0
0
0
I want to apologize if i may have triggered anyone.
I am getting triggered as well and honestly trying to find peace and friendship. I am 3 generations of military. But I did not know my grandfather or dad were both combat vets until I was done and was well having trouble. I try to piece my history together through government reports, as that is literally what I am using, for all data, with the overlapping reality that my father and grandfather both of would of been great to talk to when things got rough and I was confused as to things when I was on my own ship.
The VA Psych Department has not gotten me a doctor in over 1 year even previous Covid, and I have had issues every since I stood up for myself and victims rights of abuse, when I finally started putting the pieces together, not being reported for landlord abuse, and made a complaint in patient advocates office which escalated. And yep when you make a complaint does it ever get really recieved well?
I mean to be honest I started to recall all the stress an insane mind blowing requirements that I could not mess up on the ship at 18 and then i started to have pride, and i was like why are you not. Protecting me, when I have a medical condition from people trying to take advantage of me, and it is my patient records.
This Mental Health Stigma keeps on being discussed at the top DOD Rand all branches etc.
If some of you read my post in the last 5 years of being on Rallypoint then you have seen some progression and development, and Rallypoint has been a good place to understand and recalibrate.
I want understanding and friends. I want to understand what you are about and what you went through so I can become a better friend, and I hope to be understood for the details, as I keep on finding articles put out by government that deals directly with my history. I am not about conspiracy theory. I am using reports from the government, “We The People” to rebuild and understand even something called mental health stigma in the military. I didn’t to make this term up. And I wonder how no one stepped in and looked a little deeper in 1998 when my Navy Army Transfer conducted at MEPS was permanently medically disqualified 1 being for psych, and I was put back on the ship without any follow up. You don’t think I was spooked at 22 when this was happening? How about 1999 when the Navy MTF doctor. Noted I had Bi Polar and Major Depression and trouble sleeping and concentrating, and my best friend fiance of 4 years was leaving me now.But still no one looked deeper what was going on with my ship assignement from 1994-1999. I was discharged honorably re1. code eligible to reenlist even with no discharge physical, and within 3 months in a psych hospital for homeless depressed medicated. I mean how was I really an re1? I was really not well. Now I realize that the VA service connects conditions that show up with in one year, if only I had known. But no one would educate as no discharge Physical took place. Think about what family member of yours might think if they saw you go through this?
But anyways I believe in GOD and I don’t blame anyone specific.
I think this all goes around non-perfect humans for whatever reason trying to create something on a budget that is given them, in this case a Navy military, and they scramble for ideas, and even how can we get more labor for less on the budget. I think there are really big failures in this, and I would say the best way it to pay 100% of what you can, fully protect your people wiling to do this. If you are really concerned about the budget and disability payments that show up on the budget regardless, you will pay upfront to secure those guys and ladies especially in an operational mode fully manned all the time no shortcuts. Losing a center fielder in Baseball because you want to save money on the budget and now trying to play the same game with 8 guys, is going to break your team in many different ways.
Is undermanning still going on?
“The thesis finds that, over the past 25 years, Navy policy changes
have resulted in decreased Destroyer manning, insufficient training due to revised methodologies, and deficient maintenance.”
THE UNRESOURCED BURDEN ON
UNITED STATES NAVY SAILORS AT SEA
By
Christine L. Fletcher
Lieutenant Commander, USN
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2018
Approved by: Nita Lewis Shattuck
Thesis Advisor
Charles Good
This thesis did not capture a similar but different scenario that would be my history.
But now with the internet, and information available I can understand and put it all together. Mental Health Stigma. PTSD a new word after I was done. Assaults and Bullying, young active duty in deck departments on a young reserve enlisted, the best setup ever, putting one your best most bright young sailors with a drive in a very outnumbered compromising position, with a skill set that did not come close to what the active duty had. All these e1 e2 e3 doing dangerous things and one e2 has such a different lack of knowledge for that ship. You will see in the following reports that Center for Navy Analysis infact documented that this enlistment he had the SAM enlistment, the Navy had no prior experience with(like the Army saying it had no previous experience with a Army Reserve or National Guard contract), and the ships he was assigned were running a “TEST” 80 percent active duty with 20 percent Reserve compared to a 100% fully manned active duty ship. Also the CNA properly documents that something over 90% of Navy Reserve are prior service, with skill sets, and know what is going on, and already veterans, and can go to the va.
1983
Center For Naval Analyses
Alternative Accession Policies for Junior Enlisted Personnel in the Naval Selected Reserve: A Total Force Perspective
“The restriction of promotion for unrated SAM’s may not be accurate, but the Naval Reserve has had no previous experience with non-prior service, non-A-school personnel, and there is some doubt that a rating could be earned through only part time on-the-job training.”
1987
Center for Naval Analyses Memorandum 87-30
Historically, most selected reservists have been Navy Veterans.
I got to breathe and relax wow...man please don’t judge me.
So if you have kids or friends or lover do you listen to them to try to find the underlying reason they are acting different like depressed confused upset etc? Is that not what the best teams and family would do?
You don’t look at them oddly and ignore them or even worse.
If you want a good team you get to know that person and grow.
I analyze things to see where it started and how to improve it.
So maybe getting to know someone in your unit who is not doing well might actually help them and improve them and make them a better more trusted individual. Maybe there is a problem in training that is out of their control and they have no idea what is going on and are feeling the results?
This person could be one of your best if you actually cared to inquire. Again it could be repairable and fixable. Maybe the training actually does have a problem for this person and you need to get him help like a battle buddy.
But in bootcamp generally the slower guy, the guy who is out of step is targeted, as the company pays in physical punishment extra work etc, by the company commander who points out the slower out of step guy is to blame. You are told that the slower guy can injure the rest when it counts. Infact that could be true. In the worst of circumstances one mistake could you know not be good by you or your teammate. One person not doing their job correctly could injure others. That is true in basically all jobs.
This is my history in bootcamp. I was varsity high school letterman athlete through high school in endurance individual and team sports cross country and track. I played baseball shortstop and pitcher as a kid all the way up to high school as an all star. So I was not the kid who was slower. I was placed as LPO in bootcamp. I won the bootcamp olympics mile and shook the hand of the Navy Seal at the finish line! I graduated meritoriously. It was competitive. We were not taught to ask each other questions and inquire if we could help others who were not doing so well keeping up. I think bootcamp obviously targeted my individual athletic mind frame for winning as if life was a sport. It was not into being someone who analyzes and knows where to go when things are not going right. Again what if it is out of your control, and you could be the fastest person know to man, but if you are given two lead shoes and did not know, and could not keep up with your guys anymore, imagine what would happen in the bootcamp type setting. YOu are going to not have a good experience.
You are going to run harder and destroy your joints slowly and panic emotionally. We are humans trying to be a part of a community and if are given an odd set of parameters like lead feet, that basically destroys your ability to fit in, at an early age, in a developmental stage such as 18, and this situation last for years until you are 23 what do you think might happen to the rest of this persons life?
It might even get more tight if you do not have much of a family at home. You left at 18 no father figure to call and ask for advice. The miliary was your family now. The older guys your uncle and older male figures to emulate.Now you wanted to be an Admiral one of those guys that go from e1 to admiral. It has happened and you heard of it. There was an example of it Admiral BOORDA the then current CNO!!!
Regardless, Mental Health Stigma. What is after bootcamp, you are given your first duty, effectively what accounts to a calculus math problem, no one has encountered let alone succeed at.
The Inspector General may just normally investigate such a situation if they were even aware it was happening. But in this case it is documented the Inspector General is noted as investigating and stating “systemic weakness in training and administration” for the command, an actual surface combatant, as found in, 1995 COMNAVRESFORINST 5040.1.
“Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships”
Just so you know, I have taken the last 8 years approximately to find as much information about my military history all with military reports and documents and investigations.When the VA denied me a homeless housing voucher and I was not doing well, I had to do anything include find any document I could to piece this puzzle piece together. How would it feel if you were a police officer or fire fighter and could not go to your association as a veteran and be recognized, and you personally were blank for what you had even experienced as you tried to forget, as you had no idea)
You are 18 and just hitting the deck plate oblivious. And your role on the ship is even more peculiar, so unusual no one can really understand the elephant in the room.
You were 18 swore an oath to defend the constitution and soon were in bootcamp. When you tell people, how young you were 18, and you are 44 now, you think wow I was a kid. And infact you were 1 year, from being considered by the Convention on the Rights of a Child, from being by definition a Child Hood Warrior as this Wikipedia discusses.
Children in the military are children (defined by the Convention on the Rights of the Child as persons under the age of 18) who are associated with military organizations, such as state armed forces and non-state armed groups.[1] Throughout history and in many cultures, children have been involved in military campaigns.[2] For example, thousands of children participated on all sides of the First World War and the Second World War.[3][4][5][6] Children may be trained and used for combat, assigned to support roles such as porters or messengers, or used for tactical advantage as human shields or for political advantage in propaganda.[1][7]
It is interesting and funny possibly how arbitrary the cut off is 17-18 when you are basically the same, when 1 day, a week before, you were a child 17, and had a birthday, and no longer a child. But people go around and i think reality says you are basically a still forming adult. You are not formed I suppose till you are like mid late 20s possibly. But a lot of things can happen in that time frame from 18 onward.
So basically, you have a head full of steam, and not much education or real life development, and listening to everything, and ready to defend your country.
So here are reports to give a better fuller idea and history. Please let me know what you think. Ask questions. Please pay attention to SAM data NRF FFG data and how the combine
1983 May
ALL HANDS
Rear Admiral Robert F. Dunn talks about reserves today
A new recruiting program could ease some of the present problems for the Naval Reserve “We have the Sea and Air Mariner Program in the works now for recruiting non-priory service people.” Admiral Dunn
Part of the settling in process with his new job involves Admiral Dunn’s carrying the word to the active Navy. He’s intent on correcting certain misconceptions: “Just because an individual wears the uniform only one weekend a month or during two weeks in the summer and someboadyuh else wears it all year, doesn’t mean that the first one is less of a sailor or less of a naval person.”
