few cavalrymen, occupied either Munson’s or Upton’s Hills. The dishonesty, however, did not end there. The deep entrenchments the two Rebel regiments were supposedly hiding behind turned out to be nothing but ditches constructed to fool Union onlookers.
Even more embarrassing, the numerous cannons, mouths pointed at the spires and government offices of Washington, were nothing but wooden logs and stovepipes painted black. The ruse had worked, keeping the Union forces at bay for weeks.
Wishing to not only occupy, but fortify the hills, General McClellan issued orders for more troops to advance. Though it was dark, Lt. Col. Isaac Wistar maneuvered the 71st Pennsylvania past the Vanderburgh House, three miles north of Munson’s Hill. Along the way, the regiment cleared downed trees from their path and eventually came across pickets from a New York regiment. Wistar thought that he was already beyond the Union outposts.
The road bent to the right and he found pickets from a Michigan regiment. His men then entered a thick forest, which opened up on the right side of the road. Suddenly, from their left, muzzle flashes lit up from the woods. The 71st turned and fired into the darkness where the flashes had been. Wistar, who was convinced that no Rebels were in the area, implored both sides to stop firing, that they were each firing at friends.
Ignoring him, both sides fired at close range for nearly two minutes, until the troops in the woods backed off. Wistar ordered his men to take care of the wounded and prepared to march on. Suddenly, the troops from the woods returned, pouring a volley into the 71st at only six yards distance. The fighting again commenced.
This time, the horses pulling the artillery that was traveling with the 71st were hit and sent into a blind panic. They bolted to the rear, running over some of Wistar’s men to escape. Quickly, Wistar formed Company G and advanced them into the woods, but the “enemy” was gone.
The 71st suffered four killed and fourteen wounded (some mortally), while another nearby Pennsylvania regiment had one killed and three wounded.
Discovering that the Rebel artillery on Munson’s and Upton’s Hills was fake, combined with a deadly incident of friendly-fire, made the capture of the hills over Washington a bitter-sweet accomplishment for McClellan. [2]
[1] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 5, p881-882.
[2] Army of the Potomac; McClellan Takes Command by Russel H. Beatie.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/quaker-guns-friendly-fire-and-the-hills-above-washington/
Sunday, September 28, 1862: The splendid Rebel plan to retake Corinth, Mississippi. “Sterling Price wasn’t an unreasonable man, it’s just that he didn’t believe a word Earl Van Dorn was saying. Following the strange battle of Iuka, Sterling Price and his army slipped away from Union forces under General Grant. Their move took them southwest, on a track to join up with Van Dorn’s army at Ripley, Mississippi.
The tramp to join their comrades was a trying one, with heavy rains, bad roads, little sleep, and even an earthquake. On top of this, there was quite a bit of apprehension over joining with Van Dorn, who would be in charge of the entire show. Price’s chief-of-staff, Major Thomas Snead, even tried to resign. Thankfully, Price was able to play the patriotism card to convince him to stay.
Finally, on this date, they arrived and heard Van Dorn’s plan. The idea was a move on Corinth, the railroad city that General Beauregard once defended (and abandoned) against 120,000 Yankees. Now, claimed Van Dorn, it was lightly defended and ripe for the picking.
If Corinth fell, he reasoned, it would mean that all of the Federal forces in Western Tennessee would have to retreat. This would even secure Vicksburg, along the Mississippi, from any attacks coming from the north. It would, explained Van Dorn, allow General Braxton Bragg to take Louisville (an idea that Bragg himself had already dismissed).
With the addition of Price’s force, Van Dorn commanded 22,000 troops. Corinth, he reasoned, was only held by 15,000 Federals. General Grant had other troops in the area, sure, but they were too spread out to matter. Van Dorn figured there were 6,000 at Memphis, 8,000 at Bolivar, 3,000 at Jackson and 10,000 more scattered throughout different outposts.
Two things were essential for this plan to work. The Federals had to be surprised and the Confederates had to move swiftly.
These two essentials could be dealt with in one plan. First, they would not attack Corinth directly. They would first move to Pocahontas, just across the state line. This would, reasoned Van Dorn, throw off these dispersed Federal forces, making them believe he were about to strike Bolivar, Tennessee, forty miles to the northwest of Corinth.
However, when his troops reached the Tennessee line at Pocahontas, they would take an abrupt right and quickly fall upon Corinth from the northwest, striking the weakest portion of the Federal defenses. The plan was pure genius!
It was only nineteen miles from Pocahontas to Corinth and the roads were in good shape. It should be a hard day’s march, but hard marching would take care of speed.
Some under Van Dorn, most notably Sterling Price and the newly-arrived Mansfield Lovell, thought the plan a bad one. Lovell, undaunted over the surrender of New Orleans and the tarnished reputation that followed, believed the army should simply attack Bolivar. This would, he argued, cut the Federal supply line and force Grant to abandon Corinth. On the run, they could be easily driven back to the Ohio River.
Price, on the other hand, wanted to wait. There was good reason. Though it possibly slashed Van Dorn’s needs for secrecy and speed, it would add an additional 15,000 troops to the Rebel force. These reinforcements were coming in the form of exchanged prisoners at Jackson, Mississippi. They could be easily armed and established into a division. They would not, however, be available until the middle of October.
Without them, Price believed, Corinth could not be held. It was probably true that Van Dorn could take Corinth, but holding it? Price just didn’t see how. Even by Van Dorn’s own calculations, there were 27,000 Federals outside of Corinth, ready to descend upon the city to take it back. The casualties that Van Dorn would suffer while taking Corinth were sure to be serious. How, with such a weakened force, could Van Dorn expect to hold his bounty?
Adding weight to Lovell and Prices’ reservations were the Yankees themselves. The troops would be commanded by Generals Grant, Sherman and Rosecrans. While Sherman had not yet come into his own, Grant was certainly making a name for himself. Rosecrans, who graduated fifth in his class at West Point, was an officer to be taken seriously. Van Dorn, who graduated fifth from the bottom of the very same West Point class, somehow disagreed.
Lovell, who commanded a division, and Price, who commanded two, were ordered to have three day’s cooked rations ready. The new Confederate Army of West Tennessee, Earl Van Dorn commanding, would step off at dawn the next morning. [1]
[1] Sources: The Darkest Days of the War by Peter Cozzens; Grant Rises in the West by Kenneth P. Williams; Nothing But Victory by Stephen E Woodworth”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/the-rebel-plan-to-retake-corinth/
Pictures: 1864-09 Raid on Marianna Map; Union Quaker guns; Federal Guard Tent; 1863 Confederate Quaker Gun Port Hudson
A. 1861: Federals advanced on Munson’s Hill, a few miles southwest of Washington, and discovered that it was not as heavily defended as presumed. Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had combined the Armies of the Potomac and the Shenandoah into one force consisting of two corps. Major General George B. McClellan, commanding the Federal Army of the Potomac, sought to clear these points and use them for his planned ring of forts and defensive works around the capital. The two sides engaged in a heavy skirmish, after which the Federals reported that Confederates had constructed strong defenses on Munson’s Hill that included rifle pits and artillery. The Federals climbed the slopes and discovered that the rifle pits had been abandoned. And to their dismay (and their commanders’ embarrassment), they found that the mighty cannon pointed in their direction for nearly two months consisted only of logs and stovepipes painted black. A correspondent who had hoped to witness a battle resentfully called these “Quaker guns.”
Making matters worse for the Federals, on the night of the 28th, troops of the 69th and 71st Pennsylvania accidentally fired into each other while clearing the woods around Munson’s Hill, resulting in several killed and wounded. This tragic mishap, combined with the ruse on the hills, diminished the Federals’ successful occupation of the supposedly threatening positions.
B. 1862: CSA Maj Gen Earl van Dorn planned to retake Corinth, Mississippi. If Corinth fell, he reasoned, it would mean that all of the Federal forces in Western Tennessee would have to retreat. This would even secure Vicksburg, along the Mississippi, from any attacks coming from the north. It would, explained Van Dorn, allow General Braxton Bragg to take Louisville (an idea that Bragg himself had already dismissed).
Two things were essential for this plan to work. The Federals had to be surprised and the Confederates had to move swiftly.
These two essentials could be dealt with in one plan. First, they would not attack Corinth directly. They would first move to Pocahontas, just across the state line. This would, reasoned Van Dorn, throw off these dispersed Federal forces, making them believe he were about to strike Bolivar, Tennessee, forty miles to the northwest of Corinth.
Adding weight to Lovell and Prices’ reservations were the Yankees themselves. The troops would be commanded by Generals Grant, Sherman and Rosecrans. While Sherman had not yet come into his own, Grant was certainly making a name for himself. Rosecrans, who graduated fifth in his class at West Point, was an officer to be taken seriously. Van Dorn, who graduated fifth from the bottom of the very same West Point class, somehow disagreed.
Lovell, who commanded a division, and Price, who commanded two, were ordered to have three day’s cooked rations ready. The new Confederate Army of West Tennessee, Earl Van Dorn commanding, would step off at dawn the next morning.
C. 1863: In the aftermath of the Battle of Chickamauga [fought September 18–20, 1863], the War Department relieved Gen. Alexander McCook and Gen. Crittenden of their commands, and consolidated their two depleted-corps into one. This was done over the protests of Gen. Rosecrans, who had resisted Washington’s requests to fire the two generals. The President of the United States directed that the Twentieth and Twenty-First Army Corps be consolidated and called the Fourth Army Corps, and that Major General Gordon Granger be the commander of this consolidated corps.
D. 1864: Battle of Vernon, Florida. Neither federal nor Confederate force knew it, but they were approaching each other via the same road. Believing that Confederate forces were en route and having achieved their objective of capturing Marianna and many of its defenders, the Federals withdrew from the town before sunrise on the morning of September 28. They rode south down the St. Andrews Bay Road and then veered west onto the Vernon road.
As the Union soldiers approached a creek crossing, they ran head on into Capt. W.B. Jones and his company of scouts from Vernon and Holmes Valley. Alerted by a courier that Marianna was facing attack, these men were marching to help their neighbors in Jackson County when they unexpectedly encountered the Union column.
Accounts of what happened next are extremely meager, but apparently Jones and his men engaged in a brief skirmish with the vanguard of Asboth's column. At least one Confederate volunteers was killed and several others, including the captain, were captured. The rest of his men retreated as best they could. Pushing forward, the Federals reached Vernon by nightfall on September 28. Camping there, they moved out again for Choctawhatchee Bay before dawn the next morning.
As the Federals were pushing southwest from Marianna and engaging Jones' men in Washington County, help was pouring into Marianna from all directions. Capts. Jeter and Milton had arrived with Companies E and G of the 5th Florida Cavalry on the night of September 27, as did Capt. George Robinson and his Home Guards from eastern Jackson County. They were joined the next morning by Luke Lott's company from Calhoun County and later by Lt. Col. G.W. Scott of the 5th Florida Cavalry, who arrived ahead of his battalion with a company of Georgia cavalry and a home guard unit from Gadsden County. Organizing these forces as best he could, Scott established a strong line of patrols around Marianna on September 28 and, as soon as he could, set out in pursuit of the Union raiders.
Telegrams also went to Gen. Dabney H. Maury in Mobile, who sent the 15th Confederate Cavalry east in an effort to cut off Asboth's Union column. The following pursuit failed. The Union column was too well-organized and had too much of a head start. By the time Scott's Confederates could reach Vernon, Asboth was already at Point Washington on the Choctawhatchee Bay.
Brig. Gen. Alexander Asboth and the wounded were placed aboard the steamer USS Lizzie Davis, while the rest of the column crossed East Pass and marched down Santa Rosa Island to Fort Pickens. The raid was over.
FYI SGT Mark Anderson PO3 Edward Riddle Maj William W. 'Bill' Price COL (Join to see) SSgt David M.] SPC Maurice Evans SPC Jon O. SGT Jim ArnoldAmn Dale PreisachCW4 (Join to see) Sgt Jerry GenesioSSG (Join to see)LTC John Griscom LTC Thomas Tennant LTC David Brown LTC (Join to see) CWO3 (Join to see) SGT John " Mac " McConnell SFC (Join to see) CPL Ronald Keyes Jr
By the time of the US Civil War, tribunals, court martials and the like were used against General officers who lost battles. In 1863 after the Battle of Chickamauga [September 18-20, 1863] Corps commanders Maj Gen. Alexander McCook and Maj Gen. Thomas Crittenden were relieved of command despite the protests of their commanding officer, the very capable, Maj Gen. William Rosecrans.
In 1864, CSA resident Jefferson Davis approved General John Bell Hood's request to relieve Lieutenant-General Hardee from duty as commander of the Army of Tennessee. He was replaced by Lieutenant-General P.G.T. Beauregard
Deception in the civil war included Quaker Guns which was a euphemism since Quakers were opposed to warfare. Quaker gun was a deception tactic that was commonly used in warfare during the 18th and 19th centuries. Although resembling an actual cannon, the Quaker gun was simply a wooden log, usually painted black, used to deceive an enemy.
