Why can't our Iraqis or Afghans fight like their Iraqis or Afghans?

COL Jon Thompson — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 11:33:41 -0400

I have been re-reading several books that I first read as a Lieutenant and Captain. Most deal with the Korean and Vietnam wars. Now with several deployments since I last read them, I have a different perspective. One thing that stands out is how in most cases, the side we supported failed to perform on the battlefield (as a rule and I know there have been exceptions). In Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, it is the same ethnic people fighting against each other. And usually the ones we have supported have had superior training and equipment. So why have our "allies" failed so often?

http://www.unprecedentedmediocrity.com/marvin-the-arvn-and-the-iraqi-army/

Marvin the ARVN and the Iraqi Army - Unprecedented Mediocrity

Why can’t our Vietnamese fight like their Vietnamese? That is the question posed by many Vietnam Veterans back in the day I’m told. You see, Marvin the ARVN was the name for the South Vietnamese Army and our American warriors… Continue Reading

Response by SSG Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 13 at 2015 11:43 AM

SSG Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 11:43:15 -0400

They do not care as much as we do, they expect us to do it for them.

Response by CH (CPT) Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 13 at 2015 11:44 AM

CH (CPT) Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 11:44:30 -0400

I would propose that it is the same mentality that exist when people become dependent on government assistance. Its to easy to let someone else do it. The one who struggles the most fights the hardest. When there is more at stake for the loser they tend to be more ferocious in the fight. Just a theory.

Response by SFC Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 13 at 2015 11:57 AM

SFC Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 11:57:35 -0400

Something I noticed in the difference between my first and second deployments was that on the first one I worked with Iraqi National Guard and the second one is worked with Iraqi Army.
Working with the ING, these guys fought to protect their home. The fight was local and it was their clan or tribe they were protecting
protecting. The IA were pulled from all over the country and assigned where they were needed. They were from a different province than the one they served in, so it was only a job.
I blame it on the tribalism that's present throughout Iraq. In America, we are all Americans and we fight for America. In Iraq, there are clans. The survival of a different clan doesn't affect the clan. I think this is why the Sons of Iraq program and the Iraqi National Guard worked so well, and why our attempts to set up the Iraq Army in a system that mirrored ours did not.

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made Jun 13 at 2015 11:59 AM

MAJ Ken Landgren — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 11:59:47 -0400

I am thinking they are lacking the ideology and fervor to fight for a bigger cause: democracy and nationalism. George Washington and the Continental Army fought like they had something to fight for. I really don't know what the soldiers in the Iraqi and Afghan Army think and feel.

Response by SPC Jan Allbright, M.Sc., R.S. made Jun 13 at 2015 12:03 PM

SPC Jan Allbright, M.Sc., R.S. — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 12:03:14 -0400

Because "ours" DGS and "theirs" do.

Response by 1LT Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 13 at 2015 12:27 PM

1LT Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 12:27:27 -0400

COL Jon Thompson. I suspect a huge part of the problem is we tend to be incredibly arrogant in presenting the imaging of the american soldier . . . and denigrate the ability of the indigenous soldier to accomplish anything approaching what american soldiers can accomplish. We tend to train indigenous soldiers to follow our lead . . . rather than building up their own leadership.

In the end in Vietnam we bagged out on our promise of financial, logistic, and military support . . . so that while Vietnamese troops were fighting and winning conflicts even larger than Tet68 . . . no military organization could survive without copious financial, logistic, and military support.

In the Middle East "our guys" appear to cut and ran due to failed leadership and unit cohesion.