1983
Center For Naval Analyses
Alternative Accession Policies for Junior Enlisted Personnel in the Naval Selected Reserve: A Total Force Perspective
“The restriction of promotion for unrated SAM’s may not be accurate, but the Naval Reserve has had no previous experience with non-prior service, non-A-school personnel, and there is some doubt that a rating could be earned through only part time on-the-job training.”
1987
Center for Naval Analyses Memorandum 87-30
Historically, most selected reservists have been Navy Veterans.
1993 DOD Manpower Requirement Report
Naval Reserve
Age Group 17-19 1.8% 20-24 22.1% 25-29 23%
1994 DOD Manpower Requirement Reports
The Navy must be able to fill key positions to perform its mission successfully and safely. Therefore, the recruiting and retention of high caliber officer and enlisted personnel to man our technologically-sophisticated Navy remains a top priority.
Navy Manpower Requirements
Active 480.8
Selected Reserve/TAR 113.4
SAM 0.9
The Sea Air Mariner program, a non-prior service accession program inaugurated in 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personal
E. SAM II Program. Members enlisted under the SAMII program incur an 8 year MSO. The first 2 years are spent on IADT which consists of recruit training, followed by either “A” school or the Apprenticeship Training Program, and assignment on board a designated Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Fast Frigate Trainer (FFT) by the end of 1992
The Reserve Training Frigates were all inactivated in 1994, and some of them have been disposed of through Security Assistance Program (SAP) foreign military sale.
1403. Special Pay and Allowances
Naval Reserve Fleet Pay. Reservists assigned to NRF Ships are authorized an additional $10 per IDT period up to 60 IDT per FY
1992
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
Naval Reserve Force Structure
TOTAL RESERVE ‘force structure’
NRF Naval Reserve Ships 2%
1993 Report on the BOTTOM UP REVIEW
Les Aspin Secretary of Defenes
Several Conditions and initiatives define the period of Navy’s downsizing:
Active Duty Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) is stressed introduction of technologies into the fleet is accelerating, and there is continuous pressure to reduce the size of Navy Infrastructure
Currency is perishable, relevant technologies and or warfare skills appear to be a limiting factor. Most often, this can only be found in Reservists who were very recently released from active duty USN, where the skills have not yet degraded
1994 SURFACE WARFARE A TOTAL FORCE
The Total Surface Force
Post-Cold War, New World Order downsizing, rightsizing, streamlining-no matter what terminology or jargon you choose to apply, our surface force is getting smaller. At the same time, our mission and responsibilities continue unabated while trouble spots proliferate across the face of the globe. By now we are all intimately familiar with the brutal reality.
RADM Paddock “Our primary contribution in the Naval Reserve is the talents of our people,who often have many years of active duty experience in their background
All must recognize change is a way of life in the years ahead, and work constantly to improve each Naval Reserve Billet, unit and program to both reduce the risk in sustaining a smaller force and to help lower defense costs by making better use of reservists
1999 Navy’s Total Force Presidents Budget
Reserve Employment
During the 1980;s the Commander, Naval REserve Force an the Fleet CINC established a Memorandum of Understanding stipulating that the CINCs, who maintained operational control over NRF ships, would not use the ships to meet Navy Commitments. Instead, the ships operations wer devoted exclusively to training reservists for war. At the heart of it, a skeptical congress was concerned that Navy might actually use the NRF Ships, and other reservists, to “do Navy’s day to day busines” Times have changed. Training still matters, but getting a return on investment matters, too.
Policy Foundation
With regard to employment, or utilization,, Navy’s Total Force Policy OPNAV
1994
NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE
Mobilization Force Category A (reserve surface combatants and amphibious warfare ships) 16
TOTAL SHIP BATTLE FORCES 456
1994
OPNAVINST 3120.32C
SORM Standard Organization and Regulations of the US NAVY
807 A. On The Job Training. Officers and senior petty officers, in their daily association with subordinates, must encourage professional development. OJT is a personalized means of teaching and developing professional skills. All OJT must be high quality, correct, and monitored. B. Team Training. Team Training is watch/battle station assignments is best accomplished through drills and excersises import and underway.
814. Indoctrination Training. The performance of officer and enlisted personnel can be enhanced by command indoctrination programs for newly reporting personnel. These programs must clearly state command policy and, and at the same time, inform the individual that he is an important part of the command. The “welcome aboard” needs to be effective and ongoing.
Has anyone else have a similar experience?
The idea of selection boards for special forces is this to my understanding. You applied with experience, for an advanced position. Leadership will not just place you in this statistically unique position, You are put through intense scrutiny, and punishment, in a more intense bootcamp type experience, to weed out weaker candidates. Any time in this selection process you can “Ring The Bell” or Tap Out, if the selection process is to rough. You do not leave under threat of punishment of the UCMJ for abandoning your station or orders.
Now you can not tap out or ring the bell in bootcamp because it is to hard. You already signed that enlistment. You are 18 and very idealistic having just sworn an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States.
There are filters and requirements and standard built over centuries of the United States Military, for all positions operational past bootcamp
Operational Duty is where the Tip Meets the Spear where all that bootcamp training was preparing you to go all in, without question, and without complete understanding as you are 18.
But what if you are assigned orders to an operational billet in such a way that broke all tradition and standards?
You were just 2 arms and 2 legs to fill a spot in a budget cutting operational “test”.
If you abandoned these orders you were always under threat of punishment.
There was no known way to Ring The Bell.
You did not join the military with, even the thought you would tap or ring the bell.
But pain confusion and worse can seep through even the most stoic young guy.
No one is known to have 1 million pushups in day or fly a plane with no gas.
Evil Kneivel had a maximum world record setting amount of cars he could jump with his bike. And he almost died muliptle times,
There are limits and impossibilities to what a human can be expected to do.
The process of having the correct selection board application is required. For example you must prove you have reached certain marks to even apply. You most likely already have experience and education and formed a well developed full view of what you are applying for. Again you are under no threat that you do not pass selection
Your enlistment package has a lot to do with how you are going to experience the
Part of my reason for being on Rallypoint is to find someone who had a similar experience in the Navy eventually. Service Members want to be recognized for their sexuality, race, religion etc, and make friends based on similar experiences.
If you accidently set it up where 1 18 year old is having such a unique odd experience that no one has ever seen or dealt with, and therefore there is no instruction or standard, on how to monitor him, or what to monitor him for, and there are no friends having the same extreme experience then what do you think the outcome might be for this 18 year old?
I open myself to the most extreme critique. I had to download and dig through gigabytes of DOD reports over the last 7 years to finally understand what it was exactly I experienced. So if someone can review these documents with me then I think I am coming from a strong place. Infact I believe I am a subject matter expert to this point. But again I am open to examination.
Will you take a journey to investigate and confirm things for correction in the Navye4 , the year is 1994 Navy experience the year is 1994?
1994 DOD Manpower reports the following comments:
The goal is to highlight a situation for correction so it not happen again.
confirm with reports the rarity oddity of this situation, for review, correction, and education
Here are a few quotes we will “Together, these decisions constrain the ability of the Navy to recruit and retain key sailors for Naval Reserve
frigates and other important units.”
Together, these decisions constrain the ability of the Navy to recruit and retain key sailors for Naval Reserve
frigates and other important units.
Deve opment of- a .New Screening Table,
For
Sea/Air Mariners
by
Dwight F. Scott
Commander, United States Navy
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1985
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the attrition
behavior of the first accessions, fiscal year 1984 accessions,
into the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program and develop an
improved screening table for SAM applicants.
The SAM program is targeted to the El-E4
shortages identified by previous NAMMOS results.
SAMs entering the SELRES are sent to full-time training
to qualify them for their assigned rating.
The return from this training investment
comes as individuals serve their term of service and are
available for mobilization.
A typical NPS reservist who
enlists for six years and serves a complete term would serve
for 228 days. However, the return from training for a
reservist can not be measured strictly by days served, since
the reservist is liable for full-time duty at any time
during the six year period.
Reserves should seek a higher quality recruit than the
active forces because reserve personnel train only
part-time and must retain skills over .longer
periods with less practice and supervision. (Ref. 30)
https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA159551
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/39784
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG).
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/8719
Naval Reserve Force: cost and benefit analysis of reducing the number of Naval Surface Reserve Force operating budget holders
https://ia800106.us.archive.org/3/items/DTIC_ADA159551/DTIC_ADA159551.pdf
Development of a New Screening Table
For Sea/Air Mariners
SAM applicants are screened by their AFQT scores, education
level, and age using the same SCREEN table used for
regular Navy recruits. [Ref. 283 The SAM applicant, being a
moonlighter, may possess diferent attributes and attitudes
from one who enlists into the regular Navy. Additionally,
the reserve environment is quite unique. Both of these
factors would seem to indicate that there should be different
screening standards for entry into the SAM program as
opposed to those for the regular Navy.
A paper written at the Air Command and Staff College,
Washington, D.C., by Arthur Moxon stressed the effects of
active Navy policies on the SELRES forces in consonance with
the total force concept (integration of active and reserve
capabilities to maximize military effectiveness). [Ref. 249)
This total force concept is closely related to the allvolunteer
force concept, in the sense that the total force
policy assigned increased roles and responsibility to the
reserves and the termination of the draft ended the major
incentive for reserve enlistments. Moxon's major points
were:
4. Reserves should seek a higher quality recruit than the
active forces because reserve personnel train only
part-time and must retain skills over .longer
periods with less practice and supervision. (Ref. 30)
Except for the highly praised Air Reserve components,
"...the Naval Reserve continues to be criticized, sometimes
unfairly, as the least effective and most misused of -the
reserve components". [Ref.31] Moxon feels that the primary
cause for the state of reserve readiness is the persistent
unwillingness of the active Navy to give more than nominal
support to reserve forces and acknowledge the utility of
reserves in performing naval missions in both peace and war.
