Commanding Officer
Commanding Officer
Posted on Oct 8, 2019
Would you help me decipher Navy Surface Force Training Instructions as they pertained to my very particular rare situation?
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COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
Selected Reservists are organized into units with specific mobilization billets, generally onboard active commands
(“gaining commands”)
1502. Training Philosophy. A primary objective in the training of the SELRES is the integration of individuals and units with their active
duty counterparts.
To the maximum extent possible, commanding officers should work to foster a close working relationship with their counterpart
reserve units by frequently communicating with them, coordinating the embarkation/debarkation of reserve unit personnel, and developing tailored training programs designed to optimize limited reserve active
duty training and personnel qualification opportunities. To achieve
these goals, Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations. Standalone reserve units will work in close coordination with their ISICs and supported/supporting commanders. Training of reservists will be conducted per reference
(a).
a. Reserve Training Environment.
1. Inactive Duty Training (IDT) is accomplished two days per
month, usually on the weekend; Annual Training (AT) is accomplished two weeks per year.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1D CH1
14 Oct 08
126
b. Personnel Qualifications (NRF Ships). NRF ship Commanding Officers are to assign all primary crew SELRES to Condition I and III watch stations. SELRES will use PQS to train for final qualification
in these watch stations. Qualification time lines are as assigned by
the commanding officer, commensurate with drill and annual training time available, present ship's employment, prior active duty, and PQS qualifications documented in service record page 4's. Once PQS qualified for their Condition I and III assignments, SELRES may undertake other PQS, such as inport watch stations and ESWS. General DC and 3M qualifications should be accomplished early in the SELRES' tour of duty in conjunction with initial Condition I and III watch
station PQS. This watch station assignment/job accomplishment policy applies only to the NRF primary crew SELRES and not to the SELRES who perform one time annual training in support of fleet operations.
1504. Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Readiness Criteria. NRF units are generally tasked with the same training requirements as their active
duty counterparts. However, due to limited days underway with selected reservists embarked, and limited availability of inport trainers, these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control. Accordingly, NRF units may complete the advanced unit phase of training without achieving C1/M1 readiness in all primary mission areas. The mission area readiness ratings listed in Figure 151 specifically
prescribe the minimum acceptable standards for NRF units at the end of advanced training and during repetitive (proficiency) training.
How was I at 18 to overcome the Inherrent Limitations of sporadically being put on a guided missle frigate for 5 years forced to try to fit in and not be affected by being insecure when all the other sailors knew what was going on and some in deck would isolate bully threaten assault, not to mentions sea sickness constantly being sent home without health care benefits of leadership access, and I was far below poverty and education and professional development socially economically in all realms just starting my life on and off the ship.
I was 18, after meritorious bootcamp gradation, assigned to guided missile frigates for 5 years with a reserve SAM enlistment. The instructions specifically mention most sailors had previous active duty experience at sea. What if you did not? What if you were 18 and forced to acclimate qualify with all these “Inherrent Limitiations” and no other SAM enlisted on the ship. Yes that is correct I was the only SAM on a ship of 200 guys. My Navy Army Transfer and the medical disqualifications starts making a lot of sense now 1998 off the ship.
Can you imagine sprinting for days or weeks or month straight no idea how to pace yourself on high alert trying to absorb all these things on a a ship and sent home beat up sea sick emotionally drained every month for 5 years?
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
Selected Reservists are organized into units with specific mobilization billets, generally onboard active commands
(“gaining commands”)
1502. Training Philosophy. A primary objective in the training of the SELRES is the integration of individuals and units with their active
duty counterparts.
To the maximum extent possible, commanding officers should work to foster a close working relationship with their counterpart
reserve units by frequently communicating with them, coordinating the embarkation/debarkation of reserve unit personnel, and developing tailored training programs designed to optimize limited reserve active
duty training and personnel qualification opportunities. To achieve
these goals, Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations. Standalone reserve units will work in close coordination with their ISICs and supported/supporting commanders. Training of reservists will be conducted per reference
(a).
a. Reserve Training Environment.
1. Inactive Duty Training (IDT) is accomplished two days per
month, usually on the weekend; Annual Training (AT) is accomplished two weeks per year.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1D CH1
14 Oct 08
126
b. Personnel Qualifications (NRF Ships). NRF ship Commanding Officers are to assign all primary crew SELRES to Condition I and III watch stations. SELRES will use PQS to train for final qualification
in these watch stations. Qualification time lines are as assigned by
the commanding officer, commensurate with drill and annual training time available, present ship's employment, prior active duty, and PQS qualifications documented in service record page 4's. Once PQS qualified for their Condition I and III assignments, SELRES may undertake other PQS, such as inport watch stations and ESWS. General DC and 3M qualifications should be accomplished early in the SELRES' tour of duty in conjunction with initial Condition I and III watch
station PQS. This watch station assignment/job accomplishment policy applies only to the NRF primary crew SELRES and not to the SELRES who perform one time annual training in support of fleet operations.
