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On December 11, 1878, prior to the Anglo-Zulu War, British high commissioner Henry Bartle Frere presented an ultimatum to the Zulu Kingdom to submit to British rule or face war. From the article:
"Zulu War
Background The Cape Colony was the first region of southern Africa to come under British control, in 1806, and it was important for the whole southern coast to be safe for ships travelling between England and India. From 1838 the British sought control of Natal from the Boers and annexed the district in 1845. Although the Boers were a problem for the British, it was widely accepted by all inhabitants of the whole region that, from past experience, the real danger was from the Zulus. The Rise of the ZulusThe native tribes of Southern Africa are generally believed to have migrated down the eastern side of the continent, in the mid 18th century, to establish grazing land for their cattle and escape the Arab slave traders. There were inevitable quarrels between tribes for land and disputes were often settled at pre-arranged points where ritual combat would take place involving single combat and organised throwing of spears. Around 1787 Shaka was born, the illegitimate son of Chief Senzangakhona of the amaZulus. Shaka was somewhat of an outcast but gained some respect among the Mthethwa people. He gained a reputation for military prowess and trained his men in tactics of his own devising, and the use of a stabbing spear to replace the throwing type. He eventually returned to his own people and was made king of the Zulu nation.
Shaka's Reign of Terror
Around 1816 King Shaka began his military conquests against neighbouring tribes. He ruled by fear, and moulded his regiments into unstoppable fighting machines. Boys were trained to ignore pain and obey their leaders implicitly. Regiments were formed by age groups and the warriors had to earn the right to marry. Usually only the middle-aged men were allowed to marry after many years service in their regiment. Shaka's cruel punishments ensured that his warriors prefered to face the enemy than the consequences of retreat.
Boers v Zulus
A despot like Shaka was not likely to see old age. He was killed by his half-brother Dingaan in 1828 and the military conquests ceased. Dingaan was a self-indulgent man who was, at first, more peaceful than Shaka, but could not be trusted. It was during his reign that the Boers made their Great Trek north from the Cape Colony. The main reason for this was a difference of opinion about how to treat the non-whites. The Boers had a long tradition of using slaves which they were reluctant relinquish, while the British had, since the latter part of the 18th century, been persuaded that slavery should be abolished. One group of Boers, under Piet Retief, approached Dingaan in 1838 with a request for permission to settle on Zulu land. He agreed, on the condition that they find and return some cattle stolen by Basutos. Retief and 60 Boers did as they were asked and returned with the cattle, but once inside Dingaan's kraal they were massacred. This, of course, incensed the Boers who, together with British settlers in Durban, advanced on the Zulus to exact revenge. But they too were wiped out and the Zulus were free to take over white controlled Durban. The remaining settlers managed to escape by ship but the town was sacked. A leader of the Boers Andreas Pretorius led another expedition against the Zulus at the end of 1828 and was successful.
When Dingaan's half brother, Mpande fled to Natal with 17.000 followers, the Boers seized the opportunity to replace Dingaan with a more friendly Zulu king. It Was Dingaan's turn to flee when the Boers, with Mpande, invaded Zululand. King Mpande ruled from 1840 and proved to be a peaceful ruler. However, the conflict now shifted to Boer versus the British, and in 1845, after a struggle, Natal was formally annexed as a district of Cape Colony. The Boers began to move out, and a treaty was made with Mpande. In 1847 and again in 1850 there were the 7th and 8th Cape Frontier Wars to quell Xhosa uprisings, and in 1852 the Boers set up their own republic in the Transvaal. The Orange Free State was established by the Boers in 1854. Natal at this time was populated by 3,000 British settlers and 150,000 natives who had been driven out of their lands by the Zulus.
Mpande had two sons by different mothers, Cetshwayo and Mbulazi. Both boys attracted followers and the two groups became sworn enemies. Things came to a head in 1856 when Cetshwayo's followers defeated Mbulazi's at a bloody battle on the Tugela. To help him in his quest for power, Cetshwayo offered friendship to the Boers and the British. Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the Natal Secretary for Native Affairs, thought it prudent to recognise him as the heir to the Zulu throne. When Mpande died in 1873, Shepstone attended Cetshwayo's coronation, giving the Great White Queen's seal of approval, but also extracting promises of good conduct for the future. Cetshwayo listened, but with the throne now secure and the Zulus acknowledging his kingship he had no intention of ruling his people under the dictates of an outsider.
The British Plan for Confederation South Africa had always been the poor relation in the British Empire, used as a stopping-off place en route to India, the Jewel in the Imperial Crown. But in 1868 diamonds and gold were discovered and this engendered a greater respect for the colony. The British Government decided that at last they could get a return on all those years of trouble and expense. The problem was that the region was a patchwork of Boer republics, black kingdoms and British colonies. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Carnarvon took it upon himself to link these entities into a Confederation. To this end he appointed Sir Henry Bartle Frere to the position of Governor of Cape Colony, tasked with implementing the Confederation policy. Transvaal had already come under British jurisdiction thanks to the work of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and it was plainly obvious to Frere that Zululand had to be conquered. The Boer-Zulu Border Dispute The Boer republic of Transvaal had been established to give the Afrikaners their own land away from British interference. But some of them had remained within the Natal borders, settling in the remote northwest, around Blood River (Ncome River). They were cattle owners and were attracted to the good grazing on the grassy uplands to the east, in Zululand. Mpande was king at that time and they sought his permission to use the area for their cattle. He was prepared to maintain good relations with the Boers and allowed them to move in. But there were no clearly defined bounderies so the Boers edged their way further and further into Zululand. When Cetshwayo came to the throne he wanted the Boers out of his country so the area (see Map), which stretched from Rorke's Drift in the south to the Transvaal border in the north, became disputed territory. The Boers claimed that Mpande had given them the land and Cetshwayo claimed that it was merely a loan and that he wanted it back. The British, at first, gave their support to the Zulus in the argument, but when the Transvaal came under British control, they felt that it would be better to placate the potentially hostile Boer population by supporting their claim. This dismayed Cetshwayo and provided another reason for the British to confront the Zulus.
Bartle Frere's Reasons for Provoking the Zulus
1. The Zulu Kingdom was an anachronism. They did not fit in with the new order of stable economic progress.
2. A show of military might would demonstrate what would happen if the Boers or natives opposed it.
3. A victory would increase confidence in the British administration.
4. The Zulus were probably encouraging other groups to fight the British. Frere thought it was they who caused the 9th Cape Frontier War.
5. The Zulus were a threat to Natal's national security. He encouraged the idea that Cetshwayo was planning to invade Natal and massacre the population.
6. Black people were needed to work in the diamond fields. The Zulu spirit needed to be broken.
7. The border dispute between the Boers and Zulus needed to be settled.
The Boundary Commission 1878 Sir Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, was less than keen on the idea of provoking a war with the Zulus. He thought that if it failed, Natal would be over-run by the victorious Zulu army and all would be lost. And even if the British invasion was successful it would poison race relations for years to come. Bulwer wanted to proceed with caution so he proposed that a Commission be set up to take evidence from the Boers and the Zulus and decide who was at fault in their dispute. Frere approved the setting up of this Commission because he was confident that it would provide confirmation of his views. The Commission set up to resolve the border dispute consisted of three members. One was Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Durnford RE who was later killed at Isandhlwana. The other two members were John Wesley Shepstone, brother of Sir Theophilus, and M H Gallway, Natal's Attorney-General. They convened at Rorke's Drift in March 1878 and listened to the claims from both parties.
The Boers were represented by Henrique Shepstone, another brother of Sir Theophilus, who was Secretary of Native Affairs in the Transvaal. Also Gert Rudolph, the Landdrost of Utrecht, and Petrus Lefras Uys a prominent farmer in the disputed area.
The Zulus were represented by Chief Sihayo whose tribe lived near Rorke's Drift, and two of Cetshwayo's officials, Gebula and Mundula. The king also sent Sintwangu, a servant who was instructed to provide a confidential report on the proceedings, for royal ears only.