The term moonlighting is usually associated with
civilian employment but in this case the term can also refer
to service in the reserves. It is important that one be
aware of the differences between moonlighting in a civilian
job and moonlighting in the reserves. The following is a
list of the most relevant differences:
1. SELRES are obligated for up to six years
2. SELRES must accept military discipline
3. SELRES can be called to full-time military duty
during mobilization or civil emergency
4. Drill schedules are inflexible
5. Large travel costs to attend drills can easily
offset any gains associated with reserve service
6. SELRES attend 16 hours/month while civilian moonlighters
average 13 hours/week in a second job.
Naval History and Heritage Command
A Sampling of U.S. Naval Humanitarian Operations
Adam B. Siegel
OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT DIVISION
CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES
4401 Ford Avenue · Post Office Box 16268 · Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268
Abstract
This Information Manual provides a sampling of U.S. Naval humanitarian operations over the past four decades. It was prepared as an adjunct to CNA's work on the history of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps crisis-response activity. This manual should not be viewed as a comprehensive documentation but instead as a highlighting of a few examples of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps humanitarian activity.
I dug up 1997 DOD POPREP annual report, the earliest report I can find online, to find out how many 18 year olds signed up in to the Navy Reserve. I signed up in 1994. The figure should be similar. It was a downsizing era after the first gulf war.
I will compare the services to see the oddity and uniqueness in the Navy Reserve.
Population Representation in the Military Services
Fiscal Year 1994
December 1995
dtic quALrnrinspected
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This is the 21st annual Department of Defense report on social representation in the U.S. Military Services. The ensuing eight chapters and technical appendices provide data and commentary on demographic, educational, aptitude, and socioeconomic characteristics ofapplicants, new recruits, and enlisted and officer members ofthe Active and Reserve Components. This report covers fiscal year (FY) 1994, October 1,1993 to September 30, 1994.
The FY 1994 end-strength of the Active Component was 1.58 million and the Selected Reserve (comprising the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve) totaled 984,000. Today's force is much smaller than in the early volunteer force years, and even reduced in comparison to the size in the late 1980s; planned downsizing ofthe military is nearly complete. To sustain even this reduced strength, in FY 1994 just over 176,000 new non-prior service (NPS) recruits were enlisted and almost 16,000 newly commissioned officers reported for active duty. Furthermore, nearly 56,000 without and more than 98,000 with prior service experience were enlisted in the Selected Reserves. Close to 15,000 officers entered the National Guard or Reserves this past fiscal year as well. The salient characteristics of these personnel are described in this summary.
FY 1994 Highlights
Age. The active duty military comprises a younger workforce than the civilian sector. Service policies and legal restrictions account for the relative youthfulness of the military. Just over 90 percent ofFY 1994 new active duty recruits were 18 through 24 years of age, in comparison to 34 percent of civilians within the military-age range of 17-35.
Fiscal Year 1994: The Drawdown Draws Down
Given that a large peacetime force was fostered in response to the Cold War, it is fitting that the end of the Cold War ushered in a drawdown of forces. The drawdown is nearing completion. As shown in Figure 1.1, beginning next fiscal year, accession requirements will inch up, albeit slightly, with the completion of the drawdown.
The Total Force and its Missions
In FY 1994, end-strength of the Active Component (AC) was further reduced by 5 percent below last year's strength to 1.58 million. Although the active force is down by 20 percent from FY 1991 levels (1.91 million), the pace of reduction has slowed. The end-strength of the Selected Reserve (comprising the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve) did not top one million in FY 1994, but stood at 984,000 members-representing a reduction on the order of 15 percent from 1991 levels of 1.15 million.
Despite the end of the Cold War, defense remains a risky business. What's more, the leaner forces, who willingly choose to serve, are far from idle. Today's forces, both active and reserve, are exposed to an increasingly quick and stressful operating and personnel tempo (OPTEMPO & PERSTEMPO). They train for and participate in war and other-than-war related missions to combat hostile regional powers, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the ravages of ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and the illegal drug trade, and to promote peace, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.
Table 23- Age of FY 1994 Active Component NPS Accessions, bv Service, and Civilians 17-35 Years Old (percent)
Age
17 18 19
Army 3.5 26.5 22.3
Navy 3.9 33.8 25.4
Marine
Corps 4.7 40.8 27.0
Air
Force 3.0 32.9 25.3
Age. Substantive differences exist among the Reserve Components in the proportion of enlisted members in various age groups, as shown in Table 5.7. The Air Force Reserve Components (ANG and USAFR) have the "oldest" members -- with 34 and 32 percent, respectively, of enlisted members 40 years of age or older. These proportions are strikingly different from the Active Components and other Reserve Components. For example, only 3 percent of USMCR enlisted members are 40 or older.
Age differences among the Components result from diverse mission requirements and retention. The mission drives the NPS/prior service mix in each of the Reserve Components. For example, the "labor-intensive" requirements of infantry and other ground combat units usually mandate the need for younger individuals, while "equipment-intensive" requirements demand more formal training. Normally, longer training periods result in the Services seeking recruits for longer terms of enlistment or maintaining a force with greater experience. Individuals in equipment-intensive or high-technology fields, such as those found more often in the USNR, ANG, and USAFR, usually are more experienced, and therefore are older.
Table 5-7. FY 1994 Selected Reserve Enlisted Members, by Age aad Component,
(Percent)
Age
Group
17-19
Army
National
Guard
7.3
Army Reserve
9.7
Naval
Reserve
1.7
Marine Corps Reserve
11.7
Air Force Reserve
0.7
Age differences among the Components result from diverse mission requirements and retention. The mission drives the NPS/prior service mix in each of the Reserve Components. For example, the "labor-intensive" requirements of infantry and other ground combat units usually mandate the need for younger individuals, while "equipment-intensive" requirements demand more formal training. Normally, longer training periods result in the Services seeking recruits for longer terms of enlistment or maintaining a force with greater experience. Individuals in equipment-intensive or high-technology fields, such as those found more often in the USNR, ANG, and USAFR, usually are more experienced, and therefore are older.
Appendix C:
Selected Reserve Enlisted Accessions, Enlisted
Force, Officer Accessions, and Officer Corps Tables
Table C-1. FY 1997 NPS Selected Reserve Enlisted Accessions by Age Group, Component, and Gender with Civilian Comparison Group
(Numbers)
17-19
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
Male 11,412
ARMY RESERVE
Male 6,525
NAVAL RESERVE
Male 13
MARINE CORPS RESERVE
Male 4,021
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
Male 1,299
AIR FORCE RESERVE
Male 285
TOTAL DoD
Male 23,555
Table 5.2. FY 1998 Selected Reserve Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accessions, by Age and Component, and Civilian Labor Force 17–35 Years Old (Percent)
Age
Group
17-19
Army
National
Guard
62.5
Army Reserve
68.9
Naval
Reserve
0.2
Marine Corps Reserve
65.9
Air Force Reserve
39.2
Total DoD
60.8
Table 5.2. FY 2000 Selected Reserve Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accessions, by Age and Component,
and Civilian Labor Force 17–35 Years Old (Percent)
Age
Group
Army
National
Guard
65.9
Naval
Reserve
0.3
Table 5.8. FY 2000 Selected Reserve Enlisted Members, by Age and Component,
and Civilian Labor Force Over 16 Years Old (Percent)
Age
Group
17–19
Naval
Reserve
0.9
Non-Prior Service
Reserve Enlistments
Supply Estimates and Forecasts
Published 1991 by RAND
Hong W. Tan
The recruiter projections are treated somewhat differently for
the Naval Reserve. Although this component reported increases
in the number of recruiters in the first two years of the forecast
period (from 958 to 1056 recruiters), all of the increase probably
went to PS recruiting rather than to SAM recruiting. This was the
result of an institutional decision to reduce SAM recruiting goals
in FY 1988, brought about by Navy concerns over the mismatch
between a desired ratings mix and an annual recruiting goal of
10,000 SAMs. Reflecting this institutional decision, the number of
SAM recruiters is tied instead to SAM goals and these decline
over the forecast period.
Table B.3 lists the recruiter figures projected under these
alternative assumptions.
8Sea and Air Mariners in the early years of the program apparently had limited
opportunities for training except in simulators. Reportedly, this may account for
lower enlistment rates in the midwest; those with a Navy preference tended to
enlist in the active component rather than in the SAM program.
7 The Sea/Air Mariners (SAM) program was similar to the proposed alternative in this thesis in that
new Reserve recruits attended full basic training with their active-duty counterparts. This program was
Discontinued.
14 The Sea/Air Mariners (SAM) program recruited individuals into the Naval Reserve, providing the
individual with a maximum of 12 months of active duty for training before joining a Reserve unit. This
program targeted the E1-E4 shortages the Navy was experiencing and has since been discontinued and
replaced with the current Naval Reserve Accession Course (NRAC) program.
B. RESERVE RECRUITING SINCE FISCAL YEAR 2000
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2000, the Naval Reserve established the Non-prior Service
Accession Course (NPSAC), now known as the Naval Reserve Accession Course
(NRAC). NRAC includes two recruiting programs: the Advanced Pay-Grade (APG)
program, which accesses personnel into temporary rates and pay-grades from E-3 to E-5;
and the Accelerated Initial Accession (AIA) program, which accesses non-rated
personnel into the temporary pay-grade of E-3.15 These recruiting programs are in
addition to the traditional recruiting of NAVETS and OSVETS into the Reserves.