Warmest Regards, Sandy

Response by SSG Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 13 at 2015 12:44 PM

SSG Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 12:44:31 -0400

Rather lengthy, but it's my answer. My response is based on my experience with some local national armies, be it limited, and our own fighting force. Some people envision themselves doing things they don't actually have the heart to do. They anticipate being a part of something bigger than themselves, but think that they can just blend in with the crowd and the people around them will make it happen. "If I'm there, and this works, I can claim a part of that and reap the rewards of all their efforts without doing any hard work myself (especially if you expect the U.S. military to fight the war for you)." My understanding is that most of the individuals in those countries don't have many other options other than to join to earn a living. The military is a way for them to be alive, and sometimes just gives them something to do. But when faced with death in a combat situation, that negates their reason for being there and their self-preservation instincts kick in. They are not willing to fight for the greater good, only for their own life. Not willing to suffer for those things they don't have, and probably believe they will never have. We, as Americans, grew up in homes, with toys, electric and all of its benefits, education, opportunities and the freedom to choose what we do and how successful we want to be, and it is difficult to imagine/understand what it is like to just have nothing and no hope of it getting better. Everyone's motivation is different, and we aren't all born into the same circumstances, but we fight so that our way of life can continue. A lot of those other people grew up just trying to stay alive. And in many places, if you aren't born into wealth, then you will never have an opportunity to have anything. Who would want to fight to make sure that system continues? I am not well versed in the intimate details of all of those societies, but many of the local national soldiers I was around struck me as just showing up for work, without much conviction, doing whatever was asked of them as long as the food/money/etc. kept coming. Obviously this is not all inclusive of them, just like not everyone in our own military is here to fight the fight. "I'm just here for the college money", "there are no jobs at home", etc. This is not exclusive to the military, either.
On the flip side, the "rebels", if you will, are usually fighting for beliefs, or if they don't fight then they or their families will be killed, but they usually have more than self-preservation as motivation.
Just my 2 cents.

Response by 1SG Cameron M. Wesson made Jun 13 at 2015 12:50 PM

1SG Cameron M. Wesson — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 12:50:58 -0400

COL Jon Thompson this has been a point of discussion around the waterhole here at Fortress Leavenworth by a few of us that have been there... And even a few from other games.

I would submit that there is an incredibly deficent "trust" factor. I saw this in the 90s and then again in 02 to 04 throughout the area (turkey, iraq, afganistan, Uzbekistan). There was generally, that i perceived, a feeling of distrust between the ranks that each would not "do the right thing". Officers did not take care of there soldiers and lets be frank... Their NCO Corps is non exsistant and the moniker of "mission first and soldiers always" doesn't even resonate with a vast majority of them.

There is also the factor that SFC Private RallyPoint Member correctly notes. That is the "clanish link" and worse yet putting multiple soldiers from various clans in the same unit under leadership from even a different clan... That might have a long history of being enemies.

Now before we start thinking we are all that... We have done no better. When president Truman force integrated the services...that challenge lasted for years... And for good reason. I mean we sent the "colored" regiments in WWI to serve under french leadership... Tuskeegee airmen' the 555th... There was open hostilities between races.... And please dont tell me that was different.... It really wasnt.

Trust and commitment. The soldiers didnt trust leadership... And leadership didnt trust the soldiers. The only way that this challenge will correct itself is time... and through the leadership of the Armies. The soldiers will have to experience that the leadership cares for the soldiers.... Because words do little... And the have to enable a professional NCO Corps (public service announcement).

Lastly, as the motto of one of my old Infantry battalion"Deeds! Not Words!" this is what it will take. If you dont believe... Look back through history.

My 2 cents

Response by HN Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 13 at 2015 1:02 PM

HN Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 13:02:50 -0400

I think the main reason is because the Iraqis and Afghans we train do not have something major to believe in. Some have families and some fight for eventual peace. What do their enemies fight for? Religion. Their enemies fight because they want to spread what they believe in whether it is right or wrong and they are willing to kill innocent people to do so. We train individuals who don't really want to fight they just want to be left alone. I mean, haven't you seen the videos of them PTing with Marines and Soldiers? They look like a joke. They barely put any motivation into the PT they were involved in.