Saturday, September, 28, 1861: Quaker Guns, friendly-fire and the hills above Washington. “It had been over two months since the Confederate victory at Bull Run. Since then, General Joseph E. Johnston had struggled to keep his Confederate Army of the Potomac afloat, while rebuilding and reorganizing it. Thousands of recruits had joined its ranks, swelling its numbers to over 40,000 men.
Prior to the battle in July, Generals Johnston and Beauregard commanded independent armies, the Army of the Shenandoah and Army of the Potomac, respectively. Over time, both of the Armies were merged into one, the Army of the Potomac, under the nominal command of Johnston, from the Army of the Shenandoah. Beauregard commanded the First Corps, consisting of 24,000 men, mostly from his old Army of the Potomac, while General Gustavus Woodson Smith took the reigns of the old Army of the Shenandoah.
General Johnston’s concern, aside from feeding his legions, was military strategy. While the main body of the Army was anchored at Centreville, Beauregard’s Corps had moved to Fairfax, with regiments as close to Washington as Munson’s Hill, which overlooked the capital. Beauregard pushed for the entire Army move north to Fairfax, but Johnston insisted that it was not yet strong enough to move anywhere.
Beauregard’s advanced location made Johnston nervous. He described their position as defensively unsound. Either of their flanks could be assailed by Union General McClellan’s troops. He asked, on September 26, for either Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin or President Davis himself to come to Fairfax “to decide definitely whether we are to advance or fall back to a more defensible line.” [1]
Before he received a reply, Johnston ordered the defenses closest to Washington to be abandoned. By dawn of this date, most of Beauregard’s troops had vacated Munson’s and Upton’s Hills. They retired to Centreville, leaving a few companies of J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry to act as a rear guard.
Munson’s Hill, which could be clearly seen from the capital, had been a constant reminder of the defeat at Bull Run. The hill was lined with what appeared to be rifle pits and large cannons. Above the artillery, floated a large Confederate Flag. General McClellan had been planning on capturing the hills and had twice sent heavily-armed reconnaissance parties to probe the Rebel lines. This was probably what convinced General Johnston to vacate Munson’s Hill.
Knowing that the Confederates had abandoned the hills west of Washington, General McClellan crossed the Potomac to see for himself. Now assured that it was safe, he ordered the brigades of Richardson and Wadsworth, both having skirmished with the Rebels for the past few weeks, to advance and take the hills.
A local woman informed Richardson that while it seemed as if the hills were vacant, two Confederate regiments were hidden in the fortifications and six others were nearby. This stopped everything. The Union picket lines encircled the hills, were scattered in houses, buildings and a school. For hours they waited, but no command came. There was some minor skirmishing with some Confederate cavalry, but the two regiments supposedly manning the Confederate works never showed themselves.
Someone, not Richardson, yelled “Forward!” and nearly his entire brigade advanced upon Munson’s Hill. Unable to stop them, Richardson followed. Meanwhile, Wadsworth’s brigade also moved forward.
Both brigades discovered that the local woman was lying. No Confederates, not even the few cavalrymen, occupied either Munson’s or Upton’s Hills. The dishonesty, however, did not end there. The deep entrenchments the two Rebel regiments were supposedly hiding behind turned out to be nothing but ditches constructed to fool Union onlookers.
Even more embarrassing, the numerous cannons, mouths pointed at the spires and government offices of Washington, were nothing but wooden logs and stovepipes painted black. The ruse had worked, keeping the Union forces at bay for weeks.
Wishing to not only occupy, but fortify the hills, General McClellan issued orders for more troops to advance. Though it was dark, Lt. Col. Isaac Wistar maneuvered the 71st Pennsylvania past the Vanderburgh House, three miles north of Munson’s Hill. Along the way, the regiment cleared downed trees from their path and eventually came across pickets from a New York regiment. Wistar thought that he was already beyond the Union outposts.
The road bent to the right and he found pickets from a Michigan regiment. His men then entered a thick forest, which opened up on the right side of the road. Suddenly, from their left, muzzle flashes lit up from the woods. The 71st turned and fired into the darkness where the flashes had been. Wistar, who was convinced that no Rebels were in the area, implored both sides to stop firing, that they were each firing at friends.
Ignoring him, both sides fired at close range for nearly two minutes, until the troops in the woods backed off. Wistar ordered his men to take care of the wounded and prepared to march on. Suddenly, the troops from the woods returned, pouring a volley into the 71st at only six yards distance. The fighting again commenced.
This time, the horses pulling the artillery that was traveling with the 71st were hit and sent into a blind panic. They bolted to the rear, running over some of Wistar’s men to escape. Quickly, Wistar formed Company G and advanced them into the woods, but the “enemy” was gone.
The 71st suffered four killed and fourteen wounded (some mortally), while another nearby Pennsylvania regiment had one killed and three wounded.
Discovering that the Rebel artillery on Munson’s and Upton’s Hills was fake, combined with a deadly incident of friendly-fire, made the capture of the hills over Washington a bitter-sweet accomplishment for McClellan. [2]
[1] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 5, p881-882.
[2] Army of the Potomac; McClellan Takes Command by Russel H. Beatie.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/quaker-guns-friendly-fire-and-the-hills-above-washington/
Sunday, September 28, 1862: The splendid Rebel plan to retake Corinth, Mississippi. “Sterling Price wasn’t an unreasonable man, it’s just that he didn’t believe a word Earl Van Dorn was saying. Following the strange battle of Iuka, Sterling Price and his army slipped away from Union forces under General Grant. Their move took them southwest, on a track to join up with Van Dorn’s army at Ripley, Mississippi.
The tramp to join their comrades was a trying one, with heavy rains, bad roads, little sleep, and even an earthquake. On top of this, there was quite a bit of apprehension over joining with Van Dorn, who would be in charge of the entire show. Price’s chief-of-staff, Major Thomas Snead, even tried to resign. Thankfully, Price was able to play the patriotism card to convince him to stay.
Finally, on this date, they arrived and heard Van Dorn’s plan. The idea was a move on Corinth, the railroad city that General Beauregard once defended (and abandoned) against 120,000 Yankees. Now, claimed Van Dorn, it was lightly defended and ripe for the picking.
If Corinth fell, he reasoned, it would mean that all of the Federal forces in Western Tennessee would have to retreat. This would even secure Vicksburg, along the Mississippi, from any attacks coming from the north. It would, explained Van Dorn, allow General Braxton Bragg to take Louisville (an idea that Bragg himself had already dismissed).
With the addition of Price’s force, Van Dorn commanded 22,000 troops. Corinth, he reasoned, was only held by 15,000 Federals. General Grant had other troops in the area, sure, but they were too spread out to matter. Van Dorn figured there were 6,000 at Memphis, 8,000 at Bolivar, 3,000 at Jackson and 10,000 more scattered throughout different outposts.
Two things were essential for this plan to work. The Federals had to be surprised and the Confederates had to move swiftly.
These two essentials could be dealt with in one plan. First, they would not attack Corinth directly. They would first move to Pocahontas, just across the state line. This would, reasoned Van Dorn, throw off these dispersed Federal forces, making them believe he were about to strike Bolivar, Tennessee, forty miles to the northwest of Corinth.
However, when his troops reached the Tennessee line at Pocahontas, they would take an abrupt right and quickly fall upon Corinth from the northwest, striking the weakest portion of the Federal defenses. The plan was pure genius!
It was only nineteen miles from Pocahontas to Corinth and the roads were in good shape. It should be a hard day’s march, but hard marching would take care of speed.
Some under Van Dorn, most notably Sterling Price and the newly-arrived Mansfield Lovell, thought the plan a bad one. Lovell, undaunted over the surrender of New Orleans and the tarnished reputation that followed, believed the army should simply attack Bolivar. This would, he argued, cut the Federal supply line and force Grant to abandon Corinth. On the run, they could be easily driven back to the Ohio River.
Price, on the other hand, wanted to wait. There was good reason. Though it possibly slashed Van Dorn’s needs for secrecy and speed, it would add an additional 15,000 troops to the Rebel force. These reinforcements were coming in the form of exchanged prisoners at Jackson, Mississippi. They could be easily armed and established into a division. They would not, however, be available until the middle of October.
Without them, Price believed, Corinth could not be held. It was probably true that Van Dorn could take Corinth, but holding it? Price just didn’t see how. Even by Van Dorn’s own calculations, there were 27,000 Federals outside of Corinth, ready to descend upon the city to take it back. The casualties that Van Dorn would suffer while taking Corinth were sure to be serious. How, with such a weakened force, could Van Dorn expect to hold his bounty?
Adding weight to Lovell and Prices’ reservations were the Yankees themselves. The troops would be commanded by Generals Grant, Sherman and Rosecrans. While Sherman had not yet come into his own, Grant was certainly making a name for himself. Rosecrans, who graduated fifth in his class at West Point, was an officer to be taken seriously. Van Dorn, who graduated fifth from the bottom of the very same West Point class, somehow disagreed.
Lovell, who commanded a division, and Price, who commanded two, were ordered to have three day’s cooked rations ready. The new Confederate Army of West Tennessee, Earl Van Dorn commanding, would step off at dawn the next morning. [1]
[1] Sources: The Darkest Days of the War by Peter Cozzens; Grant Rises in the West by Kenneth P. Williams; Nothing But Victory by Stephen E Woodworth”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/the-rebel-plan-to-retake-corinth/
Pictures: 1864-09 Raid on Marianna Map; Union Quaker guns; Federal Guard Tent; 1863 Confederate Quaker Gun Port Hudson
A. 1861: Federals advanced on Munson’s Hill, a few miles southwest of Washington, and discovered that it was not as heavily defended as presumed. Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had combined the Armies of the Potomac and the Shenandoah into one force consisting of two corps. Major General George B. McClellan, commanding the Federal Army of the Potomac, sought to clear these points and use them for his planned ring of forts and defensive works around the capital. The two sides engaged in a heavy skirmish, after which the Federals reported that Confederates had constructed strong defenses on Munson’s Hill that included rifle pits and artillery. The Federals climbed the slopes and discovered that the rifle pits had been abandoned. And to their dismay (and their commanders’ embarrassment), they found that the mighty cannon pointed in their direction for nearly two months consisted only of logs and stovepipes painted black. A correspondent who had hoped to witness a battle resentfully called these “Quaker guns.”
Making matters worse for the Federals, on the night of the 28th, troops of the 69th and 71st Pennsylvania accidentally fired into each other while clearing the woods around Munson’s Hill, resulting in several killed and wounded. This tragic mishap, combined with the ruse on the hills, diminished the Federals’ successful occupation of the supposedly threatening positions.
B. 1862: CSA Maj Gen Earl van Dorn planned to retake Corinth, Mississippi. If Corinth fell, he reasoned, it would mean that all of the Federal forces in Western Tennessee would have to retreat. This would even secure Vicksburg, along the Mississippi, from any attacks coming from the north. It would, explained Van Dorn, allow General Braxton Bragg to take Louisville (an idea that Bragg himself had already dismissed).
Two things were essential for this plan to work. The Federals had to be surprised and the Confederates had to move swiftly.
These two essentials could be dealt with in one plan. First, they would not attack Corinth directly. They would first move to Pocahontas, just across the state line. This would, reasoned Van Dorn, throw off these dispersed Federal forces, making them believe he were about to strike Bolivar, Tennessee, forty miles to the northwest of Corinth.
Adding weight to Lovell and Prices’ reservations were the Yankees themselves. The troops would be commanded by Generals Grant, Sherman and Rosecrans. While Sherman had not yet come into his own, Grant was certainly making a name for himself. Rosecrans, who graduated fifth in his class at West Point, was an officer to be taken seriously. Van Dorn, who graduated fifth from the bottom of the very same West Point class, somehow disagreed.
Lovell, who commanded a division, and Price, who commanded two, were ordered to have three day’s cooked rations ready. The new Confederate Army of West Tennessee, Earl Van Dorn commanding, would step off at dawn the next morning.
C. 1863: In the aftermath of the Battle of Chickamauga [fought September 18–20, 1863], the War Department relieved Gen. Alexander McCook and Gen. Crittenden of their commands, and consolidated their two depleted-corps into one. This was done over the protests of Gen. Rosecrans, who had resisted Washington’s requests to fire the two generals. The President of the United States directed that the Twentieth and Twenty-First Army Corps be consolidated and called the Fourth Army Corps, and that Major General Gordon Granger be the commander of this consolidated corps.
D. 1864: Battle of Vernon, Florida. Neither federal nor Confederate force knew it, but they were approaching each other via the same road. Believing that Confederate forces were en route and having achieved their objective of capturing Marianna and many of its defenders, the Federals withdrew from the town before sunrise on the morning of September 28. They rode south down the St. Andrews Bay Road and then veered west onto the Vernon road.
