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On October 19, 202 BC, at the Battle of Zama, Hannibal Barca and the Carthaginian army were defeated by Roman legions under Scipio Africanus ending the Second Punic War. From the article:
"Battle of Zama
202 BC
The decisive victory of Scipio on Hannibal closed the Second Punic War and giving to Rome, once for all, the supremacy in the Mediterranean.
•The two commanders
•Birth of Roman imperialism
•The victories of Scipio and •Hannibal's comeback
•The armies
•The opposing forces
•Deployment
•The battle
•The consequences
ZAMA
The two commanders
Publius Cornelius Scipio (235 - 183 BC)
Scipio was one of the greatest Roman general and statesman. In 211 BC, just 24 years old, was sent to Spain by the Senate as proconsul to regain control of Iberia; in 209 BC, he led a successful surprising attack against the headquarters of the Carthaginian army stationed at Carthago Nova (modern Cartagena); the following year he defeated the Carthaginian General Hasdrubal, failing, however, to prevent him from crossing the Pyrenees and reaching Italy for aiding his brother Hannibal. He managed to conquer Cadiz chasing out permanently, from Spain, the Carthaginian army.
Elected Consul in 205 BC, between 204 and 203 BC led a military campaign in North Africa, defeating the Carthaginians at Bagbrades (present-day Souk al-Khamis, in Tunisia). Hannibal was recalled back from Italy and Scipio pursued him until the decisive victory at the battle of Zama (202 BC). For this victory, which ended the Second Punic War, Scipio was nicknamed "African".
In 190 BC, during the consulship of Lucius Cornelius, was his advisor in war against the Seleucid King Antiochus III, which ended with the defeat of the Syrian army at Magnesia, in Asia minor. Back in Rome, Scipio was accused by his political opponent Marcus Porcius Cato have accepted money from Antiochus and underwent a process.
Acquitted of the charges, he retired from public life in his Literno's villa, in Campania, Italy.
Hannibal Barca (247 - 183 BC)
Considered as one of the greatest strategist in history, became famous for his victories in the Second Punic War. Son of Hamilcar Barca, who had inculcated hatred against Roma in him, was born probably in 247 BC. At 25 years, succeeded his brother-in-law Hasdrubal in the government of Spanish territories and after two years, he completed the conquest of Iberia with the successful siege of Saguntum (which fell in 219 BC), city allied with Rome, starting the Second Punic War against the "Urbe", nicknamed "war against Hannibal", since he was the undisputed protagonist.
From Spain, he crossed with his Army the Pyrenees and the Alps, then, in Italy, he defeated the Roman legions at Ticino (218 BC), at the Trebia (218 BC), at Lake Trasimene (217 BC) and Cannae (216 BC). After Scipio's victory in Tunisia was recalled to Africa in 204 BC to defend Carthage and was subsequently defeated by the same Scipio at Zama in 202 BC.
After the final defeat of Zama was exiled in Syria by the Seleucid King Antiochus III in 195 BC and later, after the defeat of Antiochus III by the Romans, in Bithynia at the King Prusias I in 189 BC. Here he ends his life by poisoning himself in 183 BC, in order not to fall into the hands of the Romans.
Birth of Roman imperialism
With the battle of Zama in 202 BC, fought in a plain about 100 miles southwest of Tunis, Rome had ended the Second Punic War with a decisive and definitive victory that sanctioned the end of Carthaginian power.
During the Second Punic War, the Roman Republic and the Roman army underwent many changes. The disaster of Cannae, with annihilation by Hannibal of the eight legions commanded by Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro seemed to have scored a decisive point in favour of Carthage in the long struggle with Rome. But it wasn't; the delaying strategy of Fabius Maximus managed to raise the fortunes, infact Rome had great organizational and military resources. The Senate immediately ordered the reorganization of the army. Hannibal meanwhile, disappointed by the failure to let defect, from the Roman camp, most of the Italic allies of the Republic, had to settle for a demonstration in force before the walls of Rome but then, without adequate siege engines, was forced to return in southern Italy hoping to consolidate its positions. Just keeping its eyes on the movements of the great Carthaginian in southern Italy, Rome, who, in 212 BC already had 22 legions, more than they had before Cannae, devoted itself to hit Carthaginian interests where they were most vulnerable.
The interests of the Republic, during the war, had moved. This interests were no longer those who had seen strating hostilities between the two cities for hegemony in Sicily. That policy, limited to the control of the Italian peninsula, starting from a solid presence in Lazio and in Central Italy, was changed into a full-fledged power politics, with the Mediterranean as a centre, Iberia as an addictional theatre and soon the Near East of the Hellenistic kingdoms as a goal.
The Roman ruling class itself was deeply changed during the course of wars. This class does not tolerate the limitations imposed at home by themos maiorum, the costumes of the fathers, and, together with the political cosmopolitanism of Hellenistic-style, it aspired to a richer lifestyle, more elegant, and far more representative of what would have been the new expansive phase of the Republic.
The army was significantly changed. What Publius Cornelius Scipio led to victory at Zama in 202 BC, was only superficially similar to the army that Hannibal had roundly defeated at Cannae in 216, although many of the men were veterans of that defeat. Organisational structures remained the same: the manipula, derived from the reforms of Camillus, more than a century before, still divided the Legion into three lines of hastati, principes and triarii, but the soldiers that composed it were no longer the same. The army defeated at Cannae was composed of citizens with the nerve of smallholders of Roman citizenship, certainly brave and accustomed to the hardships of the war, but only for a single campaign, linked as they were to the farm left in the "agro romano" and disinclined to remain in the field for more than one or two years. The Scipio's army at Zama was real professional army, made up of well-trained volunteers and veterans hardened by years of campaigning that had made them real soldiers, loyal to their commander and willing to stay in the army for all his life.
Will men like these, linked to Rome and even more attached to their generals, that conquered for Rome the control over the entire Mediterranean area. Will men like these to overwhelm the power of the Greek phalanx, hitherto regarded as invincible. Finally, will be men very similar to those that, in the whirlwind of the civil wars, a century later, that will mark the end of the ancient Republic turning it first in the Principality, then in the Empire.
Some historians argue, and probably with good reason, that Rome, the Imperial Rome, would not have been the same if he hadn't to struggle against Carthage. We can perhaps say that the seed containing the shape and ideology of Imperial Rome was thrown in that year 202 BC, at Zama.
The victories of Scipio and Hannibal's return
In 211 BC, the Senate took an important decision, which will decide the birth of Roman imperialism. A commander of just 24 years old but already very experienced, considering his 7 years of military service, was sent to Spain as proconsul: that was the first important mission for Publius Cornelius Scipio. The young Roman leader began a merciless war against Carthaginian settlements with numerous victories, conquered the Carthaginian army headquarters at Carthago Nova (modern Cartagena) in 209 and, with the victory of Baecula, defeated Hasdrubal in 208 whose mission was to lead an army in Italy as aid to his brother Hannibal. In 207 Hasdrubal was however able to cross the Pyrenees and come in Italy, but was severely beaten on the Metauro River, in the Marche region of Italy. Hannibal had certainly need reinforcements, but definitely to overturn the outcome of the conflict had especially need of a general skilled and experienceed as was his brother. The head of his brother, that the Romans launched in the Carthaginian camp, was a clear sign to Hannibal that the hopes to receive support from motherland had disappeared forever. The only allied and the only base that remained to Hannibal were in the rugged mountains of Bruzio, reduced its range to avoid any clash with the Romans.
Hasdrubal Gisco and Mago Barca, in 206, reiterated the offensive against the Roman presence in Spain but, at the battle of Ilipia, Scipio overcame Hasdrubal Gisco, ending definitely the Carthaginian domination in Spain by chasing out, in fact, the armies of Carthage from the Iberian Peninsula.
Returning to Rome in 205 Scipio was nominated Consul and from this position he tried to convince the Senate to support him in his project: bringing the war in Africa as to finally defeat Carthage. The Senators knew he could beat Carthage but not considered necessary an immediate intervention because, at the time, Rome was not in dangerous conditions, and the presence of Hannibal in Italy could not continue indefinitely, considering the strategic and economic marginality of the Carthaginian possession. Fabius Maximus, supported by a large part of the Senate as a supporter of peace, considered Scipio's proposal as an enterprise with uncertain and useless risks, especially because the threat of Hannibal could come back. However according to Scipione, Hannibal was not longer a threat. He had led the Roman legions in the conquest of Iberian territories beating overnumbering enemies and was convinced he could beat Hannibal on its territory marking the end of Carthage and giving to Rome the supremacy in the Mediterranean. Supported by the people, Scipio convinced the senators, was appointed as a consular province Sicily, with permission to leave for Africa, but he wasn't allowed to recruit new legions, could enlist only volunteers and received the command of the V and VI Legion in Sicily, composed of the veterans of Cannae to which had added the defeated soldiers of the two battles of Herdonea. Scipio confided in the value of those veterans and believed in their eager to avenge the shame of defeat, arrived in Sicily with 7,000 volunteers. Soon after his first "contact" with the troops, began the training for the soldiers that he consider of primary importance. He wouldn't leave until his men had assimilated his tactical schemes that formed the basis of all his victories.
In 204 Scipio sailed from Lilybaeum (Marsala) with 16,000 infantry and 1,500 Cavalry; he transformed a group of volunteers and Veterans exiled in a perfect war machine, the more efficient than Rome had ever seen. He landed near Utica (porto Farina) and besiege it. His legions were reinforced by Numidian Cavalry of Prince Massinissa, skillful Knights, once allied with the Carthaginians, now exiled by King of the numidians Syphax, who had chosen the alliance with Rome offering to Scipio his own friendship and his services.
Meanwhile, the Carthaginians had rise a large army of 30,000 infantry and 3,000 Cavalry led by Hasdrubal and Syphax, King of the numidians, an ally of Carthage, was coming with an army of 60,000 men including 10,000 cavalry. The two enemy armies deployed at dozen kilometres south from the Roman camp. After a series of ups and downs and peace negotiations, in 203 Scipio attacked the numidians and Punic camps with a great victory. According to the sources, Punic causalties were 40,000, with few soldiers escaped, such as Syphax and Hasdrubal, while Roman casualties were part of the order of tens. This victory, immediately followed by another one at Bagbrades (near the present-day site of Suk Al-Khamis, in Tunisia), where he routed the army gleaned in hurry by Carthage, led once again by Hasdrubal and Syphax. Achieved these successes, Publius Cornelius Scipio camped nearby Tunis, so to threaten Carthage which, however, with its mighty walls, always remained a bastion difficult to capture.
Threatened directly on African soil and in a panic, the Grand Council of Carthage there was nothing left to do than call back home Hannibal and his army; that was what Scipio wanted. He knew that the challenge with Hannibal should be permanently closed and on African soil. Confident, as he was, to command the best troops in the world, he could defeat Hannibal only once drawn the Carthaginian into a pitched battle.
The Romans granted a truce, a truce that let Hannibal, with part of his veterans, to abandon Italy after 15 years as to return to Carthage, camping at Hadrumentum (Sousse), within his family's possessions.
Refreshed by the return of their leader, the Carthaginians, unknowingly, completed the plan of Scipio: once rejected the truce, Hannibal moved verus the Romans a numerically strong army, but, if we exclude the 15,000 veterans he had brought from Italy, inferior than the Scipio's Legions. The Romans, confident in their quality and in the ability of their Commander, met the enemy at Naraggara (Sidi Youssef), a plain about 15 kilometers from Zama.
The armies
The Roman Legion
The Roman Legion was generally deployed in "checkerboard" order on three rows of combat divided in manipula. The front row was formed by the hastati units, separated by a space equal to that occupied by a single manipula; the gaps were covered by maniples of principes, which occupied the second row; the last row was formed by triarii covering the ranges left empty by the manipula of principes.
The hastati and principes formed the backbone of the Roman Legion, they were enlisted among men in full force. Their functions were identical but, as mentioned, were arranged differently in the grid: the hastati in front row and the principes in the second. They were equipped with a bronze helmet, armour and a large oval shield. The armament consisted of two javelins of different weight called pila (singular pilum) and a short sword that challenged in hand-to-hand combat after having thrown the javelins.
The light infantry was formed by the velites, formed by younger soldiers assigned as support to each maniple. They wore a helmet of bronze, often covered by a wolf skin, a round shield called parma, some light javelins and a short sword in Italian or Spanish style similar to that of heavy infantry. The older Legionnaires formed the triarii manipula and, in battle, they were placed in the third row of the Legion. Fitted with equipment identical to that of principes and hastati, were armed instead of pilum by a long spear of greek hoplitic origin. The triarii could be used tactically as a mobile reserve behind the Legion, or as support to repel with their long rods the attacks of enemies cavalries. On some occasions the triarii were fighting on the flanks or on the rear of the opposing formations, already engaged on the front from the first two rows.
The Carthaginian army
The Carthaginian army was formed by mercenaries recruited among the populations subject to the Carthaginian domain. So we can consider this as an army made up of different people with different military traditions. During the Second Punic War the main recruiting areas were: the African hinterland, from which came the famous numidian light cavalry, one of the best weapons in Hannibal's army and the heavy libo-Phoenician infantry; and the Iberian colonial Territories, which provided the Carthaginian armies of a fierce light-medium infantry and cavalry.
Moreover, in Hannibal's victories in Italy did attended, among the Carthaginian forces, the Gauls of the Po Valley and many Italians of the South. During the campaign of Hannibal, his troops often riequipped themselves with the material captured by the Romans on the battlefield, these soldiers will be his "Veterans" at Zama.
The opposing forces
Publius Cornelius Scipio could count on 23,000 infantrymen among the Romans and Italians plus 6,000 Numidians. The cavalry could count on 2,400 between Romans and Italians, 4,000 Numidians and 600 Berbers. The roman Cavalry superiority wasn't just numerical but even qualitatively, considering the numidians knights of Masinissa, who had often been decisive supporting Hannibal in Italy; and considering 300 Roman Knights, very well equipped and particularly trained by Scipio in Sicily.
Hannibal could count about 15,000 veterans of the italian campaign, especially italians or spaniards, 15,000 Lybian and Carthaginians infantrymen, recently taken by the Carthaginian Senate and of dubious usefulness, 12,000 mercenaries among Ligurians, Celts, Mauritanians plus 4,000 Macedonians. The cavalry had 2,000 carthaginians and 2,000 numidians. To these were added 80 African forest's elephants, smaller than those of the savannahs, but still dangerous.
Deployment
The two armies deployed in a wide plain without impediments, ideal for a large pitched battle.
Hannibal lined up his army on three lines, keeping in mind the quality of his troops. In front of the army were deployed war elephants as to putting in disarray the first lines of the Roman infantry. At the forefront were deployed the various groups of mercenaries, Italic allies, Gauls and Ligurians; many of these were always overwhelmed by roman legionaries and had followed reluctantly the Carthaginian leader. Hannibal knew that, to these units, could ask only one initial impetus united to that of the elephants, certainly not an all-out resistance. The second row, at short distance from the first, was formed by African contingents hastily recruited from Carthage to confront the Roman invasion. Even these units weren't reliable, as they were without adequate training and experience, able to confront the Romans only after the intervention of elephants and mercenaries. In the third row, far beyond the first two lines (about 178 meters), Hannibal had deployed his veterans of italian campaign ready to intervene, even with more complex tactics, perhaps to strike the decisive blow. On the wings the Cavalry, on which Hannibal had not much expectations, thier task was just to neutralize and block the Roman cavalry, superior in numbers and training. Therefore a differentiated deployment of appropriately trained troops, elephants and mercenaries will form the first two strikes in succession, the African troops will provide support and a veteran reserve, had to confront the Roman when they had been eventually worn.
Even Scipio had deployed his forces on three lines, as usual. But, instead of alternating maniples in checkerboard formation, dispose the manipula in column as to create "lanes" to let pass the predictable elephant attack. Therefore at the forefront were deployed the hastati, with velites covering the "lanes" and acting as bait: they had to absorb the first impact with elephants, they had orders to move once the elephants were almost in contact with the infantry, leaving open the gates and allowing the pachyderms to slip in "aisles" to be targeted on the flanks. In the second line were placed the maniples of principes, while those of the triarii, according to tradition, were in third-line. The Roman cavalry of Caio Lelio was on the left, while on the right was the Numidian Masinissa's cavalry. Moreover, among the front rows Scipio disposed several men with trumpets and percussion instruments which had the task of making noise as to scare the elephants.