A major difference between the original accession of non-prior service personnel
and the current NRAC program is that full basic training and A-school advanced training
are not provided in the newer program. The elimination of this training has had a
profound effect on readiness and mobilization due to the increased time it takes for an
NPS recruit under the NRAC program to complete necessary training requirements.16
Another difference between the two programs is that the original program
targeted individuals directly out of high school, while recruits into NRAC have until very
recently been between 26 and 37 years of age. This age requirement was imposed with
the idea that older NPS individuals would be more mature, and would have higher levels
of education and work experience. Theoretically, these qualities would enhance the value
of the individual to the Reserve Force.
One of the major issues that exacerbates the problem is that the attrition
rate for NPS individuals is extremely high, averaging 35 to 40 percent for two years of
service. NPS personnel account for over 60 percent of losses across the military
Reserves Components.18
17
VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The current Reserve NPS accession program is a successful recruiting tool that
attracts quality individuals into the Reserves. One of the reasons for its success is the
relatively short basic training period of 17 days. However, it is also the program’s
biggest disadvantage since all Reservists must complete 84 days of active training before
they can be deployed or mobilized. Because the majority of this training time is done
through drill weekends, it takes an average of 2.3 years per NPS accession before they
become fully qualified Reserve assets.
New Reserve accessions would receive the required training immediately,
enhancing their performance and readiness to fulfill the requirements of the billets
assigned. This training would be conducted alongside their active duty enlisted
counterparts, aligning the two Components more closely and streamlining the training
process. With the initiative underway to integrate the Naval Reserve Force with active
duty Navy, this training proposal would foster integration from the time of enlistment.
Additionally, NPS personnel would no longer be constrained from deploying,
participating in active-duty exercises, and mobilizing. This would greatly increase both
individual, unit, and overall Reserve readiness. Even with negative effects on end
strength, the Reserve units would be more fully qualified to complete their missions since
each NPS individual would have all necessary baseline training and could participate and
contribute to all Reserve unit tasks. The Reserve Centers would be better equipped to
handle their full-time responsibilities, improving customer service to all drilling
Reservists.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
REPORT
FOR FY 1990
E. Key Manpower Issues
1. Medical Department Officer Shortfall and Planned Growth
It is the position of Congress that the Navy is not providing
an adequate level of access of care to military beneficiaries.
The Navy is committed to providing an adequate level of health
care. However, attaining end strength targets is complicated by a
national nursing shortage and an inability to recruit and retain the
correct physician specialty mix. In light of this the Navy has undertaken
significant initiatives to increase medical officer end strength
in FY 1989 and beyond:
C. Civilian Component
Civilians constitute approximately one-third or 1.1 million of
the Department's active manpower. Civilians occupy roles that do not
require military incumbents. Our civilian work force repairs airplanes,
ships, and tanks; provides research, medical, communications, and logistical
support; and operates and maintains military installations. They
contribute directly to the..readiness of the armed forces. Civilian
strength is projectod-V6'decline by 4,566 end strength (0.4 percent)
between FY ljS9-•nd FY 1990.
C. Civilian Manpower
1. General
Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of Navy's overall
resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees directly support our
fleet readiness posture. Approximately half of them work in industrial
activities, performing depot maintenance and repair, engineering, RDT&E,
printing, public works, and transportation functions essential to the
readiness of the fleet. Many of the Navy's civilians employed at operation
and maintenance activities perform essential readiness support in
supply centers, air stations, and ship and aircraft repair and maintenance
facilities. The balance of the civilians provide essential support
in functions such as training, medical care, engineering, development,
and acquisition, all of which have an indirect but important impact on
readiness.
Wartime manpower requirements include 19,053 additional people
needed on M-Day and 51,365 new positions. Therefore, Navy needs to
procure more than 70,418 new hires over the 180-day mobilization scenerio.
These requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, such as
depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and missiles, as well
as associated equipment and supply support.
I. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICY, AND DEFENSE MANPOWER.
To supplement the active component units some reserve
component units must be maintained in a combat ready state for immediate
call up for limited periods.
Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military, civilian
personnel, contract resources, and host nation support. Mlanpower requirements
are developed based on the forces required to execute our military
strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by
fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the
event of war,
THE TOTAL FORCE.
The structure of our armed forces is based on the DoD Total Force
Policy which recognizes that all elements of the structure contribute to
national defense. Those elements include the Active and Reserve Components,
civilian workforce, and retired military, host nation. support, and DoD
Contractors.-,
1. Navy Total Force
A Total Force Advocate flag officer billet within the Plans,
Policy and Operations Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations assesses the optimum mix of Active and Reserve Component
manpower and units in the Navy. With analytical support from the Center
for Naval Analyses, potential changes in Total Force composition are
evaluated to determine whether the Naval Reserve can shoulder a larger
share of peacetime naval operations and is able to train and be equipped
to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in wartime.
By the mid-199Ots, the US Naval Reserve (measured in manpower,
ships, and aircraft) will become the tenth most powerful naval
force in the world. Combined and thoroughly integrated with the Active
Navy, this Total Force will ensure that the United States will prevail in
k any conflict at sea.
However, past decisions to assign significant combat and combat
support capabilities to the Naval Reserve were not supported by the
Congress when authorizing Naval Reserve end strength growth
Further, despite several years of requests for legislative authority for
incentives for hard-to-man units to help attract the quality and skill
mix needed to man the programmed growth in the Naval Reserve, such
authority was not granted.
Together, these decisions constrain the ability of the Navy to recruit and retain key sailors for Naval Reserve
frigates and other important units.
II. Significant Program Highlights
A. Active Component Military Manpower
1. General
Navy's highest priority continues to be the accession and
retention of manpower in the necessary quantity and quality to meet operational requirements. People are as integral to new weapon systems as
hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, Navy
continues to focus on retaining those enlisted and officer personnel
whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose
talents are in shortest supply. End strength authorizations, critical
skill retention, and a quality of life for service members and their
families that encourages retention will determine our ability to man the
modern Navy.
B. Reserve Component Military Manpower
The phrase "mutual support" has been adopted to
describe those Naval Reserve training evolutions that simultaneously
provide direct assistance to active duty units in performing their
missions.
(1) General. A major component of Navy's growth toward
the goal of 600 ships is occurring in the Naval Reserve, now well underway
in the most ambitious expansion effort in recent history. Navy
endeavors to use limited resources with optimum efficiency, while remaining
prepared to respond rapidly to crises, accomplish heavy training
requirements, and maintain Fleet readiness.
Mobilization Forces Category "A"
In FY 1989 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will
increase by two ships to a total of 27 with the addition of two frigates
and one mine countermeasure ship and the loss of one destroyer.
5. TAR End Strength Shortfall
In the 1986 Report to the Congress on Navy's Total Force,
Navy addressed SECNAV's policy to man FF-1052 and FFG-7 ships with
approximately a 30%/70% active/TAR crew mix. Between FY 1987 and FY
1989, programmed TAR growth has been reduced by 4,987 because of Congressional
actions. One thousand of these billets were originally programmed
for Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
The assignment of additional MPN assets to ensure proper manning of NRF ships places an
even greater demand on the constrained active duty manpower.
The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program was inaugurated
in FY 1984, to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel
mobilization requirements (E-3 and below).
(3) Reserve Skill and Grade. Table IV-6 reflects a marked rate imbalance in the FY 1988 Selected Reserve. The imbalance results from the increased emphasis on placing E-3 and below and junior
officer requirements in the Reserve Force. The SAM program is meeting
some of these junior enlisted mobilization requirements.
1993 and 1994 DOD Manpower Requirements Report the following on the SAM enlistment I signed in 1994. Now 2021, I realize I signed a Navy enlistment that was being drawn down, to leave room for more experienced vetearn personnel coming off of active duty.
There were 2 versions for the SAM.
The Sea and Air Mariner program, inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel. An offshoot of this program is the Sea and Air Mariner II (SAM II) program, a non-prior ser- vice accession program in support of the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept (INRC) program. Individuals entering the SAM II program serve two years on Initial Active Duty Training, during which they attend recruit training Apprentice Training Program or "A" school followed by assignment to an FFT 1052 class ship.
Population
Representation
in the Military Services
Fiscal Year 2000
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This is the 27th annual Department of Defense (DoD) report on social representation in
the U.S. Military Services. In response to a mandate by the Senate Committee on Armed
Services (Report 93-884, May 1974), the Directorate for Accession Policy, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) has provided annual data addressing
the quality and representativeness of military personnel since fiscal year (FY) 1975. Originally,
the report was limited to an assessment of the active duty enlisted force only. In keeping with an
increased emphasis and reliance on a Total Force, Accession Policy has expanded this effort to
include statistics not only for enlisted personnel but also for officers and res
I am getting triggered as well and honestly trying to find peace and friendship. I am 3 generations of military. But I did not know my grandfather or dad were both combat vets until I was done and was well having trouble. I try to piece my history together through government reports, as that is literally what I am using, for all data, with the overlapping reality that my father and grandfather both of would of been great to talk to when things got rough and I was confused as to things when I was on my own ship.
The VA Psych Department has not gotten me a doctor in over 1 year even previous Covid, and I have had issues every since I stood up for myself and victims rights of abuse, when I finally started putting the pieces together, not being reported for landlord abuse, and made a complaint in patient advocates office which escalated. And yep when you make a complaint does it ever get really recieved well?
I mean to be honest I started to recall all the stress an insane mind blowing requirements that I could not mess up on the ship at 18 and then i started to have pride, and i was like why are you not. Protecting me, when I have a medical condition from people trying to take advantage of me, and it is my patient records.
This Mental Health Stigma keeps on being discussed at the top DOD Rand all branches etc.
If some of you read my post in the last 5 years of being on Rallypoint then you have seen some progression and development, and Rallypoint has been a good place to understand and recalibrate.
