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They are part of the NATO partnership in peace? Is this what the Ukraine wants to be a partnership in peace associate for eventual incorporation into NATO? Thank you for the posting I'm a little confused about where they stand. Are you saying that Russia may want to invade or Iran may want to meddle with this country's Independence?
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SGT (Join to see)
I'm thinking that Putin might want a puppet government installed, or the country under the control of an ally like Iran for the purpose of controlling more of the Caspian Sea natural gas resources. That is not to consume those resources, but rather to control when and how they go to market, as Russia's economy is largely driven by their export of natural gas.
In a nutshell, I'm thinking it would be hybrid-warfare. More specifically - in Putin's behavior since 2008, the pattern seems to me to be:
1. Create a "reason" for intervening on behalf of some aggrieved internal political group. This is something that in Ukraine I suspect, (without having the benefit of knowing anyone from Ukraine and without having ever been there), that Putin instigates, invents, stirs up and creates.
2. He then intervenes in response to the crisis he actually created, being very conservative with deployment of Russia armed forces. Using "little green men" if there is even the slightest chance of losing.
3. If it works, he consolidates influence and control politically in that area, if it doesn't, he waits, tries again.
With Putin's existing relationship with Iran, he could conceivably try to employ Iran in the same role that Russia took in Ukraine: Iran tries to stir up something in Azerbaijan and claims some moral obligation and right to intervene in that artificial crisis by way of ethnic links between much of the Iranian population and that of Azerbaijan.
Meanwhile, Putin's relationship with Erdogan makes Turkey's NATO role seem questionable to me and I think complicates getting NATO forces into the Caucasus region.
Once Iran attempts their intervention, Russia enters as well, to "assist" and the relationship between Russian and Iranian forces (regulars and irregulars from both) begin to show parallels from the experience in Syria.
In a nutshell, I'm thinking it would be hybrid-warfare. More specifically - in Putin's behavior since 2008, the pattern seems to me to be:
1. Create a "reason" for intervening on behalf of some aggrieved internal political group. This is something that in Ukraine I suspect, (without having the benefit of knowing anyone from Ukraine and without having ever been there), that Putin instigates, invents, stirs up and creates.
2. He then intervenes in response to the crisis he actually created, being very conservative with deployment of Russia armed forces. Using "little green men" if there is even the slightest chance of losing.
3. If it works, he consolidates influence and control politically in that area, if it doesn't, he waits, tries again.
With Putin's existing relationship with Iran, he could conceivably try to employ Iran in the same role that Russia took in Ukraine: Iran tries to stir up something in Azerbaijan and claims some moral obligation and right to intervene in that artificial crisis by way of ethnic links between much of the Iranian population and that of Azerbaijan.
Meanwhile, Putin's relationship with Erdogan makes Turkey's NATO role seem questionable to me and I think complicates getting NATO forces into the Caucasus region.
Once Iran attempts their intervention, Russia enters as well, to "assist" and the relationship between Russian and Iranian forces (regulars and irregulars from both) begin to show parallels from the experience in Syria.
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SGT (Join to see)
Hypothetical: With Russian advice and assistance, Iran attempts a political line-of-effort in Azerbaijan to sow dissension, and to provoke the government. Russian-developed kompromat (spelling?) is used. If this proves successful in creating some conditions of instability, then the IRGC looks to initiate a more active, violent line-of-effort using either their own personnel or radicalized local nationals (not a problem that I am aware of there, but we have radicalized individuals here in the West, so plausible). Iran and Russia are then able to continue pursuing further destabilization in hopes of creating conditions suitable for direct military intervention, or to back-off and wait if their either line-of-effort is unproductive. They've got the time and the access.
I don't know. Looking at the whole hybrid-war thing and what exactly Putin is up to in the world seems more easily thought-out when considering real-world geography, while at the same time it's kind of eerie and easily misunderstood by the casual reader. But, what gets my interest in this area is 1.) Putin has meddled nearby before, in the nation of Georgia, and 2.) Azerbaijan's gas resources (again, not that Putin has any need of them, but that the would certainly like to control them and how, where, and when they get to market and in what volume, and finally 3.) it's hard for NATO to get to physically - if Turkey is unreliable, and if Russian and Iranian forces are in Syria, and Russian forces are in the Black Sea, then it is getting harder to reach, not impossible, but the threats increase along every possible route. (Crimea was not entirely inaccessible to NATO during Putin's actions there, but it is in an awkward place. In that way, the countries of the Transcaucasian region are even more so.)
So right now, we see in the news stories about improving the readiness of the Baltic countries, Scandinavia, and Poland. But if I were Putin the next place I'd be looking to meddle, would be Azerbaijan.
I don't know. Looking at the whole hybrid-war thing and what exactly Putin is up to in the world seems more easily thought-out when considering real-world geography, while at the same time it's kind of eerie and easily misunderstood by the casual reader. But, what gets my interest in this area is 1.) Putin has meddled nearby before, in the nation of Georgia, and 2.) Azerbaijan's gas resources (again, not that Putin has any need of them, but that the would certainly like to control them and how, where, and when they get to market and in what volume, and finally 3.) it's hard for NATO to get to physically - if Turkey is unreliable, and if Russian and Iranian forces are in Syria, and Russian forces are in the Black Sea, then it is getting harder to reach, not impossible, but the threats increase along every possible route. (Crimea was not entirely inaccessible to NATO during Putin's actions there, but it is in an awkward place. In that way, the countries of the Transcaucasian region are even more so.)
So right now, we see in the news stories about improving the readiness of the Baltic countries, Scandinavia, and Poland. But if I were Putin the next place I'd be looking to meddle, would be Azerbaijan.
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