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Tell me the things that jump out at you when you see a unit operating?

What are the metrics that tell you a unit is disciplined?

How important is individual and unit discipline?
Posted in these groups: B04bb539 MarinesDiscipline1 DisciplineAir_combat_art_0134 Combat200210106b Command
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0cbe4288
Not all service Branches have equal standards for thier basic training, should each Armed Forces recruit face the same initial standards before the head off to their Military branches MOS school?
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I personally think we all looked a little more professional wearing a beret although it didn't block the sun from blazing your eyes.
Posted in these groups: Ccredberet BeretVtvr2bwn4 Soldier4276e14c Uniforms
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We never had a patching ceremony but she claims since the orders stated it was in support of OEF (Spartan Shield), we are authorized.
Posted in these groups: Combat_patch_logo Combat Patch (SSI-FWTS)
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Command Post What is this?
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I recently read a great position article by Victor Cha from the Center for Strategic and International studies on how to play the China card in regards to handling the events we are seeing out of North Korea. For the most part, the general consensus to dealing with North Korea will be through their closest friend, China. To this point, I completely agree. It is likely that we will (and are) attempting to pressure China to, in turn, pressure North Korea. However, as Victor points out, this pressure is not likely to lead to our best envisioned end state of a regime change and diminished focus on weapons of mass destruction. Why? Multiple factors of competition, mistrust, history, regime collapse and more lead to a litany of variables that China just doesn’t want to be responsible for or tied to. As Victor argues, it’s time to consider a change in diplomacy; I argue that it also is a time to consider a change in end state expectations and how we get there. [1]

Multiple presidential administrations have attempted to curb North Korean weapons development and engage the hermit country in a way that would stabilize the peninsula and tone down the rhetoric. From the “preventive defense” attempts of the 1994 U.S.- North Korea Framework to curb nuclear power ambitions to the crippling sanctions of today, all attempts to change the regime’s trajectory towards nuclear weapons have been some sort of a failure.[2] However, I believe the actions themselves aren’t the failure, but the underlying assumptions with a focus on the stabilization of the country rather than the stabilization of the Kim Regime itself is the underlying issue.

Although I am by no means an expert on the Kim Jong-un regime or the Kim Dynasty as a whole, from the discussions I have had to the research I have conducted, I am thoroughly convinced every action conducted by the leader is for the security of his Regime, not the country. So, as initiatives have consistently worked to deter action and stabilize a country, I argue it is time we work to stabilize the regime and, in turn, help manage its actions. Now, before we talk about this, let’s acknowledge that working with a regime like this goes against our moralistic nature, as the regime of North Korea is brutish and just down right horrible to its population. However, to that point, its brutal practices are likely actions driven by a regime who consistently is working to secure itself and thereby, has the potential to diminish as the regime’s future is secured.

So, where would we begin to stabilize what seems to be a regime of non-rational actors? First, I believe we need to start by treating them as rational actors. Although their actions may not seem rational to us, as former Joint Chief of Staff General Dempsey once pointed out to a poor reporter, that doesn’t mean they aren’t rational actors. I do believe the regime has an envisioned future and understands where they want to sit in the world. What is that position? Likely, a mid-level country like their cousins to the South. A regime who holds an array of respect and positions in the international system. A position that can influence trade, maritime operations, or weigh in on regional and international issues. Essentially, a position that projects the regimes divinity and strength from within. What is important to remember is that we are talking about the regime, not the country, and thereby we have to acknowledge that this will look vastly different than the free and connected society in the south, but with all the basic tenants of holding a position in the world. This fundamental change in an underlying assumption and focus is a strong facet to seeing that the regime has the potential to stabilize as their envisioned future comes to fruition.

Operating off this assumption, I believe to bring a regime like Kim’s to that point of stability, we have to employ a preventative style of strategy that integrates North Korea into the world system. This would be very familiar to post-Cold War strategies for integrating a fledgling Russian federation back into the world. We’d utilize methods like inviting the Russians into peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Kosovo, which developed communication frameworks and enabled Russia to find their prideful place in the world structure. Similar activities like investment and repurposing of military personnel in the Ukraine, post Soviet collapse, helped to secure the region and denuclearize a once heavily nuclear country. Many of these strategies of preventative defense, outlined by former Secretaries of Defense Carter and Perry in their book, “Preventative Defense” could yield positive results, as long as their strategies are employed with a focus on the Kim Jong-un regime, rather than the country itself.

