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"On March 10, 241 BC, in the First Punic War at the Battle of the Aegates Islands, the Romans sunk the Carthaginian fleet bringing the First Punic War to an end. From the article:
"The Battle of the Aegates (Italian Battaglia delle Isole Egadi) was fought off the Aegadian Islands, off the western coast of the island of Sicily on 10 March 241 BC. It was the final naval battle fought between the fleets of Carthage and the Roman Republic during the First Punic War. The better-trained Roman fleet[1] defeated a hastily raised, undermanned and ill-trained Punic fleet, which was a decisive Roman victory as Carthage sued for peace, resulting in the Peace of Lutatius leading to Carthage surrendering Sicily and some adjoining islands to Rome.
Prelude
The Carthaginians had gained command of the sea after their victory in the Battle of Drepanum and the Battle of Phintias in 249 BC, but they held only two cities in Sicily: Lilybaeum and Drepanum The Carthaginian state was led by the landed aristocracy at the time, and they preferred to expand across northern Africa instead of pursuing an aggressive policy in Sicily. Hanno "The Great"[2] was in charge of operations in Africa since 248 BC and had conquered considerable territory by 241 BC.[3] The Carthaginian leadership probably thought Rome had been defeated and invested little manpower in Sicily.[4] Carthage at this time was feeling the strain of the prolonged conflict. In addition to maintaining a fleet and soldiers in Sicily, they were also fighting the Libyans and Numidians in northern Africa.[5] As a result, Hamilcar Barca was given a fairly small army when he took command in Sicily in 248 BC, and the Carthaginian fleet was gradually withdrawn so that, by 242 BC, Carthage had no ships to speak of in Sicily.[6] Carthage was feeling the financial strain of the war, which had led Carthage to request a 2000 talent loan from Egypt, which was refused. {{sfn|Miles|2011|pp=193Rome had previously rebuilt her fleets even after losing 284 to 600 ships in a storm in 255 BC and another 150 ships in 253 BC. The Drepana defeat and loss of the fleet so demoralized the Romans that they waited seven years before building another fleet.[7][8] The absence of Roman ships probably caused Carthage, thinking the Romans would not venture into the sea again, to decommission her navy, sparing the financially strained state the expense of building, maintaining and repairing ships, plus and training and provisioning the crews.
The War 247 – 243 BC
The years preceding the battle were relatively quiet within the First Punic War. Hostilities between Roman and Carthaginian forces gradually stalled, becoming concentrated in small-scale land operations in Sicily. Hamilcar's strategic goal probably was to maintain a stalemate, as he had neither the resources to win the war nor the authority to peacefully settle it[9] Hamilcar was in command of a mercenary army composed of multiple nationalities and his ability to successfully lead this force demonstrates his skill as field commander. He employed combined arms tactics, like Alexander and Pyrrhus,[10] and his strategy was similar to the one employed by Quintus Fabius Maximus in the Second Punic War, ironically against Hannibal, the eldest son of Hamilcar Barca, in Italy during 217 BC. Hamilcar’s landing at Heirkte (near Panormus) drew the Romans away to defend that port city and resupply point and gave Drepana some breathing room. Subsequent naval raids along the Sicilian and Italian coasts obtained no permanent result, and guerrilla warfare kept the Roman legions pinned down and preserved Carthage's toehold in Sicily, although Roman forces which bypassed Hamilcar forced him to recapture Eryx from Rome, to better defend Drepana.[11]
New Model Roman Fleet
While Hamilcar’s activities kept the Carthaginian flag flying in Sicily and after 20 years of war both states were financially and demographically exhausted.[12]. Realizing they could not defeat Hamilcar on land, and without a fleet, blockade Drepana and Lilybaeum, Rome decided to build a fleet. With the state coffers exhausted, the Senate approached the citizens, and wealthy citizens, either alone or in groups, decided to show their patriotism and finance the construction of one ship apiece. The result was a fleet of approximately 200 quinqueremes, built, equipped, and crewed without government expense. The Romans had copied a Carthaginian Ship when first they decided to build a fleet in 260 BC.[13][14] The Romans modeled the new fleet based on the ship of Hannibal the Rhodian, who had repeatedly evaded the Roman blockading ships at Lilybaeum until his fast maneuverable ship was captured.[15][16][17]
Carthage Cornered
The new fleet was completed in 242 BC and entrusted to the consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus, assisted by the praetor Quintus Valerius Falto. Romans had learned from past misfortunes at sea and their light, maneuverable ships were now more resistant to adverse weather conditions, with the corvus having been abandoned. Catulus and Falto also to drilled the crews in maneuvers and exercises before leaving Italy, with a fleet at the peak of their fighting ability. After arriving in Sicily with 200 Quinqueremes and 700 transports, Lutatius seized the Harbor of Drepana and the anchorages off Lilybaeum uncontested as there was no Carthaginian ship to counter the Roman fleet. Lutatius built siege works at Drepana. And blockaded Lilybaeum (at the western tip of Sicily, now called Marsala) and Drepana, to cut the connection to Carthage. The intent was seemingly to cut Hamilcar Barca's supply and communication lines. For the rest of the year Catulus waited for the Carthaginian response. The fleet and it’s crew trained and drilled while the siege was conducted to remain in peak condition. [18][16][17] The senate granted him a proconsulship for 241 BC.
