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Please consider this is a MISHAP case study, I put together, to investigate and solve occupational operational illness injury casualties
Case Subject:
18 yo Former High School Varsity Athlete Meritorious Bootcamp Graduate
22 yo Navy Army Transfer attempt medically permanently disqualified for Spine Musculoskeletal Psych at MEPS
These are excerpts from nearly 23 reports found online for examination
I can guarantee you personally don't want to be in a command at 18, that you later find multiple reports, stating things like this,
“Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept”
“systemic weakness in training and administration.”
“operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives.”
Would this explain your ill fated Navy Army Transfer, at 22? Should not MEPS look into what command you were attempting to transfer from?
((REPORT 1))
Naval War College
Newport R.I.
TELL THE TRUTH! CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE”S SURFACE ASSETS?
Conclusion
“I maintain based on 27 months in command of one, that the NRF FFGs are not, and should not be expected to be, fully combat ready for immediate deployment into a high threat area, under the present “system”. Our manning and employment policies are detrimental to their wartime combat readiness. They will never be equal to their active sister ships immediately upon mobilization because the selected reservists (SELRES) portion of the crew receives neither the quantity nor the quality of training received by their active duty counterparts, neither as port of the ‘team” nore as individual crewmembers.”
((Report (1) review What might happen to a 18 year old SELRES assigned to NRF FFG experiencing? ))
(Report 2)
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
((Report (2) Question. What kind of double talk is this "well orchestrated" "discontinuity" sending straight into a dark dark spot? “MOST” What if you are not “Most” on the ship? Can you imagine any leader, coach, or teacher putting a program together, this training, without even contemplating mishap injury or illness, by assigning a bright eyed logical young man, ready for the world in his teens to experience high school varsity sports, or bootcamp, or college, or as crew to a Navy combat ship with the following parameters ``Training for individual....must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity.”? You at 18 had no active duty experience, and over 5 years assigned, blanked out, with a sea service ribbon, amazingly in shock, at the VA, would not even get enough active duty time for VA recognition as a veteran for veteran purposes. )
((Report 3))
<<This Reports broadly explains both the beginning and end of the NRF and the SAM Enlistment.>>
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
<<Here is the Military Law USCode for the SAM Enlistment, a 8 Yr MSO>>
10 USC 511(d)
“The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program. The SAM program is a non-prior service mandatory drilling program. Personnel who enlist in the SAM Program, under authority of 10 USC 511(d) incur a 8 yr MSO Military Service Obligation. They must drill continuously in the selective reserve (SELRES) for 6 of the 8 years. The mandatory continuous 6 year period begins the day the member reports for recruit training.
My name
Aaron, the High Priest
Moses's brother helped lead the Israelites to freedom.
Aaron
(a) (1397-1273 BCE) Son of Amram and Jochebed, brother of Miriam and Moses. Moses’ partner and spokesman in his mission to free the Israelites from Egypt. First High Priest and patriarch of the Priestly Family. A man who loved peace and always sought to bring conflicting parties to reconciliation. Died in the desert, shortly before the Israelites entered Canaan. (b) A common Jewish name.
First off I have always known I have a judeo christian heritage and name Aaron
I am
“A man who loved peace and always sought to bring conflicting parties to reconciliation”
(( Report 4 ))
<< SAM enlistment for $4000 to fund an entire 4 year degree. At 18 I signed everything. I thought it was something similar to ROTC except I would go to bootcamp first >>
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/CNRF/11004A.PDF
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMNAVRESFORINST 1100.4A O9 FEB 1994
Subj:ENLISTED NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
4. SAM Educational Assistance Payments. Individuals who are a secondary school graduate and completed IADT, including rate training or sufficient training to be deployable are entitled to initial and subsequent Educational Assistance. Payment cannot exceed $1,000 in any 12 month period based on the enlistment anniversary date) or a total of $4,000. Payment. is for educational expenses (tuition, fees, books, laboratory fees and shop fees for consumable material used as part of classroom or shopinstruction) incurred by members at accredited institutions until they complete a course of instruction required for the award of up to a baccalaureate degree, or the equivalent evidence of study completed in a non degree program. Members are reimbursed when they submit documentation described in paragraph 5 below.
(( Report 5 ))
<< 1997 summits are being held to discuss a reservist and healthcare and va status, which was basically nothing, no VA status or healthcare insurance access, for my SAM enlistment package. I had already been assigned to a ship for 3 years, with no health care access or va support >>
https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=41152
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, Nov. 24, 1997
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen said Nov. 18 the summit will address the full spectrum of health care issues, entitlements and legislative policies affecting the readiness of reserve components in the post-Cold War world.
In Phase I, slated for late November in Washington, summit participants will evaluate prevailing laws and policy relating to reserve component health care.
Participants will identify legislative and policy changes necessary to ensure members of the reserve components receive health care benefits that are consistent with the increased reliance on today's reserve force.
"We have a vested interest in the health readiness of our reserve component personnel," said Dr. Ed Martin, acting assistant secretary of defense for health affairs.
Beginning late December, the second phase of the summit will address incapacitation and disability issues. In mid-January 1998, the third phase will address reserve component access to VA benefits and programs.
Recognizing the increased reliance on the reserve components in recent years, Cohen said, "We must ensure their medical readiness to achieve a truly integrated total force. I am pleased that this summit is a partnership effort - with the DoD, the private sector and VA all working together."
(from a DoD release)
Contact Author
(( Report 6 ))
<< Navy War College report shows duplication cost of surface commands actually eliminates the savings of the 80/20 undermanning active duty ships and putting them in the Naval Reserve >>
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF)
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. TOTAL SAVINGS
The bottom line is that sending an FFG from the Active
Fleet to the Naval Reserve Force saves about $979,000 per year, or about 6.1% of all operating and support costs.
A. THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE
The primary mission of the U. S. Navy is to conduct sustained combat operations at sea in support of American national interests under Title 10 of the U. S. Code. The mission of the Naval Reserve under 10 USC 262 is to provide trained units and qualified personnel to augment the Active Fleet in time of war, national emergency and at such other times as national security requires.
Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cash outlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged$3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savingsof 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).
The Naval Reserve surface program has allowed the Navy to have a slightly larger Order of Battle, but at acost of reduced readiness for 14 to 16 ships, and with significantly fewer deployable assets.