The battle
The battle, as Scipio predicted, was opened by the attack of the Carthaginian war elephants.
The pachyderms, however, appalled by the javelins launched by the velites and frightened by the sounds coming from the ranks of Rome, were partly driven back and slipping on the flanks of the Carthaginian infantry, went to cluttering up the wings of cavalry. Once saw the difficulty of the Carthaginian Cavalry wings, Caio Lelio and Masinissa attacked and, after a brief melee, both units of Hannibal's cavalry were routed, pursued by the roman knights. The other elephants had more success but were channeled into the spaces left by the manipula. The elephants passed without causing damages to hastati, principes and triarii, only the velites aid a hefty price, already considered by Scipio who got what he wanted: his line has been ordered, the hastati were intact and the principes were not involved.
Thereupon, the infantry advanced and were in contact, except Carthaginians veterans who maintained the position. The battle was very violent and started a confused melee with large gaps that opened in the mercenaries formation where some fled. In addition, the line of African toops not intervened to support immediately, because the front was occupied by fugitives they prevented from going through as to not cluttering up the ranks. Sonna as they had the front enough free, some departments of African troops joined the fray, coming in contact with the hastati, who had left the position to pursuit the fugitives. It was necessary the support of principes in the points where the hastati had not recovered the position. In, this disorder, the Romans, better trained and armed, manage to prevail. The first two Carthaginians rows, now mixed, begin to abandon the combat line and some flee.
Hannibal was able to regain control of some African and mercenaries units and reorganize veterans sides, trying to widen the front as to surround the roman flank. Scipio, reorganized the hastati, already in pursuit of fugitives, let move his legionaries on the flanks, tactic already successfully used previously, but this time only to extend either side of the hastati's front but not to outflank the enemy. So the Roman front result equal to or slightly greater than the Carthaginian one, with principes and triarii, so far little committed, that had to fight on the wings against tired forces, although the hastati, committed so far in the clash, now had to contend with the Carthaginian veterans still fresh.
The fight between the infantry seemed to continue for a long time, with an uncertain outcome, but the Roman chivalries, who had now scattered the enemy Knights, returned to the battlefield attacking from behind Hannibal's troops. These, closely pressed by the Roman cavalry, quickly flee. As always happened in the wars of antiquity, once finished the battle, began the pursuit and the massacre. Hannibal managed to escape to Carthage but had left on the field at least 20,000 dead and 10,000 prisoners. Romans accounted losses to a maximum of 4,000 men, half of whom were numidians. Scipio had the pitched battle that he wanted and this victory had ended the second deadly conflict between Rome and Carthage.
The consequences
The decisive victory at the battle of Zama ended the Second Punic War (219-202 BC) and was, in fact, the end of Carthaginian power in the Mediterranean. Carthage, the great city of Phoenician origin that, with his business empire, for sixty years had contested Rome in the dominance of the Western Mediterranean, was defeated. Rome forced the rival city-State to a humiliating peace. A heavy Treaty required to dismantle completely the war fleet, only a few dozen ships were allowed to the Carthaginian Navy; all Carthaginian colonies in Spain passed under Roman control. The same foreign policy of Carthage had to conform to the Romans and the Punic were forced to pay a heavy tribute which, for fifty years, burdened on its economy.
Half century later there would be a third Punic War, which culminated with the destruction of Carthage, but it was more a posthumous Roman revenge than a consequence of a resurrected Carthaginian power that, after Zama, was definitely set.
Fearing Roman vengeance the city forced Hannibal, his greatest son, into exile at Syria's King Antiochus III; after the defeat of the latter against the Romans in Bithynia, Hannibal was poisoned so as to not be hand over in Rome. The defeat of Carthage is the first element in the construction of the Roman hegemony that somehow still marks the civilisation of our continent."
COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen F. SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen SPC Woody Bullard CPL Dave Hoover SFC William Farrell Lt Col Charlie Brown Col Carl Whicker SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth SPC Margaret Higgins ~1692709:SGT Robert Pryor] SGT Jim Arnold Maj William'Bill' Price PO1 Tony Holland SGT John " Mac " McConnell LTC Wayne Brandon PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SPC Douglas Bolton
"Battle of Zama
202 BC
The decisive victory of Scipio on Hannibal closed the Second Punic War and giving to Rome, once for all, the supremacy in the Mediterranean.
•The two commanders
•Birth of Roman imperialism
•The victories of Scipio and •Hannibal's comeback
•The armies
•The opposing forces
•Deployment
•The battle
•The consequences
ZAMA
The two commanders
Publius Cornelius Scipio (235 - 183 BC)
Scipio was one of the greatest Roman general and statesman. In 211 BC, just 24 years old, was sent to Spain by the Senate as proconsul to regain control of Iberia; in 209 BC, he led a successful surprising attack against the headquarters of the Carthaginian army stationed at Carthago Nova (modern Cartagena); the following year he defeated the Carthaginian General Hasdrubal, failing, however, to prevent him from crossing the Pyrenees and reaching Italy for aiding his brother Hannibal. He managed to conquer Cadiz chasing out permanently, from Spain, the Carthaginian army.
Elected Consul in 205 BC, between 204 and 203 BC led a military campaign in North Africa, defeating the Carthaginians at Bagbrades (present-day Souk al-Khamis, in Tunisia). Hannibal was recalled back from Italy and Scipio pursued him until the decisive victory at the battle of Zama (202 BC). For this victory, which ended the Second Punic War, Scipio was nicknamed "African".
In 190 BC, during the consulship of Lucius Cornelius, was his advisor in war against the Seleucid King Antiochus III, which ended with the defeat of the Syrian army at Magnesia, in Asia minor. Back in Rome, Scipio was accused by his political opponent Marcus Porcius Cato have accepted money from Antiochus and underwent a process.
Acquitted of the charges, he retired from public life in his Literno's villa, in Campania, Italy.
Hannibal Barca (247 - 183 BC)
Considered as one of the greatest strategist in history, became famous for his victories in the Second Punic War. Son of Hamilcar Barca, who had inculcated hatred against Roma in him, was born probably in 247 BC. At 25 years, succeeded his brother-in-law Hasdrubal in the government of Spanish territories and after two years, he completed the conquest of Iberia with the successful siege of Saguntum (which fell in 219 BC), city allied with Rome, starting the Second Punic War against the "Urbe", nicknamed "war against Hannibal", since he was the undisputed protagonist.
From Spain, he crossed with his Army the Pyrenees and the Alps, then, in Italy, he defeated the Roman legions at Ticino (218 BC), at the Trebia (218 BC), at Lake Trasimene (217 BC) and Cannae (216 BC). After Scipio's victory in Tunisia was recalled to Africa in 204 BC to defend Carthage and was subsequently defeated by the same Scipio at Zama in 202 BC.
After the final defeat of Zama was exiled in Syria by the Seleucid King Antiochus III in 195 BC and later, after the defeat of Antiochus III by the Romans, in Bithynia at the King Prusias I in 189 BC. Here he ends his life by poisoning himself in 183 BC, in order not to fall into the hands of the Romans.
Birth of Roman imperialism
With the battle of Zama in 202 BC, fought in a plain about 100 miles southwest of Tunis, Rome had ended the Second Punic War with a decisive and definitive victory that sanctioned the end of Carthaginian power.
During the Second Punic War, the Roman Republic and the Roman army underwent many changes. The disaster of Cannae, with annihilation by Hannibal of the eight legions commanded by Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro seemed to have scored a decisive point in favour of Carthage in the long struggle with Rome. But it wasn't; the delaying strategy of Fabius Maximus managed to raise the fortunes, infact Rome had great organizational and military resources. The Senate immediately ordered the reorganization of the army. Hannibal meanwhile, disappointed by the failure to let defect, from the Roman camp, most of the Italic allies of the Republic, had to settle for a demonstration in force before the walls of Rome but then, without adequate siege engines, was forced to return in southern Italy hoping to consolidate its positions. Just keeping its eyes on the movements of the great Carthaginian in southern Italy, Rome, who, in 212 BC already had 22 legions, more than they had before Cannae, devoted itself to hit Carthaginian interests where they were most vulnerable.
The interests of the Republic, during the war, had moved. This interests were no longer those who had seen strating hostilities between the two cities for hegemony in Sicily. That policy, limited to the control of the Italian peninsula, starting from a solid presence in Lazio and in Central Italy, was changed into a full-fledged power politics, with the Mediterranean as a centre, Iberia as an addictional theatre and soon the Near East of the Hellenistic kingdoms as a goal.
The Roman ruling class itself was deeply changed during the course of wars. This class does not tolerate the limitations imposed at home by themos maiorum, the costumes of the fathers, and, together with the political cosmopolitanism of Hellenistic-style, it aspired to a richer lifestyle, more elegant, and far more representative of what would have been the new expansive phase of the Republic.
The army was significantly changed. What Publius Cornelius Scipio led to victory at Zama in 202 BC, was only superficially similar to the army that Hannibal had roundly defeated at Cannae in 216, although many of the men were veterans of that defeat. Organisational structures remained the same: the manipula, derived from the reforms of Camillus, more than a century before, still divided the Legion into three lines of hastati, principes and triarii, but the soldiers that composed it were no longer the same. The army defeated at Cannae was composed of citizens with the nerve of smallholders of Roman citizenship, certainly brave and accustomed to the hardships of the war, but only for a single campaign, linked as they were to the farm left in the "agro romano" and disinclined to remain in the field for more than one or two years. The Scipio's army at Zama was real professional army, made up of well-trained volunteers and veterans hardened by years of campaigning that had made them real soldiers, loyal to their commander and willing to stay in the army for all his life.
Will men like these, linked to Rome and even more attached to their generals, that conquered for Rome the control over the entire Mediterranean area. Will men like these to overwhelm the power of the Greek phalanx, hitherto regarded as invincible. Finally, will be men very similar to those that, in the whirlwind of the civil wars, a century later, that will mark the end of the ancient Republic turning it first in the Principality, then in the Empire.
Some historians argue, and probably with good reason, that Rome, the Imperial Rome, would not have been the same if he hadn't to struggle against Carthage. We can perhaps say that the seed containing the shape and ideology of Imperial Rome was thrown in that year 202 BC, at Zama.
The victories of Scipio and Hannibal's return
In 211 BC, the Senate took an important decision, which will decide the birth of Roman imperialism. A commander of just 24 years old but already very experienced, considering his 7 years of military service, was sent to Spain as proconsul: that was the first important mission for Publius Cornelius Scipio. The young Roman leader began a merciless war against Carthaginian settlements with numerous victories, conquered the Carthaginian army headquarters at Carthago Nova (modern Cartagena) in 209 and, with the victory of Baecula, defeated Hasdrubal in 208 whose mission was to lead an army in Italy as aid to his brother Hannibal. In 207 Hasdrubal was however able to cross the Pyrenees and come in Italy, but was severely beaten on the Metauro River, in the Marche region of Italy. Hannibal had certainly need reinforcements, but definitely to overturn the outcome of the conflict had especially need of a general skilled and experienceed as was his brother. The head of his brother, that the Romans launched in the Carthaginian camp, was a clear sign to Hannibal that the hopes to receive support from motherland had disappeared forever. The only allied and the only base that remained to Hannibal were in the rugged mountains of Bruzio, reduced its range to avoid any clash with the Romans.
Hasdrubal Gisco and Mago Barca, in 206, reiterated the offensive against the Roman presence in Spain but, at the battle of Ilipia, Scipio overcame Hasdrubal Gisco, ending definitely the Carthaginian domination in Spain by chasing out, in fact, the armies of Carthage from the Iberian Peninsula.
Returning to Rome in 205 Scipio was nominated Consul and from this position he tried to convince the Senate to support him in his project: bringing the war in Africa as to finally defeat Carthage. The Senators knew he could beat Carthage but not considered necessary an immediate intervention because, at the time, Rome was not in dangerous conditions, and the presence of Hannibal in Italy could not continue indefinitely, considering the strategic and economic marginality of the Carthaginian possession. Fabius Maximus, supported by a large part of the Senate as a supporter of peace, considered Scipio's proposal as an enterprise with uncertain and useless risks, especially because the threat of Hannibal could come back. However according to Scipione, Hannibal was not longer a threat. He had led the Roman legions in the conquest of Iberian territories beating overnumbering enemies and was convinced he could beat Hannibal on its territory marking the end of Carthage and giving to Rome the supremacy in the Mediterranean. Supported by the people, Scipio convinced the senators, was appointed as a consular province Sicily, with permission to leave for Africa, but he wasn't allowed to recruit new legions, could enlist only volunteers and received the command of the V and VI Legion in Sicily, composed of the veterans of Cannae to which had added the defeated soldiers of the two battles of Herdonea. Scipio confided in the value of those veterans and believed in their eager to avenge the shame of defeat, arrived in Sicily with 7,000 volunteers. Soon after his first "contact" with the troops, began the training for the soldiers that he consider of primary importance. He wouldn't leave until his men had assimilated his tactical schemes that formed the basis of all his victories.
In 204 Scipio sailed from Lilybaeum (Marsala) with 16,000 infantry and 1,500 Cavalry; he transformed a group of volunteers and Veterans exiled in a perfect war machine, the more efficient than Rome had ever seen. He landed near Utica (porto Farina) and besiege it. His legions were reinforced by Numidian Cavalry of Prince Massinissa, skillful Knights, once allied with the Carthaginians, now exiled by King of the numidians Syphax, who had chosen the alliance with Rome offering to Scipio his own friendship and his services.
Meanwhile, the Carthaginians had rise a large army of 30,000 infantry and 3,000 Cavalry led by Hasdrubal and Syphax, King of the numidians, an ally of Carthage, was coming with an army of 60,000 men including 10,000 cavalry. The two enemy armies deployed at dozen kilometres south from the Roman camp. After a series of ups and downs and peace negotiations, in 203 Scipio attacked the numidians and Punic camps with a great victory. According to the sources, Punic causalties were 40,000, with few soldiers escaped, such as Syphax and Hasdrubal, while Roman casualties were part of the order of tens. This victory, immediately followed by another one at Bagbrades (near the present-day site of Suk Al-Khamis, in Tunisia), where he routed the army gleaned in hurry by Carthage, led once again by Hasdrubal and Syphax. Achieved these successes, Publius Cornelius Scipio camped nearby Tunis, so to threaten Carthage which, however, with its mighty walls, always remained a bastion difficult to capture.
Threatened directly on African soil and in a panic, the Grand Council of Carthage there was nothing left to do than call back home Hannibal and his army; that was what Scipio wanted. He knew that the challenge with Hannibal should be permanently closed and on African soil. Confident, as he was, to command the best troops in the world, he could defeat Hannibal only once drawn the Carthaginian into a pitched battle.
The Romans granted a truce, a truce that let Hannibal, with part of his veterans, to abandon Italy after 15 years as to return to Carthage, camping at Hadrumentum (Sousse), within his family's possessions.
Refreshed by the return of their leader, the Carthaginians, unknowingly, completed the plan of Scipio: once rejected the truce, Hannibal moved verus the Romans a numerically strong army, but, if we exclude the 15,000 veterans he had brought from Italy, inferior than the Scipio's Legions. The Romans, confident in their quality and in the ability of their Commander, met the enemy at Naraggara (Sidi Youssef), a plain about 15 kilometers from Zama.
The armies
The Roman Legion
The Roman Legion was generally deployed in "checkerboard" order on three rows of combat divided in manipula. The front row was formed by the hastati units, separated by a space equal to that occupied by a single manipula; the gaps were covered by maniples of principes, which occupied the second row; the last row was formed by triarii covering the ranges left empty by the manipula of principes.
The hastati and principes formed the backbone of the Roman Legion, they were enlisted among men in full force. Their functions were identical but, as mentioned, were arranged differently in the grid: the hastati in front row and the principes in the second. They were equipped with a bronze helmet, armour and a large oval shield. The armament consisted of two javelins of different weight called pila (singular pilum) and a short sword that challenged in hand-to-hand combat after having thrown the javelins.
