Posted on Apr 3, 2016
The single bullet found in the Arabian desert, 02/04/2016, Today - BBC Radio 4
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Another reviewer of the Seven Pillars recommends reading Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East Paperback by Scott Anderson at the same time or before reading Seven Pillars http://www.amazon.com/Lawrence-Arabia-Deceit-Imperial-Making/dp/ [login to see] /ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=
http://bloggingthecanon.blogspot.com/2014/03/seven-pillars-of-wisdom-te-lawrence.html
http://bloggingthecanon.blogspot.com/2014/03/seven-pillars-of-wisdom-te-lawrence.html
Amazon.com: Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle...
Amazon.com: Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East (0884729379209): Scott Anderson: Books
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"Unconventional Warfare," the Bread and Butter of the US Army's Special Forces & Green Beret ODA Teams began our Global War on terror ("GWOT") after 9/11 in Afghanistan, and will most likely end all of our wars in Iraq Afghanistan and now Syria, and in Africa now, and SF are probably already on the ground in Libya. Using "surrogate warfare" is not new to the US Army (or our allies), we did it pretty good in the Indian Wars both before and after the US Civil War. We did it in WWII in France helping the French Resistance, and Indochina and the Far East against the Japs in WWII, with the organization that has contributed the most to modern unconventional warfare was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the operational predecessor of Special Forces (and the CIA).
You have just got to read this outtake from an Army paper in 2005, "Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces A Monograph by MAJ Isaac J. Peltier U.S. Army "(hell, read the whole thing to understand just how important the role of our Special Forces and Green Berets their ODA Teams and "unconventional warfare" ("UW") and our use of "Surrogate Warfare" is and will be critical to our near and long term success in GWOT. But first an outtake from the Monograph, and a Big Nod to what TE Lawrence did in Arabia for the Allied Cause against the Turkish Ottoman Empire from the Monogram from Page 9, Chapter 2, Understanding Surrogate Warfare :
"With respect to surrogate warfare, perhaps no military theorist proves more insightful than T.E. Lawrence. In The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence recounts his time spent as a British liaison officer from 1917-1918 in support of the Arab Revolt led by the Emir Feisal. Prior to becoming a liaison officer, Lawrence had been an intelligence officer in Cairo where he became an expert in the Arab nationalist movement. His knowledge of the Arabs and his empathy for the Arab struggle against Turkish imperial rule allowed him to gain the trust and confidence of Emir Feisal. Subsequently, he was able to influence the Arabs to conduct operations to help British forces under the command of General Allenby to defeat the Turks.
Lawrence formed his theory of unconventional warfare to address the unique circumstances of tribal Bedouins fighting against a modern army. Lawrence began by identifying the Arab aim of war as being geographical in nature. For Arabs, success was measured by how much land they controlled, not the number of enemy they killed. To achieve this aim, Lawrence realized that the Arabs would have to leverage their strengths against their enemy's weaknesses. Lawrence identified the Turkish Army's weakness as a shortage of supplies. The Arabs, on the other hand, possessed mobility with their camels and could strike with impunity from the desert against Turkish lines of communication. Based on this, Lawrence came to the conclusion that it was foolish for the Arabs to attack the Turkish Army, which outnumbered and out-gunned them, but rather they should attack the railroads and bridges that the Turks depended upon so heavily for resupply. 9 ( My notes- I see this as where TE Lawrence brilliantly applied the Maneuver Warfare concepts of "surfaces and gaps" we Marine Lieutenants were taught at The Basic School, (and are still taught), from FMFM-1 (now revised and updated to MDCP-1), you never match your strengths to an enemy's strengths, but you match your strengths to their weaknesses-Here the speed and maneuverability of Lawrence's mounted guerilla force, to the very stretched thin lines of logistics that the Turks had. Lawrence was a very famous railroad & bridge destroyer, knowing that the Turks' entire inland supply chain rested on a main single railway line- he understood there was no way the Turks could manage to protect the hundred of miles of that single railway line that stretched into remote desert that offered the perfect target for the hit and run tactics that the Arab Bedouins were so naturally good at). Put another way, he understood his men and their capabilities, and he matched those known and strong capabilities (their surface) to his enemy's weakness (or gap), their vulnerable logistics line.
It is essential to understand the importance of culture to understand Lawrence's theory of unconventional warfare. Lawrence was keenly aware of the importance of family in Arab culture, their allegiance to clan and tribe, and the role blood feud played in settling disputes. Unlike the Turks, the Arabs valued their people very much and a single death had significant impact on the whole. Thus, Lawrence developed a theory for fighting a war of detachment where the Arabs would avoid direct engagement with the Turkish Army and would concentrate instead on attacking their lines of communication. By doing this, Lawrence reasoned, he could exploit Turkish weakness while at the same time avoiding Arab casualties.