From these savings one would have to deduct any cost of duplication between active and reserve areas. To quote from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
We found areas of active and reserve forces that, if eliminated, better integrate the Total Force and preserve robust combat capabilities at lower cost. One such example is the parallel headquarters structures in the active and reserve components... In the Navy, there is a Commander, Naval Reserve Force; A Commander, Naval Air Reserve; and a Commander, Naval Surface Reserve, each
with a headquarters staff duplicating the functions of
one another and of the Active Navy component."
By being in the business of operating surface ships, the Naval Reserve is forced to duplicate staff functions of the Active Navy. The costs of operating headquarters staff is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it could cut considerably into the $18M-44M savings achieved at the shipboard level by the NRF FFG program.
(( Report 7 ))
<< These 1975 (7) and 1976 (8) Reports “Total Force” Policy developing integrating young non-prior reserve enlisted and the “potential problems” with the Navy 80/20 “test” >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA032080.pdf
1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
Manpower and recruiting problems also directly affected readiness as well as impacting on training through increased requirements for retraining or for initial skill qualification. Since the outset of the no-draft era, we have had to rely to a great extent on veteran volunteers to meet our strength needs.
Although the recruiting of veterans has allowed us to meet our goals, over-dependence on veterans has some problems. SInce veterans come to the Reserve with their specialties already determined by prior training and experience, the ability to manage the specialties of personnel to match specific mobilization billet requirements is reduced because of geographic locations. In addition, large imputes of veterans increased the average grade and longevity of our manpower, resulting in higher pay costs. These were offset to some extent by reduction in the necessity to provide lengthy periods of initial training. As a result we have reached a point where we must now place greater emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior service personnel.
Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other then a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as encouragement to our allies.
This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the “Total Force Policy” in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The “Total Force Policy” dictates that all available forces—U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies—would be considered in determining the Defense needs to most future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
(( Report 8 ))
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417
1976 Annual Defense Department Report
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
(( Report 9 ))
<< Navy Health Research Studies on occupational injuries of FFG ship crew >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a213071.pdf
Search Results
Web results
Sleep Problems, Health Symptoms, and Tension ... - dtic.mil
Naval Health Research Center.
Approach
A cross-sectional sample of officers' and enlisted personnel aboard nine
U.S. .Navy combatant ships vas surveyed. Shiptypes included tvo Guided Missile
Cruisers (CGs), five Minesweepers (MSOs), one Guided Missile Frigate (FFG),
and one Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD).
Tension/Anxiety
Overall, tension/anxiety levels of the cross-sectional sample appeared to
be within normal limits. However, Junior enlisted personnel (El to E3) reported
greater subjective tension/anxiety than higher paygrade personnel.
This result may have been a reflection of the relative inexperience of these
sailors in extended at-sea operations and the potentially hostile environment.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a224791.pdf
Physical and Psychological Effects of Sustained Shipboard ...
Study Subjects
The subject population was comprised of officers and enlisted crew from
two U.S. Navy ships, a frigate (FFG) and a guided missile cruiser (CG).
Crewmen aboard
the FFG experienced significantly more psychological fatigue. Although not
statistically significant (t = 1.85, p = 0.070), personnel aboard the FFG
also reported more problems with physical fatigue than personnel aboard the
CG.
A more likely explanation is the fact that due to fewer staff, personnel
aboard the FFG were required to spend longer periods of time on watchstanding
duty. Thus, the FFG presented fewer opportunities for prolonged rest
periods. The CG, on the other hand, had three different watch sections. As
noted elsewhere (Congleton, Englund, Hodgdon, Palinkas, Armstrong, and
Kelleher, 1988), crewmen aboard the FFG also reported shorter and more
fragmented sleep periods. In addition, the FFG had undergone a series of GQ
drills prior to entering the operational area which further fatigued its
crew.
(( Report 10 ))
<< 1998 Navy Analysis reports “Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420 , 1988 )” >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA257555.pdf
NAVAL RESERVE: AN ORGANIZATION IN TRANSITION
by
Richard Charles Mazza
Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve
B.A., Boston State College, 1978
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issues facing the Naval Reserve as
it transitions from its cold war mission to new and, possibly, expanded roles under the
New National Military Strategy.
A. MANAGEMENT
In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve. The CINCPACFLT
Det 420 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.
The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420, 1988)
The MAT found that there was a prevailing failure to
comply with CNAVRES policy throughout the Naval Reserve.
Equally as serious as this non-compliance was the toleration
of willful non-compliance. Organizational disconnects, as
well as a lack of standardized command selection criteria,
were noted as a contributory factor in the observed widespread
lack of leadership.
The lack of organizational vigor in the Naval Reserve was
attributed to the double and triple hatting of commanders at
various echelons of command.
Numerous violations of the traditional notion of chain of
command were noted in which clear lines of authority and
responsibility were diffused through a myriad of "stove pipe"
commands within the Naval Reserve. The lack of
standardization of command authority and responsibility was
contrary to established Navy policy and tradition.
Fragmentation and rivalries between different segments of
the Naval Reserve has led to a breakdown of the traditional
concept of teamwork. This fragmentation has led to localized
politicalization of various reserve commands in which policies
and directives are promulgated that are not necessarily
consistent with the mission of the Naval Reserve.
The MAT also noted a consistent lack of completed staff
work among the various levels of the Naval Reserve. Although
the MAT could not pin down the exact cause, it was speculated
that poor morale could be the cause of poor staffwork or that
poor staffwork could be a factor in poor morale. Poor
staffwork prior to the establishment of significant changes in
reserve policy or command authority has, in the past, led to
unnecessary administrative duplication, and prolonged
confusion over lines of legitimate command authority and
responsibility.
b. Personnel/Mobilization
In the early 1970's, the Naval Reserve began a major
effort to align Naval Reserre units with active force
commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve
units with active components was an effort to
institutionalize the "one Navy" concept originally envisioned
under the Total Force Concept. Naval surface reserve force
ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for
operational control. For non-hardware or augment units, this
was the beginning of the gaining command concept presently in
place.
Under the gaining command concept, training and
mobilization standards were developed and implemented through
input received from the active forces. Although not formally
institutionalized, direct or mutual support to active commands
greatly increased to the point where many essential warfare
and support functions are now carried out by the Naval
Reserve. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)
(( Report 11 ))
<<1995 and 1998 Navy IG is reporting “systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships >>
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1995 5040.1
1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assign responsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES)components in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components fell outside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspectionsand, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight of the administration and training of the SELRES component.