To put these ideas into perspective a little more, let’s expand on a few things. To date, the regime is clearly not deterred from developing their weapons of mass destruction and I believe that is because the regime believes it is their most effective and most feasible entry to the international community. To support this, we have to understand that the hermit nation really has no place in modern society. They are not a world player in exports or imports. They do not possess advanced technology which they can offer to the world, and they do not carry any cultural or historic envy in the world. So, what do they have? What do they have to offer? From the regime’s eyes, I believe its only option is their military capability or threat. Basically, “a pay attention to us by force” motto.

Beyond attention-seeking, let’s talk about the potential personal ambitions of Kim Jong-un and his Regime. Kim is a leader, a divinity to some, and one of the privileged few that gets to look beyond the gates of the Regime. Enter the mind of a man in that position, looking out and knowing his influence has significant limits and that those limits actually threaten the life span of his regime, and thereby, his influence. Wouldn’t that drive you to build a mechanism to gain more, or to at least secure your regime’s future both within the country and the international community? I believe it would. This goes back to the understanding that the regime’s survival is priority number one and, therefore, any and all mechanisms to strengthen it must be pursued, no matter the cost.

Moving on to the next piece of bringing North Korea into the world; allowing their sustained nuclear strike capability. Before we talk about nuclear weapons as a means of communication vs. a threat, let's first acknowledge a few other issues that are likely to come up with a reliable nuclear strike platform. With an increased capability like this, the conventional military threat could be emboldened as well, and the regional stability could be threatened. Additionally, we could see increased rhetoric and open threats as North Korean leaders learned how to negotiate and communicate on the world stage - threats would likely be their default response. Further, we could see an intrepid nuclear-capable regime backtrack or cheat on negotiated deals, which could deteriorate security worldwide. These, and many more, are all risks we must acknowledge and account for. We must be heavily involved in the management of regime actions as they move forward as a nuclear power.

Now, with all that we have outlined here - the changes in the assumptions and the changes in focus from country to the regime - we can talk about nuclear capability in North Korea as a potential conduit of communication rather than strictly a threat. Acknowledging their nuclear capability and immediately bringing them into established frameworks for nuclear capable countries could potentially open lines of communication that have not yet been achieved. With a strong deterrence in his pocket from “western interdiction”, Kim could possibly be more willing to establish norms and predictability in their military exercises and actions as they attempt to garner an image of a world player. To circle back to Victor Cha’s article, these lines of communication will likely never be directly with the U.S. or “West” due to the regime’s lack of trust, but would more likely be directed through China. However, the closer the regime gets to established frameworks, the closer those lines of communication can become.

Years of attempting to deter a nuclear North Korea have seem to have little effect, and the time for acknowledging their capability may be presenting itself. So, there are interesting questions that need to be asked. If Kim Jong-un has his desired nuclear program with strike capabilities around the world, could that actually be the missing piece that brings him within the international framework? Will it actually be the conduit that brings stability to the regime and, thereby, the entire region of North Korea? Or are we actually sitting at the brink of a mad-man ready to destroy the world? Either way, these are two extremely interesting and important questions.

What do you think?


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Luke Jenkins is an Active Duty Army officer and founder of OweYaa.com, a veteran service organization. He is a passionate student of strategy and matters relating to national defense strategy. This article reflects his personal analysis and thoughts and does not reflect an official stance of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or any organization related to national defense framework.

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[1] https://www.csis.org/analysis/right-way-play-china-card-north-korea
[2] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework
Photo by Roman Harak - https://www.flickr.com/photos/roman-harak/ [login to see]
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Posted in these groups: Knowledge-management KnowledgeF3af5240 Military History
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I can't help to hear most other branches (MOSs) claim to be just like the Infantry. I had the worst experience of this when dealing with MPs. Many receive combat training and feel like they are pretty much infantry and go about claiming they are pretty much the same.