I want understanding and friends. I want to understand what you are about and what you went through so I can become a better friend, and I hope to be understood for the details, as I keep on finding articles put out by government that deals directly with my history. I am not about conspiracy theory. I am using reports from the government, “We The People” to rebuild and understand even something called mental health stigma in the military. I didn’t to make this term up. And I wonder how no one stepped in and looked a little deeper in 1998 when my Navy Army Transfer conducted at MEPS was permanently medically disqualified 1 being for psych, and I was put back on the ship without any follow up. You don’t think I was spooked at 22 when this was happening? How about 1999 when the Navy MTF doctor. Noted I had Bi Polar and Major Depression and trouble sleeping and concentrating, and my best friend fiance of 4 years was leaving me now.But still no one looked deeper what was going on with my ship assignement from 1994-1999. I was discharged honorably re1. code eligible to reenlist even with no discharge physical, and within 3 months in a psych hospital for homeless depressed medicated. I mean how was I really an re1? I was really not well. Now I realize that the VA service connects conditions that show up with in one year, if only I had known. But no one would educate as no discharge Physical took place. Think about what family member of yours might think if they saw you go through this?
But anyways I believe in GOD and I don’t blame anyone specific.
I think this all goes around non-perfect humans for whatever reason trying to create something on a budget that is given them, in this case a Navy military, and they scramble for ideas, and even how can we get more labor for less on the budget. I think there are really big failures in this, and I would say the best way it to pay 100% of what you can, fully protect your people wiling to do this. If you are really concerned about the budget and disability payments that show up on the budget regardless, you will pay upfront to secure those guys and ladies especially in an operational mode fully manned all the time no shortcuts. Losing a center fielder in Baseball because you want to save money on the budget and now trying to play the same game with 8 guys, is going to break your team in many different ways.
Is undermanning still going on?
“The thesis finds that, over the past 25 years, Navy policy changes
have resulted in decreased Destroyer manning, insufficient training due to revised methodologies, and deficient maintenance.”
THE UNRESOURCED BURDEN ON
UNITED STATES NAVY SAILORS AT SEA
By
Christine L. Fletcher
Lieutenant Commander, USN
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2018
Approved by: Nita Lewis Shattuck
Thesis Advisor
Charles Good
This thesis did not capture a similar but different scenario that would be my history.
But now with the internet, and information available I can understand and put it all together. Mental Health Stigma. PTSD a new word after I was done. Assaults and Bullying, young active duty in deck departments on a young reserve enlisted, the best setup ever, putting one your best most bright young sailors with a drive in a very outnumbered compromising position, with a skill set that did not come close to what the active duty had. All these e1 e2 e3 doing dangerous things and one e2 has such a different lack of knowledge for that ship. You will see in the following reports that Center for Navy Analysis infact documented that this enlistment he had the SAM enlistment, the Navy had no prior experience with(like the Army saying it had no previous experience with a Army Reserve or National Guard contract), and the ships he was assigned were running a “TEST” 80 percent active duty with 20 percent Reserve compared to a 100% fully manned active duty ship. Also the CNA properly documents that something over 90% of Navy Reserve are prior service, with skill sets, and know what is going on, and already veterans, and can go to the va.
1983
Center For Naval Analyses
Alternative Accession Policies for Junior Enlisted Personnel in the Naval Selected Reserve: A Total Force Perspective
“The restriction of promotion for unrated SAM’s may not be accurate, but the Naval Reserve has had no previous experience with non-prior service, non-A-school personnel, and there is some doubt that a rating could be earned through only part time on-the-job training.”
1987
Center for Naval Analyses Memorandum 87-30
Historically, most selected reservists have been Navy Veterans.
I got to breathe and relax wow...man please don’t judge me.
So if you have kids or friends or lover do you listen to them to try to find the underlying reason they are acting different like depressed confused upset etc? Is that not what the best teams and family would do?
You don’t look at them oddly and ignore them or even worse.
If you want a good team you get to know that person and grow.
I analyze things to see where it started and how to improve it.
So maybe getting to know someone in your unit who is not doing well might actually help them and improve them and make them a better more trusted individual. Maybe there is a problem in training that is out of their control and they have no idea what is going on and are feeling the results?
This person could be one of your best if you actually cared to inquire. Again it could be repairable and fixable. Maybe the training actually does have a problem for this person and you need to get him help like a battle buddy.
But in bootcamp generally the slower guy, the guy who is out of step is targeted, as the company pays in physical punishment extra work etc, by the company commander who points out the slower out of step guy is to blame. You are told that the slower guy can injure the rest when it counts. Infact that could be true. In the worst of circumstances one mistake could you know not be good by you or your teammate. One person not doing their job correctly could injure others. That is true in basically all jobs.
This is my history in bootcamp. I was varsity high school letterman athlete through high school in endurance individual and team sports cross country and track. I played baseball shortstop and pitcher as a kid all the way up to high school as an all star. So I was not the kid who was slower. I was placed as LPO in bootcamp. I won the bootcamp olympics mile and shook the hand of the Navy Seal at the finish line! I graduated meritoriously. It was competitive. We were not taught to ask each other questions and inquire if we could help others who were not doing so well keeping up. I think bootcamp obviously targeted my individual athletic mind frame for winning as if life was a sport. It was not into being someone who analyzes and knows where to go when things are not going right. Again what if it is out of your control, and you could be the fastest person know to man, but if you are given two lead shoes and did not know, and could not keep up with your guys anymore, imagine what would happen in the bootcamp type setting. YOu are going to not have a good experience.
You are going to run harder and destroy your joints slowly and panic emotionally. We are humans trying to be a part of a community and if are given an odd set of parameters like lead feet, that basically destroys your ability to fit in, at an early age, in a developmental stage such as 18, and this situation last for years until you are 23 what do you think might happen to the rest of this persons life?
It might even get more tight if you do not have much of a family at home. You left at 18 no father figure to call and ask for advice. The miliary was your family now. The older guys your uncle and older male figures to emulate.Now you wanted to be an Admiral one of those guys that go from e1 to admiral. It has happened and you heard of it. There was an example of it Admiral BOORDA the then current CNO!!!
Regardless, Mental Health Stigma. What is after bootcamp, you are given your first duty, effectively what accounts to a calculus math problem, no one has encountered let alone succeed at.
The Inspector General may just normally investigate such a situation if they were even aware it was happening. But in this case it is documented the Inspector General is noted as investigating and stating “systemic weakness in training and administration” for the command, an actual surface combatant, as found in, 1995 COMNAVRESFORINST 5040.1.
“Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships”
Just so you know, I have taken the last 8 years approximately to find as much information about my military history all with military reports and documents and investigations.When the VA denied me a homeless housing voucher and I was not doing well, I had to do anything include find any document I could to piece this puzzle piece together. How would it feel if you were a police officer or fire fighter and could not go to your association as a veteran and be recognized, and you personally were blank for what you had even experienced as you tried to forget, as you had no idea)
You are 18 and just hitting the deck plate oblivious. And your role on the ship is even more peculiar, so unusual no one can really understand the elephant in the room.
You were 18 swore an oath to defend the constitution and soon were in bootcamp. When you tell people, how young you were 18, and you are 44 now, you think wow I was a kid. And infact you were 1 year, from being considered by the Convention on the Rights of a Child, from being by definition a Child Hood Warrior as this Wikipedia discusses.
Children in the military are children (defined by the Convention on the Rights of the Child as persons under the age of 18) who are associated with military organizations, such as state armed forces and non-state armed groups.[1] Throughout history and in many cultures, children have been involved in military campaigns.[2] For example, thousands of children participated on all sides of the First World War and the Second World War.[3][4][5][6] Children may be trained and used for combat, assigned to support roles such as porters or messengers, or used for tactical advantage as human shields or for political advantage in propaganda.[1][7]
It is interesting and funny possibly how arbitrary the cut off is 17-18 when you are basically the same, when 1 day, a week before, you were a child 17, and had a birthday, and no longer a child. But people go around and i think reality says you are basically a still forming adult. You are not formed I suppose till you are like mid late 20s possibly. But a lot of things can happen in that time frame from 18 onward.
So basically, you have a head full of steam, and not much education or real life development, and listening to everything, and ready to defend your country.
So here are reports to give a better fuller idea and history. Please let me know what you think. Ask questions. Please pay attention to SAM data NRF FFG data and how the combine
1983 May
ALL HANDS
Rear Admiral Robert F. Dunn talks about reserves today
A new recruiting program could ease some of the present problems for the Naval Reserve “We have the Sea and Air Mariner Program in the works now for recruiting non-priory service people.” Admiral Dunn
Part of the settling in process with his new job involves Admiral Dunn’s carrying the word to the active Navy. He’s intent on correcting certain misconceptions: “Just because an individual wears the uniform only one weekend a month or during two weeks in the summer and someboadyuh else wears it all year, doesn’t mean that the first one is less of a sailor or less of a naval person.”
1983
Center For Naval Analyses
Alternative Accession Policies for Junior Enlisted Personnel in the Naval Selected Reserve: A Total Force Perspective
“The restriction of promotion for unrated SAM’s may not be accurate, but the Naval Reserve has had no previous experience with non-prior service, non-A-school personnel, and there is some doubt that a rating could be earned through only part time on-the-job training.”
1987
Center for Naval Analyses Memorandum 87-30
Historically, most selected reservists have been Navy Veterans.
1993 DOD Manpower Requirement Report
Naval Reserve
Age Group 17-19 1.8% 20-24 22.1% 25-29 23%
1994 DOD Manpower Requirement Reports
The Navy must be able to fill key positions to perform its mission successfully and safely. Therefore, the recruiting and retention of high caliber officer and enlisted personnel to man our technologically-sophisticated Navy remains a top priority.
Navy Manpower Requirements
Active 480.8
Selected Reserve/TAR 113.4
SAM 0.9
The Sea Air Mariner program, a non-prior service accession program inaugurated in 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personal
E. SAM II Program. Members enlisted under the SAMII program incur an 8 year MSO. The first 2 years are spent on IADT which consists of recruit training, followed by either “A” school or the Apprenticeship Training Program, and assignment on board a designated Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Fast Frigate Trainer (FFT) by the end of 1992
The Reserve Training Frigates were all inactivated in 1994, and some of them have been disposed of through Security Assistance Program (SAP) foreign military sale.