This caught the Carthaginians totally unprepared. The garrisons of Lilybaeum, Drepana and Hamilcar’s army at Eryx was held fast, but without supplies from Carthage they could not hold out indefinitely. However, Rome had seized the initiative with a battle ready fleet blockading Carthaginian holdings in Sicily, and without warships, the un escorted Carthaginian supply ships would fall prey to the Romans. Carthage began to ready a fleet, fit out transports , gather supplies and train crews and marines to meet the Roman challenge at sea. It took nine months to ready 250 warships and 150 to 350 transports. Carthage was pressed for time as supplies in their blockaded strongholds were running out, and in their haste had a hard time finding the required rowers to crew the ships and marines to man them. Hanno the Great was conducting his campaign against Numidians, so Carthage may have also suffered financial difficulties in paying for the fleet. As a result, the fleet was undermanned and the crew poorly trained, and far below in fighting quality from the Romans. Hanno, the general who had lost the Battle of Agrigentum and Battle of Ecnomuss, may have commanded the fleet, but given the had of Carthaginians to crucify defeated commanders, it is not likely. It is not known why the victors of Drepana, Adherbal and Carthalo, were not in command. [19]
Aegates Islands
The Carthaginian fleet arrived to relieve the blockade in March 241 BC. Hanno called a halt near the Western most Aegates Island (“Holy Island”) for the night, planning to use a favorable breeze to speed his fleet to Eryx. However, the Carthaginian fleet was spotted by Roman scouts and Catulus abandoned the blockade to meet his enemy. The Roman fleet sailed and anchored on the middle Island. On the morning of March 10, the Carthaginians and Hanno immediately set sail. Catulus measured the risk of attacking with the wind in his bow versus the risk of letting Hanno reach Sicily to relieve Hamilcar Barca and Lilybaeum. Despite unfavourable conditions, the proconsul decided to intercept the Carthaginians and ordered his fleet to prepare for battle. He had the Roman ships stripped of their masts, sails and other unnecessary equipment in order to make them more seaworthy in the rough conditions. Catulus himself was unable to join the actual battle because of injuries suffered in an earlier engagement, so in the actual battle the ships were commanded by his second in command, Falto. In the ensuing battle the Romans enjoyed a far greater mobility, since their vessels were carrying only the bare necessities, while the Carthaginians were burdened with men, equipment and provisions. The Carthaginian crews were also hurriedly levied and inexperienced. The Romans quickly gained the upper hand, using their ships' greater maneuverability to ram the enemy vessels. The Romans lost 30 ships sunk and another 50 damaged. 50 Carthaginian ships were sunk, 20 of them with all hands, and 70 captured along with 4,040 or 6,000 men.[20] The rest were saved only by an abrupt change in the direction of the wind, allowing them to flee from the Romans. Several rams from both Roman and Phoenician ships have been found[21] along with amphora from the cargoes and helmets.[22]
End of the First Punic War
Upon achieving decisive victory over the Carthaginian fleet, Catulus continued the land operations in Sicily against Lilybaeum, Eryx and Drepana defended by Hamilcar Barca and his army. The Carthaginian senate was reluctant to wage the war further by allocating the resources necessary to have another fleet built and manned. They ordered Hamilcar to negotiate a peace treaty with the Romans, which he left up to his subordinate commander Gesco. The Treaty of Lutatius was signed with conditions unfavourable to Carthage and brought the First Punic War to its end. To celebrate his victory, Catulus built a temple to Juturna in the Campus Martius, in the area currently known as the Largo di Torre Argentina."