I have a serious issue with this for many reasons. I am Infantry but I am not taking anything away from other soldiers. But it seems like they want to be something else than what they are. So they claim they do their job and can do infantry also. I would often ask them the Principles of Patroling or how to set up a Platoon Patrol Base just wait for the blank stares. I might as well be speaking Greek. Those are infantry tasks. What they learned were soldiers skills and common tasks, not infantry training. I can set up a radio but that does not make me Signal. I still need that Signal soldier. Defending yourself or your base is not primarily an infantry task.

Now along with other branches of the military we each have our role. I, as an infantry officer, need MPs to process detainees and Quartermasters to supply me with gear. I am not the Army. I am the Infantry. Together we are the Army and not an Army of one. Just so in case if anyone is wondering all of these pictures are US Army Infantry and are 11Bs. They show the diversity of the Infantry and their capabilities.

What are your experience with this in your MOS, just not infantry? Are you pretty much infantry?

(Now for some humor. Two officers were talking about their branch training. One was an Infantry officer and the other was an Armor officer. The Armor officer was telling the Infantry officer about his Infantry phase of his training and how he could do his job. Without missing a beat the Infantry officer says to the Armor officer "We also have an Armor phase in our training. We call it the Weekend."
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71edd101
Just the other days I saw a PFC wearing Rocky C4T boots, I asked him if he knew they were unauthorized and he told me that he does but his NCO hasn't told him anything so, he keeps using them.

Why do we keep seeing SM wearing unauthorized boots?
Posted in these groups: 4276e14c Uniforms454274742x356 DA Pam 670-1Paratrooper_boots_a01-495x507 Boots
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Currently the only Cord authorized for wear is the Infantry Blue Cord, but I have seen evidence that other Branches/Corps also had their own Cord at one time. Why is the Infantry Cord the only one we have now? What is its importance to Infantrymen today?
Posted in these groups: Infantry_branch_insignia_photo_cards-r4ae815fac115412683e3bff623b4440b_vgjpz_8byvr_512 InfantryUs-medals AwardsF3af5240 Military History
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I'm an FY15 Lieutenant and I'm trying decide between an Infantry VTIP, my original Signal Detail, or an ARSOF packet stuck between SF and CA. Anything helps. My main struggle is feeling selfish leaving the conventional Army. I truly believe every soldier is entitled to outstanding leadership and not everyone needs to go to Special Operations however, if not me then who?
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Nvy
When you think of the services you think of the Army. From GI Joe to GI Jane, the image is Bivouacs and an Abrams Tank. But who is in the field most of the time? Who is on crowded ships for extended periods of times? The Navy travels around on ships and they are heavily involved in wars and combat. They can be like sitting ducks and on Aircraft Carriers a virtual airport.

I have a CD about the Navy and it shows just how active and how dangerous the Navy's job is. They may not be boots on the ground but they are boots on deck and very vulnerable as Pearl Harbor suggests.

What's your take? Is the Navy under-appreciated? I want to make this abundantly clear, this is not about minimizing the efforts of the other branches but my brother was Navy and when he saw my dorm, he was speechless and then said, "You Air Force people have it made". LOL
Posted in these groups: Respect__logo RespectNavy Navy
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Ender's Game is an award winning Sci-Fi novel with great emphasis on leadership and tactics (very enjoyable, thought provoking, and studied in many academic settings).&nbsp; As I re-read it, in preparation for the movie, I'll post discussions on the parts that really stand out.<br><br>This first question is based on an early glimpse into Ender's mind ... "I have to win this now, and for all time, or I'll fight it every day and it will get worse and worse."<br><br>So then, the question is: For you and your team, how do you build the mindset to win, rather than just the mindset to fight?&nbsp; Anyone can fight ... and lose.&nbsp; Those who prevail fight to WIN.<br>
Posted in these groups: Strategy-globe-1cfii4y StrategyComp CompetitionTactics_logo Tactics
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I've been told that there are many ways in which to be a good leader. As a fresh NCO, I would like some advice on how to earn and not force the respect of my soldiers. I've always been a lead from the front kind of guy, but I've been told by my COC that I need to work less and supervise more, which I kind of disagree with. Any advice?
Posted in these groups: Leadership-development Leadership DevelopmentRespect__logo Respect
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B4fe1038
I'm hearing/reading people saying "I'm old school, therefore..." So out of curiosity's sake, where is that ever-moving line?
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Federal or AGR
Posted in these groups: Images Military Career
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