1504. Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Readiness Criteria. NRF units are generally tasked with the same training requirements as their active
duty counterparts. However, due to limited days underway with selected reservists embarked, and limited availability of inport trainers, these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control. Accordingly, NRF units may complete the advanced unit phase of training without achieving C1/M1 readiness in all primary mission areas. The mission area readiness ratings listed in Figure 151 specifically
prescribe the minimum acceptable standards for NRF units at the end of advanced training and during repetitive (proficiency) training.
How was I at 18 to overcome the Inherrent Limitations of sporadically being put on a guided missle frigate for 5 years forced to try to fit in and not be affected by being insecure when all the other sailors knew what was going on and some in deck would isolate bully threaten assault, not to mentions sea sickness constantly being sent home without health care benefits of leadership access, and I was far below poverty and education and professional development socially economically in all realms just starting my life on and off the ship.
I was 18, after meritorious bootcamp gradation, assigned to guided missile frigates for 5 years with a reserve SAM enlistment. The instructions specifically mention most sailors had previous active duty experience at sea. What if you did not? What if you were 18 and forced to acclimate qualify with all these “Inherrent Limitiations” and no other SAM enlisted on the ship. Yes that is correct I was the only SAM on a ship of 200 guys. My Navy Army Transfer and the medical disqualifications starts making a lot of sense now 1998 off the ship.
Can you imagine sprinting for days or weeks or month straight no idea how to pace yourself on high alert trying to absorb all these things on a a ship and sent home beat up sea sick emotionally drained every month for 5 years?
CDR
Commanding Officer
Training
Navy Reserve
Edited 4 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 5
1
1
0
As a career Naval Officer and one who spent the latter half in training and administration of reserves (twice a reserve center c.o., a readiness command surface program manager, two shipboard tours, and Reserve Surface Force Program Officer), I am at a loss as to what you are asking. It seems that you were an interservice transfer from the Army and still don’t understand the armed forces expectation that you take responsibility for getting your quals done? On the other hand, chronic seasickness is just as much a disqualifier as airsickness for flight crew. It’s a physical issue and not uncommon, but still a disqualifier just as color blindness and bad vision. I’ve known new officers and others who just never could function. Some could not step foot on a ship...how they got commissioned?? The answers are plentiful.
There are thousands of sailors who enter the same program you signed up for and have been successful—some just satisfactorily to others who are exemplary. There are the quals standards for basic seamanship and those for promotion. All are obvious and available. Success sometimes can be just by the luck of the draw. Why I survived without a scratch an 80mm mortar attack and the guy several steps away from me lost his whole face...
All that being said, if you approached your time in the Navy in the same manner as your above stated quandary I can understand the responses you experienced. The Armed Forces are difficult, a very different life and not fair. I’m a retired surface warfare officer and a riverine combat vet. I really wanted to be a pilot but my eyesight changed in flight school. I seldom got the desired geographical assignments as the needs of the service is the reality. Some assignments sucked, and some COs were idiots but they were the CO.
It now all depends on what you decide to do to take your tough experiences, learn from them and make them work for you.
There are thousands of sailors who enter the same program you signed up for and have been successful—some just satisfactorily to others who are exemplary. There are the quals standards for basic seamanship and those for promotion. All are obvious and available. Success sometimes can be just by the luck of the draw. Why I survived without a scratch an 80mm mortar attack and the guy several steps away from me lost his whole face...
All that being said, if you approached your time in the Navy in the same manner as your above stated quandary I can understand the responses you experienced. The Armed Forces are difficult, a very different life and not fair. I’m a retired surface warfare officer and a riverine combat vet. I really wanted to be a pilot but my eyesight changed in flight school. I seldom got the desired geographical assignments as the needs of the service is the reality. Some assignments sucked, and some COs were idiots but they were the CO.
It now all depends on what you decide to do to take your tough experiences, learn from them and make them work for you.
