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Responses: 18
RDML Bob Frick
12
12
0
As a member of the submarine force from 1962 to 1997 first as a white hat on a WWII Diesel and then through the the ranks on Nuclear Missile and Attacks Submarines and finally as the guy in charge of Submarine Acquisition I can tell you that in every case where we identified a submarine that had significant mechanical, electrical,, electronics and overall material failures it was primarily because the CO, XO and other senior officers avoided their responsibility and knowledge of the engineering spaces and the propulsion and auxiliary power divisions and the condition of the crew and the equipment. It was lesson one and every important lesson I learned and as a CO there was nothing Concerning the material condition of my ship or the men operating that equipment that I did not know within minutes of any event. I trusted and respected the officers and men and they returned that trust by making sure I was aware. They also took the action necessary to keep us CASREP free. Clearly in this discussion we have some officers who believe their lives are involved only on the bridge or in CIC. They should be relieved. As a Deputy Squadron Commander I had the unsatisfactory experience of riding on a few submarines that were having trouble and I relieved more than one of them on the spot due to incompetence and lack of confidence. Our crews deserve the best. They bust their butts all day everyday to keep our ships and submarines operating at 100%.
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SN Greg Wright
SN Greg Wright
>1 y
RDML Bob Frick Welcome to RP, Sir. Don't see many 1-star Mustangs around here.
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LCDR Sales & Proposals Manager Gas Turbine Products
LCDR (Join to see)
>1 y
Well Said, Sir!
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MCPO Roger Collins
MCPO Roger Collins
>1 y
I served aboard a WWII fleet submarine and followed your track, albeit not at quite as lofty a position, Admiral. From 1957-1977. One instance early on in my career, we were airing out the boat after spraying for insects, remember how you opened the FTR hatch and the ATR hatch and ran one of the diesels to pull fresh air through the boat. The duty officer got his wires crossed and shut both hatches, resulting in the destruction of the diesel engine. Nothing happened to the DO or the CO, in fact, the CO eventually became a VADM. Perhaps the name Joe Williams Jr. rings a bell. Point being, Cos and officers do not always accept responsibility for casualties. In my early days, and yours based on your input, the CO WAS responsible for the actions of his wardroom, good or bad. I don't see it much now days. Having been an Engineman early in my career, it is difficult to understand how this could have happened without more details.
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Capt Mark Strobl
6
6
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Probably should have shut her down at the high-temperature alarms. If it wasn't the CHENG's call to make, the CO should have.
Bad News: That skipper is responsible for everything the ship does... or fails to do.
Good news: That the former vacancy at MWR-Office at NAS North Island just got filled.
(6)
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SCPO Reid Flade
5
5
0
This was a major casualty that took a ship out of the fight. The combining gear was originally built in Sweden and the newer ones are built in Germany, so it's not like you can go to the local 7-11 and pick up parts. This incident shows a lack of training and failure to follow procedures. It falls directly on the CO's shoulders. This ship will be out of action for a long time.
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