Response by CMSgt Mike Esser made Jun 13 at 2015 1:25 PM

CMSgt Mike Esser — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 13:25:18 -0400

ISAF = i saw americans fighting.....NATO = not at the office

Response by MAJ Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 13 at 2015 3:21 PM

MAJ Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 15:21:58 -0400

Great question, SFC James Sczymanski! As I see it, the Iraqis and Afghanis we back and support lack a common unifying purpose or cause, they are still bound by their centuries-old ways of doing things, placing tribal loyalties above all else; they cannot wrap their heads around a unified government, let alone one that includes cooperation with Shia, Kurds, and Sunnis working peacefully as one. Our enemies on the other hand, do not have these challenges. So long as one is Sunni and is willing to fight and die to establish the Caliphate, tribal differences do not matter; the goals are mutual: establish the Caliphate, live in strict compliance with Sharia Law, expand the Caliphate, and kill anyone who refuses to comply. The alliances on their side are based on a burning, fanatical desire that has been forged into a strength as they can now recruit from all corners of the Earth. Conversely, the alliances on our side are tenuous, built on tepid promises that may mean something today, but absolutely nothing a month from now. Thus, it's a huge liability for us.

Response by Sgt Jay Jones made Jun 13 at 2015 6:30 PM

Sgt Jay Jones — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 18:30:00 -0400

We made the same mistake in Vietnam. We went to Vietnam to stop the spread of Communism. We feel this is a significant threat to our American way of life. The NVA and Viet Cong were fighting to "reunify" their country. Total different motivation from what we perceived. No wonder it is now under Communist rule.

We are making the same mistake in Afghanistan and Iraq. The enemy in most cases are motivated by Religion. Just as many of us Christians are willing and committed to die for the Cross, they are just as willing to die for their religious beliefs. The problem exists when those we trained and left behind to take up the fight don't and didn't have the same commitment!

Response by SSG Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 13 at 2015 6:39 PM

SSG Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 18:39:05 -0400

When there's apathy, there can be nothing else because apathy festers. Moreover, with their culture and their sense of spiritually and faith and their understanding of time, apathy is multiplied a hundred fold

Response by SFC Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 13 at 2015 6:51 PM

SFC Private RallyPoint Member — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 18:51:04 -0400

I believe that most of them, although grateful for the training and equipment we supplied them with, were mainly volunteering for the wrong reasons. Possibly just to have a source of reliable income. I'm not well versed in Iraqi or Afghan history, but I don't believe that they feel truly proud of their history. As Americans, we have so much to uphold and for the most part, a history to be extremely proud of. The patriotic emotions and the will to fight and maintain a "great'' nation just isn't there for them. Just my two cents.

Response by Sgt Daniel V. made Jun 13 at 2015 7:22 PM

Sgt Daniel V. — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 19:22:21 -0400

I think it could very well be a mixture of motivation to fight outside of their local concerns, as the nations are very fractal and there is little or national identity to find that common ground to fight on and secondly, a bit too much reliance on the supporting force to do a majority of the fighting with the mentality that once that supporting force leaves they will have big targets painted on their backs if they earn accolades or recognition for fighting. Its very easy to just sit back and let the americans fight and when they leave, tell the people they were against that the americans forced them to fight. The only way to avoid this is to leave when there is only one side left. but good luck with that

Response by COL Jason Smallfield, PMP, CFM, CM made Jun 13 at 2015 9:03 PM

COL Jason Smallfield, PMP, CFM, CM — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 21:03:37 -0400

- Each case (Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan) has similarities and differences and therefore its own unique reasons for why our allies "failed". My own quick thoughts.
- Korea. South Korea did not fail. The US failed to support South Korea to the extent that the Soviets supported North Korea. The US also allowed the Soviets and North Koreans to believe that South Korea was outside of our "sphere of influence". In spite of all this, South Korea and its supporters/allies were able to at least keep South Korea independent and South Korea has flourished since then.
- Vietnam. Where to begin? The US got involved when we did not have and arguably should not have gotten involved. Once we got involved, LBJ never went "all in". The US supported corrupt individuals and a corrupt government. Simply stated, the North Vietnamese were willing to stay longer, commit more resources, and be as brutal as necessary to win.
- Iraq. One can argue whether the US should have invaded in 2003 or not but two big reasons for strategic failure include: did not plan for Phase IV operations (what happens after we "win" and we pulled out completely in 2011 (can not have influence if one does not have a presence). On the Iraqi side, one can not get Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds together if one establishes a Shia dominated government. Lack of will and corruption are two big reasons as well.
- Afghanistan. Hard to convince an Afghani to stay in the fight for the long haul if they are not convinced that the US is in it for the long haul. I have never understood the currently thinking / requirement of an "exit plan" when all of our success stories (Japan, Germany, South Korea) involved US forces staying up to the present time.