The light infantry was formed by the velites, formed by younger soldiers assigned as support to each maniple. They wore a helmet of bronze, often covered by a wolf skin, a round shield called parma, some light javelins and a short sword in Italian or Spanish style similar to that of heavy infantry. The older Legionnaires formed the triarii manipula and, in battle, they were placed in the third row of the Legion. Fitted with equipment identical to that of principes and hastati, were armed instead of pilum by a long spear of greek hoplitic origin. The triarii could be used tactically as a mobile reserve behind the Legion, or as support to repel with their long rods the attacks of enemies cavalries. On some occasions the triarii were fighting on the flanks or on the rear of the opposing formations, already engaged on the front from the first two rows.
The Carthaginian army
The Carthaginian army was formed by mercenaries recruited among the populations subject to the Carthaginian domain. So we can consider this as an army made up of different people with different military traditions. During the Second Punic War the main recruiting areas were: the African hinterland, from which came the famous numidian light cavalry, one of the best weapons in Hannibal's army and the heavy libo-Phoenician infantry; and the Iberian colonial Territories, which provided the Carthaginian armies of a fierce light-medium infantry and cavalry.
Moreover, in Hannibal's victories in Italy did attended, among the Carthaginian forces, the Gauls of the Po Valley and many Italians of the South. During the campaign of Hannibal, his troops often riequipped themselves with the material captured by the Romans on the battlefield, these soldiers will be his "Veterans" at Zama.
The opposing forces
Publius Cornelius Scipio could count on 23,000 infantrymen among the Romans and Italians plus 6,000 Numidians. The cavalry could count on 2,400 between Romans and Italians, 4,000 Numidians and 600 Berbers. The roman Cavalry superiority wasn't just numerical but even qualitatively, considering the numidians knights of Masinissa, who had often been decisive supporting Hannibal in Italy; and considering 300 Roman Knights, very well equipped and particularly trained by Scipio in Sicily.
Hannibal could count about 15,000 veterans of the italian campaign, especially italians or spaniards, 15,000 Lybian and Carthaginians infantrymen, recently taken by the Carthaginian Senate and of dubious usefulness, 12,000 mercenaries among Ligurians, Celts, Mauritanians plus 4,000 Macedonians. The cavalry had 2,000 carthaginians and 2,000 numidians. To these were added 80 African forest's elephants, smaller than those of the savannahs, but still dangerous.
Deployment
The two armies deployed in a wide plain without impediments, ideal for a large pitched battle.
Hannibal lined up his army on three lines, keeping in mind the quality of his troops. In front of the army were deployed war elephants as to putting in disarray the first lines of the Roman infantry. At the forefront were deployed the various groups of mercenaries, Italic allies, Gauls and Ligurians; many of these were always overwhelmed by roman legionaries and had followed reluctantly the Carthaginian leader. Hannibal knew that, to these units, could ask only one initial impetus united to that of the elephants, certainly not an all-out resistance. The second row, at short distance from the first, was formed by African contingents hastily recruited from Carthage to confront the Roman invasion. Even these units weren't reliable, as they were without adequate training and experience, able to confront the Romans only after the intervention of elephants and mercenaries. In the third row, far beyond the first two lines (about 178 meters), Hannibal had deployed his veterans of italian campaign ready to intervene, even with more complex tactics, perhaps to strike the decisive blow. On the wings the Cavalry, on which Hannibal had not much expectations, thier task was just to neutralize and block the Roman cavalry, superior in numbers and training. Therefore a differentiated deployment of appropriately trained troops, elephants and mercenaries will form the first two strikes in succession, the African troops will provide support and a veteran reserve, had to confront the Roman when they had been eventually worn.
Even Scipio had deployed his forces on three lines, as usual. But, instead of alternating maniples in checkerboard formation, dispose the manipula in column as to create "lanes" to let pass the predictable elephant attack. Therefore at the forefront were deployed the hastati, with velites covering the "lanes" and acting as bait: they had to absorb the first impact with elephants, they had orders to move once the elephants were almost in contact with the infantry, leaving open the gates and allowing the pachyderms to slip in "aisles" to be targeted on the flanks. In the second line were placed the maniples of principes, while those of the triarii, according to tradition, were in third-line. The Roman cavalry of Caio Lelio was on the left, while on the right was the Numidian Masinissa's cavalry. Moreover, among the front rows Scipio disposed several men with trumpets and percussion instruments which had the task of making noise as to scare the elephants.
The battle
The battle, as Scipio predicted, was opened by the attack of the Carthaginian war elephants.
The pachyderms, however, appalled by the javelins launched by the velites and frightened by the sounds coming from the ranks of Rome, were partly driven back and slipping on the flanks of the Carthaginian infantry, went to cluttering up the wings of cavalry. Once saw the difficulty of the Carthaginian Cavalry wings, Caio Lelio and Masinissa attacked and, after a brief melee, both units of Hannibal's cavalry were routed, pursued by the roman knights. The other elephants had more success but were channeled into the spaces left by the manipula. The elephants passed without causing damages to hastati, principes and triarii, only the velites aid a hefty price, already considered by Scipio who got what he wanted: his line has been ordered, the hastati were intact and the principes were not involved.
Thereupon, the infantry advanced and were in contact, except Carthaginians veterans who maintained the position. The battle was very violent and started a confused melee with large gaps that opened in the mercenaries formation where some fled. In addition, the line of African toops not intervened to support immediately, because the front was occupied by fugitives they prevented from going through as to not cluttering up the ranks. Sonna as they had the front enough free, some departments of African troops joined the fray, coming in contact with the hastati, who had left the position to pursuit the fugitives. It was necessary the support of principes in the points where the hastati had not recovered the position. In, this disorder, the Romans, better trained and armed, manage to prevail. The first two Carthaginians rows, now mixed, begin to abandon the combat line and some flee.
Hannibal was able to regain control of some African and mercenaries units and reorganize veterans sides, trying to widen the front as to surround the roman flank. Scipio, reorganized the hastati, already in pursuit of fugitives, let move his legionaries on the flanks, tactic already successfully used previously, but this time only to extend either side of the hastati's front but not to outflank the enemy. So the Roman front result equal to or slightly greater than the Carthaginian one, with principes and triarii, so far little committed, that had to fight on the wings against tired forces, although the hastati, committed so far in the clash, now had to contend with the Carthaginian veterans still fresh.
The fight between the infantry seemed to continue for a long time, with an uncertain outcome, but the Roman chivalries, who had now scattered the enemy Knights, returned to the battlefield attacking from behind Hannibal's troops. These, closely pressed by the Roman cavalry, quickly flee. As always happened in the wars of antiquity, once finished the battle, began the pursuit and the massacre. Hannibal managed to escape to Carthage but had left on the field at least 20,000 dead and 10,000 prisoners. Romans accounted losses to a maximum of 4,000 men, half of whom were numidians. Scipio had the pitched battle that he wanted and this victory had ended the second deadly conflict between Rome and Carthage.
The consequences
The decisive victory at the battle of Zama ended the Second Punic War (219-202 BC) and was, in fact, the end of Carthaginian power in the Mediterranean. Carthage, the great city of Phoenician origin that, with his business empire, for sixty years had contested Rome in the dominance of the Western Mediterranean, was defeated. Rome forced the rival city-State to a humiliating peace. A heavy Treaty required to dismantle completely the war fleet, only a few dozen ships were allowed to the Carthaginian Navy; all Carthaginian colonies in Spain passed under Roman control. The same foreign policy of Carthage had to conform to the Romans and the Punic were forced to pay a heavy tribute which, for fifty years, burdened on its economy.
Half century later there would be a third Punic War, which culminated with the destruction of Carthage, but it was more a posthumous Roman revenge than a consequence of a resurrected Carthaginian power that, after Zama, was definitely set.
Fearing Roman vengeance the city forced Hannibal, his greatest son, into exile at Syria's King Antiochus III; after the defeat of the latter against the Romans in Bithynia, Hannibal was poisoned so as to not be hand over in Rome. The defeat of Carthage is the first element in the construction of the Roman hegemony that somehow still marks the civilisation of our continent."
COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen F. SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen SPC Woody Bullard CPL Dave Hoover SFC William Farrell Lt Col Charlie Brown Col Carl Whicker SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth SPC Margaret Higgins ~1692709:SGT Robert Pryor] SGT Jim Arnold Maj William'Bill' Price PO1 Tony Holland SGT John " Mac " McConnell LTC Wayne Brandon PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SPC Douglas Bolton
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Conversation between Hannibal and Scipio before The Battle of Zama (202 BC) // As told by Livy
The year is 202 BC and the Roman Republic has spent seventeen years at war with the Carthaginians. Legendary general Hannibal, who at this point had been in ...
Thank you my friend SGT (Join to see) for reminding us that on October 19, 202 BC Publius Cornelius Scipio led his Roman legions and defeated Hannibal Barca and the Carthaginian army at the Battle of Zama, Tunisia.
Later Publius Cornelius Scipio was awarded the title Africanus after this win.
I just finished scanning through a book focused on this battle.
Conversation between Hannibal and Scipio before The Battle of Zama (202 BC) // As told by Livy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2QEVbQH1ZRg
1. The disposition of troops at Zama
2. The Battle of Zama - Giulio Romano
3. Hannibal Barca by Kordas
4. The Zama Tapestry, Patrimonio Nacional, Madrid, Spain
Background
1. ancient.eu/article/292/the-battle-of-zama---the-beginning-of-roman-conque
2. hannibal-barca-carthage.blogspot.com/2012/02/hannibals-tactics-at-zama-202-bc.html
1. Background from {[https://www.ancient.eu/article/292/the-battle-of-zama---the-beginning-of-roman-conque/]}
The Battle of Zama - The Beginning of Roman Conquest
by Joshua J. Mark published on 26 March 2020
The Battle of Zama (202 BCE) was the final engagement of the Second Punic War (218-202 BCE) at which Hannibal Barca of Carthage (l. 247-183 BCE) was defeated by Scipio Africanus of Rome (l. 236-183 BCE) ending the conflict in Rome’s favor. The Second Punic War had begun when Hannibal attacked the city of Saguntum, a Roman ally, in Spain and continued with a number of stunning victories by Hannibal in Northern Italy, most notably the Battle of Cannae in 216 BCE.
Hannibal seemed unstoppable until Scipio took command of the Roman forces after Cannae, defeated Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal Barca (l. c. 244-207 BCE) in Spain, driving him into Italy, and then drawing Hannibal back to North Africa by threatening the city of Carthage. Hannibal met Scipio at Zama in defense of his home city but Scipio, using Hannibal’s same tactics from Cannae, won the day and Carthage fell to the Romans.
Hannibal then lived the rest of his life as a fugitive, finally taking his own life rather than ever surrender to the Romans. Although initially hailed as Rome’s savior, Scipio was later vilified by his countrymen who forgot what they owed him. He left Rome for his villa and gave instructions in his will that he should be buried at his estate rather than in the ungrateful city of Rome. The Battle of Zama is remembered for Scipio’s brilliant tactics, based on Hannibal’s, which would afterwards become standard operating procedures for the Roman military and enable them to build their empire.
Background & First Punic War
HAMILCAR’S CLEVER TACTICS AT SEA & HIS CREWS’ EXPERIENCE LED TO A SERIES OF DECISIVE VICTORIES EARLY IN THE WAR.
Carthage and Rome first came into conflict over the island of Sicily, which both controlled parts of, igniting the First Punic War (264-241 BCE). The Carthaginian forces were led by Hamilcar Barca (l. 275-228 BCE) who used his fleet to strike without warning at Roman ports and outposts along Italy’s coast, cutting supply lines, and then attacking with his army. Carthage, at the beginning of the war, had the greatest fleet in the Mediterranean while the Romans were only used to land engagements. Hamilcar’s clever tactics and his crews’ experience in Carthaginian naval warfare led to a series of decisive victories early in the war.
Rome quickly taught itself how to fight at sea, however, and the Carthaginian government offered their general little support so the tide of the war shifted in favor of the Romans. Hamilcar defeated Rome at Drepana in 249 BCE but, receiving less and less support from his home government, steadily lost engagements while Rome grew stronger until, in 241 BCE, Carthage was forced to sue for peace and had to pay a large war indemnity to the victors.
Afterwards, Hamilcar went to the Carthaginian-held regions of Spain – ostensibly to take control of the silver mines there to pay Carthage’s debt to Rome – and began reequipping the Carthaginian army to resume the war. He brought his son Hannibal with him as well as his son-in-law Hasdrubal the Fair (l. c. 270-221 BCE) and, later, his younger son Hasdrubal Barca.
When Hamilcar died in 228 BCE, command of the army went to Hasdrubal the Fair who favored diplomatic measures with Rome over military conflict. Hasdrubal the Fair negotiated the Ebro Treaty in 226 BCE which stipulated that Roman and Carthaginian territories in Spain would be set by the Ebro River: Rome would hold the regions to the north, Carthage the regions to the south, and neither would infringe upon the others’ lands. Hasdrubal the Fair was assassinated in 221 BCE, however, and command went to Hannibal, who had sworn eternal enmity with Rome.
Second Punic War & Cannae
In 218 BCE, the Romans initiated a coup in the city of Saguntum, which was south of the Ebro, and installed a government hostile to Carthage. Hannibal marched on the city, lay siege and took it, which the Romans claimed was an act of war. They demanded Hannibal be turned over to them and, when the Carthaginian senate refused, war was declared.
HANNIBAL DEFEATED EVERY ROMAN FORCE SENT AGAINST HIM, CULMINATING IN THE BATTLE OF CANNAE IN 216 BCE WHERE HE LURED THE ROMANS INTO A TRAP.
Hannibal left his brother Hasdrubal in charge of the troops in Spain and marched his army over the Alps into Italy to bring the fight to the Romans. He defeated every Roman force sent against him, culminating in the Battle of Cannae in 216 BCE where he lured the Romans into a trap. Knowing the Romans favored their traditional tactic of masking their heavy infantry behind the front line of their lighter infantry with cavalry support from the wings, Hannibal formed a crescent formation with his light infantry at the center and his heavy infantry in a crescent formation.
The Romans relied on the strength of the charge to break the center of an enemy’s lines through sheer strength of numbers and so, in this battle, drove toward the center of Hannibal’s lines which gave way before them. The Romans, encouraged, drove on but the Carthaginians who seemed to be retreating were actually reforming to the left and right along the crescent. There was, therefore, no longer an actual center for the Romans to break – although it seemed there was – and by the time they realized their mistake, they were surrounded and the trap was closed. Out of the over 80,000 Romans troops on the field, 44,000 were killed and the rest scattered.
Rome was completely demoralized and could find no general to step up and take command of what was left of the Roman army as every general now seemed to feel that facing Hannibal in battle was a suicide mission. Scipio volunteered, though he was only 24 years old at the time and considered too young and inexperienced to stand a chance against Hannibal. He left for Spain with 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to engage Hasdrubal Barca who had killed both his father and uncle at the Battle of Upper Baetis in 211 BCE.
Scipio in Spain
Scipio led his troops against the city of Carthago Nova (New Carthage) in Spain in 209 BCE. New Carthage was thought to be impregnable owing to its fortifications and the natural defense of a lagoon protecting one whole side of the city. Prior to Cannae, Roman warfare relied largely on strength of numbers and sheer might of force in taking a city or driving an enemy from the field. Scipio, following Hannibal’s lead of a thinking commander, gathered intelligence that the water level of the lagoon could be dropped to a considerably lower level through sluices which allowed water in and out of the lagoon. The lagoon was used as a salt marsh for harvesting salt from the sea and Scipio realized all he had to do was distract the city’s defenders long enough to lower the lagoon’s level enough to allow for a crossing of his infantry.
Directing his second-in-command, Gaius Laelius, to mount a naval attack, and sending his infantry against the gates of the city, Scipio seized on this advantage of the lagoon. He led a column through the water at low tide – after the sluices had been utilized – breached the walls, and captured the city. Scipio would continue on with this same type of strategy in his other engagements with the Carthaginian forces.
In 208 BCE, Scipio met Hasdrubal Barca in battle at Baecula and recognized that, in order to attack, he would have to send his troops across a small river to then charge uphill against a fortified position. Again considering what Hannibal might do in such a situation, Scipio noted the dried gulleys on either side of the plateau Hasdrubal had fortified and so sent a lightly armed force straight ahead across the river and up the slope while his main force divided and drove toward the two gulleys. The Carthaginians were focused on the center, moved to engage, and were crushed by the wings which struck from either side.