(1)
(0)
PO3 Aaron Hassay
LCDR Morrissey,
Sir I respectfully request you help me review analyze these reports attached with links and excerpts. I respectfully request an open conversation. Please bear with me and get through this response. You are a seasoned salty guy and I am sure seen heard it all. But have you seen IG reports that state Systemic Weakness in Training and Administration, that same ships I was on? How is any intelligent young junior enlisted not supposed to be affected when the IG is stating this about your very command.I found a 1995 LCDR Executive Officer Navy War College Report (attached) that shows the real deck plate reality of these NRF FFGs. I found many other reports stating the scenario I was dealing with 18-23 my formative years, still thinking I will be married have kids have a great career the American Dream!!! I just graduated Meritorious Bootcamp Greatlakes 1994!! I was a varsity high school letterman, proud and ready, logical, and full of military bearing, with attention to detail. All I needed was great leadership from there!!!
Maybe you are aware of this!
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/US%20Navy%20Regulations/Chapter%208%20-%20The%20Commanding%20Officer.pdf
Chapter 8
THE COMMANDING OFFICER
0820. Welfare of Personnel.
Section 1. Commanding Officers in General
b. maintain a satisfactory state of health
and physical fitness of the personnel under his or
her command;
You are the commanding officer I could never talk with as I was not feeling well and confused to say the least due stressors unique to the NRF FFG I was assigned, and maybe it was a systemic problem as the NAVY IG stated 1995 and 1998 as you will see below, or it was exacerbated by the ships command, but me being a junior enlisted with this issue to deal with formulate my life around was feeling the affects deeply physically mentally. Your history I deeply respect and my father's memory RIP is even brought up you will see why. My father I found out 2005, after I was discharged 2002, an actual Army 11 Light Infantry Brigade Soldier Vietnam 66-68, who was too injured due incapacitation to raise me, VA documents would confirm. I can not match wits with a Vietnam Combat Service Member. I can only imagine being and giving all in dangerous things I felt overwhelmed by on the ship and feeling out of control due lack of experience and training for years and it ate at me literally, not to mention the full time master chief kicked my A-- in the forward locker and threatened my career, due my depression at sea feeling unstable, a uniform issue as I recall started it, and well inexperienced, as this e9 should of gathered, me just part time on the ship, and all together which prompted my Navy ARmy Transfer to save myself
I understand your service was from 1964s to 1989 right before the first gulf war, and during the cold war Navy Ship Build up to nearly 600 ships!!. I started 18 yo 1994 smack dab in the middle of a force draw down bases being closed ships being decommissioned. So you will see below 1995 and 1998 the NRF Ships I was on the NAVY IG investigated and reported as being “systemically weak training administration”. How was I to survive this? They never say bootcamp was “systematically weak in training and administration” when they teach you in daily interaction with the command leadership courage honor dedication to follow orders and risk all for your own country.
I joined the Navy Honorably with no connection still to my father. I had great ambition to be an officer, then have a career of service successfully in the police or firefighter, never homeless and my mom RIP younger sister and brother worried deeply about me as I really started getting a psychiatric problem that stopped even a Navy Army Transfer. THE SAM Enlistment gave me a direct shot to get in and started. Now, 2019, I want to know how I went from a Meritorious Bootcamp Graduate 1994 assigned to a FFG 1994-1999 attempting a Permanently Medically Disqualified Navy Army Transfer 1998 Honorable Discharge 2002 and a suicide hospital SSDI for Psych affective year 2005. This SAM enlistment hindered me so much that I could not even go the VA without stoppages denials of services and benefits specifically because of the SAM Enlistment was created not to end up with enough active duty days to qualify, no matter what command I was in and what I experienced, as if I did not exist at all, that is how it felt. I gave my all to an enlistment that was not even recognized as a veteran, and therefore all the liability of chronic injury was passed through to me, being cycled on and off guided missile frigates, turned on and turned off, for 5 years to start my adulthood. You will see that
1990
DOD Total Force Policy Interim Report
"Use of Reserve Volunteers has tended to work well for unit or individual missions that do not require close, intra-unit coordination. It has been less effective in force elements such as ground combat units or ship crews, where unit training and cohesiveness is more important."
Navy IG states the ships I’m on I am experiencing systemic weakness in training and administration
1995 5040.1
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1998 5040.1A
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401A.PDF
Department of Navy
Subject: Reserve Administration and Training Evaluation (RATE) Program
4. Background
“The Rate Program was initiated in response to Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships
SELRES Personnel assigned must be ready to mobilize on short notice and, as a result, be maintained at the highest state of readiness.”
I enlisted 1994 in SAM Enlistment. Its a 8 Yr Obligated Enlistment. I was recruited with inventive to be an officer by 22 attending college after bootcamp which I graduated Meritoritorious. I just became aware of the force drawdown and its era affects as well.