The Commission was escorted by 20 men of the Natal Mounted Police and was careful to appear as impartial as possible, so that when the Transvaal group tried to sit next to the Commissioners, they were moved away. The process lasted a month, with a large amount of evidence being scrutinized, both written and oral. Much of the Boer evidence was suspect, and the final outcome was that the Commission found in favour of the Zulus. However they stipulated that some of the more predominently Boer populated areas should be allowed to remain in Boer possession. This was good news for the Zulus. Bartle Frere, on the other hand, was not at all pleased, so it was a relief for him when another excuse for war presented itself.
Sihayo's Wives Sihayo, chief of the Qungebe, one of the Zulu tribes, was a supporter of Cetshwayo and the brother of Mfokanaza who was a favourite of king Mpande. He was a progressive Zulu who liked to dress in European clothes and dine at table with the missionaries. While he was away in Ulundi, his sons discovered that two of his wives had absconded and were over the border, in Natal. One of them was staying in the homestead of Mswagele a border policeman, so Sihayo's three sons, together with his brother and a force of 30 armed and mounted men and a large following of foot soldiers, crossed the Buffalo River at Rorke's Drift in broad daylight on 28th July 1878. They caught the wife and dragged her back over the border where they knocked her teeth out and either clubbed her or strangled her to death. The following day they repeated the same process for the second wife. These events shocked the colonists in Natal, and Frere's warnings about the ferocity of the Zulus seemed to be vindicated. It also had the effect of bringing Bulwer round to Frere's way of thinking. Bartle Frere's UltimatumThe Boundary Commission's findings were not the result that Sir Bartle Frere had anticipated so he sat on the report rather than publish it immediately. He needed time to think how he was going to present this to the Zulus without losing face. What he came up with was an ultimatum that he intended to put to the Zulus alongside the findings of the Commission. This ultimatum was a blatant provocation that could only have one outcome. The conditions imposed on Cetshwayo were:
1. Surrender of Sihayo's 3 sons and brother to be tried in the courts in Natal.
2. Payment of a fine of 500 head of cattle for the above offence and for failure to comply.
3. Payment of a fine of 100 head of cattle for the offence against Messrs Smith and Deighton.
4. Surrender of the Swazi Chief Umbilini and others to be tried in Transvaal courts.
5. Observance of promises made by Cetshwayo at his coronation.
6. That the Zulu army be disbanded and the men allowed to go home.
7. That the Zulu military system be discontinued and other military regulations be adopted, to be decided upon after consultation with the Great Council and British representatives.
8. That every man, when he comes to man's estate, be free to marry.
9. All missionaries and their converts, who until 1877 lived in Zululand, shall be allowed to return and re-occupy their stations.
10. All such missionaries shall be allowed to teach, and any Zulu, if he chooses, shall be free to listen to the teachings.
11. A British Agent shall be allowed to reside in Zululand who will see that the above provisions are carried out.
12. All disputes in which a missionary or European is concerned, shall be heard by the King in public, and in the presence of the Resident.
13. No sentence of expulsion from Zululand shall be carried out until it has been approved by the Resident.
Cetshwayo's Response
Cetshwayo had 20 days from the 11th Dec to comply with Bartle Frere's conditions. On the 18th he sent word that he would try to send the cattle and the wanted men but that the river was in flood and it may take longer. Of course, the king had no intention of giving up his impi and was hoping that there would be some negotiation if he looked as if he were at least trying to comply. But Frere was in no mood for a conversation. He wanted all conditions met within 20 days or else the British army would cross into Zululand on the 21st day and advance after the 30th day.
Reaction in London
In London the new Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, heard about the ultimatum and was appalled, but it was too late to stop the war. Hicks Beach was not in favour of his predecessor's Confederation scheme or Bartle Frere's aggressive intentions. Since it was a fait accompli there was little he could do except provide extra regiments to increase the chances of a British victory. So now the juggernaut had been set in motion.
British ForcesSir Frederick Thesiger had brought the 9th Cape Frontier war to a successful conclusion and had inherited the title Lord Chelmsford in October 1878. Frere had already asked him to make plans for the invasion of Zululand and prepare the army. These preparations went ahead well before the ultimatum was even delivered. Chelmsford was worried that his force was under-strength. When he contemplated the troops at his disposal; he had no regular cavalry regiments, so had to rely on Natal volunteer units, and only 5 regular infantry battalions for the invasion:
1st Battalion 24th Regiment
2nd battalion 24th Regiment
2nd battalion 3rd Regiment (The Buffs)
1st Battalion 13th Light infantry
The single battalion 90th Light Infantry
There were other British Infantry regiments in South Africa. The 80th was in the Transvaal but needed to stay to keep an eye on the northern border of Zululand, and make sure the Boers did not make trouble. The 88th were in the Cape Colony with companies detached in Mauritius and St Helena. Hicks Beach, in London, although he was not in favour of the war, was prepared to send reinforcements, which arrived later:
2nd Battalion 4th Regiment (King's Own)
The single battalion 99th Regiment
If the assembly of adequate forces had stretched the manpower and armoury of the colony to the limit, the problems of supplying and maintaining such an army with food, water, fuel, ammunition, tentage, equipment, and above all, transportation for these commodities, presented greater difficulties. Reckoning on operations lasting between 6 weeks and 2 months, Chelmsford realised that 1,800 tons of stores would be needed to accompany the army. The most common form of transport in South Africa was the ox wagon, 18 feet long and 6 feet wide, which required between 14 and 18 animals to draw it. To keep the oxen in good working trim, 16 hours a day had to be allowed for their grazing and rest, so that on the rough dirt tracks only about 10 miles a day could be covered, even under good conditions. More often the roads were strewn with boulders, scarred by water courses or churned up by rain. Also herds of cattle had to be driven to supply the men with fresh meat. Thus a military column would stretch for miles and be an easy target for fast-moving Zulus. Chelmsford's staff were kept busy collecting the necessary transports, and with inflated prices the expense was enormous. In January 1879 they had 977 wagons, 56 carts, 10,023 oxen, 803 horses and 398 mules, with 2,000 extra natives to drive and manage them.
Lord Chelmsford's Strategy The aim of Lord Chelmsford's army was to make Natal secure from Zulu invasion. To achieve this it was not practical to provide guards along the 200 mile border. A large Zulu impi could easily brush past a platoon of soldiers protecting one section of the border and wreak havoc in areas that were not protected. Anyway it would be almost impossible to mobilise against a fast-moving, unencumbered Zulu army. The only way to deal with the problem, as Bartle Frere had stated, was to go into Zululand with a large army, find the impi, bring it to battle and destroy it. But to take the whole army in one column would have meant that the Zulus could easily bypass them and enter Natal at some other river crossing 'while the cat's away' so to speak. Also a single column would be very slow and unwieldy. Chelmsford therefore decided to split the field force into 5 columns, which in effect ended up as 3 invading columns, entering Zululand from different points along the frontier.
No.1 Column
80th (Staffordshire Volunteers) Regiment (equipped with two 6-pounders and one 4-pounder)
Cape Mounted Riflemen
Border Horse. Lt-Col Frederick Weatherley
Transvaal Rangers. Commandant Pieter Raaff
Ferreira's Horse
Schutte's Horse
Eckersley's Transvaal Native Contingent
Each of the columns was to act independently, taking it's own provisions and making decisions without referral to Lord Chelmsford. They were instructed that the aim of the field force was the destruction of the Zulu army and the capture of King Cetshwayo and to head in the general direction of Ulundi, starting on 11th January 1879. More specifically, Pearson's no.1 Column was ordered to establish a base at Eshowe and Glyn's no.3 Column was ordered to establish a base at Isipezi Hill. Wood was required to contain the Zulus in the north to prevent them from interfering with no.3 column.
Durnford's no.2 Column was broken up so that 2 battalions of the 1st Natal Native Contingent should remain at Middle Drift, the third battalion to go to Umsinga, and the Rocket Battery and Natal Native Horse were to accompany Durnford who was now attached to no.3 Column. Chelmsford also attached himself and his staff to Colonel Glyn's no.3 Column.