As the Union soldiers approached a creek crossing, they ran head on into Capt. W.B. Jones and his company of scouts from Vernon and Holmes Valley. Alerted by a courier that Marianna was facing attack, these men were marching to help their neighbors in Jackson County when they unexpectedly encountered the Union column.
Accounts of what happened next are extremely meager, but apparently Jones and his men engaged in a brief skirmish with the vanguard of Asboth's column. At least one Confederate volunteers was killed and several others, including the captain, were captured. The rest of his men retreated as best they could. Pushing forward, the Federals reached Vernon by nightfall on September 28. Camping there, they moved out again for Choctawhatchee Bay before dawn the next morning.
As the Federals were pushing southwest from Marianna and engaging Jones' men in Washington County, help was pouring into Marianna from all directions. Capts. Jeter and Milton had arrived with Companies E and G of the 5th Florida Cavalry on the night of September 27, as did Capt. George Robinson and his Home Guards from eastern Jackson County. They were joined the next morning by Luke Lott's company from Calhoun County and later by Lt. Col. G.W. Scott of the 5th Florida Cavalry, who arrived ahead of his battalion with a company of Georgia cavalry and a home guard unit from Gadsden County. Organizing these forces as best he could, Scott established a strong line of patrols around Marianna on September 28 and, as soon as he could, set out in pursuit of the Union raiders.
Telegrams also went to Gen. Dabney H. Maury in Mobile, who sent the 15th Confederate Cavalry east in an effort to cut off Asboth's Union column. The following pursuit failed. The Union column was too well-organized and had too much of a head start. By the time Scott's Confederates could reach Vernon, Asboth was already at Point Washington on the Choctawhatchee Bay.
Brig. Gen. Alexander Asboth and the wounded were placed aboard the steamer USS Lizzie Davis, while the rest of the column crossed East Pass and marched down Santa Rosa Island to Fort Pickens. The raid was over.
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Sunday in the Civil War was a time of worship and reflection on the one hand and bitter fighting, bloodshed, death and dying on the other. Death does not take holidays.
Sometimes church would be respected and undisturbed while at other times horses would be stolen or ambushes set. In the first year, Sunday was more commonly respected as a day of worship since there were many Christians on both sides. By 1862, chivalry was dying in many places and by 1863 in had died a painful death in all but the most noble hearts.
The US Civil War, Major Generals generally commanded Federal Corps while in the Confederate Army Lieutenant Generals frequently commanded their Corps.
While Federals fought Confederates in the east and west, Indians engaged settlers and Federal soldiers in the Indian territories throughout the war. In 1864, Cheyenne and Arapahoe leaders came to Denver with white captives to meet with Federal Officers.
Monday, September 28, 1863: Robert E. Lee began to suspect that Meade was up to something. “The previous day, Confederate along the Rapidan River in Virginia could hear the sound of trains chuffing to and fro from the direction of Brandy Station. It was clear that something was happening, but nobody could divine what. There had been messages sent describing campsites that had been emptied, and it was clear that new Federal troops were now occupying picket posts along the river. General Lee himself was fairly baffled by the happenings, believing that General George Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, was receiving more and more reinforcements. On the 27th, Lee received word from the Shenandoah Valley that, if true, could change everything. On this date, she spelled it out for Jefferson Davis.
“It is stated that Generals Slocum and Howard’s corps, under General Hooker, are to re-enforce General Rosecrans,” reported Lee. “They were to move over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and to commence on the night of the 25th.”
This was all basically true. Generals Henry Slocum and Oliver Otis Howard commanded the XII and XI Corps, respectively. They had been pulled from Meade’s lines and sent west via the B&O Railroad to reinforce William Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga.
Lee also wrote of the empty camps and the changes in the Union lines. He was unsure of the news, however, since he believed the railroad between Meade and Washington was “still closely guarded” by his cavalry.
“If the report from the valley is true,” he continued, “it will no doubt be corroborated to-day or to-morrow.” He had sent additional cavalry into the valley in an attempt to break up the B&O Railroad into West Virginia. Soon, he would be hearing from them.
General Lee voiced two concerns over this news. First, it (as Lee put it) “furnishes additional reason for prompt action on the part of General Bragg.” Lee and Davis had been talking about Bragg doing something with the Chickamauga victory, and with at least two corps of reinforcements en route to Rosecrans, time was fairly important.
Lee’s second concern was a bit of a stretch. Rumors had been circulating that perhaps Meade’s entire army was pulling out and headed to the Peninsula again. Lee discounted them, but clearly they were still in his thoughts. For, “if the withdrawal of these two corps under General Hooker is true,” he wrote, “they may be intended to operate on the Peninsula as a diversion to Meade’s advance.” In closing, he requested that a strong scouting party move down the Peninsula to check things out.
While Lee was writing to Davis, Davis was writing to Braxton Bragg, whose Army of the Tennessee had moved against Rosecrans at Chattanooga. He warned him of troops coming from General Grant’s department along the Mississippi, as well as Slocum’s and Howard’s corps coming from the east. He gave no commentary upon it, and presented it neither as a rumor or a fact – he was merely passing on the report Lee had received on the 27th.
As for things in Rosecrans’ camp, there had been quite a stir up. Due to the messages sent by Assistant Secretary of War Charles Dana (who had witnessed the battle along the Chickamauga) to Secretary Edwin Stanton in Washington, Generals Alexander McCook and Thomas Crittenden were to be relieved of duty, and “a court of inquiry be convened… to inquire and report upon the conduct of Major-Generals McCook and Crittenden, in the battles of the 19th and 20th instant.” They were to report to the Adjutant-General in Indianapolis. Their two corps, the XX and XXI, were to be consolidated into a new corps, the IV.
The IV Corps, of course, had already been a corps in the Union Army. Under Erasmus D. Keyes (who had since been dismissed from command), it had fought in the Peninsula Campaign. During the Gettysburg Campaign, they had been stationed on the Peninsula to act as a sort of diversion (one of the reasons that Lee was suspicious of such a move). In August, the corps had been disbanded, and the remaining units shuffled to the XVIII Corps, in North Carolina.
This IV Corps was a completely different thing, and was helmed by Gordon Granger, who had recently commanded Rosecrans’ Reserve Corps, most of which also folded itself into the new corps. [1]
[1] Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 29, Part 2, p753-754; Vol. 30, Part 3, p911; Vol. 52, Part 2, p532-533.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lee-begins-to-suspect-that-meade-is-up-to-something/
Below are several journal entries from 1861, 1862, 1863 and 1864 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. … I am including journal entries from Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee for each year. I have been spending some time researching Civil War journals and diaries and editing them to fit into this series of Civil War discussions.
Saturday, September, 28, 1861: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," We had regular drill this morning and in the afternoon our election of officers. The election resulted as follows: Captain, Samuel S. McLoney; First Lieutenant, John F. Compton; Second Lieutenant, Lorenzo D. Durbin; Orderly Sergeant, Joel H. Clark. I went home this evening for the last time before leaving for Camp McClellan.”
Sunday, September 28, 1862: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, " It rained all day. I went out on picket. David Huff, Leroy Douglas, Win. Esher and I were together at one post. We had strict orders to keep a sharp lookout for the rebel cavalry. We are expecting to be attacked.”
Sunday, September 28, 1862: Kate Cummings, a nurse in the Confederate Army hospital in Chattanooga, writes in her journal of her concerns for the patients, the management of the hospitals, and for the soldiers and her brother: “The great cry of our sick is for milk. We could buy plenty, but have no money. We get a little every day for the worst cases, at our own expense. I intend letting the folks at home know how many are suffering for want of nourishment, for I feel confident that if they knew of it they would send us means.
Last week, in despair, I went to Dr. Young, the medical purveyor, and begged him to give me some wine; in fact, any little thing, I told him, would be acceptable. I did not come away empty-handed. He gave me arrow-root, sago, wine, and several kinds of spices, and many things in the way of clothing.
In every hospital there is invariably a fund; there is none at present in this. The reason, we have been told, is because the hospitals at this post are in debt to the government, by drawing more money from it than their due, and until it is paid we will get no more. . . .
There are quite a number of soldiers in the place who can not get on to their commands, as the country is filled with bushwhackers, and it is dangerous for them to go through it unless in very large bodies.
I am a good deal worried about my brother, as I have not heard from him since the army went into Kentucky.”
Sunday, September 28, 1862: Union Army surgeon Alfred L. Castleman records a disturbing experience as he rides to Sharpsburg: “28th.—Rode to Sharpsburg to-day to procure some medicines, of which we are sadly deficient. Found a purveyor there, but he had no medicines except morphine and brandy. I passed over Antietam battle-field. The smell was horrible. The road was lined with carriages and wagons conveying coffins and boxes for the removal of dead bodies, and the whole battle-field was crowded with people from distant States exhuming and removing the bodies of their friends. ‘Twas a sad, sad sight, and whilst the world is calculating the chances of war, and estimating its cost in dollars, I am dotting down in my memory the sad scenes I witness as small items in the long account of heart-aches.”
Monday, September 28, 1863: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade, “I went out on picket today, on the public highway from Vicksburg to Warrington. We have to maintain a heavy picket with strong reserve at all the public highways leading from this place.”
Wednesday, September 28, 1864: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, " Cloudy with some rain today. I went on picket this morning for the first time since coming back from the hospital. I was on a lookout post on the right of the picket lines of the brigade with four other men out of our brigade. All is quiet in front of the lines. I miss the four boys killed in battle while I was absent from the company — they were all good men, three of them being veterans.”
Pictures: 1864-09-28 A delegation of Arapaho and Cheyenne leaders met with the U.S. military; 1861-09 View of Munson's Hill; 1863 U.S. gunboat Kansas; 1864-09-28 Cheyenne and Arapaho chiefs arrive in Denver with their white captives
A. Saturday, September, 28, 1861: Federals advanced on Munson’s Hill, a few miles southwest of Washington, and discovered that it was not as heavily defended as presumed. Since the Battle of Bull Run, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had combined the Armies of the Potomac and the Shenandoah into one force consisting of two corps. The former army had become the First Corps of about 24,000 men under General P.G.T. Beauregard. The latter had become the Second Corps of about 16,000 men under General Gustavus W. Smith.
The Confederates mainly held positions in the Centreville area of northern Virginia, with Beauregard’s corps at Fairfax Court House and advance elements within 10 miles of Washington at Munson’s Hill. These elements overlooked Arlington Heights and threatened to disrupt Federal traffic on the Potomac River. By late September, Johnston feared that the forward positions had become vulnerable to attack by the ever-growing Federal Army of the Potomac.
Johnston had reason to fear an attack. Federals had recently conducted a reconnaissance in force around Munson’s Hill and nearby Upton’s Hill, south of Falls Church. Major General George B. McClellan, commanding the Federal Army of the Potomac, sought to clear these points and use them for his planned ring of forts and defensive works around the capital. The two sides engaged in a heavy skirmish, after which the Federals reported that Confederates had constructed strong defenses on Munson’s Hill that included rifle pits and artillery.
The Federals were unaware that these “strong” defenses were mostly a bluff on Johnston’s part. On September 26, he wrote to Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin and President Jefferson Davis asking that one of them inspect the army’s positions and help “to decide definitely whether we are to advance or fall back to a more defensible line.” Then, without waiting for either to respond, Johnston ordered the withdrawal from Munson’s Hill and other forward points.
By dawn on the 28th, General P.G.T. Beauregard had evacuated both Munson’s and Upton’s hills, falling back to Fairfax Court House and Centreville. McClellan, who had been reluctant to attack such “strong” positions, resolved to seize the hills upon learning that the Confederates had retreated. Heeding false warnings from local residents that Confederates were waiting in ambush, the Federals advanced toward the hills with extreme caution.
The Federals climbed the slopes and discovered that the rifle pits had been abandoned. And to their dismay (and their commanders’ embarrassment), they found that the mighty cannon pointed in their direction for nearly two months consisted only of logs and stovepipes painted black. A correspondent who had hoped to witness a battle resentfully called these “Quaker guns.”
Making matters worse for the Federals, on the night of the 28th, troops of the 69th and 71st Pennsylvania accidentally fired into each other while clearing the woods around Munson’s Hill, resulting in several killed and wounded. This tragic mishap, combined with the ruse on the hills, diminished the Federals’ successful occupation of the supposedly threatening positions.
On the Confederate side, Secretary of War Benjamin responded to Johnston’s invitation to inspect the army a day after the Confederates abandoned their forward positions. Benjamin stated that Davis should visit the army and then admonished Johnston for not submitting “a single return from your army of the quantity of ammunition, artillery, means of transportation, or sick in camp or in hospitals, to enable us to form a judgment of what your necessities may be… (it should be) obvious to you that the Department cannot be administered without a thorough reform in this respect.”
This demonstrated the growing tension between Johnston and his superiors, which would continue into October, after President Davis arrived to inspect the army.