Response by 1SG David Niles made Jun 13 at 2015 11:09 PM

1SG David Niles — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 23:09:19 -0400

Their heart is not in the fight, they are fighting for what we believe in, not what they believe in. They don't want to be us.

Response by LTC Jason Mackay made Jun 13 at 2015 11:39 PM

LTC Jason Mackay — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 23:39:39 -0400

Purely my two cents....couple factors:
- goes to Sun Tzu and the concept of death ground. When on death ground, you fight or die. There is no alternative but victory. I think many of the Iraqis and Afghans feel they can weather the storm if they fail. Both have a long history of deals of convenience and shifting allegiances. Obviously, the Yazidi and Kurds have serious skin in the game, no deals for them. Other tribes and clans, meh. They did the same with us.
- motivation.plain and simple. Goes back to the first thing, but further. They can not envision a better alternative, as they seem to expect someone else to do it. Under Saddam, this is how it was. He ran the place since 68. Individual initiative was rewarded with bullets to the head. Not sure what would really turn on the Afghans. Most just want to be left alone.

Response by Capt Seid Waddell made Jun 13 at 2015 11:53 PM

Capt Seid Waddell — Sat, 13 Jun 2015 23:53:04 -0400

Could it be because we shoulder the main load of fighting and they are happy to let us do so?

Response by SGM Mikel Dawson made Jun 14 at 2015 7:48 AM

SGM Mikel Dawson — Sun, 14 Jun 2015 07:48:56 -0400

SFC Boyd, good point. Tribal is the key word and always will be. Their true allegiance is to religion first, clan/tribe second. The national thing doesn't pull that much weight. The middle east is still and probably always will be tribal/clan focused. My only answer.

Response by Lt Col Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 15 at 2015 8:13 AM

Lt Col Private RallyPoint Member — Mon, 15 Jun 2015 08:13:14 -0400

Lack of ideals, but also...our Iraqis and Afghanis often turn into their Iraqis and Afghanis.

Response by CPT Pedro Meza made Jun 15 at 2015 4:47 PM

CPT Pedro Meza — Mon, 15 Jun 2015 16:47:17 -0400

The failure lies in us that fail to understand the dynamics that rule the beliefs, expectations and behavior of the people we assume to liberate and then trained to accept our way of life. We come from a land of plenty where we are blinded by what we have and fear loosing so we fight. Then we go to lands where people have nothing and expect them to accept our ideas and beliefs systems. Even the choices that were given to select from (lack of leadership, Apathy etc) are from our perspective.

Response by SSG Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 15 at 2015 5:05 PM

SSG Private RallyPoint Member — Mon, 15 Jun 2015 17:05:05 -0400

The Iraqis don't feel a sense of identity to the nation-state of Iraq. The desire to preserve Iraq as it is on the map is a Western desire, not a local one. There's no loyalty to the concept and it doesn't help that their leaders are corrupt. For a lot of them, the perception is that if you're fighting for "Iraq", you're fighting to help the Westerners preserve their colonial agenda.

We should accept a Kurdish state to the north, a Shia'a state to the south, and support them in their fight against ISIL/Daesch as they need. They'll fight to preserve their own homes, but have no desire to push into Sunni-dominated al-Anbar to liberate a bunch of people they never liked or got along with in the first place.

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made Jun 15 at 2015 6:28 PM

MAJ Ken Landgren — Mon, 15 Jun 2015 18:28:04 -0400

Could it be that the Iraqi and Afghan soldiers who fight on behalf of a national army is too foreign to them? They are invested in their home towns or villages?