(( Report 11a)
1998 5040.1A
Subject: Reserve Administration and Training Evaluation (RATE) Program
4. Background
The Rate Program was initiated in response to Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships
SELRES Personnel assigned must be ready to mobilize on short notice and, as a result, be maintained at the highest state of readiness.”
(( Report 12 ))
<< 1997 Navy Surface Training Instructions that have a small chapter that discusses a reservist and how they must match the full time guys qualifications >>
1997 Department of Navy
3502.1B Surface Master Training Plan
1205. Training Philosophy. The Naval Surface Reserve Force is primarily focused on requirements-based training. Per. OPNAVINST 1001.21.A These training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties.
Implementing the Naval Surface Reserve Force training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force. Drill Limitations
Drill Limitations. Reserve Training is limited and must be used to maximize mobilization readiness.
1303. Naval Reserve NRF Training Requirements. The specified wartime mission for NRF units requires that training requirements remain the same as for active duty counterparts to provide a benchmark for measuring the actual status of NRF readiness.
2101. Sources. As previously stated in paragraph 1201 of this instruction it is the mission of the Naval Reserve Force to provide trained and qualified personnel to active duty commands in the event of mobilization. Opnavinst 1001.21A requires that a reservist be assigned the same training requirements as their active duty counterpart performing the same duties. Therefore, a Reservist’s training requirements must mirror the watch station, work center, and skills maintenance training required by their active duty counterpart.
(( Report 13 ))
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1D CH1
14 Oct 08
126
b. Personnel Qualifications (NRF Ships). NRF ship Commanding Officers are to assign all primary crew SELRES to Condition I and III watch stations. SELRES will use PQS to train for final qualification
in these watch stations. Qualification time lines are as assigned by
the commanding officer, commensurate with drill and annual training time available, present ship's employment, prior active duty, and PQS qualifications documented in service record page 4's. Once PQS qualified for their Condition I and III assignments, SELRES may undertake other PQS, such as inport watch stations and ESWS. General DC and 3M qualifications should be accomplished early in the SELRES' tour of duty in conjunction with initial Condition I and III watch
station PQS. This watch station assignment/job accomplishment policy applies only to the NRF primary crew SELRES and not to the SELRES who perform one time annual training in support of fleet operations.
1504. Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Readiness Criteria. NRF units are generally tasked with the same training requirements as their active
duty counterparts. However, due to limited days underway with selected reservists embarked, and limited availability of inport trainers, these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control. Accordingly, NRF units may complete the advanced unit phase of training without achieving C1/M1 readiness in all primary mission areas. The mission area readiness ratings listed in Figure 151 specifically
prescribe the minimum acceptable standards for NRF units at the end of advanced training and during repetitive (proficiency) training.
(( Report 14 ))
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
Selected Reservists are organized into units with specific mobilization billets, generally onboard active commands
(“gaining commands”)
1502. Training Philosophy. A primary objective in the training of the SELRES is the integration of individuals and units with their active
duty counterparts.
To the maximum extent possible, commanding officers should work to foster a close working relationship with their counterpart
reserve units by frequently communicating with them, coordinating the embarkation/debarkation of reserve unit personnel, and developing tailored training programs designed to optimize limited reserve active
duty training and personnel qualification opportunities. To achieve
these goals, Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations. Standalone reserve units will work in close coordination with their ISICs and supported/supporting commanders. Training of reservists will be conducted per reference
(a).
a. Reserve Training Environment.
1. Inactive Duty Training (IDT) is accomplished two days per
month, usually on the weekend; Annual Training (AT) is accomplished two weeks per year.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
(( Report 15 ))
<< These NAVY reports review attempt to save money in the NRF FFG’s >>
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cash outlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged$3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savingsof 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).
(( Report 16 ))
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a218963.pdf
March 1987
Reserve Manning of FF-1052 and FFG-7 Class Frigates:
A Critique of the Accuracy and Completeness
of Existing Costing Studies
by
Patrick Robert Rearden
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1976
M.A., Pepperdine University, 1979
The purposes for this research have included:
1. To evaluate studies that have attempted to make a
cost analysis of either Regular Navy or Naval Reserve
Force ships.
2. To collect and analyze data related to the costs of
operating selected Regular Navy and NRF ships during
Fiscal Year 1986.
(( Report 17 ))
<< Another Navy Cost Report about the NRF FFG >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA294225.pdf
A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE FRIGATES
December, 1994
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5000
by
Jeffrey S. Davis
Lieutenant, United States Navy Reserve
B.A., University of California, Riverside, 1987
This thesis analyses the Naval Reserve Force Oliver Hazard Perry class (FFG-7) guided missile
frigates. It assesses the cost-effectiveness of operating these ships in the Naval Reserve fleet vice the
Active fleet.
The analysis then assesses the ship's operational
readiness by comparing the ships' performance on Combat System Assessments and the major engineering
exams. Following this, the quality of life on board the NRF FFGs is qualitatively evaluated. This analysis
concludes that using FFGs in the NRF is not the most cost-effective option. Alternative recommendations
are then provided for their more efficient use.
(( Report 18 ))
<< This Navy War Colllege Reported by an XO the head of training of a NRF FFG, give the deck plate reality >>
---This XO report tells the real story of a NRF FFG. What is you are 18 in this command?
TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE ... LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
Structure.
(( Report 19 ))
<< This next report shows a reservist has to pay for dental, even if they are young have no insurance, and assigned to a ship as I was. My dental fillings I was ordered to get has failed creating many medical problems without medical insurance >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA586968.pdf
Medical Readiness of the
Reserve Component
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Expenses Incurred by Members to Become Medically Ready
The second potential obstacle to the RCs’ reaching their IMR goals is that reservists have been
required to pay some of their medical and dental treatment costs. As shown in Table 3.6 (and
discussed earlier), the military pays for the annual PHA review but does not pay for any treatment
indicated by the review. Some DLCs resolve themselves with time (e.g., broken bones,
pregnancy), but reservists must pay for treatment of those that do not (such as hypertension
and diabetes). Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists. Currently, the Army Reserve has
enough FY 2010 funding to pay for annual dental exams and treatments by RHRP civilian
dentists for members in dental class 3.22 But since much of the increased FY 2009 and FY 2010
funding comes from Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) supplemental funds and thus
is subject to being reduced in the future, these payments for dental services may be short lived.