B. Sunday, September 28, 1862: CSA Maj Gen Earl Van Dorn planned to retake Corinth, Mississippi. If Corinth fell, he reasoned, it would mean that all of the Federal forces in Western Tennessee would have to retreat. This would even secure Vicksburg, along the Mississippi, from any attacks coming from the north. It would, explained Van Dorn, allow General Braxton Bragg to take Louisville (an idea that Bragg himself had already dismissed).
Two things were essential for this plan to work. The Federals had to be surprised and the Confederates had to move swiftly.
These two essentials could be dealt with in one plan. First, they would not attack Corinth directly. They would first move to Pocahontas, just across the state line. This would, reasoned Van Dorn, throw off these dispersed Federal forces, making them believe he were about to strike Bolivar, Tennessee, forty miles to the northwest of Corinth.
However, when his troops reached the Tennessee line at Pocahontas, they would take an abrupt right and quickly fall upon Corinth from the northwest, striking the weakest portion of the Federal defenses. The plan was pure genius!
It was only nineteen miles from Pocahontas to Corinth and the roads were in good shape. It should be a hard day’s march, but hard marching would take care of speed.
Some under Van Dorn, most notably Sterling Price and the newly-arrived Mansfield Lovell, thought the plan a bad one. Lovell, undaunted over the surrender of New Orleans and the tarnished reputation that followed, believed the army should simply attack Bolivar. This would, he argued, cut the Federal supply line and force Grant to abandon Corinth. On the run, they could be easily driven back to the Ohio River.
Price, on the other hand, wanted to wait. There was good reason. Though it possibly slashed Van Dorn’s needs for secrecy and speed, it would add an additional 15,000 troops to the Rebel force. These reinforcements were coming in the form of exchanged prisoners at Jackson, Mississippi. They could be easily armed and established into a division. They would not, however, be available until the middle of October.
Without them, Price believed, Corinth could not be held. It was probably true that Van Dorn could take Corinth, but holding it? Price just didn’t see how. Even by Van Dorn’s own calculations, there were 27,000 Federals outside of Corinth, ready to descend upon the city to take it back. The casualties that Van Dorn would suffer while taking Corinth were sure to be serious. How, with such a weakened force, could Van Dorn expect to hold his bounty?
Adding weight to Lovell and Prices’ reservations were the Yankees themselves. The troops would be commanded by Generals Grant, Sherman and Rosecrans. While Sherman had not yet come into his own, Grant was certainly making a name for himself. Rosecrans, who graduated fifth in his class at West Point, was an officer to be taken seriously. Van Dorn, who graduated fifth from the bottom of the very same West Point class, somehow disagreed.
Lovell, who commanded a division, and Price, who commanded two, were ordered to have three day’s cooked rations ready. The new Confederate Army of West Tennessee, Earl Van Dorn commanding, would step off at dawn the next morning.
C. Monday, September 28, 1863: In the aftermath of the Battle of Chickamauga [fought September 18–20, 1863], orders from the War Department relieved Gen. Alexander McCook and Gen. Crittenden of their commands, and consolidated their two depleted-corps into one. This was done over the protests of Gen. Rosecrans, who had resisted Washington’s requests to fire the two generals. Rosecrans was also ordered to convene courts martial for McCook’s and Crittenden’s role in the Chickamauga disaster: “GENERAL ORDERS, WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL'S OFFICE, Numbers 322.
Washington, September 28, 1863.*
I. The President of the United States directs that the Twentieth and Twenty-first Army Corps be consolidated and called the Fourth Army Corps, and that Major General Gordon Granger be the commander of this consolidated corps.
II. It is also directed that a court of inquiry be convened, the detail to be hereafter made, to inquire and report upon the conduct of Major-General McCook and Crittenden, in the battles of the 19th and 20th instant. These officers are relieved from duty in the Department of the Cumberland, and will repair to Indianapolis, Ind., reporting their arrival, by letter, to the Adjutant-General of the Army.
By order of the Secretary of War: E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.”
D. Wednesday, September 28, 1864: Battle of Vernon, Florida. Neither federal nor Confederate force knew it, but they were approaching each other via the same road. Believing that Confederate forces were en route and having achieved their objective of capturing Marianna and many of its defenders, the Federals withdrew from the town before sunrise on the morning of September 28. They rode south down the St. Andrews Bay Road and then veered west onto the Vernon road.
As the Union soldiers approached a creek crossing, they ran head on into Capt. W.B. Jones and his company of scouts from Vernon and Holmes Valley. Alerted by a courier that Marianna was facing attack, these men were marching to help their neighbors in Jackson County when they unexpectedly encountered the Union column.
Accounts of what happened next are extremely meager, but apparently Jones and his men engaged in a brief skirmish with the vanguard of Asboth's column. At least one Confederate volunteers was killed and several others, including the captain, were captured. The rest of his men retreated as best they could. Pushing forward, the Federals reached Vernon by nightfall on September 28. Camping there, they moved out again for Choctawhatchee Bay before dawn the next morning.
As the Federals were pushing southwest from Marianna and engaging Jones' men in Washington County, help was pouring into Marianna from all directions. Capts. Jeter and Milton had arrived with Companies E and G of the 5th Florida Cavalry on the night of September 27, as did Capt. George Robinson and his Home Guards from eastern Jackson County. They were joined the next morning by Luke Lott's company from Calhoun County and later by Lt. Col. G.W. Scott of the 5th Florida Cavalry, who arrived ahead of his battalion with a company of Georgia cavalry and a home guard unit from Gadsden County. Organizing these forces as best he could, Scott established a strong line of patrols around Marianna on September 28 and, as soon as he could, set out in pursuit of the Union raiders.
Telegrams also went to Gen. Dabney H. Maury in Mobile, who sent the 15th Confederate Cavalry east in an effort to cut off Asboth's Union column. The following pursuit failed. The Union column was too well-organized and had too much of a head start. By the time Scott's Confederates could reach Vernon, Asboth was already at Point Washington on the Choctawhatchee Bay.
Brig. Gen. Alexander Asboth and the wounded were placed aboard the steamer USS Lizzie Davis, while the rest of the column crossed East Pass and marched down Santa Rosa Island to Fort Pickens. The raid was over.
E. All the above; None of the above; or other [please explain] many other actions are mentioned in my response below.
1. Saturday, September, 28, 1861: It was a rather quite day on all fronts, as the Confederates evacuate Munson's Hill, near the present location of Bailey's Crossroads, Virginia. The Memphis Daily Appeal reports: “One of our writers says that the American ladies, if their services were needed, "would make brave soldiers." If they have to take the field, let them by all means wear their fashionable dresses. The dress worn by day would serve the wearer as a tent at night.”
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-twenty-four
2. Sunday, September 28, 1862: Kate Cummings, a nurse in the Confederate Army hospital in Chattanooga, writes in her journal of her concerns for the patients, the management of the hospitals, and for the soldiers and her brother: “The great cry of our sick is for milk. We could buy plenty, but have no money. We get a little every day for the worst cases, at our own expense. I intend letting the folks at home know how many are suffering for want of nourishment, for I feel confident that if they knew of it they would send us means.
Last week, in despair, I went to Dr. Young, the medical purveyor, and begged him to give me some wine; in fact, any little thing, I told him, would be acceptable. I did not come away empty-handed. He gave me arrow-root, sago, wine, and several kinds of spices, and many things in the way of clothing.
In every hospital there is invariably a fund; there is none at present in this. The reason, we have been told, is because the hospitals at this post are in debt to the government, by drawing more money from it than their due, and until it is paid we will get no more. . . .
There are quite a number of soldiers in the place who can not get on to their commands, as the country is filled with bushwhackers, and it is dangerous for them to go through it unless in very large bodies.
I am a good deal worried about my brother, as I have not heard from him since the army went into Kentucky.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+28%2C+1862
3. Sunday, September 28, 1862: Union Army surgeon Alfred L. Castleman records a disturbing experience as he rides to Sharpsburg: “28th.—Rode to Sharpsburg to-day to procure some medicines, of which we are sadly deficient. Found a purveyor there, but he had no medicines except morphine and brandy. I passed over Antietam battle-field. The smell was horrible. The road was lined with carriages and wagons conveying coffins and boxes for the removal of dead bodies, and the whole battle-field was crowded with people from distant States exhuming and removing the bodies of their friends. ‘Twas a sad, sad sight, and whilst the world is calculating the chances of war, and estimating its cost in dollars, I am dotting down in my memory the sad scenes I witness as small items in the long account of heart-aches.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+28%2C+1862
4. Sunday, September 28, 1862: Lee’s army of 50,000 men is now gathered at Winchester, Virginia in the Shenandoah Valley.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-seven
5. Monday, September 28, 1863: Repercussions from Chickamauga: US Generals Crittenden, Alexander McDowell and McCook are relieved of duty and ordered to Indianapolis to face a court of inquiry.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186309
6. Monday, September 28, 1863: As Major General William S. Rosecrans, (US) blames his subordinates for the Union defeat at Chickamauga, TN, Major Generals, Alexander McDowell McCook and Thomas L. Crittenden are relieved of command of their respective US Army Corps and ordered to Indianapolis, IN, where a Court of Inquiry will look into their conduct at Chickamauga. Conditions in Chattanooga were becoming worse as food was in short supply. Word of Northern reinforcements on the move South, reach Chattanooga besieger, General Braxton Bragg, (CSA) in the form of a telegram from Jefferson Davis.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-129
7. Wednesday, September 28, 1864: President Davis approves Hood's request to relieve William Hardee.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186409
8. Wednesday, September 28, 1864: President Davis (CSA) approves General Hood's (CSA) request to relieve General William Hardee. Even though Hardee was the most able corps commander, Davis personally selected Hood to command the Army of Tennessee in July, and refused to admit his mistake. On his return trip to the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, Davis gives a speech at Columbia, South Carolina, in which he overpraises about Hood’s prospects. In doing so, he let slip important information, and that can never be a good thing. The Yankees and Rebels around Petersburg, Virginia continue to incur losses as snipers pick off men on both sides of the siege lines. General Forrest (CSA) is riding north now in Tennessee.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-181
9. Wednesday, September 28, 1864: Jefferson Davis and some political shuffling for the battlefield. “For Jefferson Davis, this was an important decision. John Bell Hood had done little more than retreat into and then out of Atlanta. But, he followed Joe Johnston who retreated all the way from Tennessee. Many of the officers and troops who were along for both retreats wished for Hood to be replaced by Johnston. However, it had been Davis who had dismissed Johnston and to reinstate him would mean admitting he was to blame. And so, while the decision was important, it was also easy. Hood would remain and Davis would be blameless.
This, of course, meant losing William Hardee, an incredibly able general who refused to work under Hood a moment longer. There were a few other changes to be made, as well, but while touring parts of Hood’s department in Alabama, Davis gave Hood the news.
“Relieve Lieutenant-General Hardee from duty with the Army of Tennessee,” read Davis’ short message, “and direct him to proceed at once to Charleston, S.C., and assume command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.”
To retain Hood didn’t simply mean that Hood would continue retreating. The army commander had told Davis much about a proposed plan to march north of Atlanta and nearly to Tennessee. He hoped that Sherman would be then forced to detach some amount of troops to deal with Hood’s bold move. He would defeat the Federal detachment and then “regain our lost territory, reinspirit the troops, and bring hope again to the hearts of our people.”
A vote for Hood was a vote for this glorified raid. But Davis wasn’t finished shuffling officers around. Hardee would be replacing P.G.T. Beauregard, who would soon be coming back west. Before he even left Richmond to deal with the Hood dilemma, Davis asked General Lee to talk Beauregard into the new position. At first, Davis was only considering Beauregard as a replacement for Hood in the field.
To the field command, Beauregard questioned whether he was “equal to the present emergency,” but agreed to do it if Davis really wanted him to. In the end, Lee basically agreed that there was nobody else available and the Beauregard was what they had to work with.
The final decision was a bit of political wrangling that would make everyone come out smelling of roses. Hood was to keep his job. Beauregard was to head up the new mega-department called The Military Division of the West, which encompassed pretty well everything in the West. Even William Hardee got a promotion. Joe Johnston, however, was still in a state of semi-retirement, living with his wife in Macon, Georgia. But then, Davis didn’t care much at all what Johnston or his friends thought. He even gave a speech defending his decision to sack Johnston while passing through Macon. Jefferson Davis was not even a little subtle.
Though it would take Beauregard several days to learn of his new promotion, he was mainly a figurehead – overseeing two already-established and fairly functional departments. He was barred by Davis even from taking command of troops unless it was a dire emergency.
As for General Hood, as soon as he learned he was still in command, he issued orders for the next move. The following morning, his Army of Tennessee was to cross the Chattahoochee and Pumpkin Town and Phillip’s Ferry to begin their march around the western side of Atlanta. [1]
[1] Sources:Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 39, Part 2, p 846, 879-880; Advance and Retreat by John Bell Hood; P.G.T. Beauregard by T. Harry Williams; Autumn of Glory by Tomas Lawrence Connelly; Joseph E. Johnston by Craig L. Symonds.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/davis-and-some-political-shuffling-for-the-battlefield/
A September 28, 1861 – Federals advanced on Munson’s Hill, a few miles southwest of Washington, and discovered that it was not as heavily defended as presumed. Since the Battle of Bull Run, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had combined the Armies of the Potomac and the Shenandoah into one force consisting of two corps. The former army had become the First Corps of about 24,000 men under General P.G.T. Beauregard. The latter had become the Second Corps of about 16,000 men under General Gustavus W. Smith.