Sihayo's KraalThe Centre Column (no.3) began crossing the Buffalo River (Mzinyathi) at 4.30am on 11th January. The men of the 24th were ferried across on flat-bottomed ponts while the Natal Native Contingent waded across in water up to their necks. Even though it was summer the temperature was very cold before sunrise and the unclothed natives were frozen. The order to walk into the cold fast-flowing river was not welcome and it is little wonder that some of them drowned. Once across it was found that the track ahead was in need of some work from the pioneers. But in order to ensure the safety of the road-workers a nearby Zulu Kraal had to be neutralised. The chief of this kraal was Sihayo, whose wives were the ones who had absconded, with far-reaching consequences. Sihayo was also involved in the Boundary Commission inquiry. The task of capturing the kraal was given to the 1st Battalion 3rd NNC commanded by Commandant George Hamilton-Browne. He described the action vividly in his book 'A Lost Legionary in South Africa'
Lord Chelmsford instructed Browne that they were not to fire unless they were fired upon, also that women and children should not be harmed The NNC formed a line in front of the hill that led up to the kraal. When shots were fired at them they charged but the only ones that went forward were a company of 100 Zulus, fighting for the British after having been exiled from Zululand. The remaining natives were inclined to run away and had to be bullied back to the fight by their roughneck NCOs. The exiled Zulus had a score to settle with Sihayo's men who had played a central part in killing their comrades in an unfair fight some years earlier. A fierce hand to hand fight now took place. After some time, the enemy Zulus had retreated to the top of a difficult 60 foot cliff and were firing down on Browne's men. At that stage the runaway natives were brought back to the battle at the point of bayonets held by men of the 24th who were commanded by Wilson Black. The native contribution was negligible because those with rifles simply fired them in the air to use up their ammunition. It was also found that 32 of their number had been killed in the action and Browne was of the opinion that they were all victims of friendly fire. There was little chance of dislodging the enemy up on the rocky cliff but the flanking companies were on their way round, and amongst them was another company of exiled Zulus. They forced the surrender of Sihayo's men and the battle was over.
The Camp at IsandhlwanaThe men were set to work on improving the road for the wagons to proceed. This took some days, and the army then marched on in the direction of Isipezi Hill where a semi permanent camp was intended. The progress of the column was slow so it became necessary to establish an intermediate camp, and the ground to the east of Isandhlwana mountain seemed to fit the bill. It had a water supply and there was space for the wagons as well as for separate unit areas. The tents were erected on the 20th Jan.
Before the start of the operation Lord Chelmsford had given very precise instructions on all aspects of the campaign and emphasized the need for good defences around the perimeter of any camp, however temporary. And so it was generally assumed that the camp would be laid out so that the wagons could be formed into a laager and defences prepared, such as thorn bushes heaped up and broken bottles scattered where the Zulus would be most likely to attack. There were plenty of large rocks which could have been built up into defensive walls. Colonel Glyn proposed to do all this, but Lord Chelmsford forbade it. His reasoning was based on the fact that he wanted the wagons to be unloaded and sent back empty to Rorke's Drift to load up with more supplies and return to the camp. He was convinced, also, that the main Zulu impi was not in that area, and that the main focus for the building of defences should be at the intended camp on the Mangeni River.
The Isandhlwana camp was laid out in a line running north-south, half a mile long with most of the wagons placed in the nek between the mountain and the Stony Hill. However, the safety of the camp was not to be completely disregarded since infantry piquets were deployed a half mile away by day and a quarter of a mile by night. Mounted vedettes were sent far out to the edge of the plateau.
Whatever Chelmsford's reasons for failing to fortify the camp, in the light of subsequent events it is hard to justify his negligence. If there was general agreement with his views amongst the officers it might be more understandable but it seems that he was alone in his attitude. Hamilton (Maori) Browne's autobiography 'A Lost Legionary in South Africa' was written and published in 1911 so he had the benefit of 30 years hindsight. But in the book he says: "I was talking to some of my best officers when [Lonsdale] joined us and his first words were, 'My God , Maori, what do you think of this camp?' I replied, 'Someone is mad.' The colonial officers were loud and long in complaint, and Duncombe (a captain in Browne's battalion) said, 'Do the staff think we are going to meet an army of school-girls? Why in the name of all that is holy do we not laager?' ....[Colonel Glyn] did not seem to be in good spirits, but said nothing about the camp, and on my remarking it looked very pretty though rather extended, he looked hard at me, shook his head and said, 'Very'."
The Column Splits in Two Chelmsford's force had supplies to last two months so he was under pressure to achieve victory by then. On the 21st Jan they had been in the field for 10 days and achieved very little, so Major Dartnell of the Natal Mounted Police was sent to reconnoitre the area to the southeast, 10 miles away, with 80 of his own men, 47 volunteers and 1,600 of the Natal Native Contingent under Commandant Rupert Lonsdale. Lonsdale had recently recovered from a bad bout of sunstroke. In the late afternoon this force encountered 2,000 Zulus and a skirmish ensued. Dartnell was forced to withdraw and call on reinforcements. They bivouaced for the night of 21st/22nd and waited until 6.30am when Chelmsford and Glyn arrived with 6 companies of 2/24th, N/5th RA (4 guns), 84 men of the MI, and a company of Pioneers. British at Battle of Isandhlwana The camp at Isandhlwana was left in the charge of Brevet Lieut-Col Henry Pulleine, CO of 1/24th. Under his command were:
7 Staff officers and 13 men
N Battery 5th Brigade RA - 2 officers and 70 men
1/24th HQ and 5 companies - A C E F and H - 15 officers and 402 men
2/24th G Company - 5 officers and 170 men,
90th Regiment - 6 men attached to 1/24th
Army Service Corps - 3 men
Army Hospital Corps - 10 men
One squadron of Mounted Infantry - 28 men
Natal Mounted Police - 34 men
Natal Carbineers - 2 officers and 26 men
Newcastle Mounted Rifles - 2 officers and 15 men
Buffalo Border Guard - one QM and 7 men
1/3rd NNC - 12 officers, 30 European NCOs and 170 natives
2/3rd NNC - 9 officers, 30 European NCOs and 170 natives
1 Company Natal Native Pioneers - 10 men
Before leaving the camp Lord Chelmsford had sent a message to Colonel Durnford who was at Rorke's Drift, having moved his no.2 Column up from Middle Drift. He was to march his men as quickly as possible to Isandhlwana to reinforce Pulleine's units. In Durnford's column, also present at the battle, were:
3 Staff Officers and one NCO RE
Rocket Battery RA One officer, one bombardier and 8 men of 1/24th
Natal Native Horse 5 Troops - 5 officers and 260 men
1/1st NNC 2 companies, D and E 6 officers, 10 European NCOs and 240 men
Zulu Impi at Battle of IsandhlwanaIn the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research (Vol XLIII no.176, Dec 1965) the writer F W D Jackson gives a list of Zulu regiments that were at Isandhlwana. He gleaned the list from 3 sources; one from Mehlokazulu who was the son of Chief Sihayo, The second from Sihlahla, and the third from the Army List. The names of the regiments usually appear in all three lists but the numbers of men in each regiment vary, so the following list gives an average figure for each unit:
Ngobamakosi 6,230 (raised by Cetshwayo, all aged 24)
Umbonambi 1,750 (raised by Mpande, all aged 32)
Nodwengu 1,500
Umcityu or Ukandempemvu 5,300
Mpunga 750
Nokenke 1,500 (aged 30)
Tulwana 2,500 (raised by Mpande, all aged 45)
Ndlondlo 1,000 (raised by Mpande, all aged 43)
Indluyengwe 1,500 (raised by Mpande, all aged 28)
Udloko or Qikazi 1,800 (raised by Mpande, all aged 40)
Isanqu 600 (men over 50 yrs old)
Total Zulu Impi by this reckoning is 24,430 men. The ages of the men and the king that raised them were taken from a list in Appendix B in Michael Barthorp's book of the Zulu War (1987). Three of the regiments do not appear on Barthorp's list.