No funding exists for preventive dental care, such as annual teeth cleaning (prophylaxis), fluoride
treatment, and periodontal care.
(( Report 20 ))
<< Finally you get to the VA 2015. 2016 OSC reports Oakland VA had problems. I was denied every service of a veteran even a homeless housing voucher using my reserve enlistment as the reason for the numerous denails, without even a concept of a humanitarian waiver >>
https://www.disabledveterans.org/2016/10/14/osc-busts-oakland-va-regional-office-14000-claim-blunder/
VARO received an application in February 2006 from a veteran with Post‐Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which was not correctly processed for seven years and eight months.
In addition, the Oakland VARO’s recordkeeping was so poor that investigators could not find logs or spreadsheets tracking the number of unprocessed claims, thus hampering their ability to fully investigate the scope of the whistleblowers’ allegations. However, another recent VA investigation confirmed that Oakland VARO staff had not processed a “substantial amount” of claims dating back to the mid‐1990s.
(( Report 21 ))
https://www.disabledveterans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/161014-OSC-Press-Release.pdf
WASHINGTON, D.C./October 13, 2016 – In a letter sent to the White House and Congress today, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) reported that the Veterans Affairs Regional Office (VARO) in Oakland, California, failed to process veterans’ benefits claims accurately and in a timely manner. This delayed the accurate payment of benefits to veterans and their dependents, in some cases by years. Three Oakland VARO whistleblowers came to OSC with disclosures of the Oakland VARO’s deficiencies, prompting an investigation. Those whistleblowers are Rustyann Brown, a former claims assistant, Roselyn Tolliver, a veterans service representative, and Lydia Cheney, a veterans service representative.
“The whistleblowers performed a public service by bringing to light the severe delays in processing veterans benefit claims and deserve our gratitude,” said Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner. “These delays are particularly disturbing since the applicants are disabled veterans and their dependents. No veteran should have to wait years before receiving the benefits they are owed for their service to this nation.”
(( Report 22 ))
((The beginning. First to join the military at 18 you swear an oath to defend the constitution and go to bootcamp which creates a foundation to follow leaders and orders))
10 U.S.C. § 502 - U.S. Code - Unannotated Title 10. Armed
Forces § 502. Enlistment oath: who may administer
(a) Enlistment oath. --Each person enlisting in an armed force shall take the following oath:
“I, _______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.”
(( Report 23 ))
The U.S. Constitution: Preamble
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
(( Report 24 ))
(Interesting as it is, Congress has held committees to examine “Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel”)
1963 88th Congress Actually Debates “Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel”
PREFACE
No persons should be more entitled to protection of their constitutional rights than the servicemen engaged in protecting the sovereignty of the United States
(( Report 25 ))
<< This article written about me is better understood with all these reports I am finding that should all together explain my attempted Navy Army Medically Disqualified Transfer >>
The MISHAP report should answer how and why this story was written.
http://veteranscominghome.org/station_media/the-story-of-a-homeless-veteran-who-fell-through-the-cracks/
In Conclusion
That about wraps up all the information I can gather for a proper MISHAP Investigation.
Fully fund Operational Manpower and Save money somewhere else. You injure guys, dreams, ,families and ultimately pay more taxing the United States “We The People”
I fight like John Paul Jones to honor honor
I fight like John Paul Jones for the Constitution I Swore an Oath to Defend, and the “more perfect Union” “Justice” and “general welfare” the Constitution's Preamble discusses.
So what did John Paul Jones say?
John Paul Jones (6 July 1747 – 18 July 1792) was a Scottish American sailor and the United States' first well-known naval fighter in the American Revolutionary War, who said:
“I would lay down my life for America but I cannot trifle with my Honor.”
“I wish to have no connection with any ship that does not sail fast; for I intend to go in harm's way.”
"I have not yet begun to fight!" for the Constitions Preamble which I Swore an Oath to Defend “We the People of the United States...form a more perfect Union, establish Justice...insure domestic Tranquility...provide common defence...promote ...general Welfare...secure Blessings of Liberty...for the United States of America….
Case Subject:
18 yo Former High School Varsity Athlete Meritorious Bootcamp Graduate
22 yo Navy Army Transfer attempt medically permanently disqualified for Spine Musculoskeletal Psych at MEPS
These are excerpts from nearly 23 reports found online for examination
I can guarantee you personally don't want to be in a command at 18, that you later find multiple reports, stating things like this,
“Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept”
“systemic weakness in training and administration.”
“operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives.”
Would this explain your ill fated Navy Army Transfer, at 22? Should not MEPS look into what command you were attempting to transfer from?
((REPORT 1))
Naval War College
Newport R.I.
TELL THE TRUTH! CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE”S SURFACE ASSETS?
Conclusion
“I maintain based on 27 months in command of one, that the NRF FFGs are not, and should not be expected to be, fully combat ready for immediate deployment into a high threat area, under the present “system”. Our manning and employment policies are detrimental to their wartime combat readiness. They will never be equal to their active sister ships immediately upon mobilization because the selected reservists (SELRES) portion of the crew receives neither the quantity nor the quality of training received by their active duty counterparts, neither as port of the ‘team” nore as individual crewmembers.”
((Report (1) review What might happen to a 18 year old SELRES assigned to NRF FFG experiencing? ))
(Report 2)
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
((Report (2) Question. What kind of double talk is this "well orchestrated" "discontinuity" sending straight into a dark dark spot? “MOST” What if you are not “Most” on the ship? Can you imagine any leader, coach, or teacher putting a program together, this training, without even contemplating mishap injury or illness, by assigning a bright eyed logical young man, ready for the world in his teens to experience high school varsity sports, or bootcamp, or college, or as crew to a Navy combat ship with the following parameters ``Training for individual....must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity.”? You at 18 had no active duty experience, and over 5 years assigned, blanked out, with a sea service ribbon, amazingly in shock, at the VA, would not even get enough active duty time for VA recognition as a veteran for veteran purposes. )
((Report 3))
<<This Reports broadly explains both the beginning and end of the NRF and the SAM Enlistment.>>
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx
Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix
U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.
