Why do we have so many Colonels?

2017-02-13T10:25:06-05:00

I was promoted to Colonel and I question the necessity. I was not selected to command and neither were 60% or more of my peers. If a Colonel is not going to command, why not keep them a Lieutenant Colonel and save all those millions of dollars. Maybe pay Sergeants more. Are we so concerned over rank that we promote people because they work for a General? Is it time to take officers down a rank?

Response by COL Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 13 at 2017 10:28 AM

2017-02-13T10:28:57-05:00

A disclaimer...I am not complaining about the command selection system here. I know everyone who was selected to command and they are amazing officers. This is about a perception that the Army is so rank heavy that it must promote lieutenant colonels that it is not going to put into command positions (thus shutting them out of continued promotion chances). Either we are too rank heavy (from the 4 star level on down to about...major) and it has a trickle down effect or we are promoting officers for the sake of maintaining them (throwing them a bone to keep them in for as long as possible). It just seems to me that the military could use the money spent on Colonels who are not going to be competitive any longer towards a better purpose. Imagine the money which could be spent on pay raises for enlisted by taking all the non-competitive LTC's out of the promotion mix.

Response by MSG Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 13 at 2017 10:36 AM

2017-02-13T10:36:30-05:00

Sir, I certainly agree with you. Every time I go to a BDE or higher Training Conference, or even an exercise (WAREX, CSTX, etc.), there is sooooo much brass walking around it's mind boggling. There are times, where I wonder if when the powers that be promote an Officer, a position for them is an afterthought.

Response by MSG Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 13 at 2017 10:47 AM

2017-02-13T10:47:07-05:00

Sir, I fully agree with you, specifically at a one star or two star command. Why do we need a Full Bird Colonel, for each one of General Staff Sections (G-Shops)? I have been a G4 and J4 NCOIC, and see no good reason for the requirement of an O-6 OIC. A Light Colonel or better yet, a Major would be more then sufficient.

Response by SSG Carlos Madden made Feb 13 at 2017 10:47 AM

2017-02-13T10:47:34-05:00

Great question! I was at AUSA last year and I asked myself the same thing. I suppose part of it may be talent retention. If a really smart medical officer, linguist, CA/FSO officer, etc doesn't get promoted and thus paid, what is stopping them from leaving the Army?

Response by Cpl Justin Goolsby made Feb 13 at 2017 11:00 AM

2017-02-13T11:00:10-05:00

Well the way I've always seen it, someone isn't going to get promoted unless someone higher has either gotten promoted themselves or has dropped their paperwork to get out. Now I can't speak obviously for your specific situation, but maybe there are some generals that just dropped their retirement packages so the military is responding by swelling the Colonel rank in preparation for the current Colonels to get selected for General.

That is literally the only input I can provide. Yes we could potentially save millions of dollars, but typically from what I've seen, people don't get promoted unless someone moves up or gets out. So who knows, maybe you can expect orders for your own Command very soon.

Response by CSM Charles Hayden made Feb 13 at 2017 12:21 PM

2017-02-13T12:21:02-05:00

COL Private RallyPoint Member I am not currently privy to the numbers; didn't the U.S. Army of WW II manage many more Soldiers with a much lower ratio of General Officers per 1000 Soldiers?

Response by SSG Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 13 at 2017 1:32 PM

2017-02-13T13:32:49-05:00

Sir I agree with you there are way to many Generals in our army right now. I also question why we need to have so many staff officers at that rank. There should not be much staff time when you pass Colonel, Generals and Colonels should spend most of there time in command. Our army has become way to top heavy we have removed a great number from the enlisted ranks and have not done so for the top. I have asked this question for a long time.

Response by CSM Richard StCyr made Feb 13 at 2017 3:03 PM

2017-02-13T15:03:47-05:00

I was always told there are so many colonels because of the senior staff positions in the G shops and directorates. Keeping folks at the LTC level would cause downgrades of all the staff positions, and in my humble opinion the years of service and experiences needed to advise commanders is held by those folks.
What incentive would there be other than patriotism to retain senior staff officers in those positions as they are run through the ringer and generally underappreciated if not the promotions.
My recommendation would be to leave things that work alone, and concentrate on fixing the numerous things that are broken. Like the time it takes to change a training POI for example.