The Confederates mainly held positions in the Centreville area of northern Virginia, with Beauregard’s corps at Fairfax Court House and advance elements within 10 miles of Washington at Munson’s Hill. These elements overlooked Arlington Heights and threatened to disrupt Federal traffic on the Potomac River. By late September, Johnston feared that the forward positions had become vulnerable to attack by the ever-growing Federal Army of the Potomac.
Johnston had reason to fear an attack. Federals had recently conducted a reconnaissance in force around Munson’s Hill and nearby Upton’s Hill, south of Falls Church. Major General George B. McClellan, commanding the Federal Army of the Potomac, sought to clear these points and use them for his planned ring of forts and defensive works around the capital. The two sides engaged in a heavy skirmish, after which the Federals reported that Confederates had constructed strong defenses on Munson’s Hill that included rifle pits and artillery.
The Federals were unaware that these “strong” defenses were mostly a bluff on Johnston’s part. On September 26, he wrote to Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin and President Jefferson Davis asking that one of them inspect the army’s positions and help “to decide definitely whether we are to advance or fall back to a more defensible line.” Then, without waiting for either to respond, Johnston ordered the withdrawal from Munson’s Hill and other forward points.
By dawn on the 28th, Beauregard had evacuated both Munson’s and Upton’s hills, falling back to Fairfax Court House and Centreville. McClellan, who had been reluctant to attack such “strong” positions, resolved to seize the hills upon learning that the Confederates had retreated. Heeding false warnings from local residents that Confederates were waiting in ambush, the Federals advanced toward the hills with extreme caution.
The Federals climbed the slopes and discovered that the rifle pits had been abandoned. And to their dismay (and their commanders’ embarrassment), they found that the mighty cannon pointed in their direction for nearly two months consisted only of logs and stovepipes painted black. A correspondent who had hoped to witness a battle resentfully called these “Quaker guns.”
Making matters worse for the Federals, on the night of the 28th, troops of the 69th and 71st Pennsylvania accidentally fired into each other while clearing the woods around Munson’s Hill, resulting in several killed and wounded. This tragic mishap, combined with the ruse on the hills, diminished the Federals’ successful occupation of the supposedly threatening positions.
On the Confederate side, Secretary of War Benjamin responded to Johnston’s invitation to inspect the army a day after the Confederates abandoned their forward positions. Benjamin stated that Davis should visit the army and then admonished Johnston for not submitting “a single return from your army of the quantity of ammunition, artillery, means of transportation, or sick in camp or in hospitals, to enable us to form a judgment of what your necessities may be… (it should be) obvious to you that the Department cannot be administered without a thorough reform in this respect.”
This demonstrated the growing tension between Johnston and his superiors, which would continue into October, after President Davis arrived to inspect the army.
https://civilwarmonths.com/2016/09/28/dubious-victory-at-munsons-hill/
B Sunday, September 28, 1862: The splendid Rebel plan to retake Corinth, Mississippi. “Sterling Price wasn’t an unreasonable man, it’s just that he didn’t believe a word Earl Van Dorn was saying. Following the strange battle of Iuka, Sterling Price and his army slipped away from Union forces under General Grant. Their move took them southwest, on a track to join up with Van Dorn’s army at Ripley, Mississippi.
The tramp to join their comrades was a trying one, with heavy rains, bad roads, little sleep, and even an earthquake. On top of this, there was quite a bit of apprehension over joining with Van Dorn, who would be in charge of the entire show. Price’s chief-of-staff, Major Thomas Snead, even tried to resign. Thankfully, Price was able to play the patriotism card to convince him to stay.
Finally, on this date, they arrived and heard Van Dorn’s plan. The idea was a move on Corinth, the railroad city that General Beauregard once defended (and abandoned) against 120,000 Yankees. Now, claimed Van Dorn, it was lightly defended and ripe for the picking.
If Corinth fell, he reasoned, it would mean that all of the Federal forces in Western Tennessee would have to retreat. This would even secure Vicksburg, along the Mississippi, from any attacks coming from the north. It would, explained Van Dorn, allow General Braxton Bragg to take Louisville (an idea that Bragg himself had already dismissed).
With the addition of Price’s force, Van Dorn commanded 22,000 troops. Corinth, he reasoned, was only held by 15,000 Federals. General Grant had other troops in the area, sure, but they were too spread out to matter. Van Dorn figured there were 6,000 at Memphis, 8,000 at Bolivar, 3,000 at Jackson and 10,000 more scattered throughout different outposts.
Two things were essential for this plan to work. The Federals had to be surprised and the Confederates had to move swiftly.
These two essentials could be dealt with in one plan. First, they would not attack Corinth directly. They would first move to Pocahontas, just across the state line. This would, reasoned Van Dorn, throw off these dispersed Federal forces, making them believe he were about to strike Bolivar, Tennessee, forty miles to the northwest of Corinth.
However, when his troops reached the Tennessee line at Pocahontas, they would take an abrupt right and quickly fall upon Corinth from the northwest, striking the weakest portion of the Federal defenses. The plan was pure genius!
It was only nineteen miles from Pocahontas to Corinth and the roads were in good shape. It should be a hard day’s march, but hard marching would take care of speed.
Some under Van Dorn, most notably Sterling Price and the newly-arrived Mansfield Lovell, thought the plan a bad one. Lovell, undaunted over the surrender of New Orleans and the tarnished reputation that followed, believed the army should simply attack Bolivar. This would, he argued, cut the Federal supply line and force Grant to abandon Corinth. On the run, they could be easily driven back to the Ohio River.
Price, on the other hand, wanted to wait. There was good reason. Though it possibly slashed Van Dorn’s needs for secrecy and speed, it would add an additional 15,000 troops to the Rebel force. These reinforcements were coming in the form of exchanged prisoners at Jackson, Mississippi. They could be easily armed and established into a division. They would not, however, be available until the middle of October.
Without them, Price believed, Corinth could not be held. It was probably true that Van Dorn could take Corinth, but holding it? Price just didn’t see how. Even by Van Dorn’s own calculations, there were 27,000 Federals outside of Corinth, ready to descend upon the city to take it back. The casualties that Van Dorn would suffer while taking Corinth were sure to be serious. How, with such a weakened force, could Van Dorn expect to hold his bounty?
Adding weight to Lovell and Prices’ reservations were the Yankees themselves. The troops would be commanded by Generals Grant, Sherman and Rosecrans. While Sherman had not yet come into his own, Grant was certainly making a name for himself. Rosecrans, who graduated fifth in his class at West Point, was an officer to be taken seriously. Van Dorn, who graduated fifth from the bottom of the very same West Point class, somehow disagreed.
Lovell, who commanded a division, and Price, who commanded two, were ordered to have three day’s cooked rations ready. The new Confederate Army of West Tennessee, Earl Van Dorn commanding, would step off at dawn the next morning. [1]
[1] Sources: The Darkest Days of the War by Peter Cozzens; Grant Rises in the West by Kenneth P. Williams; Nothing But Victory by Stephen E Woodworth”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/the-rebel-plan-to-retake-corinth/
C Monday, September 28, 1863: On this date, in the aftermath of the Battle of Chickamauga [fought September 18–20, 1863], orders from the War Department relieve Gen. Alexander McCook and Gen. Crittenden of their commands, and consolidate their two depleted-corps into one. This is done over the protests of Gen. Rosecrans, who has resisted Washington’s requests to fire the two generals. Rosecrans is also order to convene courts martial for McCook’s and Crittenden’s role in the Chickamauga disaster: “GENERAL ORDERS, WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL'S OFFICE, Numbers 322.
Washington, September 28, 1863.*
I. The President of the United States directs that the Twentieth and Twenty-first Army Corps be consolidated and called the Fourth Army Corps, and that Major General Gordon Granger be the commander of this consolidated corps.
II. It is also directed that a court of inquiry be convened, the detail to be hereafter made, to inquire and report upon the conduct of Major-General McCook and Crittenden, in the battles of the 19th and 20th instant. These officers are relieved from duty in the Department of the Cumberland, and will repair to Indianapolis, Ind., reporting their arrival, by letter, to the Adjutant-General of the Army.
By order of the Secretary of War: E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+28%2C+1863
D Wednesday, September 28, 1864: Vernon, Florida - Believing that Confederate forces were en route and having achieved their objective of capturing Marianna and many of its defenders, the Federals withdrew from the town before sunrise on the morning of September 28. They rode south down the St. Andrews Bay Road and then veered west onto the Vernon road.
As the Union soldiers approached a creek crossing, they ran head on into Capt. W.B. Jones and his company of scouts from Vernon and Holmes Valley. Alerted by a courier that Marianna was facing attack, these men were marching to help their neighbors in Jackson County when they unexpectedly encountered the Union column.
Accounts of what happened next are extremely meager, but apparently Jones and his men engaged in a brief skirmish with the vanguard of Asboth's column. At least one Confederate volunteers was killed and several others, including the captain, were captured. The rest of his men retreated as best they could. Pushing forward, the Federals reached Vernon by nightfall on September 28. Camping there, they moved out again for Choctawhatchee Bay before dawn the next morning.
As the Federals were pushing southwest from Marianna and engaging Jones' men in Washington County, help was pouring into Marianna from all directions. Capts. Jeter and Milton had arrived with Companies E and G of the 5th Florida Cavalry on the night of September 27, as did Capt. George Robinson and his Home Guards from eastern Jackson County. They were joined the next morning by Luke Lott's company from Calhoun County and later by Lt. Col. G.W. Scott of the 5th Florida Cavalry, who arrived ahead of his battalion with a company of Georgia cavalry and a home guard unit from Gadsden County. Organizing these forces as best he could, Scott established a strong line of patrols around Marianna on September 28 and, as soon as he could, set out in pursuit of the Union raiders.
Telegrams also went to Gen. Dabney H. Maury in Mobile, who sent the 15th Confederate Cavalry east in an effort to cut off Asboth's Union column. The following pursuit failed. The Union column was too well-organized and had too much of a head start. By the time Scott's Confederates could reach Vernon, Asboth was already at Point Washington on the Choctawhatchee Bay.
Brig. Gen. Alexander Asboth and the wounded were placed aboard the steamer USS Lizzie Davis, while the rest of the column crossed East Pass and marched down Santa Rosa Island to Fort Pickens. The raid was over.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1864s.html
On September 28, 1864, the men of Captain W.B. Jones' Company, Florida Home Guard, collided with the large Union force of Brigadier General Alexander Asboth on the banks of Hard Labor Creek in Washington County. The resulting skirmish has been remembered locally as the Battle of Vernon, Florida.
The encounter took place during the deepest penetration of Florida by Union troops during the entire Civil War. General Asboth and his men had left Pensacola on September 18, 1864. Leaving a wide swath of destruction in their wake, they skirmished with Southern troops near Campbellton in Jackson County on September 26th and then attacked the city of Marianna the next day.
Following the bloody Battle of Marianna, the Union troops turned southwest on the Vernon road shortly after midnight on the morning of September 28, 1864. After stopping for their midday meal at Orange Hill, they came down into Holmes Valley and soon approached the crossing of Hard Labor Creek.
Meanwhile, Captain W.B. Jones of the Vernon Home Guard learned that Marianna had been attacked. The 30-50 men of his company were either too young or too old to serve in the regular army or had been released from service due to wounds and other disabilities. Mounting their horses at Vernon, they headed out for Marianna to help their neighbors in Jackson County.
Neither force knew it, but they were approaching each other via the same road.
On the afternoon of September 28, 1864, the two forces collided unexpectedly at Hard Labor Creek near today's Washington Church. Believing they were being pursued by Confederate cavalry, the hundreds of Union soldiers were in no mood to be delayed. A company or more of soldiers from the 1st Florida U.S. Infantry was in the lead as the Federals came down the hill to the creek. They ordered Captain Jones and his men to disperse and go home. According to legend, however, one of Jones' men (Stephen Pierce) began to taunt the Union soldiers. This is impossible to prove, but what is known is that the Union troops opened fire on the men of the Vernon Home Guard. The Confederates were outnumbered more than 14 to 1, but fought back as best they could. Captain Jones ordered his men to retreat as the Union soldiers charged, but he and many of the members of his company were taken prisoner. A few others managed to escape and later reported that they were pursued by Union soldiers all the way back to Vernon.
Total losses in the Battle of Vernon included one man killed and one wounded in addition to the prisoners. The fatally wounded man was Stephen Pierce, formerly a soldier in the 4th Florida Infantry. Legend holds that he was executed for taunting the Union soldiers, but eyewitness accounts indicate he was actually shot during the brief battle He was buried nearby and his grave can be seen today adjacent to Washington Church.