To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66
<<Here is the Military Law USCode for the SAM Enlistment, a 8 Yr MSO>>
10 USC 511(d)
“The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program. The SAM program is a non-prior service mandatory drilling program. Personnel who enlist in the SAM Program, under authority of 10 USC 511(d) incur a 8 yr MSO Military Service Obligation. They must drill continuously in the selective reserve (SELRES) for 6 of the 8 years. The mandatory continuous 6 year period begins the day the member reports for recruit training.
My name
Aaron, the High Priest
Moses's brother helped lead the Israelites to freedom.
Aaron
(a) (1397-1273 BCE) Son of Amram and Jochebed, brother of Miriam and Moses. Moses’ partner and spokesman in his mission to free the Israelites from Egypt. First High Priest and patriarch of the Priestly Family. A man who loved peace and always sought to bring conflicting parties to reconciliation. Died in the desert, shortly before the Israelites entered Canaan. (b) A common Jewish name.
First off I have always known I have a judeo christian heritage and name Aaron
I am
“A man who loved peace and always sought to bring conflicting parties to reconciliation”
(( Report 4 ))
<< SAM enlistment for $4000 to fund an entire 4 year degree. At 18 I signed everything. I thought it was something similar to ROTC except I would go to bootcamp first >>
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/CNRF/11004A.PDF
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMNAVRESFORINST 1100.4A O9 FEB 1994
Subj:ENLISTED NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
4. SAM Educational Assistance Payments. Individuals who are a secondary school graduate and completed IADT, including rate training or sufficient training to be deployable are entitled to initial and subsequent Educational Assistance. Payment cannot exceed $1,000 in any 12 month period based on the enlistment anniversary date) or a total of $4,000. Payment. is for educational expenses (tuition, fees, books, laboratory fees and shop fees for consumable material used as part of classroom or shopinstruction) incurred by members at accredited institutions until they complete a course of instruction required for the award of up to a baccalaureate degree, or the equivalent evidence of study completed in a non degree program. Members are reimbursed when they submit documentation described in paragraph 5 below.
(( Report 5 ))
<< 1997 summits are being held to discuss a reservist and healthcare and va status, which was basically nothing, no VA status or healthcare insurance access, for my SAM enlistment package. I had already been assigned to a ship for 3 years, with no health care access or va support >>
https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=41152
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, Nov. 24, 1997
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen said Nov. 18 the summit will address the full spectrum of health care issues, entitlements and legislative policies affecting the readiness of reserve components in the post-Cold War world.
In Phase I, slated for late November in Washington, summit participants will evaluate prevailing laws and policy relating to reserve component health care.
Participants will identify legislative and policy changes necessary to ensure members of the reserve components receive health care benefits that are consistent with the increased reliance on today's reserve force.
"We have a vested interest in the health readiness of our reserve component personnel," said Dr. Ed Martin, acting assistant secretary of defense for health affairs.
Beginning late December, the second phase of the summit will address incapacitation and disability issues. In mid-January 1998, the third phase will address reserve component access to VA benefits and programs.
Recognizing the increased reliance on the reserve components in recent years, Cohen said, "We must ensure their medical readiness to achieve a truly integrated total force. I am pleased that this summit is a partnership effort - with the DoD, the private sector and VA all working together."
(from a DoD release)
Contact Author
(( Report 6 ))
<< Navy War College report shows duplication cost of surface commands actually eliminates the savings of the 80/20 undermanning active duty ships and putting them in the Naval Reserve >>
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF)
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. TOTAL SAVINGS
The bottom line is that sending an FFG from the Active
Fleet to the Naval Reserve Force saves about $979,000 per year, or about 6.1% of all operating and support costs.
A. THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE
The primary mission of the U. S. Navy is to conduct sustained combat operations at sea in support of American national interests under Title 10 of the U. S. Code. The mission of the Naval Reserve under 10 USC 262 is to provide trained units and qualified personnel to augment the Active Fleet in time of war, national emergency and at such other times as national security requires.
Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cash outlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged$3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savingsof 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).
The Naval Reserve surface program has allowed the Navy to have a slightly larger Order of Battle, but at acost of reduced readiness for 14 to 16 ships, and with significantly fewer deployable assets.
From these savings one would have to deduct any cost of duplication between active and reserve areas. To quote from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
We found areas of active and reserve forces that, if eliminated, better integrate the Total Force and preserve robust combat capabilities at lower cost. One such example is the parallel headquarters structures in the active and reserve components... In the Navy, there is a Commander, Naval Reserve Force; A Commander, Naval Air Reserve; and a Commander, Naval Surface Reserve, each
with a headquarters staff duplicating the functions of
one another and of the Active Navy component."
By being in the business of operating surface ships, the Naval Reserve is forced to duplicate staff functions of the Active Navy. The costs of operating headquarters staff is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it could cut considerably into the $18M-44M savings achieved at the shipboard level by the NRF FFG program.
(( Report 7 ))
<< These 1975 (7) and 1976 (8) Reports “Total Force” Policy developing integrating young non-prior reserve enlisted and the “potential problems” with the Navy 80/20 “test” >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA032080.pdf
1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
Manpower and recruiting problems also directly affected readiness as well as impacting on training through increased requirements for retraining or for initial skill qualification. Since the outset of the no-draft era, we have had to rely to a great extent on veteran volunteers to meet our strength needs.
Although the recruiting of veterans has allowed us to meet our goals, over-dependence on veterans has some problems. SInce veterans come to the Reserve with their specialties already determined by prior training and experience, the ability to manage the specialties of personnel to match specific mobilization billet requirements is reduced because of geographic locations. In addition, large imputes of veterans increased the average grade and longevity of our manpower, resulting in higher pay costs. These were offset to some extent by reduction in the necessity to provide lengthy periods of initial training. As a result we have reached a point where we must now place greater emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior service personnel.
Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other then a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as encouragement to our allies.
This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the “Total Force Policy” in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The “Total Force Policy” dictates that all available forces—U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies—would be considered in determining the Defense needs to most future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.
3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”
(( Report 8 ))
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417
1976 Annual Defense Department Report
Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”
Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”
(( Report 9 ))
<< Navy Health Research Studies on occupational injuries of FFG ship crew >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a213071.pdf
Search Results
Web results
Sleep Problems, Health Symptoms, and Tension ... - dtic.mil
Naval Health Research Center.