Response by CAPT Kevin B. made Feb 13 at 2017 3:34 PM

2017-02-13T15:34:10-05:00

"Too Many" would be quite a discussion in other services around the world. We are more top heavy than Commonwealth services but far less top heavy as say Cambodia where a two star has, wait for it, maybe 700 people. So if you get away from billets with say 4-5 Battalions of O-5's in charge that you run, there's not much out there other than specialty and staff stuff. So some of it is having a body count of O-6 slots that creates some promotion opportunity and enough of a pool to select a decent star from. I'm staff corps, so my commands were much smaller on body count but high end on contracting, environment, etc. The question then gets to how much, how complex, and AOR. Do you have enough horsepower to make it happen with the trigger puller side? Do you have the cajones to buck up against a stupid Flag that wants to give you mission without force protection? Some of it is having enough rank to protect your people from head case Alpha Hotels. So the current formula mix seems to work but there hasn't been much of a decent analysis to evaluate changing the structure. I will say, the Commonwealth services tend to have lower ranks with more responsibility, but then I've seen their relative compensation package compared with the other folk at home. Different culture, different story.

It did feel strange being in Australia and rating an aide/driver. They made me use them because that's how it's done there. Turned out the aide/driver took very good care of me and I was able to get vastly more done in a work day given the pace of the large scale multinational work being done.

Response by MSG Steve Wiersgalla made Feb 13 at 2017 6:14 PM

2017-02-13T18:14:42-05:00

I am with you 100% Sir, we are very top heavy. I understand rank is needed to deal with certain situations, but I believe that is something we have created. Why not empower/ force lower grade officers to make the same decisions? I only served at the BN Staff level so I don't have a whole lot of experience. Having been an NCO and Senior NCO at Plt Company and Battalion level it always amazed me to see the amount of pretty shiny metal when ever I was obligated to go to staff events at Battalion and Brigade levels. I avoided any echelon higher than Brigade.

Response by MAJ Bryan Zeski made Feb 13 at 2017 7:10 PM

2017-02-13T19:10:54-05:00

First, Sir, congrats on the promotion! Other than that, I have no argument with your commentary.

Response by SPC Erich Guenther made Feb 13 at 2017 8:59 PM

2017-02-13T20:59:44-05:00

Just curious, isn't there also theory going on here (similar to Airborne School) to have a surplus of higher ranking officers in case we need to expand the force rapidly or need to replace casualties?

Response by Col Neil Schuehle made Feb 14 at 2017 6:58 AM

2017-02-14T06:58:32-05:00

Taking a step further back ... I do not see this as a "Col vs LtCol" (LTC) issue. Our entire rank structure is predicated on up or out. Other nations (UK) have allowances in their system for making careers without having to promote. Not all of that works out as planned, but invariably you will wind up with folks that are more proficient in their duties. I was fortunate enough to have two company command tours, the first in Somalia 94-95. About the time I was finally getting to really understand everything (leadership, tactics, duty) I had orders. Luckily I had another shot later in life too, which is rare now as leaders roll through 0-3 so much faster.

Response by COL David Turk made Feb 14 at 2017 7:58 AM

2017-02-14T07:58:05-05:00

I have not seen the numbers, particularly by branch, but I can take a guess for part of the reason.
We can agree that there are command slots that require an O6. Well, command time for an O6 is usually 2-3 years. Once they come out of command, what do you do with an O6?
Another reason for O6 noncommand slots is the "interface" factor. Based on the rank of the personnel this slot interfaces with, you want an O6 in it. Actually this is a common consideration with lower ranks as well; e.g., major, captain.
Same could be said for the senior enlisted rank, E9. What do you do with a E9 when they are not in a slot supporting a commander?

Response by COL Jorge Rodriguez made Feb 14 at 2017 9:24 AM

2017-02-14T09:24:53-05:00

Maybe, your battalion command tour was not as successful? You can be an effective joint staff officer instead. Think positive.