BELIEVING, RIGHTLY THAT IF HE STRUCK AT CARTHAGE ITSELF HANNIBAL WOULD BE RECALLED FROM ITALY TO DEFEND IT, SCIPIO INVADED NORTH AFRICA IN 205 BCE.
Hasdrubal retreated with what was left of his army and followed Hannibal’s course over the Alps and into Italy. Before he could join his army with Hannibal’s, however, he was defeated by Gaius Claudius Nero (l. c. 237 - c. 199 BCE) at the Battle of the Metaurus where he was killed. Nero then returned to trying to trap and destroy Hannibal – which he had been unable to do definitively thus far – while Scipio finished up his work in Spain.
Battle of Zama
Scipio recognized that if he struck at Carthage itself Hannibal would be recalled from Italy to defend it and so withdrew from Spain and invaded North Africa in 205 BCE. After a siege, he took the city of Utica, allied himself with the Numidian King Masinissa, and marched on Carthage. Hannibal, who had been devastating Italy for the past twelve years, was recalled to defend the city. Scholar Ernle Bradford describes how the field of battle was chosen:
Hannibal marched west in the direction of a town called Zama, which is probably to be identified with a later Roman colony Zama Regia (Jama) ninety miles west of Hadrumetum. Reports had reached him that Scipio was engaged in burning villages, destroying crops, and enslaving the inhabitants of all this fertile area, upon which Carthage depended for its grain and other food. It can only have been this driving necessity which that made Hannibal march after Scipio, for on the surface it seems more logical for him to have taken his army in the direction of Carthage and interposed himself between Scipio and the city. But the latter’s systematic destruction of towns and villages, and his present activities in the Carthaginian hinterland, clearly precluded the ability of the city to feed a further 40,000 or so men, together with their horses and elephants, as well as its own teeming masses. The main cause, then, for the battle taking place where it did arouse out of a matter of supplies to the capital. Scipio knew what he was doing, and had quite deliberately drawn Hannibal away from the city so as to decide the outcome of the war in an area selected by himself. (196-197)
Both armies numbered about 40,000 when they met on the field. In Italy, Hannibal had been forced to fight without elephants (most of whom had been lost in his crossing of the Alps), but now back in Africa he arranged his elephant corps at the front of his lines followed by a continuous line of mercenaries, then Libyan allies, and finally his Carthaginian veterans from the Italian campaigns. To his left and right, he set his cavalry in the wings.
Scipio also arranged his lines but, instead of a continuous, unbroken line across the field, set the soldiers in columns. The gaps in these columns were masked by light infantry toward the front, making it appear as though Scipio had formed his men in the same way as Hannibal had his. To the Roman army’s left wing were the Italian cavalry, commanded by Gaius Laelius, and, to the right, the Numidian cavalry of Masinissa.
Hannibal made the first move, sending his elephants charging toward Scipio’s forces. Scipio ordered his men to hold their positions and then, at a given signal, the light infantry masking the front line moved into the columns and, at the same time, Scipio ordered his trumpets to blow and drums beat. The elephants ran harmlessly through the alleys between the columns or, startled by the trumpet blasts and the loud shouts of the Romans, turned around to trample the Carthaginian forces. Hannibal’s elephant charge had failed.
The Roman and Numidian cavalry then deployed and attacked the Carthaginian cavalry, driving them from the field. In doing so, the Roman cavalry swung to the left and right around the infantry forces on the field and the two cavalry forces fought behind the Carthaginian lines. Scipio’s infantry now advanced, mobilizing from the column formation to continuous lines, and pushed back the mercenary front lines of the Carthaginians.
The lines were so densely packed that the mercenaries fell back into the Libyan forces who could not give way because of the Carthaginians behind them. As the mercenaries were being crushed between the advancing Roman forces and the Libyans, they began to attack the Libyans to break through and escape. At this same time, the combined cavalry of Laelius and Masinissa returned to fall on the Carthaginian forces in the rear.
Hannibal’s forces were all but surrounded; 20,000 were killed and many more severely wounded. Hannibal himself escaped back to Carthage where he told the senate that he lost not only the battle, but the war, and suggested they sue for peace.
Conclusion
The two generals met after the battle to discuss terms and Scipio pardoned Hannibal who then became chief magistrate of Carthage. Rome again imposed a heavy war indemnity which was paid owing to Hannibal’s skill and dedication to his new position, but the Carthaginians blamed him for losing the war and denounced him to Rome, claiming he was attempting to make Carthage powerful enough to challenge the Romans in a new war. Hannibal recognized he would probably be handed over to Rome and fled for Tyre, then to the court of Antiochus III (the Great, r. 223-187 BCE) of the Seleucid Empire, and finally to the court of King Prusias of Bithynia where, in order to finally escape the pursuit of Rome, he took his own life in 183 BCE.
Scipio, meanwhile, was also abused by his countrymen who – forgetting how much they owed him – accused him of being a Carthaginian sympathizer in pardoning Hannibal, of accepting bribes, and misusing funds. He retreated to his estate in Liternum and was so disgusted by Rome’s ingratitude that he left instructions in his will that he be buried there instead of in a place of honor within the city. He died of natural causes the same year Hannibal committed suicide.
The Battle of Zama not only ended the Second Punic War but it also established the Roman army as the greatest fighting force since the armies of Alexander the Great. At the Battle of Cannae, Rome had relied on traditional tactics using superior numbers to crush an enemy, and from that defeat, Scipio understood that new arts of war were necessary. After Scipio’s brilliant reforms to Roman military strategy and tactics, the Romans would go on to conquer the known world. Zama, then, was not only the end of the Second Punic War but the beginning of effective campaigns of conquest which would eventually launch the Roman Empire.
BIBLIOGRAPHY RELATED CONTENT BOOKS CITE THIS WORK LICENSE
EDITORIAL REVIEW This article has been reviewed for accuracy, reliability and adherence to academic standards prior to publication.
Bibliography
• Bradford, E. Hannibal. Dorset Press, 2010.
• Durant, W. Caesar and Christ. Simon & Schuster, 1980.
• Grant, M. Readings in the Classical Historians. Scribner, 1993.
• Hoyos, D. A Companion to the Punic Wars. Wiley-Blackwell, 2015.
• Liddell Hart, B. H. Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon. Da Capo Press, 2004.
• Mellor, R. The Historians of Ancient Rome. Routledge, 2012.
• Miles, R. Carthage Must Be Destroyed. Penguin Books, 2012.
• Nardo, D. The Battle of Zama. Lucent Books, 1995.
• Sheldon, R. M. Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome. Routledge, 2007.
• Warmington, B. H. Carthage: A History. Barnes & Noble Inc, 2000.
2. Background from {[http://hannibal-barca-carthage.blogspot.com/2012/02/hannibals-tactics-at-zama-202-bc.html]}
Hannibal Barca of Carthage
The life of the Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca and his lifelong struggle against the Romans, set against the background of the Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome. This blog links to a related web-site that contains additional information and images.
Hannibal's Tactics at Zama (202 BC)
Although he was defeated at Zama, the battle shows some indications of Hannibal's tactical genius.
Hannibal could not do what he had done before, but if he had been able to force Scipio into a set battle shortly after he arrived, he would have held the cards because Scipio had practically no cavalry. But his astute opponent knew this, and after Carthage reneged on a peace with the arrival of Hannibal, Scipio's strategic move of laying waste to the hinterland of the Bagradas Valley, which also closed the gap between him and Massinissa, was brilliantly implemented; Carthage's vital lifeline was assaulted, and Hannibal was compelled to march west before he wanted to.
Hannibal knew he was finally outclassed in cavalry, and that he was up against a great general in Scipio. Furthermore, Scipio had superior cavalry and had amply proven his adeptness with 'boomerang' style tactics before (cavalry leaving the field of battle and then returning at the critical point).
Though the historical sources don't imply this, Hannibal probably deliberately sacrificed his horsemen to lure the Romans and Massinissa off the battlefield, where he had greater chance with his infantry. By using his cavalry units as decoys, however, he was taking a risk, because it still involved their defeat, exposed his flanks, and the Roman/Numidian cavalry could return before he had finished off Scipio's smaller but better body of infantry.
The fact that it was pretty close later shows Hannibal's strategy was not facile. Hannibal was a student of war, and a master of deception. He understood it all, including the strengths and liabilities of the elephants used for war purposes of his time.
Hannibal knew his military history, particularly that of the Hellenistic Kingdoms (he had Greek tutors). He knew what happened to Antigonus when his son, Demetrius Poliorcetes, went off in pursuit of Seleucus' cavalry at the great battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C. It has been suggested that Seleucus did indeed have his horses feign retreat. But, unlike Hannibal, he had 400 elephants that day, so he could deploy some in reserve in case Demetrius returned (which he never did).
Did Scipio order his cavalry to merely ride out and ride back in the manner they did?
Why didn't Scipio order a flank or rear manoeuvre with his superior cavalry, in whatever variant, as Hannibal had executed at Cannae? He was certainly capable, and with the superior material than his enemy at his disposal, which supposedly 'vanquished' the enemy horsemen. Scipio doubtless did not wish for the complete departure of his own cavalry. Having driven the enemy away, he no doubt counted on them to attack the flanks of the main Carthaginian body, instead of pursuing a fleeing foe. Scipio has been justly praised for the way he handled the elephants at Zama, but it shouldn't be forgotten that Hannibal certainly knew all about the tendencies and contingencies of elephants in battle. He perhaps didn't have as many as 80 - the number Polybius gives us. If so, why didn't Carthage use any of these beasts in the previous clashes against Scipio?
Anyway, Hannibal surely hoped the elephants would do their conventional stuff, but he easily could have known they would do exactly what they did do - swerve out to the flanks and disrupt things, which would aid his cavalry deception. It is unlikely that Hannibal would assume that things would go smoothly with recently levied war elephants. It is also possible they didn't do as much harm to his cavalry squadrons as the text sources imply. We have a scholarly point of view from Howard H. Scullard, from his book Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician Pg. 150,
"...Since it would take longer to convert a nominal into an actual flight than to drive a defeated enemy off the field, and since in fact the Roman cavalry only returned in the nick of time, it seems more probable that the Carthaginians deliberately drew them away. After getting rid of the Roman cavalry, though with little hope that his own could rally against them, Hannibal would throw all his weight against Scipio's numerically inferior infantry. The elephant charge, with which he had hoped to confuse his foe, miscarried somewhat, partly through Scipio's foresight in leaving gaps in his line for the animals to run through, partly because they were always of rather doubtful quality, and here fell afoul of the Carthaginian cavalry. However, they cannot have done great harm to their own side, since their drivers had the means of killing them if they got out of hand...".
Scullard, more than any scholar of this period, wrote a book about elephants in ancient warfare (The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World). We read of this interesting method to neutralise an out-of-control elephant from Livy - by the driver hammering a sharp chisel into the animal's brain - in reference to Hasdrubal at the Metaurus (Book 27.49), in which he states Hasdrubal was the first to use this viable control mechanism. And Zama was fought more than five years later, so why would Hannibal not make use of something that Livy states as being 'the swiftest way of dispatching a beast of such size' once all hope was lost of controlling the animal?
Moreover, Polybius mentions it was only Hannibal's left flank that was specifically impacted by any disruption due to out-of-control elephants. He states (Book 15.12):
"...When all was ready for battle on both sides, the Numidian horse having been skirmishing with each other for some time, Hannibal ordered the drivers of the elephants to charge the enemy. When the trumpets and bugles sounded shrilly from all sides, some of the animals took fright and at once turned tail and rushed back upon the Numidians who had come up to help the Carthaginians, and Massanissa attacking simultaneously, and the Carthaginian left wing was soon left exposed. The rest of the elephants falling on the Roman velites in the space between the two main armies, both inflicted and suffered much loss, until finally in their terror some of them escaped through the gaps in the Roman line with Scipio's foresight had provided, so that the Romans suffered no injury, while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight. He pressed the pursuit closely, as likewise did Massanissa....".
Thus the elephants indeed had drivers on top of them. How could the disturbance hamper the Carthaginian cavalry on Hannibal's right side, being they seemed to be mere spectators the whole time? The elephants on Hannibal's right who escaped 'at length out of the field' after the Roman cavalry showered the beasts with projectiles when they headed towards the right (the Roman left) 'in terror'. It is not stated they escaped by 'rushing back' upon the Carthaginian cavalry, as was Polybius' specific description of some of the elephants' fright and subsequent turning tail upon Hannibal's left cavalry (the Numidians under Tychaeus), which rendered that flank exposed, and never exploited by Scipio and his officers. Did they not 'see the bare flank' on Hannibal's left, or, more likely, did they not have any horsemen to exploit the opportunity because they were all riding off into the desert, chasing a 'defeated foe'?
How did Gaius Laelius, opposing the Carthaginians on the side that witnessed elephants that came their way - scattered off the field by his missile throwers - so easily send the Carthaginian cavalry to flight? Though inexperienced, the Carthaginian contingent was not outnumbered (assuming Masinissa's 4,600 or so strong (if we can sustain the presence of a 600 horsemen under a chieftain named Dacames, which only comes from Appian) was not interdispersed with the Romans on their left (Hannibal's right). The flight seemed immediate.
The answer is they were probably ordered to give ground. Regardless, Hannibal's measure involved his cavalry squadrons being almost certainly defeated eventually. However, by getting Scipio's cavalry off the field of battle, Hannibal would have eliminated the Roman advantage in this arm. For the first time, Hannibal would attempt to win without his cavalry administering any offensive action.
Hannibal's infantry dispositions at Zama were also unusual, probably becuase he knew he was at a disadvantage here too. He surely wasn't going to try to repeat his tactics at Cannae against a brilliant general who had been there as a 17 or 18 year old, thus wouldn't be taken in. Moreover, Scipio favoured flank attacks with his best troops.
Hannibal formed his infantry akin to a Roman triplex acies, but with his best unit, his veterans, the one unit who could match Scipio's troops, at a further distance than the one between the first and second line. He can be criticised for adopting a style which entailed discipline and drill which the troops of his first two lines (particularly the second) didn't possess, and there was no sound administrative quality behind his formations (there was nothing similar to an optio or signifer etc., thus no coherent command structure); but he didn't intend to apply the deployment the way the Romans usually did, that of the three lines interacting with each other to attend to any contingencies, but rather he tried to keep the three lines as distinct as possible, operating independently. Despite his obvious reputation, he had officers of Mago's old army and the inexperienced Punic contingent speak directly to the troops who had not served with him before.
Scipio could not do to Hannibal what he had so easily done to the other Carthaginian generals the past seven years. Hannibal absorbed Scipio's legions with his infantry, tiring them in the process, hoping to beat him head-on with his veterans. It wasn't to be, as Scipio was too good not to lose his advantage, as Polybius said, and his army was too well-organised and well-drilled.
But who knows what might have been if the first two lines hadn't turned on each other and Massinissa and Gaius Laelius hadn't returned 'providentially', as Polybius also said.
But the reality is that Scipio decisively won the Battle of Zama, although with the curious result that Hannibal was allowed to continue to live in Carthage."
FYI COL Mikel J. Burroughs SMSgt Lawrence McCarter SPC Michael Duricko, Ph.D GySgt Thomas Vick MSG Felipe De Leon Brown SGT Denny Espinosa SSG Stephen Rogerson SPC Matthew Lamb LTC (Join to see) LTC Greg Henning Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D. PO1 William "Chip" Nagel PO2 (Join to see) SSG Franklin Briant SPC Woody Bullard SSG Paul Headlee SPC Randy Zimmerman
Later Publius Cornelius Scipio was awarded the title Africanus after this win.
I just finished scanning through a book focused on this battle.