Approach
A cross-sectional sample of officers' and enlisted personnel aboard nine
U.S. .Navy combatant ships vas surveyed. Shiptypes included tvo Guided Missile
Cruisers (CGs), five Minesweepers (MSOs), one Guided Missile Frigate (FFG),
and one Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD).
Tension/Anxiety
Overall, tension/anxiety levels of the cross-sectional sample appeared to
be within normal limits. However, Junior enlisted personnel (El to E3) reported
greater subjective tension/anxiety than higher paygrade personnel.
This result may have been a reflection of the relative inexperience of these
sailors in extended at-sea operations and the potentially hostile environment.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a224791.pdf
Physical and Psychological Effects of Sustained Shipboard ...
Study Subjects
The subject population was comprised of officers and enlisted crew from
two U.S. Navy ships, a frigate (FFG) and a guided missile cruiser (CG).
Crewmen aboard
the FFG experienced significantly more psychological fatigue. Although not
statistically significant (t = 1.85, p = 0.070), personnel aboard the FFG
also reported more problems with physical fatigue than personnel aboard the
CG.
A more likely explanation is the fact that due to fewer staff, personnel
aboard the FFG were required to spend longer periods of time on watchstanding
duty. Thus, the FFG presented fewer opportunities for prolonged rest
periods. The CG, on the other hand, had three different watch sections. As
noted elsewhere (Congleton, Englund, Hodgdon, Palinkas, Armstrong, and
Kelleher, 1988), crewmen aboard the FFG also reported shorter and more
fragmented sleep periods. In addition, the FFG had undergone a series of GQ
drills prior to entering the operational area which further fatigued its
crew.
(( Report 10 ))
<< 1998 Navy Analysis reports “Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420 , 1988 )” >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA257555.pdf
NAVAL RESERVE: AN ORGANIZATION IN TRANSITION
by
Richard Charles Mazza
Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve
B.A., Boston State College, 1978
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issues facing the Naval Reserve as
it transitions from its cold war mission to new and, possibly, expanded roles under the
New National Military Strategy.
A. MANAGEMENT
In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve. The CINCPACFLT
Det 420 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.
The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420, 1988)
The MAT found that there was a prevailing failure to
comply with CNAVRES policy throughout the Naval Reserve.
Equally as serious as this non-compliance was the toleration
of willful non-compliance. Organizational disconnects, as
well as a lack of standardized command selection criteria,
were noted as a contributory factor in the observed widespread
lack of leadership.
The lack of organizational vigor in the Naval Reserve was
attributed to the double and triple hatting of commanders at
various echelons of command.
Numerous violations of the traditional notion of chain of
command were noted in which clear lines of authority and
responsibility were diffused through a myriad of "stove pipe"
commands within the Naval Reserve. The lack of
standardization of command authority and responsibility was
contrary to established Navy policy and tradition.
Fragmentation and rivalries between different segments of
the Naval Reserve has led to a breakdown of the traditional
concept of teamwork. This fragmentation has led to localized
politicalization of various reserve commands in which policies
and directives are promulgated that are not necessarily
consistent with the mission of the Naval Reserve.
The MAT also noted a consistent lack of completed staff
work among the various levels of the Naval Reserve. Although
the MAT could not pin down the exact cause, it was speculated
that poor morale could be the cause of poor staffwork or that
poor staffwork could be a factor in poor morale. Poor
staffwork prior to the establishment of significant changes in
reserve policy or command authority has, in the past, led to
unnecessary administrative duplication, and prolonged
confusion over lines of legitimate command authority and
responsibility.
b. Personnel/Mobilization
In the early 1970's, the Naval Reserve began a major
effort to align Naval Reserre units with active force
commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve
units with active components was an effort to
institutionalize the "one Navy" concept originally envisioned
under the Total Force Concept. Naval surface reserve force
ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for
operational control. For non-hardware or augment units, this
was the beginning of the gaining command concept presently in
place.
Under the gaining command concept, training and
mobilization standards were developed and implemented through
input received from the active forces. Although not formally
institutionalized, direct or mutual support to active commands
greatly increased to the point where many essential warfare
and support functions are now carried out by the Naval
Reserve. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)
(( Report 11 ))
<<1995 and 1998 Navy IG is reporting “systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships >>
https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF
1995 5040.1
1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assign responsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES)components in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components fell outside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspectionsand, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight of the administration and training of the SELRES component.
(( Report 11a)
1998 5040.1A
Subject: Reserve Administration and Training Evaluation (RATE) Program
4. Background
The Rate Program was initiated in response to Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weakness in the training and administration of SELRES Personnel assigned to NRF Ships
SELRES Personnel assigned must be ready to mobilize on short notice and, as a result, be maintained at the highest state of readiness.”
(( Report 12 ))
<< 1997 Navy Surface Training Instructions that have a small chapter that discusses a reservist and how they must match the full time guys qualifications >>
1997 Department of Navy
3502.1B Surface Master Training Plan
1205. Training Philosophy. The Naval Surface Reserve Force is primarily focused on requirements-based training. Per. OPNAVINST 1001.21.A These training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist’s active duty counterpart performing the same duties.
Implementing the Naval Surface Reserve Force training program requires an understanding of systemic restrictions peculiar to the Surface Reserve Force. Drill Limitations
Drill Limitations. Reserve Training is limited and must be used to maximize mobilization readiness.
1303. Naval Reserve NRF Training Requirements. The specified wartime mission for NRF units requires that training requirements remain the same as for active duty counterparts to provide a benchmark for measuring the actual status of NRF readiness.
2101. Sources. As previously stated in paragraph 1201 of this instruction it is the mission of the Naval Reserve Force to provide trained and qualified personnel to active duty commands in the event of mobilization. Opnavinst 1001.21A requires that a reservist be assigned the same training requirements as their active duty counterpart performing the same duties. Therefore, a Reservist’s training requirements must mirror the watch station, work center, and skills maintenance training required by their active duty counterpart.