The Morning of the 22nd Jan 1879The first report of Zulus advancing on the camp was at 8am on the 22nd when a trooper galloped down the spur from the plateau to say that a large force was approaching from the northeast. This report prompted Colonel Pulleine to send a message to Chelmsford which he received at 9.30. This was the first of several urgent messages that were ignored by his lordship. A second message received by Pulleine reported that the force had divided into 3 columns, 2 going northeast and one going northwest. The camp was on the alert after the first message but all was still quiet at 10 am when Colonel Durnford rode into camp with 5 Troops of NNH. His artillery and wagons were moving more slowly some way behind. Durnford was the more senior officer and was technically in command of the British force at the camp, but he was soon on the move and directed his Troops of Horse, 2 of them having to go up on the plateau with Capt Barry's 5 Company 2/3NNC in support. Durnford and Pulleine had lunch together until there was a report of 500 Zulus to the northeast, moving east. Durnford went with the Hlubi and Edendale Troops, the rocket battery and D company of 1st NNC to investigate. The Zulu Attack on IsandhlwanaThe main Zulu Impi, waiting for the propitious lunar moment in the valley to the northeast, were disturbed by Lieut Charles Raw's Troop of Native Horse and spilled out onto the Plateau to give chase. Raw was a survivor of the battle but Roberts, the commander of the other Troop that fled from the horde, was killed later that day. These 100 native troopers fired their carbines as they galloped away and gave warning to the men of the 24th at the top of the spur as they came down to the camp. Cavaye's E Coy remained in place to fire on the right horn of the Zulu impi. Lt F J D Scott of the Carbineers on Conical Hill saw the mass of Zulus pouring over the edge of the Plateau but stayed there until Durnford pulled his men back to the big donga, and then joined them.
The NNH were forced to retire towards the camp and the right flank was now exposed. Lieut Pope's G Coy 2/24th was on the right but he moved south to the track leaving a big gap between him and Wardell's H Coy. Colonel Pulleine was aware of the problem and sounded the 'Retire'. This encouraged the Zulus to rush forward. The last chance to get away was fast coming to an end, and those men who had access to a horse took the opportunity to race out through the nek. Everyone else knew that the end was near and their only hope was for a quick death. As the soldiers fell back on the camp the Zulus were upon them and they had to form into small squares to protect each other's backs as they fired the last of their ammunition and resorted to the bayonet. Those that died that day were mostly the men of the 24th Regiment. The artillerymen attempted to get away with the guns, the Native Horse and Mounted Infantry escaped on their horses and gave covering fire to others as they fled to the river. The Native Contingent escaped on foot but had to fight pursuing Zulus who chased them to the other side of the river.
In the camp the last stands were fought at the north and south ends of Isandhlwana Mountain. Durnford and Pulleine died on the southern slope with men of the 24th, Natal Police and Natal Carbineers. Younghusband's C Company fought at the north end and one of their number climbed to a cave up on the slopes. The rest made a mad charge into the Zulu mass and were cut to pieces. The man in the cave managed to hold out until evening, probably the last man to die.
The Fugitives The British/Colonial forces suffered 1,300 deaths. There were 78 fugitives who escaped the carnage at Isandhlwana and survived:
Durnford's no.2 Column
Lieutenant W F D Cochrane, 32nd Regiment (staff)
Mr Hamer (civilian transport officer)
Rocket Battery, 4 men - Bombardier G Gough RA, Privates H Grant (1/24th), W Johnson (1/24th), J Trainer (1/24th)
Captain W Barton NNH
Lieutenant Charles Raw NNH
Lieutenant V Vause NNH
Lieutenant A Henderson NNH
Lieutenant H D Davies NNH
Captain C Nourse NNC
Captain W H Stafford NNC
Captain D M Smythe NNC
Lieutenant W Erskine NNC
Colonel Glyn's no.3 Column
Captain E Essex, 75th Regiment (staff)
Captain A C Gardner, 14th Hussars (staff)
Lieutenant L H Smith-Dorrien, 95th Regiment (transport)
Mr J A Brickhill (civilian interpreter)
Lieutenant H T Curling RA
9 men of N Battery, 5th Brigade RA
Bandsman Bickley, 1/24th
Bandsman Wilson, 1/24th
11 men of no.1 Sqn Mounted Infantry - Sergeant P Naughton (2/3rd), Corporal J McCan (1/24th), Privates E Evans (2/3rd), J Edwards (2/3rd), J Gascoigne (2/3rd), D Whelan (1/13th), S Wassall (80th), T Westwood (80th), H Davis (1/24th), W Parry (1/24th), J Power (1/24th)
Natal Mounted Police, 9 men - Trumpeter Stevens, Troopers Sparks, Hayes, Collier, Kincaid, Eaton, Shannon, Doig, Dorhill
Natal Carbineers, 7 men - Troopers Muirhead, Fletcher, Edwards, Barker, Grainger, Tarboton, Sidthorpe
Newcastle Mounted Rifles, 7 men - Trumpeter Horne, TroopersBurne, Moodie, Walsh, Brown, Berning, Parsons
Buffalo Border Guard, QM McPhail and 4 men - Troopers Lennox, Adams, Adams, Stretch
Lieutenant J Adendorff NNC
Lieutenant W R C Higginson NNC
Lieutenant T Vaines NNC
Sergeant-Major Williams NNC and 2 NCOs
Lieutenant G F Andrews, Natal Native Pioneers
Conductor Foley
Smith-Dorrien's Story
The most famous of these survivors was Horace Smith-Dorrien who became a general in World War 1. He wrote an account of the battle, and his escape. He talked about Lieutenants Melvill and Coghill who famously escaped with the Queen's Colour of the 1st Battalion 24th, but were killed by Zulus. His account adds to the controversy over the award of the Victoria Cross to these officers:
"...I jumped on my broken-kneed pony which had had no rest for 30 hours, and followed it, to find on topping the nek a scene of confusion I shall never forget, for some 4,000 Zulus had come in behind [Isandhlwana Mountain] and were busy with shield and assegai. Into this mass I rode, revolver in hand, right through the Zulus, but they completely ignored me. I heard afterwards that they had been told by their King Cetshwayo that black coats were civilians and were not worth killing. I had a blue patrol jacket on, and it is noticable that the only 5 officers who escaped - Essex, Cochrane, Gardner, Curling and myself - had blue coats. The Zulus throughout my escape seemed to be set on killing natives who had sided with us, either as fighting levies or transport drivers.
"After getting through the mass of Zulus busy slaying, I followed the line of fugitives. The outer horns of the Zulu army had been directed to meet at about a mile to the southeast of the camp, and they were still some distance apart when the retreat commenced. It was this gap which fixed the line of the retreat.
"Again I rode through unheeded, and shortly after was passed by Lieutenant Coghill wearing a blue patrol and cord breeches, and riding a red roan horse. We had just exchanged remarks about the terrible disaster, and we passed on towards Fugitive's Drift. A little farther on I caught up Lt Curling and spoke to him, pointing out to him that the Zulus were all round and urging him to push on, which he did. My own broken-kneed transport pony was done to a turn and incapable of rapid progress.
"The ground was terribly bad going, all rocks and boulders, and it was about 3 or 4 miles from camp to Fugitive's Drift. When approaching this drift, and at least half a mile behind Coghill, Lieutenant Melvill, in a red coat and with a cased Colour across the front of his saddle, passed me going to the drift. I reported afterwards that the Colour was broken; but as the pole was found eventually whole, I think the casing must have been half off and hanging down. It will thus be seen that Coghill and Melvill did not escape together with the Colour. How Coghill came to be in the camp I do not know, as Colonel Glyn, whose orderly officer he was, was out with Lord Chelmsford's column.
"I then came to Fugitive's Drift, the descent to which was almost a precipice. I found there a man in a red coat badly assegaied in the arm, unable to move. He was, I believe, a mounted infantryman of the 24th, named Macdonald, but of his name I cannot be sure. I managed to make a tourniquet with a handkerchief to stop the bleeding, and got him halfway down, when a shout from behind said, 'Get on man, the Zulus are on top of you.' I turned round and saw Major Smith RA who was commanding the section of guns, as white as a sheet and bleeding profusely. In a second we were surrounded and assegais accounted for poor Smith, my wounded MI man, and my horse.
