Posted on Dec 19, 2017
Midway: Why the US won? Determination? Superior Ships? Damage Control?
1.31K
8
5
5
5
0
Posted in these groups: 
Military History Visualized
Military History
WWII World War Two
American History
Military History Visualized Military History WWII World War Two American History
Posted 7 y ago
Responses: 3
1
1
0
Luck more than anything else. Although we were reading the Japanese codes, knowledge doesn't fix practice. The American pilots got lost. Reading codes doesn't make someone a better pilot. So while it is "wise"/practical to give credence to American code breaking, it is only good for so much. Further more, there is attrition. The Japanese could afford to lose four carriers - honestly. We couldn't afford Yorktown. Had the task forces arrived on time, the already airborne Zeroes would have slaughtered all of them. As it was, the dive bombers arrived late as the Zeroes were landing. This allowed the dive bombers to wreak havoc on the Japanese.
As per "Shattered Sword" the Japanese ship layout was also suspicious. It would be - most of them were converted battle cruisers. Not purpose built carriers. So when Nagumo fritters away an attack opportunity because he's changing plane ordnance, that was real. The Japanese did not have an Indy 500 Pit-Crew system like the USA did. So the Japanese were going to lose at least a carrier or two regardless. That they lost four carriers was miraculous. Japanese damage control would be a buggaboo for them for the entire war. Its hard to train for defeat when you've been swimming in victory. As a result, they entered an attrition war and in August that same year, they would be strategically defeated at Guadalcanal.
As per "Shattered Sword" the Japanese ship layout was also suspicious. It would be - most of them were converted battle cruisers. Not purpose built carriers. So when Nagumo fritters away an attack opportunity because he's changing plane ordnance, that was real. The Japanese did not have an Indy 500 Pit-Crew system like the USA did. So the Japanese were going to lose at least a carrier or two regardless. That they lost four carriers was miraculous. Japanese damage control would be a buggaboo for them for the entire war. Its hard to train for defeat when you've been swimming in victory. As a result, they entered an attrition war and in August that same year, they would be strategically defeated at Guadalcanal.
(1)
(0)
SPC Andrew Ross
The point I was hoping to make, but did not spell out clearly: Had we not cracked the Japanese code, and concluded that AF was, in fact, Midway Island, there would have been no US carrier group in proximity, no flights actually searching to engage the Japanese battle group, and the outcome as such we can speculate.
(0)
(0)
PO3 Donald Murphy
SPC Andrew Ross - It was a main piece for sure, from OUR perspective. The strategic truth was that we had stemmed the Japanese tide at Coral Sea and they could not allow that. They wanted/demanded an end-all battle for positioning. We knew this from other traffic. We knew from other cracks that our failure to be demoralized and surrender/seek peace terms after Pearl, was the topic of daily high level Tokyo conversation. Bottom line? Had we not found them, they'd have come to us. Radar is still new for us and virtually non-existent to the IJN. So sea battles are still classic "whoever-sees-who-first" encounters.
By that stretch, they'd have needed to get us in the ring by June. They started the war for resource reasons. They need to haul newly conquered oil from Batavia, Dutch East Indies and Borneo to Japan. Like Germany, they started the war on a bluff. They don't have enough tankers/freighters to move the ton of resources they captured. The meager merchant fleet they have is highly vulnerable. They can't have a dominant American Navy tooling around the Pacific. So the orders of the day are to get us in the ring by any means possible. Hence, the four carrier task force. Remember also they're not expecting Yorktown. So four experienced Japanese versus two mildly experienced (in their view) American carriers, would be a non-starter.
Case in point would be the Guadalcanal slug fests. Both sides knew where the other was, yet every night, it swung back and forth with brutal combat. So not being able to surprise the other guy was not going to hinder the Japanese. Midway was an emperor mandated task. That captured oil was not going to get back to Japan on its own and any sea lane threat had to be removed. Nimitz likewise knew that a "showdown" set-piece battle would be coming. And overly confident King was pushing for it as well. So had Rochefort not been tasked with AF, the USN would more than likely have picked up the entire Japanese fleet and gone to meet them.
Worst case scenario? Another Japanese thrust at Pearl Harbor. Time is running out and the newly conquered oil needs to be pumping through Japan's veins by no later than August. Our need for an ambush was due to material shortages. We needed to buy time while our new Navy was being built. Their need for an ambush was to kill as many of us as possible. So the code breaking needs of both forces were different. Almost to the point that the Japanese were deliberately careless.
By that stretch, they'd have needed to get us in the ring by June. They started the war for resource reasons. They need to haul newly conquered oil from Batavia, Dutch East Indies and Borneo to Japan. Like Germany, they started the war on a bluff. They don't have enough tankers/freighters to move the ton of resources they captured. The meager merchant fleet they have is highly vulnerable. They can't have a dominant American Navy tooling around the Pacific. So the orders of the day are to get us in the ring by any means possible. Hence, the four carrier task force. Remember also they're not expecting Yorktown. So four experienced Japanese versus two mildly experienced (in their view) American carriers, would be a non-starter.
Case in point would be the Guadalcanal slug fests. Both sides knew where the other was, yet every night, it swung back and forth with brutal combat. So not being able to surprise the other guy was not going to hinder the Japanese. Midway was an emperor mandated task. That captured oil was not going to get back to Japan on its own and any sea lane threat had to be removed. Nimitz likewise knew that a "showdown" set-piece battle would be coming. And overly confident King was pushing for it as well. So had Rochefort not been tasked with AF, the USN would more than likely have picked up the entire Japanese fleet and gone to meet them.
Worst case scenario? Another Japanese thrust at Pearl Harbor. Time is running out and the newly conquered oil needs to be pumping through Japan's veins by no later than August. Our need for an ambush was due to material shortages. We needed to buy time while our new Navy was being built. Their need for an ambush was to kill as many of us as possible. So the code breaking needs of both forces were different. Almost to the point that the Japanese were deliberately careless.
(1)
(0)
1
1
0
0
0
0
The video is interesting, but what may have been the most important element of our success at Midway has been omitted in this discussion... The US navy had cracked Japan's coded messages, one of which said AF was going to be attacked.
Great, only, where in the sam hill is AF? That we still needed to learn, and quickly.
On a hunch, one of the men said to send a secure cable to Midway (a secure underwater communication cable connected Midway to Hawaii) instructing them to announce by radio communication that their water desalination plant was broken, and they were running out of water. The Midway base made the radio communication, and shortly afterwards the Japanese sent a coded message that AF is out of water.
At that point the navy knew Japan was going to strike at Midway Island, and our carriers were dispatched to find and engage the Japanese there.
http://www.slate.com/blogs/quora/2013/11/20/u_s_in_world_war_ii_how_the_navy_broke_japanese_codes_before_midway.html
Great, only, where in the sam hill is AF? That we still needed to learn, and quickly.
On a hunch, one of the men said to send a secure cable to Midway (a secure underwater communication cable connected Midway to Hawaii) instructing them to announce by radio communication that their water desalination plant was broken, and they were running out of water. The Midway base made the radio communication, and shortly afterwards the Japanese sent a coded message that AF is out of water.
At that point the navy knew Japan was going to strike at Midway Island, and our carriers were dispatched to find and engage the Japanese there.
http://www.slate.com/blogs/quora/2013/11/20/u_s_in_world_war_ii_how_the_navy_broke_japanese_codes_before_midway.html
(0)
(0)
Read This Next
Continue with Facebook 
Continue with Google