5 ‘big ideas’ to guide us in the Long War against Islamic extremism

All this seems true enough to me. Identifying insurgents who are indistinguishable from noncombatants. Winning hearts and minds. Wait! Where have I heard all this before?

Thanks for sharing COL Mikel J. Burroughs My comments are in [brackets]
[ without precise knowledge of which members are rank and file and which are leaders we would run the risk of what happened in Europe when we had a million or so soldiers in Germany instead of thousands we could be expected to have in Iraq. Since Iraq was hobbled together by the Balfour commission it includes groups that don't get along and have allegiances outside the nation - Shia to Iran and Kurds to Kurdistan which is still a dream

1st, it is increasingly apparent that ungoverned spaces in a region stretching from West Africa through the Middle East and into Central Asia will be exploited by Islamic extremists who want to establish sanctuaries in which they can enforce their extremist version of Islam and from which they can conduct terrorist attacks.
[Not all ungoverned spaces are equally important to ISIS, al Qaeda. Understanding their values would help determine which ungoverned spaces are important to the from an operational or strategic perspective.]
2nd, it is also apparent that the attacks and other activities of such extremists will not be confined to the areas or regions in which they are located. Rather, as in the case of Syria, the actions of the extremist groups are likely to spew instability, extremism, violence and refugees far beyond their immediate surroundings, posing increasingly difficult challenges for our partners in the region, our European allies and even our homeland. [this point is not very helpful. Granted it would be hard for them to say that wherever Muslims settle in large numbers is a breeding ground this Wahhabi terror to take root and expand from.]
3rd, it is also increasingly clear that, in responding to these challenges, U.S. leadership is imperative. If the United States does not lead, it is unlikely that another country will. Moreover, at this point, no group of other countries can collectively approach U.S. capabilities. This does not mean that the United States needs to undertake enormous efforts to counter extremist groups in each case. To the contrary, the United States should do only what is absolutely necessary, and we should do so with as many partners as possible. Churchill was right when he observed, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” And, if one of those partners wants to walk point — such as France in Mali — we should support it, while recognizing that we still may have to contribute substantially Partners from the Islamic world are of particular importance. Indeed, they have huge incentives to be involved, as the ongoing struggles are generally not clashes between civilizations. Rather, what we are seeing is more accurately a clash within a civilization, that of the Islamic world. And no leaders have more to lose should extremism gather momentum than those of predominantly Islamic states.
[ We do have stable allies in the Islamic World - Turkey is part of NATO but the Erdogan government is opposed to much of what we want to do especially involving the Kurds. Egypt has gone back and forth. The Obama administration support for Arab spring turned our new ally Libya into a terror hotbed. We have pumped billions in our relation with Saudi Arabia yet the Saudi leadership does not have control of all its assets. Jordan is potentially useful]
4th, it is becoming clear that the path the United States and coalition partners pursue has to be comprehensive and not just a narrow counter-terrorism approach. It is increasingly apparent that more than precision strikes and special operations raids are needed. This does not mean that the United States has to provide the conventional ground forces, conduct the political reconciliation component or undertake the nation-building tasks necessary in such cases. In Iraq at present, for example, it is clear that the Iraqis not only should provide those components, but also that they have to do so for the results achieved — with considerable help from the U.S.-led coalition — to be sustainable.
[Coherent strategy was not something that the Obama administration ever seemed to grasp in the Middle East, north Africa nd south west Asia. Hopefully the next POTUS will have a better sense of that area.]
5th, and finally, it is clear that the U.S.-led effort will have to be sustained for what may be extended periods of time — and that reductions in our level of effort should be guided by conditions on the ground rather than fixed timetables. While aspirational timelines for reductions in our efforts may have some merit, it is clear from our experiences under both post-9/11 administrations that premature transitions and drawdowns can result in loss of the progress for which we sacrificed greatly — and may result in having to return to a country to avoid a setback to U.S. interests.
[It makes sense if we are committed to a 50 to one year process to help a thousands of year old culture transform into a Republic. This is not a short term mission with a fixed timetable. We achieved this in Germany and Japan in about 10 years and stayed on for decades longer.]

The last point is where Obama failed both Iraq and the U.S.