Conversation between Hannibal and Scipio before The Battle of Zama (202 BC) // As told by Livy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2QEVbQH1ZRg
1. The disposition of troops at Zama
2. The Battle of Zama - Giulio Romano
3. Hannibal Barca by Kordas
4. The Zama Tapestry, Patrimonio Nacional, Madrid, Spain
Background
1. ancient.eu/article/292/the-battle-of-zama---the-beginning-of-roman-conque
2. hannibal-barca-carthage.blogspot.com/2012/02/hannibals-tactics-at-zama-202-bc.html
1. Background from {[https://www.ancient.eu/article/292/the-battle-of-zama---the-beginning-of-roman-conque/]}
The Battle of Zama - The Beginning of Roman Conquest
by Joshua J. Mark published on 26 March 2020
The Battle of Zama (202 BCE) was the final engagement of the Second Punic War (218-202 BCE) at which Hannibal Barca of Carthage (l. 247-183 BCE) was defeated by Scipio Africanus of Rome (l. 236-183 BCE) ending the conflict in Rome’s favor. The Second Punic War had begun when Hannibal attacked the city of Saguntum, a Roman ally, in Spain and continued with a number of stunning victories by Hannibal in Northern Italy, most notably the Battle of Cannae in 216 BCE.
Hannibal seemed unstoppable until Scipio took command of the Roman forces after Cannae, defeated Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal Barca (l. c. 244-207 BCE) in Spain, driving him into Italy, and then drawing Hannibal back to North Africa by threatening the city of Carthage. Hannibal met Scipio at Zama in defense of his home city but Scipio, using Hannibal’s same tactics from Cannae, won the day and Carthage fell to the Romans.
Hannibal then lived the rest of his life as a fugitive, finally taking his own life rather than ever surrender to the Romans. Although initially hailed as Rome’s savior, Scipio was later vilified by his countrymen who forgot what they owed him. He left Rome for his villa and gave instructions in his will that he should be buried at his estate rather than in the ungrateful city of Rome. The Battle of Zama is remembered for Scipio’s brilliant tactics, based on Hannibal’s, which would afterwards become standard operating procedures for the Roman military and enable them to build their empire.
Background & First Punic War
HAMILCAR’S CLEVER TACTICS AT SEA & HIS CREWS’ EXPERIENCE LED TO A SERIES OF DECISIVE VICTORIES EARLY IN THE WAR.
Carthage and Rome first came into conflict over the island of Sicily, which both controlled parts of, igniting the First Punic War (264-241 BCE). The Carthaginian forces were led by Hamilcar Barca (l. 275-228 BCE) who used his fleet to strike without warning at Roman ports and outposts along Italy’s coast, cutting supply lines, and then attacking with his army. Carthage, at the beginning of the war, had the greatest fleet in the Mediterranean while the Romans were only used to land engagements. Hamilcar’s clever tactics and his crews’ experience in Carthaginian naval warfare led to a series of decisive victories early in the war.
Rome quickly taught itself how to fight at sea, however, and the Carthaginian government offered their general little support so the tide of the war shifted in favor of the Romans. Hamilcar defeated Rome at Drepana in 249 BCE but, receiving less and less support from his home government, steadily lost engagements while Rome grew stronger until, in 241 BCE, Carthage was forced to sue for peace and had to pay a large war indemnity to the victors.
Afterwards, Hamilcar went to the Carthaginian-held regions of Spain – ostensibly to take control of the silver mines there to pay Carthage’s debt to Rome – and began reequipping the Carthaginian army to resume the war. He brought his son Hannibal with him as well as his son-in-law Hasdrubal the Fair (l. c. 270-221 BCE) and, later, his younger son Hasdrubal Barca.
When Hamilcar died in 228 BCE, command of the army went to Hasdrubal the Fair who favored diplomatic measures with Rome over military conflict. Hasdrubal the Fair negotiated the Ebro Treaty in 226 BCE which stipulated that Roman and Carthaginian territories in Spain would be set by the Ebro River: Rome would hold the regions to the north, Carthage the regions to the south, and neither would infringe upon the others’ lands. Hasdrubal the Fair was assassinated in 221 BCE, however, and command went to Hannibal, who had sworn eternal enmity with Rome.
Second Punic War & Cannae
In 218 BCE, the Romans initiated a coup in the city of Saguntum, which was south of the Ebro, and installed a government hostile to Carthage. Hannibal marched on the city, lay siege and took it, which the Romans claimed was an act of war. They demanded Hannibal be turned over to them and, when the Carthaginian senate refused, war was declared.
HANNIBAL DEFEATED EVERY ROMAN FORCE SENT AGAINST HIM, CULMINATING IN THE BATTLE OF CANNAE IN 216 BCE WHERE HE LURED THE ROMANS INTO A TRAP.
Hannibal left his brother Hasdrubal in charge of the troops in Spain and marched his army over the Alps into Italy to bring the fight to the Romans. He defeated every Roman force sent against him, culminating in the Battle of Cannae in 216 BCE where he lured the Romans into a trap. Knowing the Romans favored their traditional tactic of masking their heavy infantry behind the front line of their lighter infantry with cavalry support from the wings, Hannibal formed a crescent formation with his light infantry at the center and his heavy infantry in a crescent formation.
The Romans relied on the strength of the charge to break the center of an enemy’s lines through sheer strength of numbers and so, in this battle, drove toward the center of Hannibal’s lines which gave way before them. The Romans, encouraged, drove on but the Carthaginians who seemed to be retreating were actually reforming to the left and right along the crescent. There was, therefore, no longer an actual center for the Romans to break – although it seemed there was – and by the time they realized their mistake, they were surrounded and the trap was closed. Out of the over 80,000 Romans troops on the field, 44,000 were killed and the rest scattered.
Rome was completely demoralized and could find no general to step up and take command of what was left of the Roman army as every general now seemed to feel that facing Hannibal in battle was a suicide mission. Scipio volunteered, though he was only 24 years old at the time and considered too young and inexperienced to stand a chance against Hannibal. He left for Spain with 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to engage Hasdrubal Barca who had killed both his father and uncle at the Battle of Upper Baetis in 211 BCE.
Scipio in Spain
Scipio led his troops against the city of Carthago Nova (New Carthage) in Spain in 209 BCE. New Carthage was thought to be impregnable owing to its fortifications and the natural defense of a lagoon protecting one whole side of the city. Prior to Cannae, Roman warfare relied largely on strength of numbers and sheer might of force in taking a city or driving an enemy from the field. Scipio, following Hannibal’s lead of a thinking commander, gathered intelligence that the water level of the lagoon could be dropped to a considerably lower level through sluices which allowed water in and out of the lagoon. The lagoon was used as a salt marsh for harvesting salt from the sea and Scipio realized all he had to do was distract the city’s defenders long enough to lower the lagoon’s level enough to allow for a crossing of his infantry.
Directing his second-in-command, Gaius Laelius, to mount a naval attack, and sending his infantry against the gates of the city, Scipio seized on this advantage of the lagoon. He led a column through the water at low tide – after the sluices had been utilized – breached the walls, and captured the city. Scipio would continue on with this same type of strategy in his other engagements with the Carthaginian forces.
In 208 BCE, Scipio met Hasdrubal Barca in battle at Baecula and recognized that, in order to attack, he would have to send his troops across a small river to then charge uphill against a fortified position. Again considering what Hannibal might do in such a situation, Scipio noted the dried gulleys on either side of the plateau Hasdrubal had fortified and so sent a lightly armed force straight ahead across the river and up the slope while his main force divided and drove toward the two gulleys. The Carthaginians were focused on the center, moved to engage, and were crushed by the wings which struck from either side.
BELIEVING, RIGHTLY THAT IF HE STRUCK AT CARTHAGE ITSELF HANNIBAL WOULD BE RECALLED FROM ITALY TO DEFEND IT, SCIPIO INVADED NORTH AFRICA IN 205 BCE.
Hasdrubal retreated with what was left of his army and followed Hannibal’s course over the Alps and into Italy. Before he could join his army with Hannibal’s, however, he was defeated by Gaius Claudius Nero (l. c. 237 - c. 199 BCE) at the Battle of the Metaurus where he was killed. Nero then returned to trying to trap and destroy Hannibal – which he had been unable to do definitively thus far – while Scipio finished up his work in Spain.
Battle of Zama
Scipio recognized that if he struck at Carthage itself Hannibal would be recalled from Italy to defend it and so withdrew from Spain and invaded North Africa in 205 BCE. After a siege, he took the city of Utica, allied himself with the Numidian King Masinissa, and marched on Carthage. Hannibal, who had been devastating Italy for the past twelve years, was recalled to defend the city. Scholar Ernle Bradford describes how the field of battle was chosen:
Hannibal marched west in the direction of a town called Zama, which is probably to be identified with a later Roman colony Zama Regia (Jama) ninety miles west of Hadrumetum. Reports had reached him that Scipio was engaged in burning villages, destroying crops, and enslaving the inhabitants of all this fertile area, upon which Carthage depended for its grain and other food. It can only have been this driving necessity which that made Hannibal march after Scipio, for on the surface it seems more logical for him to have taken his army in the direction of Carthage and interposed himself between Scipio and the city. But the latter’s systematic destruction of towns and villages, and his present activities in the Carthaginian hinterland, clearly precluded the ability of the city to feed a further 40,000 or so men, together with their horses and elephants, as well as its own teeming masses. The main cause, then, for the battle taking place where it did arouse out of a matter of supplies to the capital. Scipio knew what he was doing, and had quite deliberately drawn Hannibal away from the city so as to decide the outcome of the war in an area selected by himself. (196-197)
Both armies numbered about 40,000 when they met on the field. In Italy, Hannibal had been forced to fight without elephants (most of whom had been lost in his crossing of the Alps), but now back in Africa he arranged his elephant corps at the front of his lines followed by a continuous line of mercenaries, then Libyan allies, and finally his Carthaginian veterans from the Italian campaigns. To his left and right, he set his cavalry in the wings.
Scipio also arranged his lines but, instead of a continuous, unbroken line across the field, set the soldiers in columns. The gaps in these columns were masked by light infantry toward the front, making it appear as though Scipio had formed his men in the same way as Hannibal had his. To the Roman army’s left wing were the Italian cavalry, commanded by Gaius Laelius, and, to the right, the Numidian cavalry of Masinissa.
Hannibal made the first move, sending his elephants charging toward Scipio’s forces. Scipio ordered his men to hold their positions and then, at a given signal, the light infantry masking the front line moved into the columns and, at the same time, Scipio ordered his trumpets to blow and drums beat. The elephants ran harmlessly through the alleys between the columns or, startled by the trumpet blasts and the loud shouts of the Romans, turned around to trample the Carthaginian forces. Hannibal’s elephant charge had failed.
The Roman and Numidian cavalry then deployed and attacked the Carthaginian cavalry, driving them from the field. In doing so, the Roman cavalry swung to the left and right around the infantry forces on the field and the two cavalry forces fought behind the Carthaginian lines. Scipio’s infantry now advanced, mobilizing from the column formation to continuous lines, and pushed back the mercenary front lines of the Carthaginians.
The lines were so densely packed that the mercenaries fell back into the Libyan forces who could not give way because of the Carthaginians behind them. As the mercenaries were being crushed between the advancing Roman forces and the Libyans, they began to attack the Libyans to break through and escape. At this same time, the combined cavalry of Laelius and Masinissa returned to fall on the Carthaginian forces in the rear.
Hannibal’s forces were all but surrounded; 20,000 were killed and many more severely wounded. Hannibal himself escaped back to Carthage where he told the senate that he lost not only the battle, but the war, and suggested they sue for peace.
Conclusion
The two generals met after the battle to discuss terms and Scipio pardoned Hannibal who then became chief magistrate of Carthage. Rome again imposed a heavy war indemnity which was paid owing to Hannibal’s skill and dedication to his new position, but the Carthaginians blamed him for losing the war and denounced him to Rome, claiming he was attempting to make Carthage powerful enough to challenge the Romans in a new war. Hannibal recognized he would probably be handed over to Rome and fled for Tyre, then to the court of Antiochus III (the Great, r. 223-187 BCE) of the Seleucid Empire, and finally to the court of King Prusias of Bithynia where, in order to finally escape the pursuit of Rome, he took his own life in 183 BCE.
Scipio, meanwhile, was also abused by his countrymen who – forgetting how much they owed him – accused him of being a Carthaginian sympathizer in pardoning Hannibal, of accepting bribes, and misusing funds. He retreated to his estate in Liternum and was so disgusted by Rome’s ingratitude that he left instructions in his will that he be buried there instead of in a place of honor within the city. He died of natural causes the same year Hannibal committed suicide.
The Battle of Zama not only ended the Second Punic War but it also established the Roman army as the greatest fighting force since the armies of Alexander the Great. At the Battle of Cannae, Rome had relied on traditional tactics using superior numbers to crush an enemy, and from that defeat, Scipio understood that new arts of war were necessary. After Scipio’s brilliant reforms to Roman military strategy and tactics, the Romans would go on to conquer the known world. Zama, then, was not only the end of the Second Punic War but the beginning of effective campaigns of conquest which would eventually launch the Roman Empire.
BIBLIOGRAPHY RELATED CONTENT BOOKS CITE THIS WORK LICENSE
EDITORIAL REVIEW This article has been reviewed for accuracy, reliability and adherence to academic standards prior to publication.
Bibliography
• Bradford, E. Hannibal. Dorset Press, 2010.
• Durant, W. Caesar and Christ. Simon & Schuster, 1980.
• Grant, M. Readings in the Classical Historians. Scribner, 1993.
• Hoyos, D. A Companion to the Punic Wars. Wiley-Blackwell, 2015.
• Liddell Hart, B. H. Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon. Da Capo Press, 2004.
• Mellor, R. The Historians of Ancient Rome. Routledge, 2012.
• Miles, R. Carthage Must Be Destroyed. Penguin Books, 2012.
• Nardo, D. The Battle of Zama. Lucent Books, 1995.
• Sheldon, R. M. Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome. Routledge, 2007.
• Warmington, B. H. Carthage: A History. Barnes & Noble Inc, 2000.
2. Background from {[http://hannibal-barca-carthage.blogspot.com/2012/02/hannibals-tactics-at-zama-202-bc.html]}
Hannibal Barca of Carthage
The life of the Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca and his lifelong struggle against the Romans, set against the background of the Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome. This blog links to a related web-site that contains additional information and images.
Hannibal's Tactics at Zama (202 BC)
Although he was defeated at Zama, the battle shows some indications of Hannibal's tactical genius.
Hannibal could not do what he had done before, but if he had been able to force Scipio into a set battle shortly after he arrived, he would have held the cards because Scipio had practically no cavalry. But his astute opponent knew this, and after Carthage reneged on a peace with the arrival of Hannibal, Scipio's strategic move of laying waste to the hinterland of the Bagradas Valley, which also closed the gap between him and Massinissa, was brilliantly implemented; Carthage's vital lifeline was assaulted, and Hannibal was compelled to march west before he wanted to.
Hannibal knew he was finally outclassed in cavalry, and that he was up against a great general in Scipio. Furthermore, Scipio had superior cavalry and had amply proven his adeptness with 'boomerang' style tactics before (cavalry leaving the field of battle and then returning at the critical point).
Though the historical sources don't imply this, Hannibal probably deliberately sacrificed his horsemen to lure the Romans and Massinissa off the battlefield, where he had greater chance with his infantry. By using his cavalry units as decoys, however, he was taking a risk, because it still involved their defeat, exposed his flanks, and the Roman/Numidian cavalry could return before he had finished off Scipio's smaller but better body of infantry.
The fact that it was pretty close later shows Hannibal's strategy was not facile. Hannibal was a student of war, and a master of deception. He understood it all, including the strengths and liabilities of the elephants used for war purposes of his time.
Hannibal knew his military history, particularly that of the Hellenistic Kingdoms (he had Greek tutors). He knew what happened to Antigonus when his son, Demetrius Poliorcetes, went off in pursuit of Seleucus' cavalry at the great battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C. It has been suggested that Seleucus did indeed have his horses feign retreat. But, unlike Hannibal, he had 400 elephants that day, so he could deploy some in reserve in case Demetrius returned (which he never did).
Did Scipio order his cavalry to merely ride out and ride back in the manner they did?
Why didn't Scipio order a flank or rear manoeuvre with his superior cavalry, in whatever variant, as Hannibal had executed at Cannae? He was certainly capable, and with the superior material than his enemy at his disposal, which supposedly 'vanquished' the enemy horsemen. Scipio doubtless did not wish for the complete departure of his own cavalry. Having driven the enemy away, he no doubt counted on them to attack the flanks of the main Carthaginian body, instead of pursuing a fleeing foe. Scipio has been justly praised for the way he handled the elephants at Zama, but it shouldn't be forgotten that Hannibal certainly knew all about the tendencies and contingencies of elephants in battle. He perhaps didn't have as many as 80 - the number Polybius gives us. If so, why didn't Carthage use any of these beasts in the previous clashes against Scipio?
