Vietnam War
Vietnam War
Posted on May 31, 2015
50 years ago today, May 31, in sunny Vietnam-land - Where were you?
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U.S. planes bomb an ammunition depot at Hoi Jan, west of Hanoi, and try again to drop the Than Hoa highway bridge.
These raids were part of Operation Rolling Thunder, which had begun in March 1965. President Lyndon B. Johnson had ordered the sustained bombing of North Vietnam to interdict North Vietnamese transportation routes in the southern part of North Vietnam and slow infiltration of personnel and supplies into South Vietnam. In July 1966, Rolling Thunder was expanded to include North Vietnamese ammunition dumps and oil storage facilities as targets. In the spring of 1967, it was further expanded to include power plants, factories, and airfields in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.
The White House closely controlled operation Rolling Thunder and President Johnson occasionally selected the targets himself. From 1965 to 1968, about 643,000 tons of bombs were dropped on North Vietnam. A total of nearly 900 U.S. aircraft were lost during Operation Rolling Thunder. The operation continued, with occasional suspensions, until President Johnson halted it on October 31, 1968, under increasing domestic political pressure.
These raids were part of Operation Rolling Thunder, which had begun in March 1965. President Lyndon B. Johnson had ordered the sustained bombing of North Vietnam to interdict North Vietnamese transportation routes in the southern part of North Vietnam and slow infiltration of personnel and supplies into South Vietnam. In July 1966, Rolling Thunder was expanded to include North Vietnamese ammunition dumps and oil storage facilities as targets. In the spring of 1967, it was further expanded to include power plants, factories, and airfields in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.
The White House closely controlled operation Rolling Thunder and President Johnson occasionally selected the targets himself. From 1965 to 1968, about 643,000 tons of bombs were dropped on North Vietnam. A total of nearly 900 U.S. aircraft were lost during Operation Rolling Thunder. The operation continued, with occasional suspensions, until President Johnson halted it on October 31, 1968, under increasing domestic political pressure.
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Vietnam War Hanoi
Posted 9 y ago
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The micro-managing of tactical decisions by Washington continued on in the war.
I was a Weapons Controller on Monkey Mountain, outside of Da Nang.
Late on the night shift - don't recall the date, but I believe it was in early 1971 - a couple of Migs jumped one of our FACs over the Plain of Jars in Laos. The FAC declared emergency and was jinking his heart out to avoid being shot down.
Lion Control in Ubon Thailand was controlling the OV-10 Bronco FAC, and scrambled two F-4s out of U-Tapao and two more out of Da Nang to run the intercept.
The F-4s from Da Nang made the intercept and had a lock-on to the Migs, and asked permission to go hot. The controller at Lion told them to stand by, and contacted the TACC-North Sector on Monkey Mountain for permission to go hot.
The TACC NS said to stand by and went to the TACC in Saigon for permission. The TACC in Saigon said to stand by and went further up the line to get permission to open fire on the Migs.
Meanwhile, the Migs were jinking and heading straight for Vinh airfield with the F-4s on their tails with a lock-on. The word finally came down the chain that if the F-4s had a Talley, they were cleared hot.
However, at zero-dark-thirty it is impossible to get a visual confirmation; a communist afterburner looks much like an American afterburner in the dark.
We had positive radar contact from the time of the attack on our FAC, the Migs were not squawking, were taking evasive action, and were headed for a communist airfield, but the civilians up the chain were not convinced that the military could tell friend from foe and were worried that we might shoot our own planes down.
The F-4s followed the Migs down to the runway, flew over them as they landed, and climbed out over water to return to base.
The Navy carrier commander was operating with a good deal more autonomy than the Air Force, and the commander on Yankee Station was listening to the radio chatter and was anxious to kill some Migs. He had his Mig CAPs up and ready to go when two targets busted up out of Vinh airfield over water and headed south along the coast. His Mig CAP was on them quickly and got a lock-on - to our F-4s - who were not squawking because they had been over enemy territory.
The F-4s got the indication that they had been locked onto, squawked emergency, and came out over Guard telling the Navy fighters to hold their fire - they were friendlies.