Response by SFC Kenneth Hunnell made Jun 16 at 2015 8:19 PM

SFC Kenneth Hunnell — Tue, 16 Jun 2015 20:19:06 -0400

First off, I do not believe that all the training and equipment will make anyone do something that they are not 100 percent behind. We are looking at a different culture than what we are accustomed to. The idea of can't does not apply here. They do not have the desire.
Look at Desert Storm, the Soldiers of the Iraqi Army couldn't get rid of their weapons fast enough when we came across the boarder.

Response by CW3 Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 16 at 2015 9:07 PM

CW3 Private RallyPoint Member — Tue, 16 Jun 2015 21:07:18 -0400

A common thread throughout the responses is our partner forces' lack of will or resolve...which can be debated...but I don't think that is the biggest problem. If you look at all the examples - you list countries that are not western. You list eastern countries and middle eastern countries. I think the biggest reason our efforts fail to produce results is because we try to impose the American (western) way of fighting into eastern/middle eastern cultures with almost total disregard for the intricacies of their culture. We focus on building a NCO corps, ensuring ethnic inclusion, human rights and rule of law, a military beholden to a civilian government etc. etc. These are OUR ideals and we we force them on other countries that we train. We expect them to adopt our culture and our way of doing things in a relatively short amount of time. 5-10 years is not a sufficient amount of time to re-educate a society and break social norms. Additionally, we ask out partners to fight like us, but often they lack the technology and support that allows us to implement our tactics and win. In my opinion we have to realize that we either a) have to commit to our partners for more than a decade or b) understand that our partners are going to fight by their rules, using their tactics, and we are going to be comfortable helping them fight wars the way the most of the world fights them -- really ugly.

Response by COL Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 18 at 2015 7:05 AM

COL Private RallyPoint Member — Thu, 18 Jun 2015 07:05:47 -0400

Historically, in Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia, victory in battle has not always favored the most civilized force. American military training is civilized, standardized, and cerebral, training and is at times detrimental to the supported forces in those regions. Although cerebral states of mind in utilization of higher technology in combat operations are a benefit, cerebral states of mind in low intensity, low tech, conventional, combat operations equate to a reduction in ferocity. Thus you will discover that the opposing side, at times, are more ferocious than their American trained counterparts. Brain surgeons are less ferocious than street thugs. War is not a civilized event. When conducting a comparison contrast of the British army and American colonial army of the 1700s, American revolutionary war period, It is clear and apparent that the British Army was a more civilized and technologically sound force yet it lost. Obviously the American colonial army was more ferocious.

Sometimes the best approach in military assistance and training to third world nations is simply providing close air support and artillery support directly to the supported host nation ground force, at the discretion of the host nation ground force commander. This facilitates the host nations armed forces utilization of traditional arts of warfare commensurate with indigenous adversarial arts of warfare, yet force multiplied. In other words, when the same ethnic people of a region are fighting each other, simply augment the supported force with force multipliers that are employed at the discretion of the host nation ground force commander. This allows the supported force to retain the ferocity of traditional arts of warfare utilized by its adversary, with increased lethality by virtue of the augmenting force multipliers. Force multipliers include B-52 bombers, AH-64 Apache Attack helicopters, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy Aviation close air support assets and U.S. Army surface to surface artillery assets. In summary, it is beneficial to allow the host nations government to fight adversaries with the host nations traditional and historic arts of warfare while maintaining an ability to escalate at culminating points, throughout the battle-space, with force multipliers that provide an advantage in warfare ultimately resulting in victorious end states.

Response by CPT Aaron Kletzing made Jun 18 at 2015 7:12 AM

CPT Aaron Kletzing — Thu, 18 Jun 2015 07:12:08 -0400

Sir that is the $1 trillion question. :-). I voted apathy

Response by LCpl Mark Lefler made Jun 18 at 2015 2:08 PM

LCpl Mark Lefler — Thu, 18 Jun 2015 14:08:46 -0400

they're not psychotic religious lunatics.