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SMSgt Lawrence McCarter LTC Trent Klug SFC Bernard WalkoSSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr CPL Ronald Keyes Jr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy SFC David Reid, M.S, PHR, SHRM-CP, DTMSgt Christopher Collins SPC (Join to see) SPC Gary C. PO3 Lynn Spalding
Sometimes church would be respected and undisturbed while at other times horses would be stolen or ambushes set. In the first year, Sunday was more commonly respected as a day of worship since there were many Christians on both sides. By 1862, chivalry was dying in many places and by 1863 in had died a painful death in all but the most noble hearts.
The US Civil War, Major Generals generally commanded Federal Corps while in the Confederate Army Lieutenant Generals frequently commanded their Corps.
While Federals fought Confederates in the east and west, Indians engaged settlers and Federal soldiers in the Indian territories throughout the war. In 1864, Cheyenne and Arapahoe leaders came to Denver with white captives to meet with Federal Officers.
Monday, September 28, 1863: Robert E. Lee began to suspect that Meade was up to something. “The previous day, Confederate along the Rapidan River in Virginia could hear the sound of trains chuffing to and fro from the direction of Brandy Station. It was clear that something was happening, but nobody could divine what. There had been messages sent describing campsites that had been emptied, and it was clear that new Federal troops were now occupying picket posts along the river. General Lee himself was fairly baffled by the happenings, believing that General George Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, was receiving more and more reinforcements. On the 27th, Lee received word from the Shenandoah Valley that, if true, could change everything. On this date, she spelled it out for Jefferson Davis.
“It is stated that Generals Slocum and Howard’s corps, under General Hooker, are to re-enforce General Rosecrans,” reported Lee. “They were to move over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and to commence on the night of the 25th.”
This was all basically true. Generals Henry Slocum and Oliver Otis Howard commanded the XII and XI Corps, respectively. They had been pulled from Meade’s lines and sent west via the B&O Railroad to reinforce William Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga.
Lee also wrote of the empty camps and the changes in the Union lines. He was unsure of the news, however, since he believed the railroad between Meade and Washington was “still closely guarded” by his cavalry.
“If the report from the valley is true,” he continued, “it will no doubt be corroborated to-day or to-morrow.” He had sent additional cavalry into the valley in an attempt to break up the B&O Railroad into West Virginia. Soon, he would be hearing from them.
General Lee voiced two concerns over this news. First, it (as Lee put it) “furnishes additional reason for prompt action on the part of General Bragg.” Lee and Davis had been talking about Bragg doing something with the Chickamauga victory, and with at least two corps of reinforcements en route to Rosecrans, time was fairly important.
Lee’s second concern was a bit of a stretch. Rumors had been circulating that perhaps Meade’s entire army was pulling out and headed to the Peninsula again. Lee discounted them, but clearly they were still in his thoughts. For, “if the withdrawal of these two corps under General Hooker is true,” he wrote, “they may be intended to operate on the Peninsula as a diversion to Meade’s advance.” In closing, he requested that a strong scouting party move down the Peninsula to check things out.
While Lee was writing to Davis, Davis was writing to Braxton Bragg, whose Army of the Tennessee had moved against Rosecrans at Chattanooga. He warned him of troops coming from General Grant’s department along the Mississippi, as well as Slocum’s and Howard’s corps coming from the east. He gave no commentary upon it, and presented it neither as a rumor or a fact – he was merely passing on the report Lee had received on the 27th.
As for things in Rosecrans’ camp, there had been quite a stir up. Due to the messages sent by Assistant Secretary of War Charles Dana (who had witnessed the battle along the Chickamauga) to Secretary Edwin Stanton in Washington, Generals Alexander McCook and Thomas Crittenden were to be relieved of duty, and “a court of inquiry be convened… to inquire and report upon the conduct of Major-Generals McCook and Crittenden, in the battles of the 19th and 20th instant.” They were to report to the Adjutant-General in Indianapolis. Their two corps, the XX and XXI, were to be consolidated into a new corps, the IV.
The IV Corps, of course, had already been a corps in the Union Army. Under Erasmus D. Keyes (who had since been dismissed from command), it had fought in the Peninsula Campaign. During the Gettysburg Campaign, they had been stationed on the Peninsula to act as a sort of diversion (one of the reasons that Lee was suspicious of such a move). In August, the corps had been disbanded, and the remaining units shuffled to the XVIII Corps, in North Carolina.
This IV Corps was a completely different thing, and was helmed by Gordon Granger, who had recently commanded Rosecrans’ Reserve Corps, most of which also folded itself into the new corps. [1]
[1] Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 29, Part 2, p753-754; Vol. 30, Part 3, p911; Vol. 52, Part 2, p532-533.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lee-begins-to-suspect-that-meade-is-up-to-something/
Below are several journal entries from 1861, 1862, 1863 and 1864 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. … I am including journal entries from Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee for each year. I have been spending some time researching Civil War journals and diaries and editing them to fit into this series of Civil War discussions.
Saturday, September, 28, 1861: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," We had regular drill this morning and in the afternoon our election of officers. The election resulted as follows: Captain, Samuel S. McLoney; First Lieutenant, John F. Compton; Second Lieutenant, Lorenzo D. Durbin; Orderly Sergeant, Joel H. Clark. I went home this evening for the last time before leaving for Camp McClellan.”
Sunday, September 28, 1862: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, " It rained all day. I went out on picket. David Huff, Leroy Douglas, Win. Esher and I were together at one post. We had strict orders to keep a sharp lookout for the rebel cavalry. We are expecting to be attacked.”
Sunday, September 28, 1862: Kate Cummings, a nurse in the Confederate Army hospital in Chattanooga, writes in her journal of her concerns for the patients, the management of the hospitals, and for the soldiers and her brother: “The great cry of our sick is for milk. We could buy plenty, but have no money. We get a little every day for the worst cases, at our own expense. I intend letting the folks at home know how many are suffering for want of nourishment, for I feel confident that if they knew of it they would send us means.
Last week, in despair, I went to Dr. Young, the medical purveyor, and begged him to give me some wine; in fact, any little thing, I told him, would be acceptable. I did not come away empty-handed. He gave me arrow-root, sago, wine, and several kinds of spices, and many things in the way of clothing.
In every hospital there is invariably a fund; there is none at present in this. The reason, we have been told, is because the hospitals at this post are in debt to the government, by drawing more money from it than their due, and until it is paid we will get no more. . . .
There are quite a number of soldiers in the place who can not get on to their commands, as the country is filled with bushwhackers, and it is dangerous for them to go through it unless in very large bodies.
I am a good deal worried about my brother, as I have not heard from him since the army went into Kentucky.”
Sunday, September 28, 1862: Union Army surgeon Alfred L. Castleman records a disturbing experience as he rides to Sharpsburg: “28th.—Rode to Sharpsburg to-day to procure some medicines, of which we are sadly deficient. Found a purveyor there, but he had no medicines except morphine and brandy. I passed over Antietam battle-field. The smell was horrible. The road was lined with carriages and wagons conveying coffins and boxes for the removal of dead bodies, and the whole battle-field was crowded with people from distant States exhuming and removing the bodies of their friends. ‘Twas a sad, sad sight, and whilst the world is calculating the chances of war, and estimating its cost in dollars, I am dotting down in my memory the sad scenes I witness as small items in the long account of heart-aches.”
Monday, September 28, 1863: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade, “I went out on picket today, on the public highway from Vicksburg to Warrington. We have to maintain a heavy picket with strong reserve at all the public highways leading from this place.”
Wednesday, September 28, 1864: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, " Cloudy with some rain today. I went on picket this morning for the first time since coming back from the hospital. I was on a lookout post on the right of the picket lines of the brigade with four other men out of our brigade. All is quiet in front of the lines. I miss the four boys killed in battle while I was absent from the company — they were all good men, three of them being veterans.”
Pictures: 1864-09-28 A delegation of Arapaho and Cheyenne leaders met with the U.S. military; 1861-09 View of Munson's Hill; 1863 U.S. gunboat Kansas; 1864-09-28 Cheyenne and Arapaho chiefs arrive in Denver with their white captives
A. Saturday, September, 28, 1861: Federals advanced on Munson’s Hill, a few miles southwest of Washington, and discovered that it was not as heavily defended as presumed. Since the Battle of Bull Run, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had combined the Armies of the Potomac and the Shenandoah into one force consisting of two corps. The former army had become the First Corps of about 24,000 men under General P.G.T. Beauregard. The latter had become the Second Corps of about 16,000 men under General Gustavus W. Smith.
The Confederates mainly held positions in the Centreville area of northern Virginia, with Beauregard’s corps at Fairfax Court House and advance elements within 10 miles of Washington at Munson’s Hill. These elements overlooked Arlington Heights and threatened to disrupt Federal traffic on the Potomac River. By late September, Johnston feared that the forward positions had become vulnerable to attack by the ever-growing Federal Army of the Potomac.
Johnston had reason to fear an attack. Federals had recently conducted a reconnaissance in force around Munson’s Hill and nearby Upton’s Hill, south of Falls Church. Major General George B. McClellan, commanding the Federal Army of the Potomac, sought to clear these points and use them for his planned ring of forts and defensive works around the capital. The two sides engaged in a heavy skirmish, after which the Federals reported that Confederates had constructed strong defenses on Munson’s Hill that included rifle pits and artillery.
The Federals were unaware that these “strong” defenses were mostly a bluff on Johnston’s part. On September 26, he wrote to Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin and President Jefferson Davis asking that one of them inspect the army’s positions and help “to decide definitely whether we are to advance or fall back to a more defensible line.” Then, without waiting for either to respond, Johnston ordered the withdrawal from Munson’s Hill and other forward points.
By dawn on the 28th, General P.G.T. Beauregard had evacuated both Munson’s and Upton’s hills, falling back to Fairfax Court House and Centreville. McClellan, who had been reluctant to attack such “strong” positions, resolved to seize the hills upon learning that the Confederates had retreated. Heeding false warnings from local residents that Confederates were waiting in ambush, the Federals advanced toward the hills with extreme caution.
The Federals climbed the slopes and discovered that the rifle pits had been abandoned. And to their dismay (and their commanders’ embarrassment), they found that the mighty cannon pointed in their direction for nearly two months consisted only of logs and stovepipes painted black. A correspondent who had hoped to witness a battle resentfully called these “Quaker guns.”
Making matters worse for the Federals, on the night of the 28th, troops of the 69th and 71st Pennsylvania accidentally fired into each other while clearing the woods around Munson’s Hill, resulting in several killed and wounded. This tragic mishap, combined with the ruse on the hills, diminished the Federals’ successful occupation of the supposedly threatening positions.
On the Confederate side, Secretary of War Benjamin responded to Johnston’s invitation to inspect the army a day after the Confederates abandoned their forward positions. Benjamin stated that Davis should visit the army and then admonished Johnston for not submitting “a single return from your army of the quantity of ammunition, artillery, means of transportation, or sick in camp or in hospitals, to enable us to form a judgment of what your necessities may be… (it should be) obvious to you that the Department cannot be administered without a thorough reform in this respect.”
This demonstrated the growing tension between Johnston and his superiors, which would continue into October, after President Davis arrived to inspect the army.
B. Sunday, September 28, 1862: CSA Maj Gen Earl Van Dorn planned to retake Corinth, Mississippi. If Corinth fell, he reasoned, it would mean that all of the Federal forces in Western Tennessee would have to retreat. This would even secure Vicksburg, along the Mississippi, from any attacks coming from the north. It would, explained Van Dorn, allow General Braxton Bragg to take Louisville (an idea that Bragg himself had already dismissed).
Two things were essential for this plan to work. The Federals had to be surprised and the Confederates had to move swiftly.
These two essentials could be dealt with in one plan. First, they would not attack Corinth directly. They would first move to Pocahontas, just across the state line. This would, reasoned Van Dorn, throw off these dispersed Federal forces, making them believe he were about to strike Bolivar, Tennessee, forty miles to the northwest of Corinth.
However, when his troops reached the Tennessee line at Pocahontas, they would take an abrupt right and quickly fall upon Corinth from the northwest, striking the weakest portion of the Federal defenses. The plan was pure genius!
It was only nineteen miles from Pocahontas to Corinth and the roads were in good shape. It should be a hard day’s march, but hard marching would take care of speed.
Some under Van Dorn, most notably Sterling Price and the newly-arrived Mansfield Lovell, thought the plan a bad one. Lovell, undaunted over the surrender of New Orleans and the tarnished reputation that followed, believed the army should simply attack Bolivar. This would, he argued, cut the Federal supply line and force Grant to abandon Corinth. On the run, they could be easily driven back to the Ohio River.