Anyway, Hannibal surely hoped the elephants would do their conventional stuff, but he easily could have known they would do exactly what they did do - swerve out to the flanks and disrupt things, which would aid his cavalry deception. It is unlikely that Hannibal would assume that things would go smoothly with recently levied war elephants. It is also possible they didn't do as much harm to his cavalry squadrons as the text sources imply. We have a scholarly point of view from Howard H. Scullard, from his book Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician Pg. 150,
"...Since it would take longer to convert a nominal into an actual flight than to drive a defeated enemy off the field, and since in fact the Roman cavalry only returned in the nick of time, it seems more probable that the Carthaginians deliberately drew them away. After getting rid of the Roman cavalry, though with little hope that his own could rally against them, Hannibal would throw all his weight against Scipio's numerically inferior infantry. The elephant charge, with which he had hoped to confuse his foe, miscarried somewhat, partly through Scipio's foresight in leaving gaps in his line for the animals to run through, partly because they were always of rather doubtful quality, and here fell afoul of the Carthaginian cavalry. However, they cannot have done great harm to their own side, since their drivers had the means of killing them if they got out of hand...".
Scullard, more than any scholar of this period, wrote a book about elephants in ancient warfare (The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World). We read of this interesting method to neutralise an out-of-control elephant from Livy - by the driver hammering a sharp chisel into the animal's brain - in reference to Hasdrubal at the Metaurus (Book 27.49), in which he states Hasdrubal was the first to use this viable control mechanism. And Zama was fought more than five years later, so why would Hannibal not make use of something that Livy states as being 'the swiftest way of dispatching a beast of such size' once all hope was lost of controlling the animal?
Moreover, Polybius mentions it was only Hannibal's left flank that was specifically impacted by any disruption due to out-of-control elephants. He states (Book 15.12):
"...When all was ready for battle on both sides, the Numidian horse having been skirmishing with each other for some time, Hannibal ordered the drivers of the elephants to charge the enemy. When the trumpets and bugles sounded shrilly from all sides, some of the animals took fright and at once turned tail and rushed back upon the Numidians who had come up to help the Carthaginians, and Massanissa attacking simultaneously, and the Carthaginian left wing was soon left exposed. The rest of the elephants falling on the Roman velites in the space between the two main armies, both inflicted and suffered much loss, until finally in their terror some of them escaped through the gaps in the Roman line with Scipio's foresight had provided, so that the Romans suffered no injury, while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight. He pressed the pursuit closely, as likewise did Massanissa....".
Thus the elephants indeed had drivers on top of them. How could the disturbance hamper the Carthaginian cavalry on Hannibal's right side, being they seemed to be mere spectators the whole time? The elephants on Hannibal's right who escaped 'at length out of the field' after the Roman cavalry showered the beasts with projectiles when they headed towards the right (the Roman left) 'in terror'. It is not stated they escaped by 'rushing back' upon the Carthaginian cavalry, as was Polybius' specific description of some of the elephants' fright and subsequent turning tail upon Hannibal's left cavalry (the Numidians under Tychaeus), which rendered that flank exposed, and never exploited by Scipio and his officers. Did they not 'see the bare flank' on Hannibal's left, or, more likely, did they not have any horsemen to exploit the opportunity because they were all riding off into the desert, chasing a 'defeated foe'?
How did Gaius Laelius, opposing the Carthaginians on the side that witnessed elephants that came their way - scattered off the field by his missile throwers - so easily send the Carthaginian cavalry to flight? Though inexperienced, the Carthaginian contingent was not outnumbered (assuming Masinissa's 4,600 or so strong (if we can sustain the presence of a 600 horsemen under a chieftain named Dacames, which only comes from Appian) was not interdispersed with the Romans on their left (Hannibal's right). The flight seemed immediate.
The answer is they were probably ordered to give ground. Regardless, Hannibal's measure involved his cavalry squadrons being almost certainly defeated eventually. However, by getting Scipio's cavalry off the field of battle, Hannibal would have eliminated the Roman advantage in this arm. For the first time, Hannibal would attempt to win without his cavalry administering any offensive action.
Hannibal's infantry dispositions at Zama were also unusual, probably becuase he knew he was at a disadvantage here too. He surely wasn't going to try to repeat his tactics at Cannae against a brilliant general who had been there as a 17 or 18 year old, thus wouldn't be taken in. Moreover, Scipio favoured flank attacks with his best troops.
Hannibal formed his infantry akin to a Roman triplex acies, but with his best unit, his veterans, the one unit who could match Scipio's troops, at a further distance than the one between the first and second line. He can be criticised for adopting a style which entailed discipline and drill which the troops of his first two lines (particularly the second) didn't possess, and there was no sound administrative quality behind his formations (there was nothing similar to an optio or signifer etc., thus no coherent command structure); but he didn't intend to apply the deployment the way the Romans usually did, that of the three lines interacting with each other to attend to any contingencies, but rather he tried to keep the three lines as distinct as possible, operating independently. Despite his obvious reputation, he had officers of Mago's old army and the inexperienced Punic contingent speak directly to the troops who had not served with him before.
Scipio could not do to Hannibal what he had so easily done to the other Carthaginian generals the past seven years. Hannibal absorbed Scipio's legions with his infantry, tiring them in the process, hoping to beat him head-on with his veterans. It wasn't to be, as Scipio was too good not to lose his advantage, as Polybius said, and his army was too well-organised and well-drilled.
But who knows what might have been if the first two lines hadn't turned on each other and Massinissa and Gaius Laelius hadn't returned 'providentially', as Polybius also said.
But the reality is that Scipio decisively won the Battle of Zama, although with the curious result that Hannibal was allowed to continue to live in Carthage."
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Hannibal: Rome's Greatest Enemy | The Man Who Hated Rome | Timeline
No shortlist of the greatest generals in history would be complete with out the name of Hannibal. This film shows why he was both feared and respected by his...
Hannibal: Rome's Greatest Enemy | The Man Who Hated Rome | Timeline
No shortlist of the greatest generals in history would be complete with out the name of Hannibal. This film shows why he was both feared and respected by his enemies. Hannibal’s tactical genius is illustrated with the latest three-dimensional graphics technology and exciting dramatic reconstructions of his victories. This is the story of the General who took on the might of Rome. Hannibal led his forces, including a squadron of elephants, through France, over the Alps and into the heart of Italy. For 15 years he fought the Romans using their own country as his battlefield and his base. With his small forces, he destroyed larger well-trained Roman Armies with almost contemptuous ease. This feature length special also shows how Rome, after defeating Hannibal, destroyed the city of Carthage and attempted to wipe out an entire civilization.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2GH1c50zcYc
Images:
1. Charlotte Mary Yonge, 1880, Hannibal and Scipio meet to discuss terms.
2. Romans marching and making camp- Use by permission. Copyright Peter Rockwell
3. Zama battle plan Scipio
4. Carthage was reduced to a fraction of its empire at the end of the Second Punic War.
5. Battle of Zama by Dutch draughtsman Cornelis Cort
Backgrounds on Punic wars
1. history.com/topics/ancient-history/punic-wars]
2. thecollector.com/the-punic-wars-how-did-the-romans-crush-carthage
1. Background from {[https://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/punic-wars]}
Punic Wars
Background and First Punic War (264-241 B.C.)
Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.)
Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.)
The three Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome took place over nearly a century, beginning in 264 B.C. and ending in Roman victory with the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. By the time the First Punic War broke out, Rome had become the dominant power throughout the Italian peninsula, while Carthage–a powerful city-state in northern Africa–had established itself as the leading maritime power in the world. The First Punic War began in 264 B.C. when Rome interfered in a dispute on the Carthaginian-controlled island of Sicily; the war ended with Rome in control of both Sicily and Corsica and marked the empire’s emergence as a naval as well as a land power. In the Second Punic War, the great Carthaginian general Hannibal invaded Italy and scored great victories at Lake Trasimene and Cannae before his eventual defeat at the hands of Rome’s Scipio Africanus in 202 B.C., which left Rome in control of the western Mediterranean and much of Spain. In the Third Punic War, the Romans, led by Scipio the Younger, captured and destroyed the city of Carthage in 146 B.C., turning Africa into yet another province of the mighty Roman Empire.
Background and First Punic War (264-241 B.C.)
Tradition holds that Phoenician settlers from the Mediterranean port of Tyre (in what is now Lebanon) founded the city-state of Carthage on the northern coast of Africa, just north of modern-day Tunis, around 814 B.C. (The word “Punic,” later the name for the series of wars between Carthage and Rome, was derived from the Latin word for Phoenician.) By 265 B.C., Carthage was the wealthiest and most advanced city in the region, as well as its leading naval power. Though Carthage had clashed violently with several other powers in the region, notably Greece, its relations with Rome were historically friendly, and the cities had signed several treaties defining trading rights over the years.
In 264 B.C., Rome decided to intervene in a dispute on the western coast of the island of Sicily (then a Carthaginian province) involving an attack by soldiers from the city of Syracuse against the city of Messina. While Carthage supported Syracuse, Rome supported Messina, and the struggle soon exploded into a direct conflict between the two powers, with control of Sicily at stake. Over the course of nearly 20 years, Rome rebuilt its entire fleet in order to confront Carthage’s powerful navy, scoring its first sea victory at Mylae in 260 B.C. and a major victory in the Battle of Ecnomus in 256 B.C. Though its invasion of North Africa that same year ended in defeat, Rome refused to give up, and in 241 B.C. the Roman fleet was able to win a decisive victory against the Carthaginians at sea, breaking their legendary naval superiority. At the end of the First Punic War, Sicily became Rome’s first overseas province.
Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.)
Over the next decades, Rome took over control of both Corsica and Sardinia as well, but Carthage was able to establish a new base of influence in Spain beginning in 237 B.C., under the leadership of the powerful general Hamilcar Barca and, later, his son-in-law Hasdrubal. According to Polybius and Livy in their histories of Rome, Hamilcar Barca, who died in 229 B.C., made his younger son Hannibal swear a blood oath against Rome when he was just a young boy. Upon Hasdrubal’s death in 221 B.C., Hannibal took command of Carthaginian forces in Spain. Two years later, he marched his army across the Ebro River into Saguntum, an Iberian city under Roman protection, effectively declaring war on Rome. The Second Punic War saw Hannibal and his troops–including as many as 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and a number of elephants–march from Spain across the Alps and into Italy, where they scored a string of victories over Roman troops at Ticinus, Trebia and Trasimene. Hannibal’s daring invasion of Rome reached its height at the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C., where he used his superior cavalry to surround a Roman army twice the size of his own and inflict massive casualties.
After this disastrous defeat, however, the Romans managed to rebound, and the Carthaginians lost hold in Italy as Rome won victories in Spain and North Africa under the rising young general Publius Cornelius Scipio (later known as Scipio Africanus). In 203 B.C., Hannibal’s forces were forced to abandon the struggle in Italy in order to defend North Africa, and the following year Scipio’s army routed the Carthaginians at Zama. Hannibal’s losses in the Second Punic War effectively put an end to Carthage’s empire in the western Mediterranean, leaving Rome in control of Spain and allowing Carthage to retain only its territory in North Africa. Carthage was also forced to give up its fleet and pay a large indemnity to Rome in silver.
Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.)
The Third Punic War, by far the most controversial of the three conflicts between Rome and Carthage, was the result of efforts by Cato the Elder and other hawkish members of the Roman Senate to convince their colleagues that Carthage (even in its weakened state) was a continuing threat to Rome’s supremacy in the region. In 149 B.C., after Carthage technically broke its treaty with Rome by declaring war against the neighboring state of Numidia, the Romans sent an army to North Africa, beginning the Third Punic War.
Carthage withstood the Roman siege for two years before a change of Roman command put the young general Scipio Aemilianus (later known as Scipio the Younger) in charge of the North Africa campaign in 147 B.C. After tightening the Roman positions around Carthage, Aemilianus launched a forceful attack on its harbor side in the spring of 146 B.C., pushing into the city and destroying house after house while pushing enemy troops towards their citadel. After seven days of horrific bloodshed, the Carthaginians surrendered, obliterating an ancient city that had survived for some 700 years. The surviving 50,000 citizens of Carthage were sold into slavery. Also in 146 B.C., Roman troops moved east to defeat King Philip V of Macedonia in the Macedonian Wars, and by year’s end Rome reigned supreme over an empire stretching from the Atlantic coast of Spain to the border between Greece and Asia Minor (now Turkey).
2. Background from {[ https://www.thecollector.com/the-punic-wars-how-did-the-romans-crush-carthage/]}
STORIES
The Punic Wars: How did the Romans crush Carthage?
The Roman victory over Carthage in the Punic Wars gave way to the establishment of the Roman Empire. Despite the great victories of Carthage during the wars, the Romans were able to outmaneuver and eventually conquer the remains of the African empire.
By Vladislav Tchakarov January 5, 2020
The Punic Wars, also known as the Carthage Wars (264–146 BC), are a series of three military conflicts between the Roman Republic and the Carthaginian Empire that led to the destruction of Carthage, the enslavement of its population and the transformation of Rome into the superpower of the Ancient World.
Carthage grew from a small port to the richest and most powerful city in the Mediterranean region. It had a powerful fleet, a mercenary army and, thanks to tariffs and trade, enough wealth to do what it pleases. At the time before the First Punic War (264-241 BC), Carthaginians had forbidden Rome to trade in the Western Mediterranean by contract.
The Carthaginians wanted everything that could be bought, sold, or traded. The Punic Wars focused mainly on the question, “In whose yard will the Mediterranean be located?” The final answer was “Rome.
Hannibal: One of the Greatest Military Leaders in History
The most commonly remembered image and story of the Punic Wars is Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps with elephants. It really happened; it was a serious test to move an army of 50,000 men with horses and elephants through the passages between snowdrifts and landslides, across rivers, and across mountain ranges.
On top of that, the locals weren’t too hospitable either. Hannibal had to fight both the local people and nature in order to cross the Alps. The elephants did not do too well; along with almost half of Hannibal’s troops, many elephants died in this historical drama.
Hannibal is definitely the most exciting figure of the Punic Wars. The son of a great warlord, Hamilcar Barca, also a brother and son-in-law of other great Carthaginian warlords, Hannibal swears from his childhood to fight with Rome. When he made his first move, for fifteen years, young children had been frightened by the words, “Hannibal ad portas” – “Hannibal is at the city gate.”
Hannibal is one of the greatest military leaders in all of history. In him, you can find all the characteristics that we associate with the military genius of people like Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Genghis Khan, Cortez, Robert Lee or Douglas MacArthur. He was brave, with brilliant tactical ability, resourceful, cunning, insanely brave, ruthless, and most often successful.
He usually attracted Roman troops to a battlefield of his choice. In the battle of Lake Trebia, for example, a whole Roman army was trapped. In the Battle of Cannae, he succeeded flanking the Roman army from both sides as if it came from the pages of a military textbook. In this battle alone, he killed over 40,000 Romans.
Whether through bribery or threats, diplomacy or intimidation, cavalry raids or prepared battles, Hannibal is well versed in the art of war.
Years after the Punic Wars, Scipio Africanus (the only Roman who really defeated Hannibal on the battlefield) asked Hannibal who he thinks are the greatest warlords in history.
Hannibal gave the first place to Alexander the Great, the second, to the king of Epirus Pyrrhus, who invaded Italy in 280 BC, and the third to himself. Then, Scipio asked him “And if you had beaten me?” The answer Hannibal had was the following: “I would have been the first then”.
The First Punic War (264 – 241 BC)
In 264 BC, a conflict in Sicily involving Carthage prompted the Romans to intervene. By sending its troops, Rome started the First Punic War.
Initially, battles took place on land and the Roman legions crushed the Carthaginians. In the second phase of the war, the Carthaginians concentrated their actions mainly at sea, because they assumed that their superiority was palpable there. They managed to inflict a lot of damage on Rome.