Response by Capt Jason S. made Feb 14 at 2017 10:03 AM

2017-02-14T10:03:56-05:00

I agree 100% with you. Colonel and Generals should be Commanding not in administrative position, just collecting a check. Each one has extremely valuable skills and knowledge that could benefit the people below them! Sometimes rules need to be looked at and adjusted! We have a military designed for peace time not war! I see that in the paper/news all the time from the Generals at the top! No more Eisenhower, Mac Arthur, or Patton this type of officer is weeded out at the lower level because they see a problem and try to be creative and fix it. When this happens it threatens the current structure and order of how things are done! This can't happen in a bureaucracy because it requires order! In war creativity is needed to win or you take heavy losses that will either cost you the war or you are so superior that creativity doesn't matter and you can keep doing thing inefficiently and still win. I saw the latter in both of my deployments to Afghanistan. Creativity and ideas where ignored time and time again! It cost lives because Command ignored people with experience below them! They would say how could you know anything about this? You are just a? So we will just carry on! Then people died! Same with promotions. Good people don't always get all the boxes checked because they are trying to get The Most Important Thing Done "The Mission". So they are over looked. I have seen this also! People who are focus on their career promote but they did not focus on the mission like some of the others. So good people are forced out for good leadership and putting mission first! Yet others put themselves first and where promoted. To make it to Full Bird Colonels the person who can put mission first, lead, take care of their personnel and career without stepping on others while being in a command position should promote to a command position. I have met a very select few who I felt met this criteria. I have seen many who just checked the box. People who care don't make it very often or they get jaded along the way, maybe even bitter. It is a sad state. We should be helping each other, mentoring! I hope God helps us all to show more Love and Compassion towards each other in the future.

Response by MCPO Roger Collins made Feb 14 at 2017 11:14 AM

2017-02-14T11:14:38-05:00

The problem starts at the top. There was a commitment to reduce flag rank by 25%, what happened to that? There used to be a promotional pyramid. I would like to see one today reflecting the DOD, by department. Grade creep, with out a total force increase is not justified, IMO. That includes SNCOs.

Response by Capt Joseph Olson made Feb 14 at 2017 12:32 PM

2017-02-14T12:32:39-05:00

Yes. Compare WWII, at its heighth there were [conservatively] 8 times as many soldiers as today led by 1/8 the officers.

Response by CW4 Keith Dolliver made Feb 15 at 2017 7:48 AM

2017-02-15T07:48:15-05:00

I read an interesting article about a year ago or so when SECDEF Carter was trying to pass his officer promotions reform that speculated that a good majority of positions maybe coded for certain grades not necessarily because that grade is required, but because the experience commensurate with that grade is required. It basically hypothesized that if we did away with the up or out system of promotions that we would be able to re-code many staff positions for a lower grade just with x-years of experience. It was something I hadn't really though of before but after reading the article it made a lot of sense to me. The only thing that got me wondering was if you did re-code, for example, a majority of Division and Corps level staff positions from COL to LTC and LTC to MAJ if there would be any difficulty with talent retention at the necessary experience levels if you weren't offering promotion as an incentive. That probably wouldn't be as big of a problem for LTC's that are working their way to 20, but it might be a bigger deal for that MAJ who isn't being promoted. Of course that will become even more complicated in the coming years with the doing away of the 20-year retirement.

I know on the WO side of the house there are plenty of pilot's that would be more than happy to stay a W-2 or W-3 and stay flying rather than promote themselves out of the cockpit. That brings up a similar question though, with the cost flight training as high as it is, how many 100s of millions of dollars could be saved just by retaining pilots longer rather than forcing them out if they're not promoted? With the 20-year retirement there are many that would be happy to stick around as a W-2, but who's to say with the new retirement if there would be any incentive to stay.

Response by LtCol Robert Quinter made Feb 16 at 2017 3:22 PM

2017-02-16T15:22:05-05:00

So that we have enough raw materials to choose a couple of good Generals

Response by MAJ Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 17 at 2017 2:27 AM

2017-02-17T02:27:40-05:00

Duplicate.