Response by Lt Col Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 18 at 2015 6:45 PM

Lt Col Private RallyPoint Member — Thu, 18 Jun 2015 18:45:57 -0400

Certainly people fight for different reasons. If people do not have a reason to fight or something to fight for, they will not perform well. If people are not trained properly or have discipline to fight as a team, they do not perform as well. And even more importantly, to try and retrain people to fight differently does not happen quickly and takes years. The US did not attain the superb military that we have over night. The farmers, store keepers, and others that made up the ragtag armies early in our nation did not do well. Military fighters have always resisted using new techniques and slow to adapt to new conditions. Command and control for a coordinated effort is something that take time and practice to maintain. Public support is important as we should know in our own country.

Response by TSgt Chip Dollason made Jun 19 at 2015 2:37 AM

TSgt Chip Dollason — Fri, 19 Jun 2015 02:37:33 -0400

It's simple Sir. The majority just don't want it bad enough. The opposition is willing to die for their cause but the good guys are not.

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made Jun 19 at 2015 8:41 PM

MAJ Ken Landgren — Fri, 19 Jun 2015 20:41:57 -0400

We win their hearts and minds but they don't feel that way. We really don't know how to understand them. What is important with us is winning hearts and minds and building up countries.

Response by SGT Bryon Sergent made Jun 30 at 2015 11:45 AM

SGT Bryon Sergent — Tue, 30 Jun 2015 11:45:25 -0400

A and B

Response by LTC Private RallyPoint Member made Jul 8 at 2015 10:50 PM

LTC Private RallyPoint Member — Wed, 08 Jul 2015 22:50:19 -0400

We do not fully understand the true dynamics of Iraq. We are trying to ask Sumnis to fight Sunnis to support a Shia government that wants nothing more than to provide less than nothing to Sunnis. In the north we are asking the Peshmerga who want a seperate Kurdish country to support a Shia government that is doing everything possible to prevent a seperate Kurdish state. Artificially created borders need to be dissolved and Iraq allowed to dissolve into 3 seperate countries based on borders decided by the Iraqis.

Response by MSG Christopher Mackey made Jul 16 at 2015 3:00 PM

MSG Christopher Mackey — Thu, 16 Jul 2015 15:00:34 -0400

Advising and Mentoring the Afghan Army I became frustrated quickly. I had to change strategy and see what made them tick. I drank green tea until I turned green with Afghan Commanders and NCO's. What I found is that if you spend time with the Soldiers and explain what and why they are fighting for I had breakthroughs. I got through to at least a third of them and the motto I had them shout out coming to attention was "God, Country, Family". The 5 languages they spoke was the biggest barrier that my Terp and I faced. Even with all of my hard work most of them would shoot their 2 magazines running towards the enemy and then turn around and go back to the rear. It is hard to say why they do not fight like they should but I always got the same answer "it is the will of Allah".

Response by LCDR Private RallyPoint Member made Sep 23 at 2015 2:26 PM

LCDR Private RallyPoint Member — Wed, 23 Sep 2015 14:26:57 -0400

Sir-My own experience with the ANA led me to the conclusion that the majority were non-Pashtun, largely western/northern Afghans with little to no respect for the more tribe-centric population on the border. By comparison, the various insurgents operating under a pseudo-Taliban aegis, were Pashtun or foreign, well -trained fighters. It's a rough comparison, but imagine grabbing a couple hundred kids at random off the streets of NYC and throwing them at a couple dozen "good old boys" with veteran leadership.

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made Sep 23 at 2015 5:43 PM

MAJ Ken Landgren — Wed, 23 Sep 2015 17:43:10 -0400

Do you want my rambling opinion?

Response by 1LT William Clardy made Sep 23 at 2015 8:42 PM

1LT William Clardy — Wed, 23 Sep 2015 20:42:26 -0400

Personally, I see a couple of likely reasons why we perceive "our" native troops as not being as fierce as "their" native troops:

1) We may see when our troops run from a fight, but we are inherently far, far less likely to witness enemy troops who opt to duck instead of fight.

2) Ethnic pride/arrogance -- both ours and the locals. This is a complicated issue, but fundamentally it comes down to local enemies being on the same side of the us/them divide as the natives we're using as proxies. In contrast, we not only are always on the "them" side, but we often highlight the divide.