1403. Special Pay and Allowances
Naval Reserve Fleet Pay. Reservists assigned to NRF Ships are authorized an additional $10 per IDT period up to 60 IDT per FY
1992
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
Naval Reserve Force Structure
TOTAL RESERVE ‘force structure’
NRF Naval Reserve Ships 2%
1993 Report on the BOTTOM UP REVIEW
Les Aspin Secretary of Defenes
Several Conditions and initiatives define the period of Navy’s downsizing:
Active Duty Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) is stressed introduction of technologies into the fleet is accelerating, and there is continuous pressure to reduce the size of Navy Infrastructure
Currency is perishable, relevant technologies and or warfare skills appear to be a limiting factor. Most often, this can only be found in Reservists who were very recently released from active duty USN, where the skills have not yet degraded
1994 SURFACE WARFARE A TOTAL FORCE
The Total Surface Force
Post-Cold War, New World Order downsizing, rightsizing, streamlining-no matter what terminology or jargon you choose to apply, our surface force is getting smaller. At the same time, our mission and responsibilities continue unabated while trouble spots proliferate across the face of the globe. By now we are all intimately familiar with the brutal reality.
RADM Paddock “Our primary contribution in the Naval Reserve is the talents of our people,who often have many years of active duty experience in their background
All must recognize change is a way of life in the years ahead, and work constantly to improve each Naval Reserve Billet, unit and program to both reduce the risk in sustaining a smaller force and to help lower defense costs by making better use of reservists
1999 Navy’s Total Force Presidents Budget
Reserve Employment
During the 1980;s the Commander, Naval REserve Force an the Fleet CINC established a Memorandum of Understanding stipulating that the CINCs, who maintained operational control over NRF ships, would not use the ships to meet Navy Commitments. Instead, the ships operations wer devoted exclusively to training reservists for war. At the heart of it, a skeptical congress was concerned that Navy might actually use the NRF Ships, and other reservists, to “do Navy’s day to day busines” Times have changed. Training still matters, but getting a return on investment matters, too.
Policy Foundation
With regard to employment, or utilization,, Navy’s Total Force Policy OPNAV
1994
NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE
Mobilization Force Category A (reserve surface combatants and amphibious warfare ships) 16
TOTAL SHIP BATTLE FORCES 456
1994
OPNAVINST 3120.32C
SORM Standard Organization and Regulations of the US NAVY
807 A. On The Job Training. Officers and senior petty officers, in their daily association with subordinates, must encourage professional development. OJT is a personalized means of teaching and developing professional skills. All OJT must be high quality, correct, and monitored. B. Team Training. Team Training is watch/battle station assignments is best accomplished through drills and excersises import and underway.
814. Indoctrination Training. The performance of officer and enlisted personnel can be enhanced by command indoctrination programs for newly reporting personnel. These programs must clearly state command policy and, and at the same time, inform the individual that he is an important part of the command. The “welcome aboard” needs to be effective and ongoing.
Has anyone else have a similar experience?
The idea of selection boards for special forces is this to my understanding. You applied with experience, for an advanced position. Leadership will not just place you in this statistically unique position, You are put through intense scrutiny, and punishment, in a more intense bootcamp type experience, to weed out weaker candidates. Any time in this selection process you can “Ring The Bell” or Tap Out, if the selection process is to rough. You do not leave under threat of punishment of the UCMJ for abandoning your station or orders.
Now you can not tap out or ring the bell in bootcamp because it is to hard. You already signed that enlistment. You are 18 and very idealistic having just sworn an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States.
There are filters and requirements and standard built over centuries of the United States Military, for all positions operational past bootcamp
Operational Duty is where the Tip Meets the Spear where all that bootcamp training was preparing you to go all in, without question, and without complete understanding as you are 18.
But what if you are assigned orders to an operational billet in such a way that broke all tradition and standards?
You were just 2 arms and 2 legs to fill a spot in a budget cutting operational “test”.
If you abandoned these orders you were always under threat of punishment.
There was no known way to Ring The Bell.
You did not join the military with, even the thought you would tap or ring the bell.
But pain confusion and worse can seep through even the most stoic young guy.
No one is known to have 1 million pushups in day or fly a plane with no gas.
Evil Kneivel had a maximum world record setting amount of cars he could jump with his bike. And he almost died muliptle times,
There are limits and impossibilities to what a human can be expected to do.
The process of having the correct selection board application is required. For example you must prove you have reached certain marks to even apply. You most likely already have experience and education and formed a well developed full view of what you are applying for. Again you are under no threat that you do not pass selection
Your enlistment package has a lot to do with how you are going to experience the
Part of my reason for being on Rallypoint is to find someone who had a similar experience in the Navy eventually. Service Members want to be recognized for their sexuality, race, religion etc, and make friends based on similar experiences.
If you accidently set it up where 1 18 year old is having such a unique odd experience that no one has ever seen or dealt with, and therefore there is no instruction or standard, on how to monitor him, or what to monitor him for, and there are no friends having the same extreme experience then what do you think the outcome might be for this 18 year old?
I open myself to the most extreme critique. I had to download and dig through gigabytes of DOD reports over the last 7 years to finally understand what it was exactly I experienced. So if someone can review these documents with me then I think I am coming from a strong place. Infact I believe I am a subject matter expert to this point. But again I am open to examination.
Will you take a journey to investigate and confirm things for correction in the Navye4 , the year is 1994 Navy experience the year is 1994?
1994 DOD Manpower reports the following comments:
The goal is to highlight a situation for correction so it not happen again.
confirm with reports the rarity oddity of this situation, for review, correction, and education
Here are a few quotes we will “Together, these decisions constrain the ability of the Navy to recruit and retain key sailors for Naval Reserve
frigates and other important units.”
Together, these decisions constrain the ability of the Navy to recruit and retain key sailors for Naval Reserve
frigates and other important units.
Deve opment of- a .New Screening Table,
For
Sea/Air Mariners
by
Dwight F. Scott
Commander, United States Navy
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1985
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the attrition
behavior of the first accessions, fiscal year 1984 accessions,
into the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program and develop an
improved screening table for SAM applicants.
The SAM program is targeted to the El-E4
shortages identified by previous NAMMOS results.
SAMs entering the SELRES are sent to full-time training
to qualify them for their assigned rating.
The return from this training investment
comes as individuals serve their term of service and are
available for mobilization.
A typical NPS reservist who
enlists for six years and serves a complete term would serve
for 228 days. However, the return from training for a
reservist can not be measured strictly by days served, since
the reservist is liable for full-time duty at any time
during the six year period.
Reserves should seek a higher quality recruit than the
active forces because reserve personnel train only
part-time and must retain skills over .longer
periods with less practice and supervision. (Ref. 30)
https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA159551
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/39784
A cost comparison between active and naval reserve force FFG-7 class ships
This thesis is a cost comparison between Active Fleet and Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates (FFG).
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/8719
Naval Reserve Force: cost and benefit analysis of reducing the number of Naval Surface Reserve Force operating budget holders
https://ia800106.us.archive.org/3/items/DTIC_ADA159551/DTIC_ADA159551.pdf
Development of a New Screening Table
For Sea/Air Mariners
SAM applicants are screened by their AFQT scores, education
level, and age using the same SCREEN table used for
regular Navy recruits. [Ref. 283 The SAM applicant, being a
moonlighter, may possess diferent attributes and attitudes
from one who enlists into the regular Navy. Additionally,
the reserve environment is quite unique. Both of these
factors would seem to indicate that there should be different
screening standards for entry into the SAM program as
opposed to those for the regular Navy.
A paper written at the Air Command and Staff College,
Washington, D.C., by Arthur Moxon stressed the effects of
active Navy policies on the SELRES forces in consonance with
the total force concept (integration of active and reserve
capabilities to maximize military effectiveness). [Ref. 249)
This total force concept is closely related to the allvolunteer
force concept, in the sense that the total force
policy assigned increased roles and responsibility to the
reserves and the termination of the draft ended the major
incentive for reserve enlistments. Moxon's major points
were:
4. Reserves should seek a higher quality recruit than the
active forces because reserve personnel train only
part-time and must retain skills over .longer
periods with less practice and supervision. (Ref. 30)
Except for the highly praised Air Reserve components,
"...the Naval Reserve continues to be criticized, sometimes
unfairly, as the least effective and most misused of -the
reserve components". [Ref.31] Moxon feels that the primary
cause for the state of reserve readiness is the persistent
unwillingness of the active Navy to give more than nominal
support to reserve forces and acknowledge the utility of
reserves in performing naval missions in both peace and war.
The term moonlighting is usually associated with
civilian employment but in this case the term can also refer
to service in the reserves. It is important that one be
aware of the differences between moonlighting in a civilian
job and moonlighting in the reserves. The following is a
list of the most relevant differences:
1. SELRES are obligated for up to six years
2. SELRES must accept military discipline
3. SELRES can be called to full-time military duty
during mobilization or civil emergency
4. Drill schedules are inflexible
5. Large travel costs to attend drills can easily
offset any gains associated with reserve service
6. SELRES attend 16 hours/month while civilian moonlighters
average 13 hours/week in a second job.
Naval History and Heritage Command
A Sampling of U.S. Naval Humanitarian Operations
Adam B. Siegel
OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT DIVISION
CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES
4401 Ford Avenue · Post Office Box 16268 · Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268
Abstract
This Information Manual provides a sampling of U.S. Naval humanitarian operations over the past four decades. It was prepared as an adjunct to CNA's work on the history of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps crisis-response activity. This manual should not be viewed as a comprehensive documentation but instead as a highlighting of a few examples of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps humanitarian activity.
I dug up 1997 DOD POPREP annual report, the earliest report I can find online, to find out how many 18 year olds signed up in to the Navy Reserve. I signed up in 1994. The figure should be similar. It was a downsizing era after the first gulf war.