Response by MAJ Private RallyPoint Member made Feb 17 at 2017 2:29 AM

2017-02-17T02:29:54-05:00

I think it's a discussion worth having sir. As others have mentioned, we had 90 divisions during WWII and less general officers. Obviously there's been significant institutional changes and restructuring since then, but our current structure still seems excessive. Ultimately I think we would have to do away with our current "up or out" career progression model to enact any meaningful change.

Response by COL Dan Fuhr made Feb 20 at 2017 2:02 PM

2017-02-20T14:02:03-05:00

First, congratulations. I'm going to take a step back for a moment and reflect on the purpose of having rank in the first place. Theoretically, rank is established to distinguish between levels of experience & competence and imbue those who do well with greater authority. In my world, each position should start with some thought into how much expertise is required to do the job. The greater the challenge, the greater the authority, but should default to the lower rank.

I don't think the Army does a great job of defaulting to the lower rank. Human nature being what it is, there is always the desire to grow an organization and to give rewards to good people. This situation is also a result of the "up or out" promotion policy. To keep competent officers beyond 20 years or so, you have to promote them.

Also, there is more glory to supervise a dozen Colonels than six each of COLs and LTCs. Although many of those in a position to set the structure don't think this way, enough of them do. Add to this a fairly unimaginative adherence to rigid structures and we get a lot of General Officers, Colonels and so on.

Enjoy your remaining time in the Army, it goes by pretty fast.

Response by SFC Jim Ruether made Mar 13 at 2017 12:35 PM

2017-03-13T12:35:08-04:00

Because Generals take a very long time to die.

Response by SSG Robert Webster made Jun 10 at 2017 12:58 PM

2017-06-10T12:58:12-04:00

COL Private RallyPoint Member I agree with you for the most part. And I would concur with your thoughts on this and a number of other commenters. Consider the following tables, who these individuals were and the positions that they held at various times throughout their military careers. For those of you not familiar with what I am alluding to, please familiarize yourselves with the individuals duty biographies for the inter-war years.

George C. Marshall
Second lieutenant, United States Army: February 2, 1902
First lieutenant, United States Army: March 7, 1907
Captain, United States Army: July 1, 1916
Major, National Army: August 5, 1917
Lieutenant colonel, National Army: January 5, 1918
Colonel, National Army: August 27, 1918
Captain, Regular Army (reverted to permanent rank): June 30, 1920
Major, Regular Army : July 1, 1920
Lieutenant colonel, Regular Army: August 21, 1923
Colonel, Regular Army: September 1, 1933
Brigadier general, Regular Army: October 1, 1936
Major general, Regular Army: September 1, 1939
General, Regular Army, for service as Army Chief of Staff: September 1, 1939
General of the Army, Army of the United States: December 16, 1944
General of the Army rank made permanent in the Regular Army: April 11, 1946

Douglas MacArthur
Second Lieutenant, Engineers, Regular Army: June 11, 1903
First Lieutenant, Engineers, Regular Army: April 23, 1904
Captain, Engineers, Regular Army: February 27, 1911
Major, Engineers, Regular Army: December 11, 1915
Colonel, Infantry, National Army: August 5, 1917
Brigadier General, National Army: June 26, 1918
Brigadier General, Regular Army: January 20, 1920
Major General, Regular Army: January 17, 1925
General for temporary service as Army Chief of Staff: November 21, 1930
Reverted to Major General, Regular Army: October 1, 1935
General, Retired list: December 31, 1937
Recalled to active service as Major General, Regular Army: July 26, 1941
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States: July 27, 1941
General, Army of the United States: December 18, 1941
General of the Army, Army of the United States: December 18, 1944
General of the Army, Regular Army: March 23, 1946