1994 DOD Manpower Requirement Reports state the Navy Manpower listed below, and the end of the SAM enlistment also below.
CHAPTER IV
NAVY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. General
This chapter outlines the Navy's requirements for active,reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1992 through FY 1994.
Further, it reviews the Navy's initiatives and programs geared to meet the challenge of maintaining their readiness posture within the context of a more fiscally constrained environment.
The Navy must be able to fill key positions to perform its mission successfully and safely. Therefore, the recruiting and retention of high caliber officer and enlisted personnel to man our technologically-sophisticated Navy remains a top priority. Retention of experienced enlisted personnel during force drawdown will require stable levels of compensation, continued advancement opportunity and an acceptable quality of life for both the sailor and his/her family.
Navy Manpower
Active
480,800
Reserve
113,400
SAM Sea Air Mariner
893
Civilian
250,800
“The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel. An offshoot of this program, Sea and AirMariner II (SAM II), was developed specifically to place individuals serving two years on Initial Active Duty Training, onboard FFT 1052class ships. With the cancelation of the FFT program, the SAM II program draws down in FY 1994.”
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
1995 LCDR Rossi Navy War College Report
“”"Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF)."
As the military forces of the 1990's "rightsize", the
importance of the reserve force's contribution within each
service component cannot be overstated. In a recent message to
the entire Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Boorda,
proclaimed:
"In the smaller Navy of today and in the future, it takes
everything and everybody working together to accomplish the
mission. 1994 was full of examples with daily contributions
by reservists (seabees, frigates, logistics and tactical
aircraft, medical intelligence and more) working side by
side with Active counterparts"
The post-Vietnam military would be shaped around a Total
Force Policy which called for the integration of the National
Guard and Reserve with active forces.5
Both the economy and public opinion demanded an end to the
massive levees experienced under Selective Service. The
logical replacement for conscription was a smaller, more
professional "all volunteer" force supplemented by well
trained, fully supported Reserves during national
emergencies.6
On top of
this minimum manning policy imposed upon the entire FFG-7 class
of ships, the active duty crew permanently assigned to NRF FFGs
is manned to only 70% of the Active Force FFG's manning
allowance. The following table illustrates the differences in
manning levels:14
This significant lack of team training is further
exasperated by the fact rarely, if ever, are 100% of the NRF
FFG's Selres billets filled. These training problems caused one
NRF FFG commanding officer to comment:
"My experience was that, during 27 months in command, I
never had more than 50% of my assigned Selres on board for
an ACDUTRA [two week, active duty training] period. ...the
typical NRF FFG never has the opportunity to conduct
intensive underway training with the entire crew on board.
The result is that the ship cannot train the various teams
required to carry out their wartime missions. Even worse,
typically, there is insufficient training time to ensure
that the individual reservists complete the qualifications
expected of active duty crew members in their ratings and
paygrades. "22
It is amazing these ships get underway and accomplish what they
do with the reduced active duty manning level and sporadic Selres
total component training they must endure.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct
corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.
Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive. Currently, a
successful Selres training period could be defined as individual
selected reservists completing 15 points of the Personnel
Qualification Standard (PQS) for one watch station during a
weekend training period.26 PQS is certainly one fleet - wide
measure of effectiveness. However, no single ship or sailor's
effectiveness is measured by PQS accomplishment alone. Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
15
CONCLUSION
"I maintain, based on 27 months in command of one, that the
NRF FFGs are not, and should not be expected to be, fully
combat ready for immediate deployment into a high threat
area, under the present "system". Our manning and
employment policies are detrimental to their wartime combat
readiness. They will never be equal to their active sisterships
immediately upon mobilization because the selected
reservists (SELRES) portion of the crew receives neither the
quantity nor the quality of training received by their
active duty counterparts, neither as part of the "team" nor
as individual crewmembers. "30
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
A ship is an independent, self-sustaining city which
requires, not only the complete integration of its crew, but the
coordinated orchestration of qualified professionals to sustain
safe and effective operations at sea. Navy manning doctrine
directs the assignment of only the minimum number of men and
women to ships in specific ratings and billets required to
provide each ship with the opportunity to succeed at sea. In
short, there is very little room for unqualified or untrained
sailors at sea. So why then do we man 16 of the 51 ships in the
FFG-7 class to only 70% of their allotted manning and say, if
needed in a time of national crisis, we will augment these crews
with quality personnel who have less than 24 days of integrated
team training each year?””