I will compare the services to see the oddity and uniqueness in the Navy Reserve.
Population Representation in the Military Services
Fiscal Year 1994
December 1995
dtic quALrnrinspected
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This is the 21st annual Department of Defense report on social representation in the U.S. Military Services. The ensuing eight chapters and technical appendices provide data and commentary on demographic, educational, aptitude, and socioeconomic characteristics ofapplicants, new recruits, and enlisted and officer members ofthe Active and Reserve Components. This report covers fiscal year (FY) 1994, October 1,1993 to September 30, 1994.
The FY 1994 end-strength of the Active Component was 1.58 million and the Selected Reserve (comprising the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve) totaled 984,000. Today's force is much smaller than in the early volunteer force years, and even reduced in comparison to the size in the late 1980s; planned downsizing ofthe military is nearly complete. To sustain even this reduced strength, in FY 1994 just over 176,000 new non-prior service (NPS) recruits were enlisted and almost 16,000 newly commissioned officers reported for active duty. Furthermore, nearly 56,000 without and more than 98,000 with prior service experience were enlisted in the Selected Reserves. Close to 15,000 officers entered the National Guard or Reserves this past fiscal year as well. The salient characteristics of these personnel are described in this summary.
FY 1994 Highlights
Age. The active duty military comprises a younger workforce than the civilian sector. Service policies and legal restrictions account for the relative youthfulness of the military. Just over 90 percent ofFY 1994 new active duty recruits were 18 through 24 years of age, in comparison to 34 percent of civilians within the military-age range of 17-35.
Fiscal Year 1994: The Drawdown Draws Down
Given that a large peacetime force was fostered in response to the Cold War, it is fitting that the end of the Cold War ushered in a drawdown of forces. The drawdown is nearing completion. As shown in Figure 1.1, beginning next fiscal year, accession requirements will inch up, albeit slightly, with the completion of the drawdown.
The Total Force and its Missions
In FY 1994, end-strength of the Active Component (AC) was further reduced by 5 percent below last year's strength to 1.58 million. Although the active force is down by 20 percent from FY 1991 levels (1.91 million), the pace of reduction has slowed. The end-strength of the Selected Reserve (comprising the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve) did not top one million in FY 1994, but stood at 984,000 members-representing a reduction on the order of 15 percent from 1991 levels of 1.15 million.
Despite the end of the Cold War, defense remains a risky business. What's more, the leaner forces, who willingly choose to serve, are far from idle. Today's forces, both active and reserve, are exposed to an increasingly quick and stressful operating and personnel tempo (OPTEMPO & PERSTEMPO). They train for and participate in war and other-than-war related missions to combat hostile regional powers, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the ravages of ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and the illegal drug trade, and to promote peace, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.
Table 23- Age of FY 1994 Active Component NPS Accessions, bv Service, and Civilians 17-35 Years Old (percent)
Age
17 18 19
Army 3.5 26.5 22.3
Navy 3.9 33.8 25.4
Marine
Corps 4.7 40.8 27.0
Air
Force 3.0 32.9 25.3
Age. Substantive differences exist among the Reserve Components in the proportion of enlisted members in various age groups, as shown in Table 5.7. The Air Force Reserve Components (ANG and USAFR) have the "oldest" members -- with 34 and 32 percent, respectively, of enlisted members 40 years of age or older. These proportions are strikingly different from the Active Components and other Reserve Components. For example, only 3 percent of USMCR enlisted members are 40 or older.
Age differences among the Components result from diverse mission requirements and retention. The mission drives the NPS/prior service mix in each of the Reserve Components. For example, the "labor-intensive" requirements of infantry and other ground combat units usually mandate the need for younger individuals, while "equipment-intensive" requirements demand more formal training. Normally, longer training periods result in the Services seeking recruits for longer terms of enlistment or maintaining a force with greater experience. Individuals in equipment-intensive or high-technology fields, such as those found more often in the USNR, ANG, and USAFR, usually are more experienced, and therefore are older.
Table 5-7. FY 1994 Selected Reserve Enlisted Members, by Age aad Component,
(Percent)
Age
Group
17-19
Army
National
Guard
7.3
Army Reserve
9.7
Naval
Reserve
1.7
Marine Corps Reserve
11.7
Air Force Reserve
0.7
Age differences among the Components result from diverse mission requirements and retention. The mission drives the NPS/prior service mix in each of the Reserve Components. For example, the "labor-intensive" requirements of infantry and other ground combat units usually mandate the need for younger individuals, while "equipment-intensive" requirements demand more formal training. Normally, longer training periods result in the Services seeking recruits for longer terms of enlistment or maintaining a force with greater experience. Individuals in equipment-intensive or high-technology fields, such as those found more often in the USNR, ANG, and USAFR, usually are more experienced, and therefore are older.
Appendix C:
Selected Reserve Enlisted Accessions, Enlisted
Force, Officer Accessions, and Officer Corps Tables
Table C-1. FY 1997 NPS Selected Reserve Enlisted Accessions by Age Group, Component, and Gender with Civilian Comparison Group
(Numbers)
17-19
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
Male 11,412
ARMY RESERVE
Male 6,525
NAVAL RESERVE
Male 13
MARINE CORPS RESERVE
Male 4,021
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
Male 1,299
AIR FORCE RESERVE
Male 285
TOTAL DoD
Male 23,555
Table 5.2. FY 1998 Selected Reserve Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accessions, by Age and Component, and Civilian Labor Force 17–35 Years Old (Percent)
Age
Group
17-19
Army
National
Guard
62.5
Army Reserve
68.9
Naval
Reserve
0.2
Marine Corps Reserve
65.9
Air Force Reserve
39.2
Total DoD
60.8
Table 5.2. FY 2000 Selected Reserve Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accessions, by Age and Component,
and Civilian Labor Force 17–35 Years Old (Percent)
Age
Group
Army
National
Guard
65.9
Naval
Reserve
0.3
Table 5.8. FY 2000 Selected Reserve Enlisted Members, by Age and Component,
and Civilian Labor Force Over 16 Years Old (Percent)
Age
Group
17–19
Naval
Reserve
0.9
Non-Prior Service
Reserve Enlistments
Supply Estimates and Forecasts
Published 1991 by RAND
Hong W. Tan
The recruiter projections are treated somewhat differently for
the Naval Reserve. Although this component reported increases
in the number of recruiters in the first two years of the forecast
period (from 958 to 1056 recruiters), all of the increase probably
went to PS recruiting rather than to SAM recruiting. This was the
result of an institutional decision to reduce SAM recruiting goals
in FY 1988, brought about by Navy concerns over the mismatch
between a desired ratings mix and an annual recruiting goal of
10,000 SAMs. Reflecting this institutional decision, the number of
SAM recruiters is tied instead to SAM goals and these decline
over the forecast period.
Table B.3 lists the recruiter figures projected under these
alternative assumptions.
8Sea and Air Mariners in the early years of the program apparently had limited
opportunities for training except in simulators. Reportedly, this may account for
lower enlistment rates in the midwest; those with a Navy preference tended to
enlist in the active component rather than in the SAM program.
7 The Sea/Air Mariners (SAM) program was similar to the proposed alternative in this thesis in that
new Reserve recruits attended full basic training with their active-duty counterparts. This program was
Discontinued.
14 The Sea/Air Mariners (SAM) program recruited individuals into the Naval Reserve, providing the
individual with a maximum of 12 months of active duty for training before joining a Reserve unit. This
program targeted the E1-E4 shortages the Navy was experiencing and has since been discontinued and
replaced with the current Naval Reserve Accession Course (NRAC) program.
B. RESERVE RECRUITING SINCE FISCAL YEAR 2000
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2000, the Naval Reserve established the Non-prior Service
Accession Course (NPSAC), now known as the Naval Reserve Accession Course
(NRAC). NRAC includes two recruiting programs: the Advanced Pay-Grade (APG)
program, which accesses personnel into temporary rates and pay-grades from E-3 to E-5;
and the Accelerated Initial Accession (AIA) program, which accesses non-rated
personnel into the temporary pay-grade of E-3.15 These recruiting programs are in
addition to the traditional recruiting of NAVETS and OSVETS into the Reserves.
A major difference between the original accession of non-prior service personnel
and the current NRAC program is that full basic training and A-school advanced training
are not provided in the newer program. The elimination of this training has had a
profound effect on readiness and mobilization due to the increased time it takes for an
NPS recruit under the NRAC program to complete necessary training requirements.16
Another difference between the two programs is that the original program
targeted individuals directly out of high school, while recruits into NRAC have until very
recently been between 26 and 37 years of age. This age requirement was imposed with
the idea that older NPS individuals would be more mature, and would have higher levels
of education and work experience. Theoretically, these qualities would enhance the value
of the individual to the Reserve Force.
One of the major issues that exacerbates the problem is that the attrition
rate for NPS individuals is extremely high, averaging 35 to 40 percent for two years of
service. NPS personnel account for over 60 percent of losses across the military
Reserves Components.18
17
VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The current Reserve NPS accession program is a successful recruiting tool that
attracts quality individuals into the Reserves. One of the reasons for its success is the
relatively short basic training period of 17 days. However, it is also the program’s
biggest disadvantage since all Reservists must complete 84 days of active training before
they can be deployed or mobilized. Because the majority of this training time is done
through drill weekends, it takes an average of 2.3 years per NPS accession before they
become fully qualified Reserve assets.
New Reserve accessions would receive the required training immediately,
enhancing their performance and readiness to fulfill the requirements of the billets
assigned. This training would be conducted alongside their active duty enlisted
counterparts, aligning the two Components more closely and streamlining the training
process. With the initiative underway to integrate the Naval Reserve Force with active
duty Navy, this training proposal would foster integration from the time of enlistment.