George S. Patton
Cadet, United States Military Academy, July 1, 1905
Second Lieutenant, Regular Army, June 11, 1909
First Lieutenant, Regular Army, May 23, 1916
Captain, Regular Army, May 15, 1917
Major, Temporary, January 26, 1918
Lieutenant Colonel, National Army, April 3, 1918 (March 20, 1918)
Colonel, National Army, October 17, 1918
Captain, Regular Army, June 30, 1920
Major, Regular Army, July 1, 1920
Lieutenant Colonel, Regular Army, March 1, 1934
Colonel, Regular Army, July 24, 1938
Brigadier General, Army of the United States, October 2, 1940
Major General, Army of the United States, April 4, 1941
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States, March 12, 1943
Brigadier General, Regular Army (bypassed), August 16, 1944 (September 1, 1943)
Major General, Regular Army, August 16, 1944 (September 2, 1943)
Lieutenant General, Regular Army, December 4, 1944
General, Army of the United States, April 14, 1945

Dwight D. Eisenhower
Cadet, United States Military Academy: June 14, 1911
Second Lieutenant, Regular Army: June 12, 1915
First Lieutenant, Regular Army: July 1, 1916
Captain, Regular Army: May 15, 1917
Major, National Army: June 17, 1918
Lieutenant Colonel, National Army: October 20, 1918
Captain, Regular Army: June 30, 1920 (Reverted to permanent rank.)
Major, Regular Army: July 2, 1920
Captain, Regular Army: November 4, 1922 (Discharged as major and appointed as captain due to reduction of Army.)
Major, Regular Army: August 26, 1924
Lieutenant Colonel, Regular Army: July 1, 1936
Colonel, Army of the United States: March 6, 1941
Brigadier General, Army of the United States: September 29, 1941
Major General, Army of the United States: March 27, 1942
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States: July 7, 1942
General, Army of the United States: February 11, 1943
Brigadier General, Regular Army: August 30, 1943
Major General, Regular Army: August 30, 1943
General of the Army, Army of the United States: December 20, 1944
General of the Army, Regular Army: April 11, 1946

Omar Bradley
Cadet, United States Military Academy: August 1, 1911
Second Lieutenant, United States Army: June 12, 1915
First Lieutenant, United States Army: July 1, 1916
Captain, United States Army: May 15, 1917
Temporary Major, National Army: June 17, 1918 to January 22, 1920
Major, National Army: July 1, 1920
Captain, Regular Army (reverted to permanent rank*): November 4, 1922 (Discharged as Major and appointed Captain November 4, 1922; acts June 30, 1922 and September 14, 1922)
Major, Regular Army: June 25, 1924
Lieutenant Colonel, Regular Army: July 26, 1936
Brigadier General, Army of the United States: February 24, 1941
Major General, Army of the United States: February 15, 1942
Lieutenant General, Army of the United States: June 2, 1943
Colonel, Regular Army: October 1, 1943**
Brigadier General, Regular Army: September 1, 1943**
Major General, Regular Army: September 8, 1944
General, Army of the United States: March 12, 1945
General, Regular Army: January 31, 1949
General of the Army, Regular Army: September 22, 1950

Note** – Bradley's effective date for permanent brigadier general in the Regular Army is earlier than his effective date of promotion for permanent colonel. While serving as a temporary lieutenant general in early 1943, Bradley was notified that he would be promoted to permanent colonel with an effective date of October 1, 1943. At the time, promotions to permanent brigadier and major general had been withheld for more than two years, except for Delos C. Emmons, Henry H. Arnold, and Dwight Eisenhower. President Franklin D. Roosevelt lifted the moratorium after Bradley was notified that he would be promoted to colonel, but before the October 1 effective date.

In determining whom to promote after the lifting of Roosevelt's moratorium, Marshall consulted with Eisenhower, and they agreed to promote Bradley and several others. Marshall and Eisenhower then arranged the effective dates of promotion to brigadier general based on where they wanted each of the individuals selected to rank in terms of seniority. Bradley's date of rank for permanent brigadier general was then set as September 1, 1943—even though this was before his October 1, 1943 effective date for promotion to colonel—based on where Eisenhower and Marshall wanted Bradley to fall in terms of seniority as a brigadier general.