AH
Sir I respectfully request you help me review analyze these reports attached with links and excerpts. I respectfully request an open conversation. Please bear with me and get through this response. You are a seasoned salty guy and I am sure seen heard it all. But have you seen IG reports that state Systemic Weakness in Training and Administration, that same ships I was on? How is any intelligent young junior enlisted not supposed to be affected when the IG is stating this about your very command.I found a 1995 LCDR Executive Officer Navy War College Report (attached) that shows the real deck plate reality of these NRF FFGs. I found many other reports stating the scenario I was dealing with 18-23 my formative years, still thinking I will be married have kids have a great career the American Dream!!! I just graduated Meritorious Bootcamp Greatlakes 1994!! I was a varsity high school letterman, proud and ready, logical, and full of military bearing, with attention to detail. All I needed was great leadership from there!!!
Maybe you are aware of this!
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/US%20Navy%20Regulations/Chapter%208%20-%20The%20Commanding%20Officer.pdf
Chapter 8
THE COMMANDING OFFICER
0820. Welfare of Personnel.
Section 1. Commanding Officers in General
b. maintain a satisfactory state of health
and physical fitness of the personnel under his or
her command;
You are the commanding officer I could never talk with as I was not feeling well and confused to say the least due stressors unique to the NRF FFG I was assigned, and maybe it was a systemic problem as the NAVY IG stated 1995 and 1998 as you will see below, or it was exacerbated by the ships command, but me being a junior enlisted with this issue to deal with formulate my life around was feeling the affects deeply physically mentally. Your history I deeply respect and my father's memory RIP is even brought up you will see why. My father I found out 2005, after I was discharged 2002, an actual Army 11 Light Infantry Brigade Soldier Vietnam 66-68, who was too injured due incapacitation to raise me, VA documents would confirm. I can not match wits with a Vietnam Combat Service Member. I can only imagine being and giving all in dangerous things I felt overwhelmed by on the ship and feeling out of control due lack of experience and training for years and it ate at me literally, not to mention the full time master chief kicked my A-- in the forward locker and threatened my career, due my depression at sea feeling unstable, a uniform issue as I recall started it, and well inexperienced, as this e9 should of gathered, me just part time on the ship, and all together which prompted my Navy ARmy Transfer to save myself
I understand your service was from 1964s to 1989 right before the first gulf war, and during the cold war Navy Ship Build up to nearly 600 ships!!. I started 18 yo 1994 smack dab in the middle of a force draw down bases being closed ships being decommissioned. So you will see below 1995 and 1998 the NRF Ships I was on the NAVY IG investigated and reported as being “systemically weak training administration”. How was I to survive this? They never say bootcamp was “systematically weak in training and administration” when they teach you in daily interaction with the command leadership courage honor dedication to follow orders and risk all for your own country.
I joined the Navy Honorably with no connection still to my father. I had great ambition to be an officer, then have a career of service successfully in the police or firefighter, never homeless and my mom RIP younger sister and brother worried deeply about me as I really started getting a psychiatric problem that stopped even a Navy Army Transfer. THE SAM Enlistment gave me a direct shot to get in and started. Now, 2019, I want to know how I went from a Meritorious Bootcamp Graduate 1994 assigned to a FFG 1994-1999 attempting a Permanently Medically Disqualified Navy Army Transfer 1998 Honorable Discharge 2002 and a suicide hospital SSDI for Psych affective year 2005. This SAM enlistment hindered me so much that I could not even go the VA without stoppages denials of services and benefits specifically because of the SAM Enlistment was created not to end up with enough active duty days to qualify, no matter what command I was in and what I experienced, as if I did not exist at all, that is how it felt. I gave my all to an enlistment that was not even recognized as a veteran, and therefore all the liability of chronic injury was passed through to me, being cycled on and off guided missile frigates, turned on and turned off, for 5 years to start my adulthood. You will see that
1990
DOD Total Force Policy Interim Report
"Use of Reserve Volunteers has tended to work well for unit or individual missions that do not require close, intra-unit coordination. It has been less effective in force elements such as ground combat units or ship crews, where unit training and cohesiveness is more important."
Navy IG states the ships I’m on I am experiencing systemic weakness in training and administration
1995 5040.1
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1998 5040.1A
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401A.PDF
Department of Navy
Subject: Reserve Administration and Training Evaluation (RATE) Program
4. Background
“The Rate Program was initiated in response to Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships
SELRES Personnel assigned must be ready to mobilize on short notice and, as a result, be maintained at the highest state of readiness.”
I enlisted 1994 in SAM Enlistment. Its a 8 Yr Obligated Enlistment. I was recruited with inventive to be an officer by 22 attending college after bootcamp which I graduated Meritoritorious. I just became aware of the force drawdown and its era affects as well.