"The Battle of the Aegates (Italian Battaglia delle Isole Egadi) was fought off the Aegadian Islands, off the western coast of the island of Sicily on 10 March 241 BC. It was the final naval battle fought between the fleets of Carthage and the Roman Republic during the First Punic War. The better-trained Roman fleet[1] defeated a hastily raised, undermanned and ill-trained Punic fleet, which was a decisive Roman victory as Carthage sued for peace, resulting in the Peace of Lutatius leading to Carthage surrendering Sicily and some adjoining islands to Rome.
Prelude
The Carthaginians had gained command of the sea after their victory in the Battle of Drepanum and the Battle of Phintias in 249 BC, but they held only two cities in Sicily: Lilybaeum and Drepanum The Carthaginian state was led by the landed aristocracy at the time, and they preferred to expand across northern Africa instead of pursuing an aggressive policy in Sicily. Hanno "The Great"[2] was in charge of operations in Africa since 248 BC and had conquered considerable territory by 241 BC.[3] The Carthaginian leadership probably thought Rome had been defeated and invested little manpower in Sicily.[4] Carthage at this time was feeling the strain of the prolonged conflict. In addition to maintaining a fleet and soldiers in Sicily, they were also fighting the Libyans and Numidians in northern Africa.[5] As a result, Hamilcar Barca was given a fairly small army when he took command in Sicily in 248 BC, and the Carthaginian fleet was gradually withdrawn so that, by 242 BC, Carthage had no ships to speak of in Sicily.[6] Carthage was feeling the financial strain of the war, which had led Carthage to request a 2000 talent loan from Egypt, which was refused. {{sfn|Miles|2011|pp=193Rome had previously rebuilt her fleets even after losing 284 to 600 ships in a storm in 255 BC and another 150 ships in 253 BC. The Drepana defeat and loss of the fleet so demoralized the Romans that they waited seven years before building another fleet.[7][8] The absence of Roman ships probably caused Carthage, thinking the Romans would not venture into the sea again, to decommission her navy, sparing the financially strained state the expense of building, maintaining and repairing ships, plus and training and provisioning the crews.
The War 247 – 243 BC
The years preceding the battle were relatively quiet within the First Punic War. Hostilities between Roman and Carthaginian forces gradually stalled, becoming concentrated in small-scale land operations in Sicily. Hamilcar's strategic goal probably was to maintain a stalemate, as he had neither the resources to win the war nor the authority to peacefully settle it[9] Hamilcar was in command of a mercenary army composed of multiple nationalities and his ability to successfully lead this force demonstrates his skill as field commander. He employed combined arms tactics, like Alexander and Pyrrhus,[10] and his strategy was similar to the one employed by Quintus Fabius Maximus in the Second Punic War, ironically against Hannibal, the eldest son of Hamilcar Barca, in Italy during 217 BC. Hamilcar’s landing at Heirkte (near Panormus) drew the Romans away to defend that port city and resupply point and gave Drepana some breathing room. Subsequent naval raids along the Sicilian and Italian coasts obtained no permanent result, and guerrilla warfare kept the Roman legions pinned down and preserved Carthage's toehold in Sicily, although Roman forces which bypassed Hamilcar forced him to recapture Eryx from Rome, to better defend Drepana.[11]
New Model Roman Fleet
While Hamilcar’s activities kept the Carthaginian flag flying in Sicily and after 20 years of war both states were financially and demographically exhausted.[12]. Realizing they could not defeat Hamilcar on land, and without a fleet, blockade Drepana and Lilybaeum, Rome decided to build a fleet. With the state coffers exhausted, the Senate approached the citizens, and wealthy citizens, either alone or in groups, decided to show their patriotism and finance the construction of one ship apiece. The result was a fleet of approximately 200 quinqueremes, built, equipped, and crewed without government expense. The Romans had copied a Carthaginian Ship when first they decided to build a fleet in 260 BC.[13][14] The Romans modeled the new fleet based on the ship of Hannibal the Rhodian, who had repeatedly evaded the Roman blockading ships at Lilybaeum until his fast maneuverable ship was captured.[15][16][17]
Carthage Cornered
The new fleet was completed in 242 BC and entrusted to the consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus, assisted by the praetor Quintus Valerius Falto. Romans had learned from past misfortunes at sea and their light, maneuverable ships were now more resistant to adverse weather conditions, with the corvus having been abandoned. Catulus and Falto also to drilled the crews in maneuvers and exercises before leaving Italy, with a fleet at the peak of their fighting ability. After arriving in Sicily with 200 Quinqueremes and 700 transports, Lutatius seized the Harbor of Drepana and the anchorages off Lilybaeum uncontested as there was no Carthaginian ship to counter the Roman fleet. Lutatius built siege works at Drepana. And blockaded Lilybaeum (at the western tip of Sicily, now called Marsala) and Drepana, to cut the connection to Carthage. The intent was seemingly to cut Hamilcar Barca's supply and communication lines. For the rest of the year Catulus waited for the Carthaginian response. The fleet and it’s crew trained and drilled while the siege was conducted to remain in peak condition. [18][16][17] The senate granted him a proconsulship for 241 BC.