Bradley's and the other promotions to brigadier general on which Marshall and Eisenhower had conferred were not acted on until mid-October 1943 because Congress had to approve a waiver for those generals, including Bradley, who did not yet have 28 years of service. As a result, his October 1, 1943 date for promotion to permanent colonel was allowed to remain in effect. When Congress acted in mid-October to approve Bradley's time in service waiver and promotion to permanent brigadier general, his effective date for brigadier general was backdated to September 1, 1943. The September 1, 1943 date for permanent brigadier general enabled Bradley to line up with his peers where Marshall and Eisenhower intended for purposes of seniority.

The effective postdated (and then backdated) date of rank for Bradley's promotion to permanent brigadier general—September 1, 1943—thus came before the effective postdated date of rank for his promotion to colonel—October 1, 1943

Response by Lt Col Jim Coe made Jun 16 at 2017 10:43 AM

2017-06-16T10:43:06-04:00

We did some of this kind of stuff after WWI and WWII. Service members who were colonels or even generals were reduced to lower ranks if they wanted to remain in the Army. I think that's where the permanent and temporary rank system came from; it was abolished with DOPMA.

The military does need to look at its distribution of resources among field and headquarters units. We do have a lot of field grade officers at unified and combined commands. That is due at least in part to the law requiring an officer to have had a joint duty assignment to become a general officer.

I can't answer why there are the number of O-6 billets in many headquarters. The colonels and captains appear to be regarded differently than O-5s and O-4s without regard to their position. I've seen O-5 Division Chiefs "uninvited" to Division Chief-level meetings because they aren't "colonels." Same for GS14 Division Chiefs being excluded when a GS15 is allowed. The command I worked for was at a distinct disadvantage because we had few GS15/O-6 billets. Only a handful of our officers could credibly attend meetings at the next higher headquarters because their counterparts there were all O-6s or GS15s. Not logical! Our Commander had to have a talk with the Commander at the higher headquarters to explain that his O-5/GS14 managers were speaking on the Commander's behalf and fully empowered to represent the organization.

Response by PVT Raymond Lopez made Jul 9 at 2017 9:53 PM

2017-07-09T21:53:45-04:00

I think there are more Colonels in Kentucky!!!

Response by COL Dave Sims made Oct 8 at 2018 12:04 PM

2018-10-08T12:04:48-04:00

This is a tough question to answer...but here goes. Colonels and LTCs perform important duties other than command. The "system" has not really woke up to that yet. (Selection for senior service college is more competitive than being promoted to O-6 . Even "below the zone" promotions do not guarantee SSC or command selection. )The rules are different for TO&E and TDA units and the wholesale// tactical side of the business also. You have to start out early if you think your talent and temperament suit you for command. The most successful commanders I have known are action oriented, analytical but not overly so and very people oriented. Once they make a decision priority is given on achieving the desired results and making adjustments along the way. When they screw up they raise their hands and take accountability. In short being a commander at any level is a extremely risky business.
There is a different skill set for the exceptional staff officer. What I have seen is that often caution will override a call for action. Staff officers tend to be very analytical , always needing more information and hedging their bets. Their focus seems to be many times on process and not mission achievement.
I spent most of my career in command billets and as a major program manager. Tactfulness was not my strong suit - but I loved the people I worked with and we achieved results. When I got assigned staff duties my plan was two fold...get out of town as quickly as I could...and meanwhile seek out an XO job. In the latter case I wanted to see how my boss approached problems.
The system that we have in our Army (promotion and command selection boards) pretty well sorts out those with talent as a commander and those who will be great staff officers. The system needs both ...but will always reward successful commanders more so than successful staff officers. The weak link in the system seems to be "schooling" raters and senior raters on how to evaluate "potential".....which is much more difficult to determine than duty performance.
Congress, god help us, determines how many generals, colonels, etc. we are permitted. The military also competes with private industry for talent. So if you are a private hedge fund manage making $500 K per annum ...why would you want to be a LTC on your fifth tour in Afghanistan. The simple, stark answer...which still counts..." "Duty, Honor, Country".