1994 DOD Manpower Requirement Reports state the Navy Manpower listed below, and the end of the SAM enlistment also below.
CHAPTER IV
NAVY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. General
This chapter outlines the Navy's requirements for active,reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1992 through FY 1994.
Further, it reviews the Navy's initiatives and programs geared to meet the challenge of maintaining their readiness posture within the context of a more fiscally constrained environment.
The Navy must be able to fill key positions to perform its mission successfully and safely. Therefore, the recruiting and retention of high caliber officer and enlisted personnel to man our technologically-sophisticated Navy remains a top priority. Retention of experienced enlisted personnel during force drawdown will require stable levels of compensation, continued advancement opportunity and an acceptable quality of life for both the sailor and his/her family.
Navy Manpower
Active
480,800
Reserve
113,400
SAM Sea Air Mariner
893
Civilian
250,800
“The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel. An offshoot of this program, Sea and AirMariner II (SAM II), was developed specifically to place individuals serving two years on Initial Active Duty Training, onboard FFT 1052class ships. With the cancelation of the FFT program, the SAM II program draws down in FY 1994.”
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
1995 LCDR Rossi Navy War College Report
“”"Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF)."
As the military forces of the 1990's "rightsize", the
importance of the reserve force's contribution within each
service component cannot be overstated. In a recent message to
the entire Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Boorda,
proclaimed:
"In the smaller Navy of today and in the future, it takes
everything and everybody working together to accomplish the
mission. 1994 was full of examples with daily contributions
by reservists (seabees, frigates, logistics and tactical
aircraft, medical intelligence and more) working side by
side with Active counterparts"
The post-Vietnam military would be shaped around a Total
Force Policy which called for the integration of the National
Guard and Reserve with active forces.5
Both the economy and public opinion demanded an end to the
massive levees experienced under Selective Service. The
logical replacement for conscription was a smaller, more
professional "all volunteer" force supplemented by well
trained, fully supported Reserves during national
emergencies.6
On top of
this minimum manning policy imposed upon the entire FFG-7 class
of ships, the active duty crew permanently assigned to NRF FFGs
is manned to only 70% of the Active Force FFG's manning
allowance. The following table illustrates the differences in
manning levels:14
This significant lack of team training is further
exasperated by the fact rarely, if ever, are 100% of the NRF
FFG's Selres billets filled. These training problems caused one
NRF FFG commanding officer to comment:
"My experience was that, during 27 months in command, I
never had more than 50% of my assigned Selres on board for
an ACDUTRA [two week, active duty training] period. ...the
typical NRF FFG never has the opportunity to conduct
intensive underway training with the entire crew on board.
The result is that the ship cannot train the various teams
required to carry out their wartime missions. Even worse,
typically, there is insufficient training time to ensure
that the individual reservists complete the qualifications
expected of active duty crew members in their ratings and
paygrades. "22
It is amazing these ships get underway and accomplish what they
do with the reduced active duty manning level and sporadic Selres
total component training they must endure.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct
corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.
Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive. Currently, a
successful Selres training period could be defined as individual
selected reservists completing 15 points of the Personnel
Qualification Standard (PQS) for one watch station during a
weekend training period.26 PQS is certainly one fleet - wide
measure of effectiveness. However, no single ship or sailor's
effectiveness is measured by PQS accomplishment alone. Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
15
CONCLUSION
"I maintain, based on 27 months in command of one, that the
NRF FFGs are not, and should not be expected to be, fully
combat ready for immediate deployment into a high threat
area, under the present "system". Our manning and
employment policies are detrimental to their wartime combat
readiness. They will never be equal to their active sisterships
immediately upon mobilization because the selected
reservists (SELRES) portion of the crew receives neither the
quantity nor the quality of training received by their
active duty counterparts, neither as part of the "team" nor
as individual crewmembers. "30
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
A ship is an independent, self-sustaining city which
requires, not only the complete integration of its crew, but the
coordinated orchestration of qualified professionals to sustain
safe and effective operations at sea. Navy manning doctrine
directs the assignment of only the minimum number of men and
women to ships in specific ratings and billets required to
provide each ship with the opportunity to succeed at sea. In
short, there is very little room for unqualified or untrained
sailors at sea. So why then do we man 16 of the 51 ships in the
FFG-7 class to only 70% of their allotted manning and say, if
needed in a time of national crisis, we will augment these crews
with quality personnel who have less than 24 days of integrated
team training each year?””