Just as Lawrence capitalized on the strengths and weaknesses of the Arabs, so, too, did U.S. Army Special Forces with their surrogates in Afghanistan and Iraq. Lawrence was able to enable his surrogates to achieve theirs' as well as British goals because he was intimately familiar with Arab culture. Regional focus and language training allows U.S. Army Special Forces to attain similar success. Lawrence possessed immense knowledge of military history, theory and doctrine. This knowledge helped him to develop his UW theories and to effectively leverage his Bedouin surrogates. U.S. Army Special Forces have been described as "PhD's with guns." SF understands the importance of continually studying their region, language, and the culture of the people with whom they work. It is through a process of life-long learning that SF is able to achieve cross-cultural expertise that allows them to achieve U.S. objectives through unconventional means."
Tell me TE Lawrence of Arabia is not more relevant today than ever, in trying to craft a winning strategy in our Global War on terror and our use of "Surrogate War" and "surrogate warfighters" as we ponder the limitations and the role of US Conventional ground forces in places like Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Outtake from: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjqnaDAkPPLAhXhnYMKHbAEBT8QFghCMAU&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fdtic%2Ftr%2Ffulltext%2Fu2%2Fa436109.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEixjHLQvaRJBGQoXDoqFIXM16f-A&sig2=8PkvNKaIlNFdX3cGtWIxsg&bvm=bv.118443451,d.amc
You have just got to read this outtake from an Army paper in 2005, "Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces A Monograph by MAJ Isaac J. Peltier U.S. Army "(hell, read the whole thing to understand just how important the role of our Special Forces and Green Berets their ODA Teams and "unconventional warfare" ("UW") and our use of "Surrogate Warfare" is and will be critical to our near and long term success in GWOT. But first an outtake from the Monograph, and a Big Nod to what TE Lawrence did in Arabia for the Allied Cause against the Turkish Ottoman Empire from the Monogram from Page 9, Chapter 2, Understanding Surrogate Warfare :
"With respect to surrogate warfare, perhaps no military theorist proves more insightful than T.E. Lawrence. In The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence recounts his time spent as a British liaison officer from 1917-1918 in support of the Arab Revolt led by the Emir Feisal. Prior to becoming a liaison officer, Lawrence had been an intelligence officer in Cairo where he became an expert in the Arab nationalist movement. His knowledge of the Arabs and his empathy for the Arab struggle against Turkish imperial rule allowed him to gain the trust and confidence of Emir Feisal. Subsequently, he was able to influence the Arabs to conduct operations to help British forces under the command of General Allenby to defeat the Turks.
Lawrence formed his theory of unconventional warfare to address the unique circumstances of tribal Bedouins fighting against a modern army. Lawrence began by identifying the Arab aim of war as being geographical in nature. For Arabs, success was measured by how much land they controlled, not the number of enemy they killed. To achieve this aim, Lawrence realized that the Arabs would have to leverage their strengths against their enemy's weaknesses. Lawrence identified the Turkish Army's weakness as a shortage of supplies. The Arabs, on the other hand, possessed mobility with their camels and could strike with impunity from the desert against Turkish lines of communication. Based on this, Lawrence came to the conclusion that it was foolish for the Arabs to attack the Turkish Army, which outnumbered and out-gunned them, but rather they should attack the railroads and bridges that the Turks depended upon so heavily for resupply. 9 ( My notes- I see this as where TE Lawrence brilliantly applied the Maneuver Warfare concepts of "surfaces and gaps" we Marine Lieutenants were taught at The Basic School, (and are still taught), from FMFM-1 (now revised and updated to MDCP-1), you never match your strengths to an enemy's strengths, but you match your strengths to their weaknesses-Here the speed and maneuverability of Lawrence's mounted guerilla force, to the very stretched thin lines of logistics that the Turks had. Lawrence was a very famous railroad & bridge destroyer, knowing that the Turks' entire inland supply chain rested on a main single railway line- he understood there was no way the Turks could manage to protect the hundred of miles of that single railway line that stretched into remote desert that offered the perfect target for the hit and run tactics that the Arab Bedouins were so naturally good at). Put another way, he understood his men and their capabilities, and he matched those known and strong capabilities (their surface) to his enemy's weakness (or gap), their vulnerable logistics line.
It is essential to understand the importance of culture to understand Lawrence's theory of unconventional warfare. Lawrence was keenly aware of the importance of family in Arab culture, their allegiance to clan and tribe, and the role blood feud played in settling disputes. Unlike the Turks, the Arabs valued their people very much and a single death had significant impact on the whole. Thus, Lawrence developed a theory for fighting a war of detachment where the Arabs would avoid direct engagement with the Turkish Army and would concentrate instead on attacking their lines of communication. By doing this, Lawrence reasoned, he could exploit Turkish weakness while at the same time avoiding Arab casualties.