"With the help of my revolver and a wild jump down the rocks, I found myself in the Buffalo River, which was in flood and 80 yards broad. I was carried away, but luckily got hold of the tail of a loose horse, which towed me across to the other bank, but I was too exhausted to stick to him. Up this bank were swarming friendly natives, but I only saw one European, a Colonial and Acting Commissariat Officer named Hamer, lying there unable to move. I managed to catch a loose horse, and put him on it, and he escaped. The Zulus were pouring in a very heavy fire from the opposite bank, and dropped several friendly natives as we climbed to the top.
"No sooner had I achieved this than I saw that a lot of Zulus had crossed higher up and were running to cut me off. This drove me to my left, but 20 of them still pursued for about 3 miles, and I managed to keep them off with my revolver.
"I got into Helpmakaar at sundown, having done 20 miles on foot from the river, for I almost went to Sandspruit. At Helpmakaar I found Huntley of the 10th who had been left there with a small garrison, and also Essex, Cochrane, Curling and Gardner, from the field of Isandhlwana, all busy placing the post in a state of defence. We could see that night the watchfires of the Zulus some 6 miles off, and expected them to come on and attack, but we knew later they had turned off to attack Rorke's Drift.
"I at once took command of one face of the laager, and shall never forget how pleased we weary watchers were when, shortly after midnight, Major Upcher's 2 companies of the 24th, with Heaton, Palmes, Clements, and Lloyd, came to reinforce. These two companies had started for Rorke's Drift that afternoon, but had been turned back to Helpmakaar by Major Spalding, a staff officer, as he said Rorke's Drift had been surrounded and captured, and that the two companies would share the same fate. Luckily his information proved to be wrong."
Melvill and Coghill
Nevill Coghill reached the river first, and spurred his horse into the fast-flowing water. When he reached the other bank he looked back and saw the mounted Teignmouth Melvill plunge in with the Colour. His horse was shot and the rider clung to a rock, calling on another officer in the river, Higginson, to help. But the Colour was swept away. Coghill saw all this and was about to ride into the river to help Melvill and Higginson. At that moment his horse was shot too, and Coghill fell into the water. He reached the rock and all three men managed to get to the Natal side of the river. Once on the other side Higginson went to find a horse as the other two were exhausted. Before he could get very far he realised that Melvill and Coghill were being attacked and he could do little to help. There is some question about who actually killed them, the suggestion being that they were finished off, not by the Zulus who had been chasing them, but by Africans on the Natal bank. The Zulus could have shouted to these men that they would suffer reprisals if the two officers were not killed.
They were killed on the day of the battle, 22nd Jan, but the bodies were not discovered until 4th Feb, by a British patrol. They were half buried in a makeshift grave, not in the condition depicted by Alphonse de Neuville's 'Last Sleep of the Brave'. The other de Neuville painting, 'Saving the Queen's Colour' is also erroneous in showing the two men riding together. As Smith-Dorrien points out, the two officers did not ride together, so Coghill's reason for leaving the battle was not to save the Colour. The VC awards were not granted straight away because there was no provision for posthumous awards at that time. When, in 1906, it was decided to give the VC to heroes who had died in the course of their brave action, the medals were sent to the families of the two officers, gazetted on 15th Jan 1907.
The Zulu Advance on Rorke's Drift, 22nd Jan When the Zulu impi was mobilised and made its approach on the camp at Isandhlwana, the 'right horn' travelled further west along the plateau and split into two. One half curved around the west side of Isandhlwana mountain to meet up with the left horn so that the British would be encircled. The other half of the right horn was instructed to pursue the fugitives that were expected to head for the Buffalo River. These Zulus belonged to four regiments of the Undi corps, raised by King Mpande and commanded by Cetshwayo's brother Dubalamanzi:
Ndlu-yengwe 1,000, aged 28 (bachelors)
Udloko 3,000, aged 40 (married)
Uthulwane 1,000, aged 45 (married)
Ndlondlo 900, aged 43 (married)
The Ndlu-yengwe pursued the fugitives to the drift that became known as Fugitive's Drift, then crossed the river 2km upstream. The rest crossed at a point further up, almost due east of the Rorke's Drift station. It is thought that some of the men were diverted to loot other buildings on the Natal side of the river so that the force that attacked the station was between 3,500 and 4,000. There was never any plan to carry out this attack, it was really a spontaneous decision on the part of Prince Dubalamanzi who disobeyed his brother's orders not to cross into Natal.
The Defenders
When No.3 Column entered Zululand on the 11th Jan, B company of 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment remained at Rorke's Drift to defend the stores and the hospital. There were also officers and men of other units and about 30 patients in the hospital.
The dawn light showed many dead warriors lying around the station and at 7am the surviving Zulus gathered at the west end of the Oskarberg looking as if they might have one more onslaught, but they turned and went home. The Zulus were mostly middle-aged men and they were also very tired, hungry and thirsty. The casualties in the garrison were 15 killed, 2 mortally wounded and 7 badly wounded. They counted around 350 dead Zulus in the vicinity but many more were found later, and those that were wounded were not likely to have effective medical care. At around 8am the garrison was relieved by the Chelmsford's force which had spent the night at Isandhlwana and set off before dawn. Russell's Mounted Infantry were the first on the scene and were a very welcome sight for the defenders.
Eleven men were awarded the Victoria Cross in this action. This reflected the way in which news of the Defence of Rorke's Drift was received by the Queen, her government, and the general public. The disaster at Isandhlwana plunged the nation into a great depression but Rorke's Drift lifted their spirits. It also raised morale in Natal. If the Zulus had over-run Rorke's Drift they would have thought themselves invincible and wreaked havoc in the colony.
A memorial stands on the battlefield of Isandhlwana to pay tribute to the men of the 24th Regiment who died on 22nd Jan 1879 both at the battle there and at Rorke's Drift."
"Zulu War
Background The Cape Colony was the first region of southern Africa to come under British control, in 1806, and it was important for the whole southern coast to be safe for ships travelling between England and India. From 1838 the British sought control of Natal from the Boers and annexed the district in 1845. Although the Boers were a problem for the British, it was widely accepted by all inhabitants of the whole region that, from past experience, the real danger was from the Zulus. The Rise of the ZulusThe native tribes of Southern Africa are generally believed to have migrated down the eastern side of the continent, in the mid 18th century, to establish grazing land for their cattle and escape the Arab slave traders. There were inevitable quarrels between tribes for land and disputes were often settled at pre-arranged points where ritual combat would take place involving single combat and organised throwing of spears. Around 1787 Shaka was born, the illegitimate son of Chief Senzangakhona of the amaZulus. Shaka was somewhat of an outcast but gained some respect among the Mthethwa people. He gained a reputation for military prowess and trained his men in tactics of his own devising, and the use of a stabbing spear to replace the throwing type. He eventually returned to his own people and was made king of the Zulu nation.
Shaka's Reign of Terror
Around 1816 King Shaka began his military conquests against neighbouring tribes. He ruled by fear, and moulded his regiments into unstoppable fighting machines. Boys were trained to ignore pain and obey their leaders implicitly. Regiments were formed by age groups and the warriors had to earn the right to marry. Usually only the middle-aged men were allowed to marry after many years service in their regiment. Shaka's cruel punishments ensured that his warriors prefered to face the enemy than the consequences of retreat.
Boers v Zulus
A despot like Shaka was not likely to see old age. He was killed by his half-brother Dingaan in 1828 and the military conquests ceased. Dingaan was a self-indulgent man who was, at first, more peaceful than Shaka, but could not be trusted. It was during his reign that the Boers made their Great Trek north from the Cape Colony. The main reason for this was a difference of opinion about how to treat the non-whites. The Boers had a long tradition of using slaves which they were reluctant relinquish, while the British had, since the latter part of the 18th century, been persuaded that slavery should be abolished. One group of Boers, under Piet Retief, approached Dingaan in 1838 with a request for permission to settle on Zulu land. He agreed, on the condition that they find and return some cattle stolen by Basutos. Retief and 60 Boers did as they were asked and returned with the cattle, but once inside Dingaan's kraal they were massacred. This, of course, incensed the Boers who, together with British settlers in Durban, advanced on the Zulus to exact revenge. But they too were wiped out and the Zulus were free to take over white controlled Durban. The remaining settlers managed to escape by ship but the town was sacked. A leader of the Boers Andreas Pretorius led another expedition against the Zulus at the end of 1828 and was successful.