This caught the Carthaginians totally unprepared. The garrisons of Lilybaeum, Drepana and Hamilcar’s army at Eryx was held fast, but without supplies from Carthage they could not hold out indefinitely. However, Rome had seized the initiative with a battle ready fleet blockading Carthaginian holdings in Sicily, and without warships, the un escorted Carthaginian supply ships would fall prey to the Romans. Carthage began to ready a fleet, fit out transports , gather supplies and train crews and marines to meet the Roman challenge at sea. It took nine months to ready 250 warships and 150 to 350 transports. Carthage was pressed for time as supplies in their blockaded strongholds were running out, and in their haste had a hard time finding the required rowers to crew the ships and marines to man them. Hanno the Great was conducting his campaign against Numidians, so Carthage may have also suffered financial difficulties in paying for the fleet. As a result, the fleet was undermanned and the crew poorly trained, and far below in fighting quality from the Romans. Hanno, the general who had lost the Battle of Agrigentum and Battle of Ecnomuss, may have commanded the fleet, but given the had of Carthaginians to crucify defeated commanders, it is not likely. It is not known why the victors of Drepana, Adherbal and Carthalo, were not in command. [19]
Aegates Islands
The Carthaginian fleet arrived to relieve the blockade in March 241 BC. Hanno called a halt near the Western most Aegates Island (“Holy Island”) for the night, planning to use a favorable breeze to speed his fleet to Eryx. However, the Carthaginian fleet was spotted by Roman scouts and Catulus abandoned the blockade to meet his enemy. The Roman fleet sailed and anchored on the middle Island. On the morning of March 10, the Carthaginians and Hanno immediately set sail. Catulus measured the risk of attacking with the wind in his bow versus the risk of letting Hanno reach Sicily to relieve Hamilcar Barca and Lilybaeum. Despite unfavourable conditions, the proconsul decided to intercept the Carthaginians and ordered his fleet to prepare for battle. He had the Roman ships stripped of their masts, sails and other unnecessary equipment in order to make them more seaworthy in the rough conditions. Catulus himself was unable to join the actual battle because of injuries suffered in an earlier engagement, so in the actual battle the ships were commanded by his second in command, Falto. In the ensuing battle the Romans enjoyed a far greater mobility, since their vessels were carrying only the bare necessities, while the Carthaginians were burdened with men, equipment and provisions. The Carthaginian crews were also hurriedly levied and inexperienced. The Romans quickly gained the upper hand, using their ships' greater maneuverability to ram the enemy vessels. The Romans lost 30 ships sunk and another 50 damaged. 50 Carthaginian ships were sunk, 20 of them with all hands, and 70 captured along with 4,040 or 6,000 men.[20] The rest were saved only by an abrupt change in the direction of the wind, allowing them to flee from the Romans. Several rams from both Roman and Phoenician ships have been found[21] along with amphora from the cargoes and helmets.[22]
End of the First Punic War
Upon achieving decisive victory over the Carthaginian fleet, Catulus continued the land operations in Sicily against Lilybaeum, Eryx and Drepana defended by Hamilcar Barca and his army. The Carthaginian senate was reluctant to wage the war further by allocating the resources necessary to have another fleet built and manned. They ordered Hamilcar to negotiate a peace treaty with the Romans, which he left up to his subordinate commander Gesco. The Treaty of Lutatius was signed with conditions unfavourable to Carthage and brought the First Punic War to its end. To celebrate his victory, Catulus built a temple to Juturna in the Campus Martius, in the area currently known as the Largo di Torre Argentina."
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