Then Rome innovated in its newly formed fleet with a bridge that connected the two ships and allowed the soldiers to storm the enemy. This reversed the course of the war. The Carthaginians were left broken and seeking peace. Rome imposed a degrading treaty on them. The Carthaginian Empire lost Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and its commercial monopoly.
After a grueling civil war and conflicts with neighboring kingdoms, Carthage began to recover. In order to counterbalance their losses and restore the power of Carthage, Carthaginian commander Hamilcar Barca set off on a campaign in Spain and laid the foundations for a great Carthaginian rule in Spain.
New Carthage (now Cartagena) was founded on the southeastern coast of Spain, and within a few years, through the mining of Spain, re-filled Carthage’s treasury. This conquest inevitably led to a collision with Rome and in 218 BC, war broke out again.
The Second Punic War (218 – 201 BC)
The Second Punic War began disastrously for Rome. Led by the talented Commander Hannibal, the Carthaginians crossed the Alps and invaded Northern Italy. Hannibal went with his army across almost the entire peninsula and devastated the country.
In the Battle of Cannae, from 87,000 Romans only 14,000 survived. However, the distance from Carthage interrupted Hannibal’s supply lines and at the same time, the Romans transferred their armies to Africa, attacking Carthage itself.
The Grand Commander was forced to abandon his conquest and rushed to save his homeland. However, near Zama (in Tunisia today), Hannibal suffered his first defeat, which was so catastrophic that Carthage was forced to seek peace again.
This time, the contract was almost devastating. The trade empire was forced to part with all its overseas territories and surrender its fleet, had no right to wage war without the consent of Rome and had to pay a huge indemnity within 50 years. Hannibal later escaped into exile, and around 183 BC, committed suicide.
Peace brought a new period of prosperity to Carthage, and to such an extent that Carthage offered to pay Rome’s indemnity in ten years only. This enormous vitality, as well as the political reforms in Carthage, were regarded as an extreme threat by its relentless enemies.
For almost two years, until his death, an elderly member of the Roman Senate, Cato, completed his speech before the Senate with the sentence “Carthago delenda est!” meaning “Cartagena must be destroyed! “
Finally, in 150 BC, a minor violation of the peace gave the Romans the occasion they sought. A war was declared, described as a “war of destruction.” For three years, the Romans laid siege to the thirty-kilometer fortifications of the city, some of which were walls over twelve feet high. In 146 BC, they managed to break into the walls.
Roman soldiers advanced through the narrow streets in the rain of arrows and embarked on a fierce melee. In sad acknowledgment of the ancient historical chronicles, archaeologists have discovered human bones under scattered stone blocks.
After six horrifying days, some 50,000 hungry residents of the city who had sought asylum in a nearby fortress surrendered. Others, who wanted to avoid execution or slavery, locked themselves in Eshmun’s temple and set it on fire.
The Romans burned down the ruins of the city, Carthage was leveled to the ground, and cursed in a special ceremony, prohibiting its settlement.
Thus, in 120 years, Rome crushed Carthage’s pursuits of domination. As it turned out, the Punic Wars marked the emergence of Roman imperial rule, which eventually swept the world."
FYI SGT (Join to see) SSG Franklin Briant LTC Wayne Brandon LTC (Join to see) SCPO Morris Ramsey SFC William Farrell PO1 H Gene LawrenceMaj Marty Hogan SMSgt David A Asbury Cpl (Join to see)SSG Jimmy CernichSSG Jeffrey LeakeCPL Dave Hoover SSG Samuel KermonSSG Donald H "Don" Bates SGT Gregory Lawritson SGT John " Mac " McConnell CWO3 Dennis M. SPC Matthew Lamb TSgt Joe C.
No shortlist of the greatest generals in history would be complete with out the name of Hannibal. This film shows why he was both feared and respected by his enemies. Hannibal’s tactical genius is illustrated with the latest three-dimensional graphics technology and exciting dramatic reconstructions of his victories. This is the story of the General who took on the might of Rome. Hannibal led his forces, including a squadron of elephants, through France, over the Alps and into the heart of Italy. For 15 years he fought the Romans using their own country as his battlefield and his base. With his small forces, he destroyed larger well-trained Roman Armies with almost contemptuous ease. This feature length special also shows how Rome, after defeating Hannibal, destroyed the city of Carthage and attempted to wipe out an entire civilization.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2GH1c50zcYc
Images:
1. Charlotte Mary Yonge, 1880, Hannibal and Scipio meet to discuss terms.
2. Romans marching and making camp- Use by permission. Copyright Peter Rockwell
3. Zama battle plan Scipio
4. Carthage was reduced to a fraction of its empire at the end of the Second Punic War.
5. Battle of Zama by Dutch draughtsman Cornelis Cort
Backgrounds on Punic wars
1. history.com/topics/ancient-history/punic-wars]
2. thecollector.com/the-punic-wars-how-did-the-romans-crush-carthage
1. Background from {[https://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/punic-wars]}
Punic Wars
Background and First Punic War (264-241 B.C.)
Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.)
Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.)
The three Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome took place over nearly a century, beginning in 264 B.C. and ending in Roman victory with the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. By the time the First Punic War broke out, Rome had become the dominant power throughout the Italian peninsula, while Carthage–a powerful city-state in northern Africa–had established itself as the leading maritime power in the world. The First Punic War began in 264 B.C. when Rome interfered in a dispute on the Carthaginian-controlled island of Sicily; the war ended with Rome in control of both Sicily and Corsica and marked the empire’s emergence as a naval as well as a land power. In the Second Punic War, the great Carthaginian general Hannibal invaded Italy and scored great victories at Lake Trasimene and Cannae before his eventual defeat at the hands of Rome’s Scipio Africanus in 202 B.C., which left Rome in control of the western Mediterranean and much of Spain. In the Third Punic War, the Romans, led by Scipio the Younger, captured and destroyed the city of Carthage in 146 B.C., turning Africa into yet another province of the mighty Roman Empire.
Background and First Punic War (264-241 B.C.)
Tradition holds that Phoenician settlers from the Mediterranean port of Tyre (in what is now Lebanon) founded the city-state of Carthage on the northern coast of Africa, just north of modern-day Tunis, around 814 B.C. (The word “Punic,” later the name for the series of wars between Carthage and Rome, was derived from the Latin word for Phoenician.) By 265 B.C., Carthage was the wealthiest and most advanced city in the region, as well as its leading naval power. Though Carthage had clashed violently with several other powers in the region, notably Greece, its relations with Rome were historically friendly, and the cities had signed several treaties defining trading rights over the years.
In 264 B.C., Rome decided to intervene in a dispute on the western coast of the island of Sicily (then a Carthaginian province) involving an attack by soldiers from the city of Syracuse against the city of Messina. While Carthage supported Syracuse, Rome supported Messina, and the struggle soon exploded into a direct conflict between the two powers, with control of Sicily at stake. Over the course of nearly 20 years, Rome rebuilt its entire fleet in order to confront Carthage’s powerful navy, scoring its first sea victory at Mylae in 260 B.C. and a major victory in the Battle of Ecnomus in 256 B.C. Though its invasion of North Africa that same year ended in defeat, Rome refused to give up, and in 241 B.C. the Roman fleet was able to win a decisive victory against the Carthaginians at sea, breaking their legendary naval superiority. At the end of the First Punic War, Sicily became Rome’s first overseas province.
Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.)
Over the next decades, Rome took over control of both Corsica and Sardinia as well, but Carthage was able to establish a new base of influence in Spain beginning in 237 B.C., under the leadership of the powerful general Hamilcar Barca and, later, his son-in-law Hasdrubal. According to Polybius and Livy in their histories of Rome, Hamilcar Barca, who died in 229 B.C., made his younger son Hannibal swear a blood oath against Rome when he was just a young boy. Upon Hasdrubal’s death in 221 B.C., Hannibal took command of Carthaginian forces in Spain. Two years later, he marched his army across the Ebro River into Saguntum, an Iberian city under Roman protection, effectively declaring war on Rome. The Second Punic War saw Hannibal and his troops–including as many as 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and a number of elephants–march from Spain across the Alps and into Italy, where they scored a string of victories over Roman troops at Ticinus, Trebia and Trasimene. Hannibal’s daring invasion of Rome reached its height at the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C., where he used his superior cavalry to surround a Roman army twice the size of his own and inflict massive casualties.
After this disastrous defeat, however, the Romans managed to rebound, and the Carthaginians lost hold in Italy as Rome won victories in Spain and North Africa under the rising young general Publius Cornelius Scipio (later known as Scipio Africanus). In 203 B.C., Hannibal’s forces were forced to abandon the struggle in Italy in order to defend North Africa, and the following year Scipio’s army routed the Carthaginians at Zama. Hannibal’s losses in the Second Punic War effectively put an end to Carthage’s empire in the western Mediterranean, leaving Rome in control of Spain and allowing Carthage to retain only its territory in North Africa. Carthage was also forced to give up its fleet and pay a large indemnity to Rome in silver.
Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.)
The Third Punic War, by far the most controversial of the three conflicts between Rome and Carthage, was the result of efforts by Cato the Elder and other hawkish members of the Roman Senate to convince their colleagues that Carthage (even in its weakened state) was a continuing threat to Rome’s supremacy in the region. In 149 B.C., after Carthage technically broke its treaty with Rome by declaring war against the neighboring state of Numidia, the Romans sent an army to North Africa, beginning the Third Punic War.
Carthage withstood the Roman siege for two years before a change of Roman command put the young general Scipio Aemilianus (later known as Scipio the Younger) in charge of the North Africa campaign in 147 B.C. After tightening the Roman positions around Carthage, Aemilianus launched a forceful attack on its harbor side in the spring of 146 B.C., pushing into the city and destroying house after house while pushing enemy troops towards their citadel. After seven days of horrific bloodshed, the Carthaginians surrendered, obliterating an ancient city that had survived for some 700 years. The surviving 50,000 citizens of Carthage were sold into slavery. Also in 146 B.C., Roman troops moved east to defeat King Philip V of Macedonia in the Macedonian Wars, and by year’s end Rome reigned supreme over an empire stretching from the Atlantic coast of Spain to the border between Greece and Asia Minor (now Turkey).
2. Background from {[ https://www.thecollector.com/the-punic-wars-how-did-the-romans-crush-carthage/]}
STORIES
The Punic Wars: How did the Romans crush Carthage?
The Roman victory over Carthage in the Punic Wars gave way to the establishment of the Roman Empire. Despite the great victories of Carthage during the wars, the Romans were able to outmaneuver and eventually conquer the remains of the African empire.
By Vladislav Tchakarov January 5, 2020
The Punic Wars, also known as the Carthage Wars (264–146 BC), are a series of three military conflicts between the Roman Republic and the Carthaginian Empire that led to the destruction of Carthage, the enslavement of its population and the transformation of Rome into the superpower of the Ancient World.
Carthage grew from a small port to the richest and most powerful city in the Mediterranean region. It had a powerful fleet, a mercenary army and, thanks to tariffs and trade, enough wealth to do what it pleases. At the time before the First Punic War (264-241 BC), Carthaginians had forbidden Rome to trade in the Western Mediterranean by contract.
The Carthaginians wanted everything that could be bought, sold, or traded. The Punic Wars focused mainly on the question, “In whose yard will the Mediterranean be located?” The final answer was “Rome.
Hannibal: One of the Greatest Military Leaders in History
The most commonly remembered image and story of the Punic Wars is Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps with elephants. It really happened; it was a serious test to move an army of 50,000 men with horses and elephants through the passages between snowdrifts and landslides, across rivers, and across mountain ranges.
On top of that, the locals weren’t too hospitable either. Hannibal had to fight both the local people and nature in order to cross the Alps. The elephants did not do too well; along with almost half of Hannibal’s troops, many elephants died in this historical drama.
Hannibal is definitely the most exciting figure of the Punic Wars. The son of a great warlord, Hamilcar Barca, also a brother and son-in-law of other great Carthaginian warlords, Hannibal swears from his childhood to fight with Rome. When he made his first move, for fifteen years, young children had been frightened by the words, “Hannibal ad portas” – “Hannibal is at the city gate.”
Hannibal is one of the greatest military leaders in all of history. In him, you can find all the characteristics that we associate with the military genius of people like Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Genghis Khan, Cortez, Robert Lee or Douglas MacArthur. He was brave, with brilliant tactical ability, resourceful, cunning, insanely brave, ruthless, and most often successful.
He usually attracted Roman troops to a battlefield of his choice. In the battle of Lake Trebia, for example, a whole Roman army was trapped. In the Battle of Cannae, he succeeded flanking the Roman army from both sides as if it came from the pages of a military textbook. In this battle alone, he killed over 40,000 Romans.
Whether through bribery or threats, diplomacy or intimidation, cavalry raids or prepared battles, Hannibal is well versed in the art of war.
Years after the Punic Wars, Scipio Africanus (the only Roman who really defeated Hannibal on the battlefield) asked Hannibal who he thinks are the greatest warlords in history.
Hannibal gave the first place to Alexander the Great, the second, to the king of Epirus Pyrrhus, who invaded Italy in 280 BC, and the third to himself. Then, Scipio asked him “And if you had beaten me?” The answer Hannibal had was the following: “I would have been the first then”.
The First Punic War (264 – 241 BC)
In 264 BC, a conflict in Sicily involving Carthage prompted the Romans to intervene. By sending its troops, Rome started the First Punic War.
Initially, battles took place on land and the Roman legions crushed the Carthaginians. In the second phase of the war, the Carthaginians concentrated their actions mainly at sea, because they assumed that their superiority was palpable there. They managed to inflict a lot of damage on Rome.
Then Rome innovated in its newly formed fleet with a bridge that connected the two ships and allowed the soldiers to storm the enemy. This reversed the course of the war. The Carthaginians were left broken and seeking peace. Rome imposed a degrading treaty on them. The Carthaginian Empire lost Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and its commercial monopoly.
After a grueling civil war and conflicts with neighboring kingdoms, Carthage began to recover. In order to counterbalance their losses and restore the power of Carthage, Carthaginian commander Hamilcar Barca set off on a campaign in Spain and laid the foundations for a great Carthaginian rule in Spain.
New Carthage (now Cartagena) was founded on the southeastern coast of Spain, and within a few years, through the mining of Spain, re-filled Carthage’s treasury. This conquest inevitably led to a collision with Rome and in 218 BC, war broke out again.
The Second Punic War (218 – 201 BC)
The Second Punic War began disastrously for Rome. Led by the talented Commander Hannibal, the Carthaginians crossed the Alps and invaded Northern Italy. Hannibal went with his army across almost the entire peninsula and devastated the country.
In the Battle of Cannae, from 87,000 Romans only 14,000 survived. However, the distance from Carthage interrupted Hannibal’s supply lines and at the same time, the Romans transferred their armies to Africa, attacking Carthage itself.
The Grand Commander was forced to abandon his conquest and rushed to save his homeland. However, near Zama (in Tunisia today), Hannibal suffered his first defeat, which was so catastrophic that Carthage was forced to seek peace again.
This time, the contract was almost devastating. The trade empire was forced to part with all its overseas territories and surrender its fleet, had no right to wage war without the consent of Rome and had to pay a huge indemnity within 50 years. Hannibal later escaped into exile, and around 183 BC, committed suicide.
Peace brought a new period of prosperity to Carthage, and to such an extent that Carthage offered to pay Rome’s indemnity in ten years only. This enormous vitality, as well as the political reforms in Carthage, were regarded as an extreme threat by its relentless enemies.
For almost two years, until his death, an elderly member of the Roman Senate, Cato, completed his speech before the Senate with the sentence “Carthago delenda est!” meaning “Cartagena must be destroyed! “
Finally, in 150 BC, a minor violation of the peace gave the Romans the occasion they sought. A war was declared, described as a “war of destruction.” For three years, the Romans laid siege to the thirty-kilometer fortifications of the city, some of which were walls over twelve feet high. In 146 BC, they managed to break into the walls.
Roman soldiers advanced through the narrow streets in the rain of arrows and embarked on a fierce melee. In sad acknowledgment of the ancient historical chronicles, archaeologists have discovered human bones under scattered stone blocks.
After six horrifying days, some 50,000 hungry residents of the city who had sought asylum in a nearby fortress surrendered. Others, who wanted to avoid execution or slavery, locked themselves in Eshmun’s temple and set it on fire.