AH
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0
0
0
Sounds to me like you brought a lot of this on yourself, sailor. First of all, all I'm hearing is "poor me", secondly, there are motion sickness pills available from sickbay. That solves sea sickness. Also there are libraries full of books for quals. All it takes is effort and desire to succeed to advance. Otherwise, seek a medical discharge and get in contact with the VA. The military is there to help you achieve your goals, not to babysit and wipe butts and noses.
(0)
(0)
PO3 Aaron Hassay
---Found links about the the start and end of the NRF Frigates and the SAM Sea Air Mariner enlistment in the same Government report.--
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
---- In 1994 18 yo I enlisted with a SAM enlistment based on a $4000 to go to college to become an officer
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/CNRF/11004A.PDF
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMNAVRESFORINST 1100.4A
O9 FEB 1994
Subj: ENLISTED NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
4. SAM Educational Assistance Payments. Individuals who are a secondary school graduate and completed IADT, including rate training or sufficient training to be deployable are entitled to initial and subsequent Educational Assistance. Payment cannot exceed $1,000 in any 12 month period based on the enlistment anniversary date) or a total of $4,000. Payment. is for educational expenses (tuition, fees, books, laboratory fees and shop fees for consumable material used as part of classroom or shop instruction) incurred by members at accredited institutions until they complete a course of instruction required for the award of up to a baccalaureate degree, or the equivalent evidence of study completed in a nondegree program. Members are reimbursed when they submit documentation described in paragraph 5 below.
-----This report says that 1994 there were less then 1000 SAM's in all the Navy and the SAM enlistment was being drawn down
https://archive.org/stream/DTIC_ADA267828/DTIC_ADA267828_djvu.txt
Manpower Requirements Report FY 1994
Department of Defense
Manpower
Requirements Report
FY1994
SAM 1/ (0.6)
The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel.
——-The Navy IG said my ships were systemically weak in training and administration. Would it be any wonder now looking back that I instinctually attempted a Navy Army transfer that was medically disqualified by MEPS off the ship when I was 22. Of course i did not know then that the IG was reporting this.
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assign responsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES) components in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components fell outside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspections and, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight of the administration and training of the SELRES component.
---This XO report tells the real story of a NRF FFG. What is you are 18 in this command?
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
Tell the Truth: Can the Operational Commander Rely ... - dtic.milapps.dtic.mil › dtic › fulltext
PDF
by TM Rossi - 1995 - Related articles
Nov 9, 1995 - TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE ... LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN. 13a. ... The NRF FFG is currently prohibited from participating in.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
----This report states the cost savings that the NRF FFG was created
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cash outlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged $3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savings of 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA586968.pdf
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4945271/
Medical Readiness of the
Reserve Component
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Expenses Incurred by Members to Become Medically Ready
The second potential obstacle to the RCs’ reaching their IMR goals is that reservists have been
required to pay some of their medical and dental treatment costs. As shown in Table 3.6 (and
discussed earlier), the military pays for the annual PHA review but does not pay for any treatment
indicated by the review. Some DLCs resolve themselves with time (e.g., broken bones,
pregnancy), but reservists must pay for treatment of those that do not (such as hypertension
and diabetes). Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists. Currently, the Army Reserve has
enough FY 2010 funding to pay for annual dental exams and treatments by RHRP civilian
dentists for members in dental class 3.22 But since much of the increased FY 2009 and FY 2010
funding comes from Overseas Contingenecy Operations (OCO) supplemental funds and thus
is subject to being reduced in the future, these payments for dental services may be short lived.
No funding exists for preventive dental care, such as annual teeth cleaning (prophylaxis), fluoride
treatment, and periodontal care.
---Just 2 years after being class 1 dental in bootcamp, I was class 3 for dental and had to pay for my own dental and had no insurance to maintain it, the dental the ship required. The active duty SN did not have to pay for their own medical care assigned to the same ship. My dental has all failed since. The fillings they required me to get. Abscesses and teeth loss as each filling would fail individually.
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
---- In 1994 18 yo I enlisted with a SAM enlistment based on a $4000 to go to college to become an officer
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/CNRF/11004A.PDF
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMNAVRESFORINST 1100.4A
O9 FEB 1994
Subj: ENLISTED NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
4. SAM Educational Assistance Payments. Individuals who are a secondary school graduate and completed IADT, including rate training or sufficient training to be deployable are entitled to initial and subsequent Educational Assistance. Payment cannot exceed $1,000 in any 12 month period based on the enlistment anniversary date) or a total of $4,000. Payment. is for educational expenses (tuition, fees, books, laboratory fees and shop fees for consumable material used as part of classroom or shop instruction) incurred by members at accredited institutions until they complete a course of instruction required for the award of up to a baccalaureate degree, or the equivalent evidence of study completed in a nondegree program. Members are reimbursed when they submit documentation described in paragraph 5 below.