Just as Lawrence capitalized on the strengths and weaknesses of the Arabs, so, too, did U.S. Army Special Forces with their surrogates in Afghanistan and Iraq. Lawrence was able to enable his surrogates to achieve theirs' as well as British goals because he was intimately familiar with Arab culture. Regional focus and language training allows U.S. Army Special Forces to attain similar success. Lawrence possessed immense knowledge of military history, theory and doctrine. This knowledge helped him to develop his UW theories and to effectively leverage his Bedouin surrogates. U.S. Army Special Forces have been described as "PhD's with guns." SF understands the importance of continually studying their region, language, and the culture of the people with whom they work. It is through a process of life-long learning that SF is able to achieve cross-cultural expertise that allows them to achieve U.S. objectives through unconventional means."
Tell me TE Lawrence of Arabia is not more relevant today than ever, in trying to craft a winning strategy in our Global War on terror and our use of "Surrogate War" and "surrogate warfighters" as we ponder the limitations and the role of US Conventional ground forces in places like Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Outtake from: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjqnaDAkPPLAhXhnYMKHbAEBT8QFghCMAU&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fdtic%2Ftr%2Ffulltext%2Fu2%2Fa436109.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEixjHLQvaRJBGQoXDoqFIXM16f-A&sig2=8PkvNKaIlNFdX3cGtWIxsg&bvm=bv.118443451,d.amc
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Tribute to Lawrence of Arabia the final moment motorcycle Brough Superior
one of the most famous motorcycle accidents in history After 6 days in hospital, attended by the king's surgeon, TE Lawrence died and left a legacy. This is ...
I am sure PT Lawrence had PTSD because what he did to liberate the Arab Tribes was a big lie once England and France carved up the area. He felt guilty and with all the torture and death he saw, I am sure his motorcycle accident was part of his way of speeding on motorcyle to get the thrill that some with PTSD experience. The adrenaline rush.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q4D82Btd8ic
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q4D82Btd8ic
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Capt Lance Gallardo
Freaking awesome video-thank you for sharing that. I wonder, since he died of head injuries, if he might have survived his crash wearing a modern motorcycle helmet. I think it something of human nature to second guess traumatic events. A Lt. Col JAG Lawyer I know asks himself that question about a bad route he selected in Iraq while on a CA Mission as the CAG in Iraq in 2005. He was severely injured by the IED that killed one of his team members riding with him in his up-armored HumVee. I know that man suffers from PTSD and TBI and the guilt that he carries as the officer who chose that bad route and the death of one of his Marines.
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Capt Lance Gallardo
See this link on how Lawrence's death spurred Motorcycle Helmet Innovation: Lawrence of Arabia and the crash helmet: "We know from Cairns' diaries that he was thinking very hard about head injuries to motorcyclists and crash helmets before World War Two. They were mentioned in his diaries and the first mention is around the time of TE Lawrence's death," explains Alex Green, consultant neurosurgeon at the Nuffield Department of Surgery in Oxford, which Cairns founded.
Cairns began to gather evidence on head injuries suffered by bikers. It was pioneering work.
It was more than six years after Lawrence's death though before Cairns was ready with his first research. In October 1941, and by now consulting neurosurgeon to the Army, he published his initial results in the British Medical Journal. The article was entitled "Head Injuries in Motor-cyclists - the importance of the crash helmet".
It revealed that in the 21 months before the start of WW2, 1,884 bikers had been killed on British roads. Of the cases Cairns studied, two-thirds suffered head injuries.
Things got even worse with the start of the blackouts prompted by air raids, despite petrol rationing reducing traffic. In the 21-month period from September 1939, 2,279 bikers died, or roughly 110 a month - an increase of 21%.
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32622465
Cairns began to gather evidence on head injuries suffered by bikers. It was pioneering work.
It was more than six years after Lawrence's death though before Cairns was ready with his first research. In October 1941, and by now consulting neurosurgeon to the Army, he published his initial results in the British Medical Journal. The article was entitled "Head Injuries in Motor-cyclists - the importance of the crash helmet".
It revealed that in the 21 months before the start of WW2, 1,884 bikers had been killed on British roads. Of the cases Cairns studied, two-thirds suffered head injuries.
Things got even worse with the start of the blackouts prompted by air raids, despite petrol rationing reducing traffic. In the 21-month period from September 1939, 2,279 bikers died, or roughly 110 a month - an increase of 21%.
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32622465
Lawrence of Arabia and the crash helmet - BBC News
How the accident which killed TE Lawrence 80 years ago led to the introduction of crash helmets.
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LTC (Join to see)
Capt Lance Gallardo - the video I posted earlier the crash scene looked weak but this hollywood rendition of his accident I wonder if a helmet would have helped!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UYcZUSknEUc
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UYcZUSknEUc
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Capt Lance Gallardo
LTC (Join to see) - Thanks for that clip Sir, but I have the updated movie LOA in HD, and now the new star wars movie on my mac with itunes. It looks great in Hd, in a small window to the right of my browser window. Very motivating when writing here on RP.
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