Posted on Nov 21, 2016
New Army Reserve chief asks whether reservists are stationed in right places
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Posted 8 y ago
Responses: 3
I see this differently. He's not so much trying to change the force structure -- the branches and units themselves -- of the Reserve, as he is trying to match the physical location of the Reserve units to where the most closely-related jobs are. I'm an Reserve Intel Officer who specializes in Cyber. Most of the cyber assets are around Fort Meade (including me) or Fort Gordon. His thinking is that, while the area has a tech sector that makes that reasonably meaningful, it may also be useful to have lots of Reserve Cyber around places like Silicon Valley, or even perhaps have most of it there. If your thinking is that you want people who are leaving Active Duty for civilian jobs to not *leave* the service and instead go/stay Reserve, this makes sense. If your thinking is that Reserve jobs should stay where their most closely-related Active counterparts are, it doesn't. I suppose I partially agree, in that having *some* Cyber forces there, when there are pretty much none now, makes sense (a BN or two), but I would think that keeping the bulk of the Cyber forces closely matched with their Active partners should remain the default.
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LTC Thomas Tennant
Your point of view is very valid. However, having dealt with previous shake ups I am wary that the staffing and analysis. There is a tendency within the OCAR & USARC staff to give the boss the packages he wants and not challenge themselves with the riggers and intellectual honesty that such a project would require. The changes in the 93-95 period were a mixture of some good and bad decisions. I still question the follow on moves of the last series of changes resulting in the 10 Regional Readiness Commands (RRC) going down to 4 Regional Support Commands (RSC).
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LTC Greg Henning
We have seen so much change over the years with the Army Reserve. No combat arms units, consolidate like units, and then decentralize by region. Where do we go next and what will the force structure look like to support future missions.
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LTC Thomas Tennant
I have the same concerns. As a former HRO (Human Resource Officer) for the Southeastern region, I helped close down the Regional Readiness Command (RRC) in Birmingham, AL and stand up the Regional Support Command (RSC) at Fort Jackson, SC. This was more than a geographical move but also a paradigm shift in how the USAR commanded and control its units.
Under the RRC concept, each of 10 RRCs were responsible for the readiness of the reserve units in their regional footprint. In addition to command and control, they provided the resources and support necessary to enhance readiness regardless of "war time trace" and structure. The RSCs only provide "base ops' support while the varies command structures provide command, control and logistical "readiness" support.
One of the critical staff elements found in the RRC and absent in the RSC was the DCSFOR. This RRC Directorate was responsible for all the "force shaping" subject areas such as the two primary of Force Structure and Force Modernization. They were also the "honest broker" and regional advocate when the "great idea and edicts" came out of USARC or DA. They were pugged into the regional demographics and knew what would or would not be supported effectively within any give locality. Sadly the "institutional knowledge" each DCSFOR represented was lost when the RRCs were disbanded.
Back in 2004, I for one fought this move towards the RSC concept. I had predicted it would cause more problems than its worth. And I have been proven right but not in time for me to have to become a "semi retired" Miltech working as a DAC at HRC as an USAR Personnel Analyst. From my new perspective surrounded by the Active Component I now under stand why and how the USAR is viewed and the reviews are mixed at best.
Under the RRC concept, each of 10 RRCs were responsible for the readiness of the reserve units in their regional footprint. In addition to command and control, they provided the resources and support necessary to enhance readiness regardless of "war time trace" and structure. The RSCs only provide "base ops' support while the varies command structures provide command, control and logistical "readiness" support.
One of the critical staff elements found in the RRC and absent in the RSC was the DCSFOR. This RRC Directorate was responsible for all the "force shaping" subject areas such as the two primary of Force Structure and Force Modernization. They were also the "honest broker" and regional advocate when the "great idea and edicts" came out of USARC or DA. They were pugged into the regional demographics and knew what would or would not be supported effectively within any give locality. Sadly the "institutional knowledge" each DCSFOR represented was lost when the RRCs were disbanded.
Back in 2004, I for one fought this move towards the RSC concept. I had predicted it would cause more problems than its worth. And I have been proven right but not in time for me to have to become a "semi retired" Miltech working as a DAC at HRC as an USAR Personnel Analyst. From my new perspective surrounded by the Active Component I now under stand why and how the USAR is viewed and the reviews are mixed at best.
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I was a Center Commander in recruiting, and the biggest problem I had was young men wanted to be reserves and not NG, but the reserves didn't offer Combat Arms positions. Once I told them that, they decided to go NG. I think the NG should be CSS since there primary mission is to the state. The reserves should have the COmbat arms units.
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