When Dingaan's half brother, Mpande fled to Natal with 17.000 followers, the Boers seized the opportunity to replace Dingaan with a more friendly Zulu king. It Was Dingaan's turn to flee when the Boers, with Mpande, invaded Zululand. King Mpande ruled from 1840 and proved to be a peaceful ruler. However, the conflict now shifted to Boer versus the British, and in 1845, after a struggle, Natal was formally annexed as a district of Cape Colony. The Boers began to move out, and a treaty was made with Mpande. In 1847 and again in 1850 there were the 7th and 8th Cape Frontier Wars to quell Xhosa uprisings, and in 1852 the Boers set up their own republic in the Transvaal. The Orange Free State was established by the Boers in 1854. Natal at this time was populated by 3,000 British settlers and 150,000 natives who had been driven out of their lands by the Zulus.
Mpande had two sons by different mothers, Cetshwayo and Mbulazi. Both boys attracted followers and the two groups became sworn enemies. Things came to a head in 1856 when Cetshwayo's followers defeated Mbulazi's at a bloody battle on the Tugela. To help him in his quest for power, Cetshwayo offered friendship to the Boers and the British. Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the Natal Secretary for Native Affairs, thought it prudent to recognise him as the heir to the Zulu throne. When Mpande died in 1873, Shepstone attended Cetshwayo's coronation, giving the Great White Queen's seal of approval, but also extracting promises of good conduct for the future. Cetshwayo listened, but with the throne now secure and the Zulus acknowledging his kingship he had no intention of ruling his people under the dictates of an outsider.
The British Plan for Confederation South Africa had always been the poor relation in the British Empire, used as a stopping-off place en route to India, the Jewel in the Imperial Crown. But in 1868 diamonds and gold were discovered and this engendered a greater respect for the colony. The British Government decided that at last they could get a return on all those years of trouble and expense. The problem was that the region was a patchwork of Boer republics, black kingdoms and British colonies. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Carnarvon took it upon himself to link these entities into a Confederation. To this end he appointed Sir Henry Bartle Frere to the position of Governor of Cape Colony, tasked with implementing the Confederation policy. Transvaal had already come under British jurisdiction thanks to the work of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and it was plainly obvious to Frere that Zululand had to be conquered. The Boer-Zulu Border Dispute The Boer republic of Transvaal had been established to give the Afrikaners their own land away from British interference. But some of them had remained within the Natal borders, settling in the remote northwest, around Blood River (Ncome River). They were cattle owners and were attracted to the good grazing on the grassy uplands to the east, in Zululand. Mpande was king at that time and they sought his permission to use the area for their cattle. He was prepared to maintain good relations with the Boers and allowed them to move in. But there were no clearly defined bounderies so the Boers edged their way further and further into Zululand. When Cetshwayo came to the throne he wanted the Boers out of his country so the area (see Map), which stretched from Rorke's Drift in the south to the Transvaal border in the north, became disputed territory. The Boers claimed that Mpande had given them the land and Cetshwayo claimed that it was merely a loan and that he wanted it back. The British, at first, gave their support to the Zulus in the argument, but when the Transvaal came under British control, they felt that it would be better to placate the potentially hostile Boer population by supporting their claim. This dismayed Cetshwayo and provided another reason for the British to confront the Zulus.
Bartle Frere's Reasons for Provoking the Zulus
1. The Zulu Kingdom was an anachronism. They did not fit in with the new order of stable economic progress.
2. A show of military might would demonstrate what would happen if the Boers or natives opposed it.
3. A victory would increase confidence in the British administration.
4. The Zulus were probably encouraging other groups to fight the British. Frere thought it was they who caused the 9th Cape Frontier War.
5. The Zulus were a threat to Natal's national security. He encouraged the idea that Cetshwayo was planning to invade Natal and massacre the population.
6. Black people were needed to work in the diamond fields. The Zulu spirit needed to be broken.
7. The border dispute between the Boers and Zulus needed to be settled.
The Boundary Commission 1878 Sir Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, was less than keen on the idea of provoking a war with the Zulus. He thought that if it failed, Natal would be over-run by the victorious Zulu army and all would be lost. And even if the British invasion was successful it would poison race relations for years to come. Bulwer wanted to proceed with caution so he proposed that a Commission be set up to take evidence from the Boers and the Zulus and decide who was at fault in their dispute. Frere approved the setting up of this Commission because he was confident that it would provide confirmation of his views. The Commission set up to resolve the border dispute consisted of three members. One was Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Durnford RE who was later killed at Isandhlwana. The other two members were John Wesley Shepstone, brother of Sir Theophilus, and M H Gallway, Natal's Attorney-General. They convened at Rorke's Drift in March 1878 and listened to the claims from both parties.
The Boers were represented by Henrique Shepstone, another brother of Sir Theophilus, who was Secretary of Native Affairs in the Transvaal. Also Gert Rudolph, the Landdrost of Utrecht, and Petrus Lefras Uys a prominent farmer in the disputed area.
The Zulus were represented by Chief Sihayo whose tribe lived near Rorke's Drift, and two of Cetshwayo's officials, Gebula and Mundula. The king also sent Sintwangu, a servant who was instructed to provide a confidential report on the proceedings, for royal ears only.
The Commission was escorted by 20 men of the Natal Mounted Police and was careful to appear as impartial as possible, so that when the Transvaal group tried to sit next to the Commissioners, they were moved away. The process lasted a month, with a large amount of evidence being scrutinized, both written and oral. Much of the Boer evidence was suspect, and the final outcome was that the Commission found in favour of the Zulus. However they stipulated that some of the more predominently Boer populated areas should be allowed to remain in Boer possession. This was good news for the Zulus. Bartle Frere, on the other hand, was not at all pleased, so it was a relief for him when another excuse for war presented itself.
Sihayo's Wives Sihayo, chief of the Qungebe, one of the Zulu tribes, was a supporter of Cetshwayo and the brother of Mfokanaza who was a favourite of king Mpande. He was a progressive Zulu who liked to dress in European clothes and dine at table with the missionaries. While he was away in Ulundi, his sons discovered that two of his wives had absconded and were over the border, in Natal. One of them was staying in the homestead of Mswagele a border policeman, so Sihayo's three sons, together with his brother and a force of 30 armed and mounted men and a large following of foot soldiers, crossed the Buffalo River at Rorke's Drift in broad daylight on 28th July 1878. They caught the wife and dragged her back over the border where they knocked her teeth out and either clubbed her or strangled her to death. The following day they repeated the same process for the second wife. These events shocked the colonists in Natal, and Frere's warnings about the ferocity of the Zulus seemed to be vindicated. It also had the effect of bringing Bulwer round to Frere's way of thinking. Bartle Frere's UltimatumThe Boundary Commission's findings were not the result that Sir Bartle Frere had anticipated so he sat on the report rather than publish it immediately. He needed time to think how he was going to present this to the Zulus without losing face. What he came up with was an ultimatum that he intended to put to the Zulus alongside the findings of the Commission. This ultimatum was a blatant provocation that could only have one outcome. The conditions imposed on Cetshwayo were:
1. Surrender of Sihayo's 3 sons and brother to be tried in the courts in Natal.
2. Payment of a fine of 500 head of cattle for the above offence and for failure to comply.
3. Payment of a fine of 100 head of cattle for the offence against Messrs Smith and Deighton.
4. Surrender of the Swazi Chief Umbilini and others to be tried in Transvaal courts.
5. Observance of promises made by Cetshwayo at his coronation.
6. That the Zulu army be disbanded and the men allowed to go home.
7. That the Zulu military system be discontinued and other military regulations be adopted, to be decided upon after consultation with the Great Council and British representatives.
8. That every man, when he comes to man's estate, be free to marry.
9. All missionaries and their converts, who until 1877 lived in Zululand, shall be allowed to return and re-occupy their stations.