-----This report says that 1994 there were less then 1000 SAM's in all the Navy and the SAM enlistment was being drawn down
https://archive.org/stream/DTIC_ADA267828/DTIC_ADA267828_djvu.txt
Manpower Requirements Report FY 1994
Department of Defense
Manpower
Requirements Report
FY1994
SAM 1/ (0.6)
The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel.
——-The Navy IG said my ships were systemically weak in training and administration. Would it be any wonder now looking back that I instinctually attempted a Navy Army transfer that was medically disqualified by MEPS off the ship when I was 22. Of course i did not know then that the IG was reporting this.
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assign responsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES) components in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components fell outside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspections and, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight of the administration and training of the SELRES component.
---This XO report tells the real story of a NRF FFG. What is you are 18 in this command?
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293960.pdf
Tell the Truth: Can the Operational Commander Rely ... - dtic.milapps.dtic.mil › dtic › fulltext
by TM Rossi - 1995 - Related articles
Nov 9, 1995 - TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE ... LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN. 13a. ... The NRF FFG is currently prohibited from participating in.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
----This report states the cost savings that the NRF FFG was created
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cash outlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged $3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savings of 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA586968.pdf
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4945271/
Medical Readiness of the
Reserve Component
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Expenses Incurred by Members to Become Medically Ready
The second potential obstacle to the RCs’ reaching their IMR goals is that reservists have been
required to pay some of their medical and dental treatment costs. As shown in Table 3.6 (and
discussed earlier), the military pays for the annual PHA review but does not pay for any treatment
indicated by the review. Some DLCs resolve themselves with time (e.g., broken bones,
pregnancy), but reservists must pay for treatment of those that do not (such as hypertension
and diabetes). Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists. Currently, the Army Reserve has
enough FY 2010 funding to pay for annual dental exams and treatments by RHRP civilian
dentists for members in dental class 3.22 But since much of the increased FY 2009 and FY 2010
funding comes from Overseas Contingenecy Operations (OCO) supplemental funds and thus
is subject to being reduced in the future, these payments for dental services may be short lived.
No funding exists for preventive dental care, such as annual teeth cleaning (prophylaxis), fluoride
treatment, and periodontal care.
---Just 2 years after being class 1 dental in bootcamp, I was class 3 for dental and had to pay for my own dental and had no insurance to maintain it, the dental the ship required. The active duty SN did not have to pay for their own medical care assigned to the same ship. My dental has all failed since. The fillings they required me to get. Abscesses and teeth loss as each filling would fail individually.
Ï¿^Ì9Ã.@Pè0fG§ÛKÊ-yZWëÚÚÐ=«DÐRÊ\}GëË(¿P;ü.åã]}kéäµ|wGb1òF¿1æGË4ðüõxãüÐÅ;ó7ë7!íêÆ0íX@Ý@ãÚS4}Ï« véë*=ÇÇiùyÐÊ@TeÅI9]gî)OTNÛùëk¡õÊú6»ÏS.ô«ÕóÐêþSKaÜã·:ƶe\Ý7óÜæ1ë§ûê6ATjcãñàhoèïemïêÛ)ôûmn[ÆòíëÏeü-¶öïþµî-b8öñögßèâCõu.zlÍâPFýÚ_D3ÍE4fÊÃ$CsS¿05Þzlcsß(µu ÙÐà]äø'\Å7X1è!XC3i MY%nBô48r8:VfËJA=`xÉåReÊMÚRm4Å}»Ìñ-æc8=Î#éÔz»¶üÑmÑ=Å Cy8jCÿkÈ~ákTµ§ïÏñX¿_G4ÿãñF~Hrmb+ zvn%¶øÒÇGzÝp]êUÚX:ékGPÉ`1îÆuÒâîz0\!µãZY,m^emBíÉwëâÚ s_BÚ#/%ÙwäKÖ^ÖÇþµ â@#I1ÓXj7æ çÁ%)ÃQL_82:s8ñS...
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PO3 Aaron Hassay
I ended up in a suicide hospital and had to like rebuild and figure out why. I found these reports. I was meritorious bootcamp graduate. But to be assigned to a FFG with this SAM enlistment which I now find it extremely rare, possibly the rarest combo ever known, would have such a casualty rate, that it is no wonder why the command and the actual enlistment are no longer
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0
0
0
Oh you must be a Millenial. I have never heard this on the 3 ships I was on. Grow up and man up sailor
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