(( Report 13 ))
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1D CH1
14 Oct 08
126
b. Personnel Qualifications (NRF Ships). NRF ship Commanding Officers are to assign all primary crew SELRES to Condition I and III watch stations. SELRES will use PQS to train for final qualification
in these watch stations. Qualification time lines are as assigned by
the commanding officer, commensurate with drill and annual training time available, present ship's employment, prior active duty, and PQS qualifications documented in service record page 4's. Once PQS qualified for their Condition I and III assignments, SELRES may undertake other PQS, such as inport watch stations and ESWS. General DC and 3M qualifications should be accomplished early in the SELRES' tour of duty in conjunction with initial Condition I and III watch
station PQS. This watch station assignment/job accomplishment policy applies only to the NRF primary crew SELRES and not to the SELRES who perform one time annual training in support of fleet operations.
1504. Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Readiness Criteria. NRF units are generally tasked with the same training requirements as their active
duty counterparts. However, due to limited days underway with selected reservists embarked, and limited availability of inport trainers, these
units may experience training degradation beyond their control. Accordingly, NRF units may complete the advanced unit phase of training without achieving C1/M1 readiness in all primary mission areas. The mission area readiness ratings listed in Figure 151 specifically
prescribe the minimum acceptable standards for NRF units at the end of advanced training and during repetitive (proficiency) training.
(( Report 14 ))
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf
COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1e
CHAPTER 1
SURFACE FORCE TRAINING
SECTION 5
1501. General.
Selected Reservists are organized into units with specific mobilization billets, generally onboard active commands
(“gaining commands”)
1502. Training Philosophy. A primary objective in the training of the SELRES is the integration of individuals and units with their active
duty counterparts.
To the maximum extent possible, commanding officers should work to foster a close working relationship with their counterpart
reserve units by frequently communicating with them, coordinating the embarkation/debarkation of reserve unit personnel, and developing tailored training programs designed to optimize limited reserve active
duty training and personnel qualification opportunities. To achieve
these goals, Commanding Officers must recognize the inherent
limitations of the Reserve training environment and develop innovative programs to overcome these limitations. Standalone reserve units will work in close coordination with their ISICs and supported/supporting commanders. Training of reservists will be conducted per reference
(a).
a. Reserve Training Environment.
1. Inactive Duty Training (IDT) is accomplished two days per
month, usually on the weekend; Annual Training (AT) is accomplished two weeks per year.
2. Training for individual reservists must be sequenced, well
orchestrated, well defined, and must account for inherent problems of discontinuity. Close coordination and liaison between the NRF ship CO/XO/Training Officer and the reserve unit SELRES Coordinator and Administrator (reserve unit CO/XO) are key to a successful reserve training program. Remember that these reservists are members of your command and most of these individuals have previous active duty experience.
(( Report 15 ))
<< These NAVY reports review attempt to save money in the NRF FFG’s >>
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39784/93Jun_Dudolevitch.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG). It examines the rationale for having a Naval Reserve surface ships program and documents the cost savings attributable to the transfer of a ship to the NRF.
AF FFGs have averaged $4.71 million in personnel cash outlays per year during FYs 89-91 while NRF FFGs have averaged$3.78 million over the same period. This represents a savingsof 19.7% for the NRF ship. (Source: VAMOSC data base).
(( Report 16 ))
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a218963.pdf
March 1987
Reserve Manning of FF-1052 and FFG-7 Class Frigates:
A Critique of the Accuracy and Completeness
of Existing Costing Studies
by
Patrick Robert Rearden
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1976
M.A., Pepperdine University, 1979
The purposes for this research have included:
1. To evaluate studies that have attempted to make a
cost analysis of either Regular Navy or Naval Reserve
Force ships.
2. To collect and analyze data related to the costs of
operating selected Regular Navy and NRF ships during
Fiscal Year 1986.
(( Report 17 ))
<< Another Navy Cost Report about the NRF FFG >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA294225.pdf
A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE FRIGATES
December, 1994
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5000
by
Jeffrey S. Davis
Lieutenant, United States Navy Reserve
B.A., University of California, Riverside, 1987
This thesis analyses the Naval Reserve Force Oliver Hazard Perry class (FFG-7) guided missile
frigates. It assesses the cost-effectiveness of operating these ships in the Naval Reserve fleet vice the
Active fleet.
The analysis then assesses the ship's operational
readiness by comparing the ships' performance on Combat System Assessments and the major engineering
exams. Following this, the quality of life on board the NRF FFGs is qualitatively evaluated. This analysis
concludes that using FFGs in the NRF is not the most cost-effective option. Alternative recommendations
are then provided for their more efficient use.
(( Report 18 ))
<< This Navy War Colllege Reported by an XO the head of training of a NRF FFG, give the deck plate reality >>
---This XO report tells the real story of a NRF FFG. What is you are 18 in this command?
TELL THE TRUTH: CAN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER RELY ON THE ADVERTISED CAPABILITIES OF THE ... LCDR THOMAS M. ROSSI, USN.
ABSTRACT
Over 31% of the United States Navy's combatant surface
escort force are guided missile frigates (FFGs) assigned to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
Documented operational successes of NRF ships are actually
the result of the smaller, active duty, core crews of these ships
working harder rather than the advertised opinion that these
successes equate to the effective operational integration of NRF
personnel. The significance to the operational commander is
twofold. First, if one ship, NRF or Active, shows up to the
theater with capabilities less than those assumed by operational
planners, the effect on a maritime battle's end state could be
significant. Secondly, if the operational successes of a NRF
ship are really the results of harder working active duty crews,
then a dangerous manning situation exists which will not be
reflected in any readiness report and could result in the
operational failure of the ship over time.
As Admiral Boorda and many other leaders continue to stress,
reservists are critical to the success of our Total Force team.
I do not disagree! Reservists who, while working in their
civilian jobs, routinely practice skills related to those upon
which they must draw while serving with the active duty military,
are much more likely to effectively contribute to the goals of
their respective military units than those Selres personnel who
routinely work in unrelated fields. Multi-engine aircraft
pilots, doctors, lawyers, construction engineers, etc. are
destined for success as Selres personnel and so are the military
units to which they are assigned. However, few civilian men and
women work in a shipboard damage control environment, conduct corrective maintenance on intricate fire control systems, serve
as a member of a weapon system's firing team, or, for that
matter, drive a ship in their normal, daily environment.Even very talented individuals cannot be expected to
effectively perform in some of the NRF FFG's more sophisticated
ratings when exposed to the limited amount of annual, complete
team training NRF Selres personnel receive.