10. All such missionaries shall be allowed to teach, and any Zulu, if he chooses, shall be free to listen to the teachings.
11. A British Agent shall be allowed to reside in Zululand who will see that the above provisions are carried out.
12. All disputes in which a missionary or European is concerned, shall be heard by the King in public, and in the presence of the Resident.
13. No sentence of expulsion from Zululand shall be carried out until it has been approved by the Resident.
Cetshwayo's Response
Cetshwayo had 20 days from the 11th Dec to comply with Bartle Frere's conditions. On the 18th he sent word that he would try to send the cattle and the wanted men but that the river was in flood and it may take longer. Of course, the king had no intention of giving up his impi and was hoping that there would be some negotiation if he looked as if he were at least trying to comply. But Frere was in no mood for a conversation. He wanted all conditions met within 20 days or else the British army would cross into Zululand on the 21st day and advance after the 30th day.
Reaction in London
In London the new Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, heard about the ultimatum and was appalled, but it was too late to stop the war. Hicks Beach was not in favour of his predecessor's Confederation scheme or Bartle Frere's aggressive intentions. Since it was a fait accompli there was little he could do except provide extra regiments to increase the chances of a British victory. So now the juggernaut had been set in motion.
British ForcesSir Frederick Thesiger had brought the 9th Cape Frontier war to a successful conclusion and had inherited the title Lord Chelmsford in October 1878. Frere had already asked him to make plans for the invasion of Zululand and prepare the army. These preparations went ahead well before the ultimatum was even delivered. Chelmsford was worried that his force was under-strength. When he contemplated the troops at his disposal; he had no regular cavalry regiments, so had to rely on Natal volunteer units, and only 5 regular infantry battalions for the invasion:
1st Battalion 24th Regiment
2nd battalion 24th Regiment
2nd battalion 3rd Regiment (The Buffs)
1st Battalion 13th Light infantry
The single battalion 90th Light Infantry
There were other British Infantry regiments in South Africa. The 80th was in the Transvaal but needed to stay to keep an eye on the northern border of Zululand, and make sure the Boers did not make trouble. The 88th were in the Cape Colony with companies detached in Mauritius and St Helena. Hicks Beach, in London, although he was not in favour of the war, was prepared to send reinforcements, which arrived later:
2nd Battalion 4th Regiment (King's Own)
The single battalion 99th Regiment
If the assembly of adequate forces had stretched the manpower and armoury of the colony to the limit, the problems of supplying and maintaining such an army with food, water, fuel, ammunition, tentage, equipment, and above all, transportation for these commodities, presented greater difficulties. Reckoning on operations lasting between 6 weeks and 2 months, Chelmsford realised that 1,800 tons of stores would be needed to accompany the army. The most common form of transport in South Africa was the ox wagon, 18 feet long and 6 feet wide, which required between 14 and 18 animals to draw it. To keep the oxen in good working trim, 16 hours a day had to be allowed for their grazing and rest, so that on the rough dirt tracks only about 10 miles a day could be covered, even under good conditions. More often the roads were strewn with boulders, scarred by water courses or churned up by rain. Also herds of cattle had to be driven to supply the men with fresh meat. Thus a military column would stretch for miles and be an easy target for fast-moving Zulus. Chelmsford's staff were kept busy collecting the necessary transports, and with inflated prices the expense was enormous. In January 1879 they had 977 wagons, 56 carts, 10,023 oxen, 803 horses and 398 mules, with 2,000 extra natives to drive and manage them.
Lord Chelmsford's Strategy The aim of Lord Chelmsford's army was to make Natal secure from Zulu invasion. To achieve this it was not practical to provide guards along the 200 mile border. A large Zulu impi could easily brush past a platoon of soldiers protecting one section of the border and wreak havoc in areas that were not protected. Anyway it would be almost impossible to mobilise against a fast-moving, unencumbered Zulu army. The only way to deal with the problem, as Bartle Frere had stated, was to go into Zululand with a large army, find the impi, bring it to battle and destroy it. But to take the whole army in one column would have meant that the Zulus could easily bypass them and enter Natal at some other river crossing 'while the cat's away' so to speak. Also a single column would be very slow and unwieldy. Chelmsford therefore decided to split the field force into 5 columns, which in effect ended up as 3 invading columns, entering Zululand from different points along the frontier.
No.1 Column
80th (Staffordshire Volunteers) Regiment (equipped with two 6-pounders and one 4-pounder)
Cape Mounted Riflemen
Border Horse. Lt-Col Frederick Weatherley
Transvaal Rangers. Commandant Pieter Raaff
Ferreira's Horse
Schutte's Horse
Eckersley's Transvaal Native Contingent
Each of the columns was to act independently, taking it's own provisions and making decisions without referral to Lord Chelmsford. They were instructed that the aim of the field force was the destruction of the Zulu army and the capture of King Cetshwayo and to head in the general direction of Ulundi, starting on 11th January 1879. More specifically, Pearson's no.1 Column was ordered to establish a base at Eshowe and Glyn's no.3 Column was ordered to establish a base at Isipezi Hill. Wood was required to contain the Zulus in the north to prevent them from interfering with no.3 column.
Durnford's no.2 Column was broken up so that 2 battalions of the 1st Natal Native Contingent should remain at Middle Drift, the third battalion to go to Umsinga, and the Rocket Battery and Natal Native Horse were to accompany Durnford who was now attached to no.3 Column. Chelmsford also attached himself and his staff to Colonel Glyn's no.3 Column.
Sihayo's KraalThe Centre Column (no.3) began crossing the Buffalo River (Mzinyathi) at 4.30am on 11th January. The men of the 24th were ferried across on flat-bottomed ponts while the Natal Native Contingent waded across in water up to their necks. Even though it was summer the temperature was very cold before sunrise and the unclothed natives were frozen. The order to walk into the cold fast-flowing river was not welcome and it is little wonder that some of them drowned. Once across it was found that the track ahead was in need of some work from the pioneers. But in order to ensure the safety of the road-workers a nearby Zulu Kraal had to be neutralised. The chief of this kraal was Sihayo, whose wives were the ones who had absconded, with far-reaching consequences. Sihayo was also involved in the Boundary Commission inquiry. The task of capturing the kraal was given to the 1st Battalion 3rd NNC commanded by Commandant George Hamilton-Browne. He described the action vividly in his book 'A Lost Legionary in South Africa'
Lord Chelmsford instructed Browne that they were not to fire unless they were fired upon, also that women and children should not be harmed The NNC formed a line in front of the hill that led up to the kraal. When shots were fired at them they charged but the only ones that went forward were a company of 100 Zulus, fighting for the British after having been exiled from Zululand. The remaining natives were inclined to run away and had to be bullied back to the fight by their roughneck NCOs. The exiled Zulus had a score to settle with Sihayo's men who had played a central part in killing their comrades in an unfair fight some years earlier. A fierce hand to hand fight now took place. After some time, the enemy Zulus had retreated to the top of a difficult 60 foot cliff and were firing down on Browne's men. At that stage the runaway natives were brought back to the battle at the point of bayonets held by men of the 24th who were commanded by Wilson Black. The native contribution was negligible because those with rifles simply fired them in the air to use up their ammunition. It was also found that 32 of their number had been killed in the action and Browne was of the opinion that they were all victims of friendly fire. There was little chance of dislodging the enemy up on the rocky cliff but the flanking companies were on their way round, and amongst them was another company of exiled Zulus. They forced the surrender of Sihayo's men and the battle was over.
The Camp at IsandhlwanaThe men were set to work on improving the road for the wagons to proceed. This took some days, and the army then marched on in the direction of Isipezi Hill where a semi permanent camp was intended. The progress of the column was slow so it became necessary to establish an intermediate camp, and the ground to the east of Isandhlwana mountain seemed to fit the bill. It had a water supply and there was space for the wagons as well as for separate unit areas. The tents were erected on the 20th Jan.
