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In a attempt to understand my medical history and my permanent medical disqualification at MEPS to transfer to the Army off these ships, I find one more report, created at the Navy War College report
TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE’S SURFACE ASSETS?
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE’S SURFACE ASSETS?
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
structure.
a293960.pdf
Posted from apps.dtic.mil
Posted 3 y ago
Responses: 1
Posted 3 y ago
I was involved in the reorganization to enact the "total force concept" in the 80s. While the concept that bringing a previously qualified SelRes back to fully qualified takes less time than training a raw recruit is valid, the impact of removing individuals from SelRes for mobilization is sometimes severe to the family and companies that are in the defense industries. In most cases, the problems would be better handled in a general mobilization. The entire program was meant to be a money saver, but the impact on individuals and their families is sometimes severe.
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PO3 Aaron Hassay
3 y
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1984_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-151113-310
Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
to the Congress
on the
FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and
FY 1984-88 Defense Programs February 1, 1983
c. Force Composition
By the end of FY 1984, our planned land force structure will consist of 29 divisions: 19 active divisions (16 Army and 3 Marine Corps) and 10 Reserve Component divisions (9 Army and 1 Marine Corps). These divisions (about 18,000 men each), supplemented by separate nondivisional brigades and regiments (4,000-5,000 men each), form the cutting edge of our land forces. They are supported by a wide variety of active and reserve units and are backed by an extensive training and support base.
Our active forces continue to rely on the Reserve Components to achieve their full combat potential. Of our 19 active divisions, 10 will require roundout by reserve combat battalions and brigades to reach their full complement. In addition, a large number of service support units needed for early deployment of the active force are also in the Reserve Components.
Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
to the Congress
on the
FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and
FY 1984-88 Defense Programs February 1, 1983
c. Force Composition
By the end of FY 1984, our planned land force structure will consist of 29 divisions: 19 active divisions (16 Army and 3 Marine Corps) and 10 Reserve Component divisions (9 Army and 1 Marine Corps). These divisions (about 18,000 men each), supplemented by separate nondivisional brigades and regiments (4,000-5,000 men each), form the cutting edge of our land forces. They are supported by a wide variety of active and reserve units and are backed by an extensive training and support base.
Our active forces continue to rely on the Reserve Components to achieve their full combat potential. Of our 19 active divisions, 10 will require roundout by reserve combat battalions and brigades to reach their full complement. In addition, a large number of service support units needed for early deployment of the active force are also in the Reserve Components.
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