Well
after the PQS for a given watch station has been completed, a
sailor trains and is evaluated in drill scenarios over and over
again until he or she attains and maintains the desired level of
watch station proficiency. We currently do not afford this same
opportunity to Selres personnel.
Intelligent, caring parents do not take their children to
medical surgeons who only practice surgical medicine 38 days a
year and where only 24 of those days demand the attendance of the
full surgical team. This is because most people acknowledge
surgical medicine requires extensive training under careful
supervision and, after certified completion of this training,
competence is only achieved and maintained through practice and
reevaluation, tempered with periodic advanced training.
The skills required to professionally and safely operate a
ship at sea may not be equivalent to the skills demanded of a
medical surgeon, but there are similar consequences to be paid if
either professional attempts to work in his or her trade without
adequate training. In 1990, the Department of Defense conducted
a Total Force Policy review in which they admitted shipboard duty
may not be a satisfactory application of the reserve force
Structure.
(( Report 19 ))
<< This next report shows a reservist has to pay for dental, even if they are young have no insurance, and assigned to a ship as I was. My dental fillings I was ordered to get has failed creating many medical problems without medical insurance >>
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA586968.pdf
Medical Readiness of the
Reserve Component
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Expenses Incurred by Members to Become Medically Ready
The second potential obstacle to the RCs’ reaching their IMR goals is that reservists have been
required to pay some of their medical and dental treatment costs. As shown in Table 3.6 (and
discussed earlier), the military pays for the annual PHA review but does not pay for any treatment
indicated by the review. Some DLCs resolve themselves with time (e.g., broken bones,
pregnancy), but reservists must pay for treatment of those that do not (such as hypertension
and diabetes). Also, most military branches have historically required reservists to pay for treatment
required to achieve at least dental class 2 status, for preventive dental care (such as sealants),
and for any costs incurred from using civilian dentists. Currently, the Army Reserve has
enough FY 2010 funding to pay for annual dental exams and treatments by RHRP civilian
dentists for members in dental class 3.22 But since much of the increased FY 2009 and FY 2010
funding comes from Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) supplemental funds and thus
is subject to being reduced in the future, these payments for dental services may be short lived.
No funding exists for preventive dental care, such as annual teeth cleaning (prophylaxis), fluoride
treatment, and periodontal care.
(( Report 20 ))
<< Finally you get to the VA 2015. 2016 OSC reports Oakland VA had problems. I was denied every service of a veteran even a homeless housing voucher using my reserve enlistment as the reason for the numerous denails, without even a concept of a humanitarian waiver >>
https://www.disabledveterans.org/2016/10/14/osc-busts-oakland-va-regional-office-14000-claim-blunder/
VARO received an application in February 2006 from a veteran with Post‐Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which was not correctly processed for seven years and eight months.
In addition, the Oakland VARO’s recordkeeping was so poor that investigators could not find logs or spreadsheets tracking the number of unprocessed claims, thus hampering their ability to fully investigate the scope of the whistleblowers’ allegations. However, another recent VA investigation confirmed that Oakland VARO staff had not processed a “substantial amount” of claims dating back to the mid‐1990s.
(( Report 21 ))
https://www.disabledveterans.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/161014-OSC-Press-Release.pdf
WASHINGTON, D.C./October 13, 2016 – In a letter sent to the White House and Congress today, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) reported that the Veterans Affairs Regional Office (VARO) in Oakland, California, failed to process veterans’ benefits claims accurately and in a timely manner. This delayed the accurate payment of benefits to veterans and their dependents, in some cases by years. Three Oakland VARO whistleblowers came to OSC with disclosures of the Oakland VARO’s deficiencies, prompting an investigation. Those whistleblowers are Rustyann Brown, a former claims assistant, Roselyn Tolliver, a veterans service representative, and Lydia Cheney, a veterans service representative.
“The whistleblowers performed a public service by bringing to light the severe delays in processing veterans benefit claims and deserve our gratitude,” said Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner. “These delays are particularly disturbing since the applicants are disabled veterans and their dependents. No veteran should have to wait years before receiving the benefits they are owed for their service to this nation.”
(( Report 22 ))
((The beginning. First to join the military at 18 you swear an oath to defend the constitution and go to bootcamp which creates a foundation to follow leaders and orders))
10 U.S.C. § 502 - U.S. Code - Unannotated Title 10. Armed
Forces § 502. Enlistment oath: who may administer
(a) Enlistment oath. --Each person enlisting in an armed force shall take the following oath:
“I, _______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.”
(( Report 23 ))
The U.S. Constitution: Preamble
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
(( Report 24 ))
(Interesting as it is, Congress has held committees to examine “Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel”)
1963 88th Congress Actually Debates “Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel”
PREFACE
No persons should be more entitled to protection of their constitutional rights than the servicemen engaged in protecting the sovereignty of the United States
(( Report 25 ))
<< This article written about me is better understood with all these reports I am finding that should all together explain my attempted Navy Army Medically Disqualified Transfer >>
The MISHAP report should answer how and why this story was written.
http://veteranscominghome.org/station_media/the-story-of-a-homeless-veteran-who-fell-through-the-cracks/
In Conclusion
That about wraps up all the information I can gather for a proper MISHAP Investigation.
Fully fund Operational Manpower and Save money somewhere else. You injure guys, dreams, ,families and ultimately pay more taxing the United States “We The People”
I fight like John Paul Jones to honor honor
I fight like John Paul Jones for the Constitution I Swore an Oath to Defend, and the “more perfect Union” “Justice” and “general welfare” the Constitution's Preamble discusses.
So what did John Paul Jones say?
John Paul Jones (6 July 1747 – 18 July 1792) was a Scottish American sailor and the United States' first well-known naval fighter in the American Revolutionary War, who said:
“I would lay down my life for America but I cannot trifle with my Honor.”
“I wish to have no connection with any ship that does not sail fast; for I intend to go in harm's way.”
"I have not yet begun to fight!" for the Constitions Preamble which I Swore an Oath to Defend “We the People of the United States...form a more perfect Union, establish Justice...insure domestic Tranquility...provide common defence...promote ...general Welfare...secure Blessings of Liberty...for the United States of America….
a293960.pdf
Posted from apps.dtic.mil
Reserves
Rights
Benefits
Injuries
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
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