Price, on the other hand, wanted to wait. There was good reason. Though it possibly slashed Van Dorn’s needs for secrecy and speed, it would add an additional 15,000 troops to the Rebel force. These reinforcements were coming in the form of exchanged prisoners at Jackson, Mississippi. They could be easily armed and established into a division. They would not, however, be available until the middle of October.
Without them, Price believed, Corinth could not be held. It was probably true that Van Dorn could take Corinth, but holding it? Price just didn’t see how. Even by Van Dorn’s own calculations, there were 27,000 Federals outside of Corinth, ready to descend upon the city to take it back. The casualties that Van Dorn would suffer while taking Corinth were sure to be serious. How, with such a weakened force, could Van Dorn expect to hold his bounty?
Adding weight to Lovell and Prices’ reservations were the Yankees themselves. The troops would be commanded by Generals Grant, Sherman and Rosecrans. While Sherman had not yet come into his own, Grant was certainly making a name for himself. Rosecrans, who graduated fifth in his class at West Point, was an officer to be taken seriously. Van Dorn, who graduated fifth from the bottom of the very same West Point class, somehow disagreed.
Lovell, who commanded a division, and Price, who commanded two, were ordered to have three day’s cooked rations ready. The new Confederate Army of West Tennessee, Earl Van Dorn commanding, would step off at dawn the next morning.
C. Monday, September 28, 1863: In the aftermath of the Battle of Chickamauga [fought September 18–20, 1863], orders from the War Department relieved Gen. Alexander McCook and Gen. Crittenden of their commands, and consolidated their two depleted-corps into one. This was done over the protests of Gen. Rosecrans, who had resisted Washington’s requests to fire the two generals. Rosecrans was also ordered to convene courts martial for McCook’s and Crittenden’s role in the Chickamauga disaster: “GENERAL ORDERS, WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL'S OFFICE, Numbers 322.
Washington, September 28, 1863.*
I. The President of the United States directs that the Twentieth and Twenty-first Army Corps be consolidated and called the Fourth Army Corps, and that Major General Gordon Granger be the commander of this consolidated corps.
II. It is also directed that a court of inquiry be convened, the detail to be hereafter made, to inquire and report upon the conduct of Major-General McCook and Crittenden, in the battles of the 19th and 20th instant. These officers are relieved from duty in the Department of the Cumberland, and will repair to Indianapolis, Ind., reporting their arrival, by letter, to the Adjutant-General of the Army.
By order of the Secretary of War: E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.”
D. Wednesday, September 28, 1864: Battle of Vernon, Florida. Neither federal nor Confederate force knew it, but they were approaching each other via the same road. Believing that Confederate forces were en route and having achieved their objective of capturing Marianna and many of its defenders, the Federals withdrew from the town before sunrise on the morning of September 28. They rode south down the St. Andrews Bay Road and then veered west onto the Vernon road.
As the Union soldiers approached a creek crossing, they ran head on into Capt. W.B. Jones and his company of scouts from Vernon and Holmes Valley. Alerted by a courier that Marianna was facing attack, these men were marching to help their neighbors in Jackson County when they unexpectedly encountered the Union column.
Accounts of what happened next are extremely meager, but apparently Jones and his men engaged in a brief skirmish with the vanguard of Asboth's column. At least one Confederate volunteers was killed and several others, including the captain, were captured. The rest of his men retreated as best they could. Pushing forward, the Federals reached Vernon by nightfall on September 28. Camping there, they moved out again for Choctawhatchee Bay before dawn the next morning.
As the Federals were pushing southwest from Marianna and engaging Jones' men in Washington County, help was pouring into Marianna from all directions. Capts. Jeter and Milton had arrived with Companies E and G of the 5th Florida Cavalry on the night of September 27, as did Capt. George Robinson and his Home Guards from eastern Jackson County. They were joined the next morning by Luke Lott's company from Calhoun County and later by Lt. Col. G.W. Scott of the 5th Florida Cavalry, who arrived ahead of his battalion with a company of Georgia cavalry and a home guard unit from Gadsden County. Organizing these forces as best he could, Scott established a strong line of patrols around Marianna on September 28 and, as soon as he could, set out in pursuit of the Union raiders.
Telegrams also went to Gen. Dabney H. Maury in Mobile, who sent the 15th Confederate Cavalry east in an effort to cut off Asboth's Union column. The following pursuit failed. The Union column was too well-organized and had too much of a head start. By the time Scott's Confederates could reach Vernon, Asboth was already at Point Washington on the Choctawhatchee Bay.
Brig. Gen. Alexander Asboth and the wounded were placed aboard the steamer USS Lizzie Davis, while the rest of the column crossed East Pass and marched down Santa Rosa Island to Fort Pickens. The raid was over.
E. All the above; None of the above; or other [please explain] many other actions are mentioned in my response below.
1. Saturday, September, 28, 1861: It was a rather quite day on all fronts, as the Confederates evacuate Munson's Hill, near the present location of Bailey's Crossroads, Virginia. The Memphis Daily Appeal reports: “One of our writers says that the American ladies, if their services were needed, "would make brave soldiers." If they have to take the field, let them by all means wear their fashionable dresses. The dress worn by day would serve the wearer as a tent at night.”
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-twenty-four
2. Sunday, September 28, 1862: Kate Cummings, a nurse in the Confederate Army hospital in Chattanooga, writes in her journal of her concerns for the patients, the management of the hospitals, and for the soldiers and her brother: “The great cry of our sick is for milk. We could buy plenty, but have no money. We get a little every day for the worst cases, at our own expense. I intend letting the folks at home know how many are suffering for want of nourishment, for I feel confident that if they knew of it they would send us means.
Last week, in despair, I went to Dr. Young, the medical purveyor, and begged him to give me some wine; in fact, any little thing, I told him, would be acceptable. I did not come away empty-handed. He gave me arrow-root, sago, wine, and several kinds of spices, and many things in the way of clothing.
In every hospital there is invariably a fund; there is none at present in this. The reason, we have been told, is because the hospitals at this post are in debt to the government, by drawing more money from it than their due, and until it is paid we will get no more. . . .
There are quite a number of soldiers in the place who can not get on to their commands, as the country is filled with bushwhackers, and it is dangerous for them to go through it unless in very large bodies.
I am a good deal worried about my brother, as I have not heard from him since the army went into Kentucky.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+28%2C+1862
3. Sunday, September 28, 1862: Union Army surgeon Alfred L. Castleman records a disturbing experience as he rides to Sharpsburg: “28th.—Rode to Sharpsburg to-day to procure some medicines, of which we are sadly deficient. Found a purveyor there, but he had no medicines except morphine and brandy. I passed over Antietam battle-field. The smell was horrible. The road was lined with carriages and wagons conveying coffins and boxes for the removal of dead bodies, and the whole battle-field was crowded with people from distant States exhuming and removing the bodies of their friends. ‘Twas a sad, sad sight, and whilst the world is calculating the chances of war, and estimating its cost in dollars, I am dotting down in my memory the sad scenes I witness as small items in the long account of heart-aches.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+28%2C+1862
4. Sunday, September 28, 1862: Lee’s army of 50,000 men is now gathered at Winchester, Virginia in the Shenandoah Valley.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-seven
5. Monday, September 28, 1863: Repercussions from Chickamauga: US Generals Crittenden, Alexander McDowell and McCook are relieved of duty and ordered to Indianapolis to face a court of inquiry.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186309
6. Monday, September 28, 1863: As Major General William S. Rosecrans, (US) blames his subordinates for the Union defeat at Chickamauga, TN, Major Generals, Alexander McDowell McCook and Thomas L. Crittenden are relieved of command of their respective US Army Corps and ordered to Indianapolis, IN, where a Court of Inquiry will look into their conduct at Chickamauga. Conditions in Chattanooga were becoming worse as food was in short supply. Word of Northern reinforcements on the move South, reach Chattanooga besieger, General Braxton Bragg, (CSA) in the form of a telegram from Jefferson Davis.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-129
7. Wednesday, September 28, 1864: President Davis approves Hood's request to relieve William Hardee.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186409
8. Wednesday, September 28, 1864: President Davis (CSA) approves General Hood's (CSA) request to relieve General William Hardee. Even though Hardee was the most able corps commander, Davis personally selected Hood to command the Army of Tennessee in July, and refused to admit his mistake. On his return trip to the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, Davis gives a speech at Columbia, South Carolina, in which he overpraises about Hood’s prospects. In doing so, he let slip important information, and that can never be a good thing. The Yankees and Rebels around Petersburg, Virginia continue to incur losses as snipers pick off men on both sides of the siege lines. General Forrest (CSA) is riding north now in Tennessee.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-181
9. Wednesday, September 28, 1864: Jefferson Davis and some political shuffling for the battlefield. “For Jefferson Davis, this was an important decision. John Bell Hood had done little more than retreat into and then out of Atlanta. But, he followed Joe Johnston who retreated all the way from Tennessee. Many of the officers and troops who were along for both retreats wished for Hood to be replaced by Johnston. However, it had been Davis who had dismissed Johnston and to reinstate him would mean admitting he was to blame. And so, while the decision was important, it was also easy. Hood would remain and Davis would be blameless.
This, of course, meant losing William Hardee, an incredibly able general who refused to work under Hood a moment longer. There were a few other changes to be made, as well, but while touring parts of Hood’s department in Alabama, Davis gave Hood the news.
“Relieve Lieutenant-General Hardee from duty with the Army of Tennessee,” read Davis’ short message, “and direct him to proceed at once to Charleston, S.C., and assume command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.”
To retain Hood didn’t simply mean that Hood would continue retreating. The army commander had told Davis much about a proposed plan to march north of Atlanta and nearly to Tennessee. He hoped that Sherman would be then forced to detach some amount of troops to deal with Hood’s bold move. He would defeat the Federal detachment and then “regain our lost territory, reinspirit the troops, and bring hope again to the hearts of our people.”
A vote for Hood was a vote for this glorified raid. But Davis wasn’t finished shuffling officers around. Hardee would be replacing P.G.T. Beauregard, who would soon be coming back west. Before he even left Richmond to deal with the Hood dilemma, Davis asked General Lee to talk Beauregard into the new position. At first, Davis was only considering Beauregard as a replacement for Hood in the field.
To the field command, Beauregard questioned whether he was “equal to the present emergency,” but agreed to do it if Davis really wanted him to. In the end, Lee basically agreed that there was nobody else available and the Beauregard was what they had to work with.
The final decision was a bit of political wrangling that would make everyone come out smelling of roses. Hood was to keep his job. Beauregard was to head up the new mega-department called The Military Division of the West, which encompassed pretty well everything in the West. Even William Hardee got a promotion. Joe Johnston, however, was still in a state of semi-retirement, living with his wife in Macon, Georgia. But then, Davis didn’t care much at all what Johnston or his friends thought. He even gave a speech defending his decision to sack Johnston while passing through Macon. Jefferson Davis was not even a little subtle.
Though it would take Beauregard several days to learn of his new promotion, he was mainly a figurehead – overseeing two already-established and fairly functional departments. He was barred by Davis even from taking command of troops unless it was a dire emergency.
As for General Hood, as soon as he learned he was still in command, he issued orders for the next move. The following morning, his Army of Tennessee was to cross the Chattahoochee and Pumpkin Town and Phillip’s Ferry to begin their march around the western side of Atlanta. [1]
[1] Sources:Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 39, Part 2, p 846, 879-880; Advance and Retreat by John Bell Hood; P.G.T. Beauregard by T. Harry Williams; Autumn of Glory by Tomas Lawrence Connelly; Joseph E. Johnston by Craig L. Symonds.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/davis-and-some-political-shuffling-for-the-battlefield/
A September 28, 1861 – Federals advanced on Munson’s Hill, a few miles southwest of Washington, and discovered that it was not as heavily defended as presumed. Since the Battle of Bull Run, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had combined the Armies of the Potomac and the Shenandoah into one force consisting of two corps. The former army had become the First Corps of about 24,000 men under General P.G.T. Beauregard. The latter had become the Second Corps of about 16,000 men under General Gustavus W. Smith.
The Confederates mainly held positions in the Centreville area of northern Virginia, with Beauregard’s corps at Fairfax Court House and advance elements within 10 miles of Washington at Munson’s Hill. These elements overlooked Arlington Heights and threatened to disrupt Federal traffic on the Potomac River. By late September, Johnston feared that the forward positions had become vulnerable to attack by the ever-growing Federal Army of the Potomac.
Johnston had reason to fear an attack. Federals had recently conducted a reconnaissance in force around Munson’s Hill and nearby Upton’s Hill, south of Falls Church. Major General George B. McClellan, commanding the Federal Army of the Potomac, sought to clear these points and use them for his planned ring of forts and defensive works around the capital. The two sides engaged in a heavy skirmish, after which the Federals reported that Confederates had constructed strong defenses on Munson’s Hill that included rifle pits and artillery.
The Federals were unaware that these “strong” defenses were mostly a bluff on Johnston’s part. On September 26, he wrote to Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin and President Jefferson Davis asking that one of them inspect the army’s positions and help “to decide definitely whether we are to advance or fall back to a more defensible line.” Then, without waiting for either to respond, Johnston ordered the withdrawal from Munson’s Hill and other forward points.