This is what the Migs would have done had they been friendlies, but the higher-ups making the decision for the initial intercept lacked the tactical information to make informed decisions.
The further up the line one goes from the tactical situation the less one knows the important details required to make valid decisions, and the more likely the decisions made will be guided by politics.
It is my opinion that the civilian leaders need to give the military the goals to be achieved, and then should step away and let the military decide how to accomplish the goals without being micro-managed by people with insufficient knowledge to do the job effectively.
I was a Weapons Controller on Monkey Mountain, outside of Da Nang.
Late on the night shift - don't recall the date, but I believe it was in early 1971 - a couple of Migs jumped one of our FACs over the Plain of Jars in Laos. The FAC declared emergency and was jinking his heart out to avoid being shot down.
Lion Control in Ubon Thailand was controlling the OV-10 Bronco FAC, and scrambled two F-4s out of U-Tapao and two more out of Da Nang to run the intercept.
The F-4s from Da Nang made the intercept and had a lock-on to the Migs, and asked permission to go hot. The controller at Lion told them to stand by, and contacted the TACC-North Sector on Monkey Mountain for permission to go hot.
The TACC NS said to stand by and went to the TACC in Saigon for permission. The TACC in Saigon said to stand by and went further up the line to get permission to open fire on the Migs.
Meanwhile, the Migs were jinking and heading straight for Vinh airfield with the F-4s on their tails with a lock-on. The word finally came down the chain that if the F-4s had a Talley, they were cleared hot.
However, at zero-dark-thirty it is impossible to get a visual confirmation; a communist afterburner looks much like an American afterburner in the dark.
We had positive radar contact from the time of the attack on our FAC, the Migs were not squawking, were taking evasive action, and were headed for a communist airfield, but the civilians up the chain were not convinced that the military could tell friend from foe and were worried that we might shoot our own planes down.
The F-4s followed the Migs down to the runway, flew over them as they landed, and climbed out over water to return to base.
The Navy carrier commander was operating with a good deal more autonomy than the Air Force, and the commander on Yankee Station was listening to the radio chatter and was anxious to kill some Migs. He had his Mig CAPs up and ready to go when two targets busted up out of Vinh airfield over water and headed south along the coast. His Mig CAP was on them quickly and got a lock-on - to our F-4s - who were not squawking because they had been over enemy territory.
The F-4s got the indication that they had been locked onto, squawked emergency, and came out over Guard telling the Navy fighters to hold their fire - they were friendlies.
This is what the Migs would have done had they been friendlies, but the higher-ups making the decision for the initial intercept lacked the tactical information to make informed decisions.
The further up the line one goes from the tactical situation the less one knows the important details required to make valid decisions, and the more likely the decisions made will be guided by politics.
It is my opinion that the civilian leaders need to give the military the goals to be achieved, and then should step away and let the military decide how to accomplish the goals without being micro-managed by people with insufficient knowledge to do the job effectively.
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SMSgt Lawrence McCarter
Captain Waddell, I know You had to pass this " Boom Boom Rock" every time You went up Monkey Mountain, though this picture might bring back some memories as well. It was 1968 the first time I was ever up Monkey Mountain. I was stationed at Da Nang Air Base at that point in time. You sure are right about the micro Management from Washington, that cost a lot of lives !
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SPC Lyle Montgomery
Capt Waddell This was an excelent read. I agree that the civilian so called leaders Don't have a clue of what is happening over there. The men there could have won if the cowards in congress and senate had let them. I was Army and we had the same problem.
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I was a young kid during the Vietnam era. My father was a funeral director. Because it was a family business, I would accompany him on road trips where it was appropriate to do so. I remember going to the airport with him to receive the body of a US soldier, who was killed in action while in Vietnam.
On a side note, I am very proud of the way my father has helped families. His work won a national award from the Department of Defense. A pathologist he worked with told him he should have been a plastic surgeon. He made it possible for families to see their loved ones in an open casket, where 99% of the time that wouldn't have been the case.
On a side note, I am very proud of the way my father has helped families. His work won a national award from the Department of Defense. A pathologist he worked with told him he should have been a plastic surgeon. He made it possible for families to see their loved ones in an open casket, where 99% of the time that wouldn't have been the case.
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