Additionally, NPS personnel would no longer be constrained from deploying,
participating in active-duty exercises, and mobilizing. This would greatly increase both
individual, unit, and overall Reserve readiness. Even with negative effects on end
strength, the Reserve units would be more fully qualified to complete their missions since
each NPS individual would have all necessary baseline training and could participate and
contribute to all Reserve unit tasks. The Reserve Centers would be better equipped to
handle their full-time responsibilities, improving customer service to all drilling
Reservists.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
REPORT
FOR FY 1990
E. Key Manpower Issues
1. Medical Department Officer Shortfall and Planned Growth
It is the position of Congress that the Navy is not providing
an adequate level of access of care to military beneficiaries.
The Navy is committed to providing an adequate level of health
care. However, attaining end strength targets is complicated by a
national nursing shortage and an inability to recruit and retain the
correct physician specialty mix. In light of this the Navy has undertaken
significant initiatives to increase medical officer end strength
in FY 1989 and beyond:
C. Civilian Component
Civilians constitute approximately one-third or 1.1 million of
the Department's active manpower. Civilians occupy roles that do not
require military incumbents. Our civilian work force repairs airplanes,
ships, and tanks; provides research, medical, communications, and logistical
support; and operates and maintains military installations. They
contribute directly to the..readiness of the armed forces. Civilian
strength is projectod-V6'decline by 4,566 end strength (0.4 percent)
between FY ljS9-•nd FY 1990.
C. Civilian Manpower
1. General
Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of Navy's overall
resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees directly support our
fleet readiness posture. Approximately half of them work in industrial
activities, performing depot maintenance and repair, engineering, RDT&E,
printing, public works, and transportation functions essential to the
readiness of the fleet. Many of the Navy's civilians employed at operation
and maintenance activities perform essential readiness support in
supply centers, air stations, and ship and aircraft repair and maintenance
facilities. The balance of the civilians provide essential support
in functions such as training, medical care, engineering, development,
and acquisition, all of which have an indirect but important impact on
readiness.
Wartime manpower requirements include 19,053 additional people
needed on M-Day and 51,365 new positions. Therefore, Navy needs to
procure more than 70,418 new hires over the 180-day mobilization scenerio.
These requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, such as
depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and missiles, as well
as associated equipment and supply support.
I. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICY, AND DEFENSE MANPOWER.
To supplement the active component units some reserve
component units must be maintained in a combat ready state for immediate
call up for limited periods.
Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military, civilian
personnel, contract resources, and host nation support. Mlanpower requirements
are developed based on the forces required to execute our military
strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by
fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the
event of war,
THE TOTAL FORCE.
The structure of our armed forces is based on the DoD Total Force
Policy which recognizes that all elements of the structure contribute to
national defense. Those elements include the Active and Reserve Components,
civilian workforce, and retired military, host nation. support, and DoD
Contractors.-,
1. Navy Total Force
A Total Force Advocate flag officer billet within the Plans,
Policy and Operations Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations assesses the optimum mix of Active and Reserve Component
manpower and units in the Navy. With analytical support from the Center
for Naval Analyses, potential changes in Total Force composition are
evaluated to determine whether the Naval Reserve can shoulder a larger
share of peacetime naval operations and is able to train and be equipped
to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in wartime.
By the mid-199Ots, the US Naval Reserve (measured in manpower,
ships, and aircraft) will become the tenth most powerful naval
force in the world. Combined and thoroughly integrated with the Active
Navy, this Total Force will ensure that the United States will prevail in
k any conflict at sea.
However, past decisions to assign significant combat and combat
support capabilities to the Naval Reserve were not supported by the
Congress when authorizing Naval Reserve end strength growth
Further, despite several years of requests for legislative authority for
incentives for hard-to-man units to help attract the quality and skill
mix needed to man the programmed growth in the Naval Reserve, such
authority was not granted.
Together, these decisions constrain the ability of the Navy to recruit and retain key sailors for Naval Reserve
frigates and other important units.
II. Significant Program Highlights
A. Active Component Military Manpower
1. General
Navy's highest priority continues to be the accession and
retention of manpower in the necessary quantity and quality to meet operational requirements. People are as integral to new weapon systems as
hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, Navy
continues to focus on retaining those enlisted and officer personnel
whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose
talents are in shortest supply. End strength authorizations, critical
skill retention, and a quality of life for service members and their
families that encourages retention will determine our ability to man the
modern Navy.
B. Reserve Component Military Manpower
The phrase "mutual support" has been adopted to
describe those Naval Reserve training evolutions that simultaneously
provide direct assistance to active duty units in performing their
missions.
(1) General. A major component of Navy's growth toward
the goal of 600 ships is occurring in the Naval Reserve, now well underway
in the most ambitious expansion effort in recent history. Navy
endeavors to use limited resources with optimum efficiency, while remaining
prepared to respond rapidly to crises, accomplish heavy training
requirements, and maintain Fleet readiness.
Mobilization Forces Category "A"
In FY 1989 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will
increase by two ships to a total of 27 with the addition of two frigates
and one mine countermeasure ship and the loss of one destroyer.
5. TAR End Strength Shortfall
In the 1986 Report to the Congress on Navy's Total Force,
Navy addressed SECNAV's policy to man FF-1052 and FFG-7 ships with
approximately a 30%/70% active/TAR crew mix. Between FY 1987 and FY
1989, programmed TAR growth has been reduced by 4,987 because of Congressional
actions. One thousand of these billets were originally programmed
for Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.
The assignment of additional MPN assets to ensure proper manning of NRF ships places an
even greater demand on the constrained active duty manpower.
The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program was inaugurated
in FY 1984, to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel
mobilization requirements (E-3 and below).
(3) Reserve Skill and Grade. Table IV-6 reflects a marked rate imbalance in the FY 1988 Selected Reserve. The imbalance results from the increased emphasis on placing E-3 and below and junior
officer requirements in the Reserve Force. The SAM program is meeting
some of these junior enlisted mobilization requirements.
1993 and 1994 DOD Manpower Requirements Report the following on the SAM enlistment I signed in 1994. Now 2021, I realize I signed a Navy enlistment that was being drawn down, to leave room for more experienced vetearn personnel coming off of active duty.
There were 2 versions for the SAM.
The Sea and Air Mariner program, inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel. An offshoot of this program is the Sea and Air Mariner II (SAM II) program, a non-prior ser- vice accession program in support of the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept (INRC) program. Individuals entering the SAM II program serve two years on Initial Active Duty Training, during which they attend recruit training Apprentice Training Program or "A" school followed by assignment to an FFT 1052 class ship.
Population
Representation
in the Military Services
Fiscal Year 2000
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This is the 27th annual Department of Defense (DoD) report on social representation in
the U.S. Military Services. In response to a mandate by the Senate Committee on Armed
Services (Report 93-884, May 1974), the Directorate for Accession Policy, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) has provided annual data addressing
the quality and representativeness of military personnel since fiscal year (FY) 1975. Originally,
the report was limited to an assessment of the active duty enlisted force only. In keeping with an
increased emphasis and reliance on a Total Force, Accession Policy has expanded this effort to
include statistics not only for enlisted personnel but also for officers and res
RAND_RR426.pdf
Posted from rand.orgPosted in these groups: 
Mental HealthMental Health Counselor
Stigma
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)PTSD Survivors of America
Mental HealthMental Health Counselor Stigma Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)PTSD Survivors of America
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 1
0
0
0
I want to start off and say I hope everyone is well out there.
I need friends. I did not join the military to have such an odd experience angry sad.
The Rand document discusses Mental Health Stigma. I have a story and hope again to make friends.
I understand that a lot of people who would respond are mainly army here. And I try to get my head around the Army to relate. I imagine teams of strong guys with personal fire arms and doing missions in all sorts of environments.
In the Navy at least I will speak from a deck hand on a surface combatant you are inside of a huge possibly largest military piece of machinery on the earth, battling steel and the elements, with limited men, with weapons all around, and missions sets from surface warfare, submarine warfare, and your helo. I guess the best way to explain it is like a huge floating tank with more weapons and the ocean.
There are more parts but in reality as a friend, I share my base, my foundation, to stay as balanced as I can self create,
Drink as much filtered water, Eat Organic Plants as often as possible and get a teeter inversion table and do that as often as possible and your health will improve bit by bit.
The opposite to you will happen if you do drugs or alcohol and eat fast food often
Dealing or remembering and trying to understand my history is something I come on rally point...and open
I know people.that shut it ..and watched them drink and well it was not what I want to you know be…
We have brains let use them..
I want communication. Please try to be nice, as I am really part of the team.
I lived in the streets for a while and well only recently in the last handful of years been reprogramming with the government reports, even his RAND report, to have a actual discussion.
I need friends. I did not join the military to have such an odd experience angry sad.
The Rand document discusses Mental Health Stigma. I have a story and hope again to make friends.
I understand that a lot of people who would respond are mainly army here. And I try to get my head around the Army to relate. I imagine teams of strong guys with personal fire arms and doing missions in all sorts of environments.
In the Navy at least I will speak from a deck hand on a surface combatant you are inside of a huge possibly largest military piece of machinery on the earth, battling steel and the elements, with limited men, with weapons all around, and missions sets from surface warfare, submarine warfare, and your helo. I guess the best way to explain it is like a huge floating tank with more weapons and the ocean.
There are more parts but in reality as a friend, I share my base, my foundation, to stay as balanced as I can self create,
Drink as much filtered water, Eat Organic Plants as often as possible and get a teeter inversion table and do that as often as possible and your health will improve bit by bit.
The opposite to you will happen if you do drugs or alcohol and eat fast food often
Dealing or remembering and trying to understand my history is something I come on rally point...and open
I know people.that shut it ..and watched them drink and well it was not what I want to you know be…
We have brains let use them..
I want communication. Please try to be nice, as I am really part of the team.
I lived in the streets for a while and well only recently in the last handful of years been reprogramming with the government reports, even his RAND report, to have a actual discussion.
(0)
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