The Romans burned down the ruins of the city, Carthage was leveled to the ground, and cursed in a special ceremony, prohibiting its settlement.
Thus, in 120 years, Rome crushed Carthage’s pursuits of domination. As it turned out, the Punic Wars marked the emergence of Roman imperial rule, which eventually swept the world."
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The Battle of Zama 202 B.C.E. - Great Battles of Roman History
The trilogy ends as the two great masters of the Punic Wars finally go head to head. Both are undefeated and both are cunning as they are lethal. The Battle ...
The Battle of Zama 202 B.C.E. - Great Battles of Roman History
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l47lEcv-Nzs
After the decisive victory by Hannibal at Cannae over the Romans, his assessment not to attempt to capture Rome ultimately led to Publius Cornelius Scipio decisively defeating Hannibal's forces at Zama, Phoenicia [Carthage] in modern day Tunisia.
Images
1. The Battle of Zama - Troop Deployment by Mohammad Adil
2. The Battle of Zama - Start of the Battle by Mohammad Adil
3. The Battle of Zama - Elephant Charge by Mohammad Adil
4. The Battle of Zama - Scipio's Attack by Mohammad Adil
5. The Battle of Zama - Cavalry Charge by Mohammad Adil
Backgrounds
1. legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/the-battle-of-z/
2. legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/battle-of-zama-strategy-tactics
3. legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/the-battle-of-zama-aftermath
1. Background from {[https://legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/the-battle-of-z/]}
The Battle of Zama
The Battle of Zama was fought in October of 202 BC between “a Roman army led by Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus” and “a Carthaginian force led by the legendary commander Hannibal.” (Battle of Zama)
Scipio set himself apart from other historical leaders by using scouts and spies from both his own, and the Carthaginian army to benefit his cause. When Hannibal came to Zama, “he sent spies to ascertain the place, nature, and strength of the Roman general’s encampment.” The Roman soldiers caught them, and brought them before Scipio to decide their fate, but rather than punishing them, he “appointed a tribune to show them everything in the camp thoroughly and without reserve,” and then “gave them provisions and an escort, and dispatched them with injunctions to be careful to tell Hannibal everything they had seen.” This reaction was so far from the norm that it seemed to charm Hannibal into “a lively desire for a personal interview with” Scipio, at which meeting he proposed a treaty which, although not successful, seemed to hint at some intimidation by Scipio’s tactics. (Polybius)
Hannibal’s terms for a new treaty (Now that they had broken the previous one) were unnacceptable to Scipio, and eventually told Hannibal the Carthaginians “must submit [them]selves and [their] country to us (The Romans) unconditionally, or conquer us in the field.” Hannibal chose to attempt the latter.
Scipio had also been studying Hannibal’s techniques for years. “Having been at Cannae,” He knew most of Hannibal’s tricks, and was able to “trump [him] with a few minor adjustments.” Having seen the use of war elephants before, he knew how to counter them in a battle. After they were taken care of, he used Hannibal’s own “battle strategy from Trebbia and Cannae” (Billau) to defeat him. One might say that he had been gathering intelligence for fourteen years, and it served him well.
2. Background from {[https://legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/battle-of-zama-strategy-tactics/]}
Battle of Zama (strategy & tactics)
The Battle of Zama took place between the Romans, accompanied by the Numidian cavalry, and the Carthaginians with Scipio as the commander of the Roman forces and Hannibal as the leader of the Carthaginian troops. This confrontation between the Romans and Carthaginians marked the end of the Second Punic War, which had been occurring for many years. It took place on the plains of Zama Regia in the fall of 202 BC.
Previous to the battle, the Romans utilized diverse mental tactics to psych out their opponents and prove dominance. As they won each battle, the Romans intentionally mangled the bodies of their fallen foes to demonstrate their ruthlessness and display an example of what the next enemy could expect to occur (75 Zhmodikov). They also made a camp each night, not only out of necessity, but to show their superiority as a force. The Romans had enough sophistication to build an entire village in one night and have it taken down by morning in order to be ready to march.
Both the Romans and the Carthaginians used similar battle layouts, but each tweaked their tactics with personal techniques. Hannibal utilized a traditional phalanx line of troops consisting of three rows with a cavalry on the wings, but also had war elephants as a unique weapon of war. Scipio, on the other hand, used a maniple formation of troops consisting of three lines with a large cavalry on the wings. The first two lines consisted of lighter infantry men known as the Hastati and the Principes (67 Zhmodikov). The last row consisted of heavy infantry men called Triarii; they were only used as back-up so they rarely saw much fighting. Although the Romans had fewer infantry troops, they made up for it in number and skill of cavalry troops. This became an important factor in the outcome of the battle; the terrain highly favored cavalry troops.
As the battle commenced, Hannibal unleashed his elephants on the Roman lines, which Scipio had anticipated. Scipio then used the maniple formation in order to allow his troops to move apart and permit the elephants to run right past them; it worked. In addition, the Romans blew loud horns as the elephants approached in an attempt to scatter them from their charge (Scullard 1930). As the lines clashed, they met in deadlock and each side repeatedly gained and lost ground with their opponent. It wasn’t until the superior Roman cavalry joined the battle, victorious over the Carthaginian cavalry, that the Romans were able to surround the Carthaginians and slaughter them. Roughly 20,000 Carthaginians were killed and another 20,000 were taken prisoner, while only 5,000 Romans were slain during the battle of Zama.
Works Cited
Rockwell, P. (1999). Romans marching and making camp- trajan’s column. Retrieved from
{[stoa.org/trajan/buildtrajanpage.cgi?261]}
Sabin, P. (2000). The face of roman battle. The Journal of Roman Studies, 90, 1-17.
Scullard, Howard Hayes (1930), Scipio Africanus in the second Punic war, CUP Publisher Archive .
Zhmodikov, A. (2000). Roman republican heavy infantrymen in battle. Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 49(1), 67-78."
3. Background from {[https://legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/the-battle-of-zama-aftermath/]}
The Battle of Zama: Aftermath
The Battle of Zama took place at Zama, near Carthage, in October of 202 BC. Publius Cornelius Scipio led the Roman army and extra Numidian cavalry against Hannibal and his Carthaginian troops. The Romans soundly defeated the Carthaginians, which brought an end to the Second Punic War (Wikipedia contributors).
According to Polybius, Scipio set the terms for a treaty and told the Carthaginian ambassadors. The ambassadors returned to Carthage to tell their senate, and Hannibal persuaded them to accept the “lenient terms” (Polybius). The terms of the treaty included parts beneficial to both sides, though naturally favoring the Romans. Carthage was to be a client state of Rome, but would be able to retain all territory owned prior to the war, as well as all property. Carthage would still rule itself, and no Roman garrison would be set in the city. In return, Carthage needed to return all prisoners of war and deserters to Rome, pay a tribute of 10,000 talents (200 a year for 50 years), and provide corn and pay the Roman army while they waited until Rome replied to the treaty. Also, Carthage had to give up 100 hostages (males between the age of 14 and 30), and give up their war elephants and all warships except 10 triremes. If crippling any potential land or sea force wasn’t enough, Rome forbade Carthage from making war on any nation outside of Africa, and required permission to war within Africa. F.E. Adcock suggested the Romans crippled the Carthaginian navy because they had a policy of making their states keep weak ones, so Rome wouldn’t have to build up a strong navy (118).
Masinissa, of the Numidians that had helped the Romans, was crowned as the King of greater Numidia. Scipio was given the name “Africanus”, and was proclaimed a war hero (“Results of the Second Punic War”).
Works Cited
“Results of the Second Punic War.” United Nations of Roma Victrix. UNRV.com, 2003-2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.
Wikipedia contributors. “Battle of Zama.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 9 Dec. 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.
Adcock, F.E. “‘Delenda Est Carthago.’” Cambridge Historical Journal 8.3 (1946): 117-128. Print. 6 Feb. 2012.
Polybius. Histories: IV. Trans. W.R. Paton. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. Print.
FYI SGT (Join to see) SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth MSgt Paul Connors SSG Robert Pratt LTC (Join to see) MAJ Rene De La Rosa MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D. MSG Felipe De Leon Brown 1stsgt Glenn Brackin SSG Robert Mark Odom PO3 Phyllis Maynard SN Greg Wright Lt Col (Join to see) PO3 Ellsworth Allen Westgate Cpl Brett Wagner SGM Gregory Tarancon IV PO2 Jeremy Spears SGT Justin Singleton
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l47lEcv-Nzs
After the decisive victory by Hannibal at Cannae over the Romans, his assessment not to attempt to capture Rome ultimately led to Publius Cornelius Scipio decisively defeating Hannibal's forces at Zama, Phoenicia [Carthage] in modern day Tunisia.
Images
1. The Battle of Zama - Troop Deployment by Mohammad Adil
2. The Battle of Zama - Start of the Battle by Mohammad Adil
3. The Battle of Zama - Elephant Charge by Mohammad Adil
4. The Battle of Zama - Scipio's Attack by Mohammad Adil
5. The Battle of Zama - Cavalry Charge by Mohammad Adil
Backgrounds
1. legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/the-battle-of-z/
2. legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/battle-of-zama-strategy-tactics
3. legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/the-battle-of-zama-aftermath
1. Background from {[https://legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/the-battle-of-z/]}
The Battle of Zama
The Battle of Zama was fought in October of 202 BC between “a Roman army led by Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus” and “a Carthaginian force led by the legendary commander Hannibal.” (Battle of Zama)
Scipio set himself apart from other historical leaders by using scouts and spies from both his own, and the Carthaginian army to benefit his cause. When Hannibal came to Zama, “he sent spies to ascertain the place, nature, and strength of the Roman general’s encampment.” The Roman soldiers caught them, and brought them before Scipio to decide their fate, but rather than punishing them, he “appointed a tribune to show them everything in the camp thoroughly and without reserve,” and then “gave them provisions and an escort, and dispatched them with injunctions to be careful to tell Hannibal everything they had seen.” This reaction was so far from the norm that it seemed to charm Hannibal into “a lively desire for a personal interview with” Scipio, at which meeting he proposed a treaty which, although not successful, seemed to hint at some intimidation by Scipio’s tactics. (Polybius)
Hannibal’s terms for a new treaty (Now that they had broken the previous one) were unnacceptable to Scipio, and eventually told Hannibal the Carthaginians “must submit [them]selves and [their] country to us (The Romans) unconditionally, or conquer us in the field.” Hannibal chose to attempt the latter.
Scipio had also been studying Hannibal’s techniques for years. “Having been at Cannae,” He knew most of Hannibal’s tricks, and was able to “trump [him] with a few minor adjustments.” Having seen the use of war elephants before, he knew how to counter them in a battle. After they were taken care of, he used Hannibal’s own “battle strategy from Trebbia and Cannae” (Billau) to defeat him. One might say that he had been gathering intelligence for fourteen years, and it served him well.
2. Background from {[https://legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/battle-of-zama-strategy-tactics/]}
Battle of Zama (strategy & tactics)
The Battle of Zama took place between the Romans, accompanied by the Numidian cavalry, and the Carthaginians with Scipio as the commander of the Roman forces and Hannibal as the leader of the Carthaginian troops. This confrontation between the Romans and Carthaginians marked the end of the Second Punic War, which had been occurring for many years. It took place on the plains of Zama Regia in the fall of 202 BC.
Previous to the battle, the Romans utilized diverse mental tactics to psych out their opponents and prove dominance. As they won each battle, the Romans intentionally mangled the bodies of their fallen foes to demonstrate their ruthlessness and display an example of what the next enemy could expect to occur (75 Zhmodikov). They also made a camp each night, not only out of necessity, but to show their superiority as a force. The Romans had enough sophistication to build an entire village in one night and have it taken down by morning in order to be ready to march.
Both the Romans and the Carthaginians used similar battle layouts, but each tweaked their tactics with personal techniques. Hannibal utilized a traditional phalanx line of troops consisting of three rows with a cavalry on the wings, but also had war elephants as a unique weapon of war. Scipio, on the other hand, used a maniple formation of troops consisting of three lines with a large cavalry on the wings. The first two lines consisted of lighter infantry men known as the Hastati and the Principes (67 Zhmodikov). The last row consisted of heavy infantry men called Triarii; they were only used as back-up so they rarely saw much fighting. Although the Romans had fewer infantry troops, they made up for it in number and skill of cavalry troops. This became an important factor in the outcome of the battle; the terrain highly favored cavalry troops.
As the battle commenced, Hannibal unleashed his elephants on the Roman lines, which Scipio had anticipated. Scipio then used the maniple formation in order to allow his troops to move apart and permit the elephants to run right past them; it worked. In addition, the Romans blew loud horns as the elephants approached in an attempt to scatter them from their charge (Scullard 1930). As the lines clashed, they met in deadlock and each side repeatedly gained and lost ground with their opponent. It wasn’t until the superior Roman cavalry joined the battle, victorious over the Carthaginian cavalry, that the Romans were able to surround the Carthaginians and slaughter them. Roughly 20,000 Carthaginians were killed and another 20,000 were taken prisoner, while only 5,000 Romans were slain during the battle of Zama.
Works Cited
Rockwell, P. (1999). Romans marching and making camp- trajan’s column. Retrieved from
{[stoa.org/trajan/buildtrajanpage.cgi?261]}
Sabin, P. (2000). The face of roman battle. The Journal of Roman Studies, 90, 1-17.
Scullard, Howard Hayes (1930), Scipio Africanus in the second Punic war, CUP Publisher Archive .
Zhmodikov, A. (2000). Roman republican heavy infantrymen in battle. Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 49(1), 67-78."
3. Background from {[https://legioilynx.com/2012/02/16/the-battle-of-zama-aftermath/]}
The Battle of Zama: Aftermath
The Battle of Zama took place at Zama, near Carthage, in October of 202 BC. Publius Cornelius Scipio led the Roman army and extra Numidian cavalry against Hannibal and his Carthaginian troops. The Romans soundly defeated the Carthaginians, which brought an end to the Second Punic War (Wikipedia contributors).
According to Polybius, Scipio set the terms for a treaty and told the Carthaginian ambassadors. The ambassadors returned to Carthage to tell their senate, and Hannibal persuaded them to accept the “lenient terms” (Polybius). The terms of the treaty included parts beneficial to both sides, though naturally favoring the Romans. Carthage was to be a client state of Rome, but would be able to retain all territory owned prior to the war, as well as all property. Carthage would still rule itself, and no Roman garrison would be set in the city. In return, Carthage needed to return all prisoners of war and deserters to Rome, pay a tribute of 10,000 talents (200 a year for 50 years), and provide corn and pay the Roman army while they waited until Rome replied to the treaty. Also, Carthage had to give up 100 hostages (males between the age of 14 and 30), and give up their war elephants and all warships except 10 triremes. If crippling any potential land or sea force wasn’t enough, Rome forbade Carthage from making war on any nation outside of Africa, and required permission to war within Africa. F.E. Adcock suggested the Romans crippled the Carthaginian navy because they had a policy of making their states keep weak ones, so Rome wouldn’t have to build up a strong navy (118).
Masinissa, of the Numidians that had helped the Romans, was crowned as the King of greater Numidia. Scipio was given the name “Africanus”, and was proclaimed a war hero (“Results of the Second Punic War”).
Works Cited
“Results of the Second Punic War.” United Nations of Roma Victrix. UNRV.com, 2003-2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.
Wikipedia contributors. “Battle of Zama.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 9 Dec. 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.
Adcock, F.E. “‘Delenda Est Carthago.’” Cambridge Historical Journal 8.3 (1946): 117-128. Print. 6 Feb. 2012.
Polybius. Histories: IV. Trans. W.R. Paton. Ed. Jeffrey Henderson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. Print.
FYI SGT (Join to see) SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth MSgt Paul Connors SSG Robert Pratt LTC (Join to see) MAJ Rene De La Rosa MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D. MSG Felipe De Leon Brown 1stsgt Glenn Brackin SSG Robert Mark Odom PO3 Phyllis Maynard SN Greg Wright Lt Col (Join to see) PO3 Ellsworth Allen Westgate Cpl Brett Wagner SGM Gregory Tarancon IV PO2 Jeremy Spears SGT Justin Singleton
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