By dawn on the 28th, Beauregard had evacuated both Munson’s and Upton’s hills, falling back to Fairfax Court House and Centreville. McClellan, who had been reluctant to attack such “strong” positions, resolved to seize the hills upon learning that the Confederates had retreated. Heeding false warnings from local residents that Confederates were waiting in ambush, the Federals advanced toward the hills with extreme caution.
The Federals climbed the slopes and discovered that the rifle pits had been abandoned. And to their dismay (and their commanders’ embarrassment), they found that the mighty cannon pointed in their direction for nearly two months consisted only of logs and stovepipes painted black. A correspondent who had hoped to witness a battle resentfully called these “Quaker guns.”
Making matters worse for the Federals, on the night of the 28th, troops of the 69th and 71st Pennsylvania accidentally fired into each other while clearing the woods around Munson’s Hill, resulting in several killed and wounded. This tragic mishap, combined with the ruse on the hills, diminished the Federals’ successful occupation of the supposedly threatening positions.
On the Confederate side, Secretary of War Benjamin responded to Johnston’s invitation to inspect the army a day after the Confederates abandoned their forward positions. Benjamin stated that Davis should visit the army and then admonished Johnston for not submitting “a single return from your army of the quantity of ammunition, artillery, means of transportation, or sick in camp or in hospitals, to enable us to form a judgment of what your necessities may be… (it should be) obvious to you that the Department cannot be administered without a thorough reform in this respect.”
This demonstrated the growing tension between Johnston and his superiors, which would continue into October, after President Davis arrived to inspect the army.
https://civilwarmonths.com/2016/09/28/dubious-victory-at-munsons-hill/
B Sunday, September 28, 1862: The splendid Rebel plan to retake Corinth, Mississippi. “Sterling Price wasn’t an unreasonable man, it’s just that he didn’t believe a word Earl Van Dorn was saying. Following the strange battle of Iuka, Sterling Price and his army slipped away from Union forces under General Grant. Their move took them southwest, on a track to join up with Van Dorn’s army at Ripley, Mississippi.
The tramp to join their comrades was a trying one, with heavy rains, bad roads, little sleep, and even an earthquake. On top of this, there was quite a bit of apprehension over joining with Van Dorn, who would be in charge of the entire show. Price’s chief-of-staff, Major Thomas Snead, even tried to resign. Thankfully, Price was able to play the patriotism card to convince him to stay.
Finally, on this date, they arrived and heard Van Dorn’s plan. The idea was a move on Corinth, the railroad city that General Beauregard once defended (and abandoned) against 120,000 Yankees. Now, claimed Van Dorn, it was lightly defended and ripe for the picking.
If Corinth fell, he reasoned, it would mean that all of the Federal forces in Western Tennessee would have to retreat. This would even secure Vicksburg, along the Mississippi, from any attacks coming from the north. It would, explained Van Dorn, allow General Braxton Bragg to take Louisville (an idea that Bragg himself had already dismissed).
With the addition of Price’s force, Van Dorn commanded 22,000 troops. Corinth, he reasoned, was only held by 15,000 Federals. General Grant had other troops in the area, sure, but they were too spread out to matter. Van Dorn figured there were 6,000 at Memphis, 8,000 at Bolivar, 3,000 at Jackson and 10,000 more scattered throughout different outposts.
Two things were essential for this plan to work. The Federals had to be surprised and the Confederates had to move swiftly.
These two essentials could be dealt with in one plan. First, they would not attack Corinth directly. They would first move to Pocahontas, just across the state line. This would, reasoned Van Dorn, throw off these dispersed Federal forces, making them believe he were about to strike Bolivar, Tennessee, forty miles to the northwest of Corinth.
However, when his troops reached the Tennessee line at Pocahontas, they would take an abrupt right and quickly fall upon Corinth from the northwest, striking the weakest portion of the Federal defenses. The plan was pure genius!
It was only nineteen miles from Pocahontas to Corinth and the roads were in good shape. It should be a hard day’s march, but hard marching would take care of speed.
Some under Van Dorn, most notably Sterling Price and the newly-arrived Mansfield Lovell, thought the plan a bad one. Lovell, undaunted over the surrender of New Orleans and the tarnished reputation that followed, believed the army should simply attack Bolivar. This would, he argued, cut the Federal supply line and force Grant to abandon Corinth. On the run, they could be easily driven back to the Ohio River.
Price, on the other hand, wanted to wait. There was good reason. Though it possibly slashed Van Dorn’s needs for secrecy and speed, it would add an additional 15,000 troops to the Rebel force. These reinforcements were coming in the form of exchanged prisoners at Jackson, Mississippi. They could be easily armed and established into a division. They would not, however, be available until the middle of October.
Without them, Price believed, Corinth could not be held. It was probably true that Van Dorn could take Corinth, but holding it? Price just didn’t see how. Even by Van Dorn’s own calculations, there were 27,000 Federals outside of Corinth, ready to descend upon the city to take it back. The casualties that Van Dorn would suffer while taking Corinth were sure to be serious. How, with such a weakened force, could Van Dorn expect to hold his bounty?
Adding weight to Lovell and Prices’ reservations were the Yankees themselves. The troops would be commanded by Generals Grant, Sherman and Rosecrans. While Sherman had not yet come into his own, Grant was certainly making a name for himself. Rosecrans, who graduated fifth in his class at West Point, was an officer to be taken seriously. Van Dorn, who graduated fifth from the bottom of the very same West Point class, somehow disagreed.
Lovell, who commanded a division, and Price, who commanded two, were ordered to have three day’s cooked rations ready. The new Confederate Army of West Tennessee, Earl Van Dorn commanding, would step off at dawn the next morning. [1]
[1] Sources: The Darkest Days of the War by Peter Cozzens; Grant Rises in the West by Kenneth P. Williams; Nothing But Victory by Stephen E Woodworth”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/the-rebel-plan-to-retake-corinth/
C Monday, September 28, 1863: On this date, in the aftermath of the Battle of Chickamauga [fought September 18–20, 1863], orders from the War Department relieve Gen. Alexander McCook and Gen. Crittenden of their commands, and consolidate their two depleted-corps into one. This is done over the protests of Gen. Rosecrans, who has resisted Washington’s requests to fire the two generals. Rosecrans is also order to convene courts martial for McCook’s and Crittenden’s role in the Chickamauga disaster: “GENERAL ORDERS, WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL'S OFFICE, Numbers 322.
Washington, September 28, 1863.*
I. The President of the United States directs that the Twentieth and Twenty-first Army Corps be consolidated and called the Fourth Army Corps, and that Major General Gordon Granger be the commander of this consolidated corps.
II. It is also directed that a court of inquiry be convened, the detail to be hereafter made, to inquire and report upon the conduct of Major-General McCook and Crittenden, in the battles of the 19th and 20th instant. These officers are relieved from duty in the Department of the Cumberland, and will repair to Indianapolis, Ind., reporting their arrival, by letter, to the Adjutant-General of the Army.
By order of the Secretary of War: E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+28%2C+1863
D Wednesday, September 28, 1864: Vernon, Florida - Believing that Confederate forces were en route and having achieved their objective of capturing Marianna and many of its defenders, the Federals withdrew from the town before sunrise on the morning of September 28. They rode south down the St. Andrews Bay Road and then veered west onto the Vernon road.
As the Union soldiers approached a creek crossing, they ran head on into Capt. W.B. Jones and his company of scouts from Vernon and Holmes Valley. Alerted by a courier that Marianna was facing attack, these men were marching to help their neighbors in Jackson County when they unexpectedly encountered the Union column.
Accounts of what happened next are extremely meager, but apparently Jones and his men engaged in a brief skirmish with the vanguard of Asboth's column. At least one Confederate volunteers was killed and several others, including the captain, were captured. The rest of his men retreated as best they could. Pushing forward, the Federals reached Vernon by nightfall on September 28. Camping there, they moved out again for Choctawhatchee Bay before dawn the next morning.
As the Federals were pushing southwest from Marianna and engaging Jones' men in Washington County, help was pouring into Marianna from all directions. Capts. Jeter and Milton had arrived with Companies E and G of the 5th Florida Cavalry on the night of September 27, as did Capt. George Robinson and his Home Guards from eastern Jackson County. They were joined the next morning by Luke Lott's company from Calhoun County and later by Lt. Col. G.W. Scott of the 5th Florida Cavalry, who arrived ahead of his battalion with a company of Georgia cavalry and a home guard unit from Gadsden County. Organizing these forces as best he could, Scott established a strong line of patrols around Marianna on September 28 and, as soon as he could, set out in pursuit of the Union raiders.
Telegrams also went to Gen. Dabney H. Maury in Mobile, who sent the 15th Confederate Cavalry east in an effort to cut off Asboth's Union column. The following pursuit failed. The Union column was too well-organized and had too much of a head start. By the time Scott's Confederates could reach Vernon, Asboth was already at Point Washington on the Choctawhatchee Bay.
Brig. Gen. Alexander Asboth and the wounded were placed aboard the steamer USS Lizzie Davis, while the rest of the column crossed East Pass and marched down Santa Rosa Island to Fort Pickens. The raid was over.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1864s.html
On September 28, 1864, the men of Captain W.B. Jones' Company, Florida Home Guard, collided with the large Union force of Brigadier General Alexander Asboth on the banks of Hard Labor Creek in Washington County. The resulting skirmish has been remembered locally as the Battle of Vernon, Florida.
The encounter took place during the deepest penetration of Florida by Union troops during the entire Civil War. General Asboth and his men had left Pensacola on September 18, 1864. Leaving a wide swath of destruction in their wake, they skirmished with Southern troops near Campbellton in Jackson County on September 26th and then attacked the city of Marianna the next day.
Following the bloody Battle of Marianna, the Union troops turned southwest on the Vernon road shortly after midnight on the morning of September 28, 1864. After stopping for their midday meal at Orange Hill, they came down into Holmes Valley and soon approached the crossing of Hard Labor Creek.
Meanwhile, Captain W.B. Jones of the Vernon Home Guard learned that Marianna had been attacked. The 30-50 men of his company were either too young or too old to serve in the regular army or had been released from service due to wounds and other disabilities. Mounting their horses at Vernon, they headed out for Marianna to help their neighbors in Jackson County.
Neither force knew it, but they were approaching each other via the same road.
On the afternoon of September 28, 1864, the two forces collided unexpectedly at Hard Labor Creek near today's Washington Church. Believing they were being pursued by Confederate cavalry, the hundreds of Union soldiers were in no mood to be delayed. A company or more of soldiers from the 1st Florida U.S. Infantry was in the lead as the Federals came down the hill to the creek. They ordered Captain Jones and his men to disperse and go home. According to legend, however, one of Jones' men (Stephen Pierce) began to taunt the Union soldiers. This is impossible to prove, but what is known is that the Union troops opened fire on the men of the Vernon Home Guard. The Confederates were outnumbered more than 14 to 1, but fought back as best they could. Captain Jones ordered his men to retreat as the Union soldiers charged, but he and many of the members of his company were taken prisoner. A few others managed to escape and later reported that they were pursued by Union soldiers all the way back to Vernon.
Total losses in the Battle of Vernon included one man killed and one wounded in addition to the prisoners. The fatally wounded man was Stephen Pierce, formerly a soldier in the 4th Florida Infantry. Legend holds that he was executed for taunting the Union soldiers, but eyewitness accounts indicate he was actually shot during the brief battle He was buried nearby and his grave can be seen today adjacent to Washington Church.
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SMSgt Lawrence McCarter LTC Trent Klug SFC Bernard WalkoSSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr CPL Ronald Keyes Jr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy SFC David Reid, M.S, PHR, SHRM-CP, DTMSgt Christopher Collins SPC (Join to see) SPC Gary C. PO3 Lynn Spalding
Lee Begins to Suspect that Meade is Up to Something
September 28, 1863 (Monday) The previous day, Confederate along the Rapidan River in Virginia could hear the sound of trains chuffing to and fro from the direction of Brandy Station. It was clear t…
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LTC Stephen F. good read and share I am choosing 1861: Federals advanced on Munson’s Hill, a few miles southwest of Washington, and discovered that it was not as heavily defended as presumed. Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had combined the Armies of the Potomac and the Shenandoah into one force
Logistics/location was my reason of choice, being Richmond was hub.
Logistics/location was my reason of choice, being Richmond was hub.
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LTC Stephen F.
You are very welcome my friend and brother-in-Christ SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL and thanks for letting us know that you consider September 28, 1861 "Federals advanced on Munson’s Hill, a few miles southwest of Washington, and discovered that it was not as heavily defended as presumed. Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had combined the Armies of the Potomac and the Shenandoah into one force."
It is noteworthy that the CSA had an Army of the Potomac in 1861.
It is noteworthy that the CSA had an Army of the Potomac in 1861.
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