Before the start of the operation Lord Chelmsford had given very precise instructions on all aspects of the campaign and emphasized the need for good defences around the perimeter of any camp, however temporary. And so it was generally assumed that the camp would be laid out so that the wagons could be formed into a laager and defences prepared, such as thorn bushes heaped up and broken bottles scattered where the Zulus would be most likely to attack. There were plenty of large rocks which could have been built up into defensive walls. Colonel Glyn proposed to do all this, but Lord Chelmsford forbade it. His reasoning was based on the fact that he wanted the wagons to be unloaded and sent back empty to Rorke's Drift to load up with more supplies and return to the camp. He was convinced, also, that the main Zulu impi was not in that area, and that the main focus for the building of defences should be at the intended camp on the Mangeni River.
The Isandhlwana camp was laid out in a line running north-south, half a mile long with most of the wagons placed in the nek between the mountain and the Stony Hill. However, the safety of the camp was not to be completely disregarded since infantry piquets were deployed a half mile away by day and a quarter of a mile by night. Mounted vedettes were sent far out to the edge of the plateau.
Whatever Chelmsford's reasons for failing to fortify the camp, in the light of subsequent events it is hard to justify his negligence. If there was general agreement with his views amongst the officers it might be more understandable but it seems that he was alone in his attitude. Hamilton (Maori) Browne's autobiography 'A Lost Legionary in South Africa' was written and published in 1911 so he had the benefit of 30 years hindsight. But in the book he says: "I was talking to some of my best officers when [Lonsdale] joined us and his first words were, 'My God , Maori, what do you think of this camp?' I replied, 'Someone is mad.' The colonial officers were loud and long in complaint, and Duncombe (a captain in Browne's battalion) said, 'Do the staff think we are going to meet an army of school-girls? Why in the name of all that is holy do we not laager?' ....[Colonel Glyn] did not seem to be in good spirits, but said nothing about the camp, and on my remarking it looked very pretty though rather extended, he looked hard at me, shook his head and said, 'Very'."
The Column Splits in Two Chelmsford's force had supplies to last two months so he was under pressure to achieve victory by then. On the 21st Jan they had been in the field for 10 days and achieved very little, so Major Dartnell of the Natal Mounted Police was sent to reconnoitre the area to the southeast, 10 miles away, with 80 of his own men, 47 volunteers and 1,600 of the Natal Native Contingent under Commandant Rupert Lonsdale. Lonsdale had recently recovered from a bad bout of sunstroke. In the late afternoon this force encountered 2,000 Zulus and a skirmish ensued. Dartnell was forced to withdraw and call on reinforcements. They bivouaced for the night of 21st/22nd and waited until 6.30am when Chelmsford and Glyn arrived with 6 companies of 2/24th, N/5th RA (4 guns), 84 men of the MI, and a company of Pioneers. British at Battle of Isandhlwana The camp at Isandhlwana was left in the charge of Brevet Lieut-Col Henry Pulleine, CO of 1/24th. Under his command were:
7 Staff officers and 13 men
N Battery 5th Brigade RA - 2 officers and 70 men
1/24th HQ and 5 companies - A C E F and H - 15 officers and 402 men
2/24th G Company - 5 officers and 170 men,
90th Regiment - 6 men attached to 1/24th
Army Service Corps - 3 men
Army Hospital Corps - 10 men
One squadron of Mounted Infantry - 28 men
Natal Mounted Police - 34 men
Natal Carbineers - 2 officers and 26 men
Newcastle Mounted Rifles - 2 officers and 15 men
Buffalo Border Guard - one QM and 7 men
1/3rd NNC - 12 officers, 30 European NCOs and 170 natives
2/3rd NNC - 9 officers, 30 European NCOs and 170 natives
1 Company Natal Native Pioneers - 10 men
Before leaving the camp Lord Chelmsford had sent a message to Colonel Durnford who was at Rorke's Drift, having moved his no.2 Column up from Middle Drift. He was to march his men as quickly as possible to Isandhlwana to reinforce Pulleine's units. In Durnford's column, also present at the battle, were:
3 Staff Officers and one NCO RE
Rocket Battery RA One officer, one bombardier and 8 men of 1/24th
Natal Native Horse 5 Troops - 5 officers and 260 men
1/1st NNC 2 companies, D and E 6 officers, 10 European NCOs and 240 men
Zulu Impi at Battle of IsandhlwanaIn the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research (Vol XLIII no.176, Dec 1965) the writer F W D Jackson gives a list of Zulu regiments that were at Isandhlwana. He gleaned the list from 3 sources; one from Mehlokazulu who was the son of Chief Sihayo, The second from Sihlahla, and the third from the Army List. The names of the regiments usually appear in all three lists but the numbers of men in each regiment vary, so the following list gives an average figure for each unit:
Ngobamakosi 6,230 (raised by Cetshwayo, all aged 24)
Umbonambi 1,750 (raised by Mpande, all aged 32)
Nodwengu 1,500
Umcityu or Ukandempemvu 5,300
Mpunga 750
Nokenke 1,500 (aged 30)
Tulwana 2,500 (raised by Mpande, all aged 45)
Ndlondlo 1,000 (raised by Mpande, all aged 43)
Indluyengwe 1,500 (raised by Mpande, all aged 28)
Udloko or Qikazi 1,800 (raised by Mpande, all aged 40)
Isanqu 600 (men over 50 yrs old)
Total Zulu Impi by this reckoning is 24,430 men. The ages of the men and the king that raised them were taken from a list in Appendix B in Michael Barthorp's book of the Zulu War (1987). Three of the regiments do not appear on Barthorp's list.
The Morning of the 22nd Jan 1879The first report of Zulus advancing on the camp was at 8am on the 22nd when a trooper galloped down the spur from the plateau to say that a large force was approaching from the northeast. This report prompted Colonel Pulleine to send a message to Chelmsford which he received at 9.30. This was the first of several urgent messages that were ignored by his lordship. A second message received by Pulleine reported that the force had divided into 3 columns, 2 going northeast and one going northwest. The camp was on the alert after the first message but all was still quiet at 10 am when Colonel Durnford rode into camp with 5 Troops of NNH. His artillery and wagons were moving more slowly some way behind. Durnford was the more senior officer and was technically in command of the British force at the camp, but he was soon on the move and directed his Troops of Horse, 2 of them having to go up on the plateau with Capt Barry's 5 Company 2/3NNC in support. Durnford and Pulleine had lunch together until there was a report of 500 Zulus to the northeast, moving east. Durnford went with the Hlubi and Edendale Troops, the rocket battery and D company of 1st NNC to investigate. The Zulu Attack on IsandhlwanaThe main Zulu Impi, waiting for the propitious lunar moment in the valley to the northeast, were disturbed by Lieut Charles Raw's Troop of Native Horse and spilled out onto the Plateau to give chase. Raw was a survivor of the battle but Roberts, the commander of the other Troop that fled from the horde, was killed later that day. These 100 native troopers fired their carbines as they galloped away and gave warning to the men of the 24th at the top of the spur as they came down to the camp. Cavaye's E Coy remained in place to fire on the right horn of the Zulu impi. Lt F J D Scott of the Carbineers on Conical Hill saw the mass of Zulus pouring over the edge of the Plateau but stayed there until Durnford pulled his men back to the big donga, and then joined them.
The NNH were forced to retire towards the camp and the right flank was now exposed. Lieut Pope's G Coy 2/24th was on the right but he moved south to the track leaving a big gap between him and Wardell's H Coy. Colonel Pulleine was aware of the problem and sounded the 'Retire'. This encouraged the Zulus to rush forward. The last chance to get away was fast coming to an end, and those men who had access to a horse took the opportunity to race out through the nek. Everyone else knew that the end was near and their only hope was for a quick death. As the soldiers fell back on the camp the Zulus were upon them and they had to form into small squares to protect each other's backs as they fired the last of their ammunition and resorted to the bayonet. Those that died that day were mostly the men of the 24th Regiment. The artillerymen attempted to get away with the guns, the Native Horse and Mounted Infantry escaped on their horses and gave covering fire to others as they fled to the river. The Native Contingent escaped on foot but had to fight pursuing Zulus who chased them to the other side of the river.
In the camp the last stands were fought at the north and south ends of Isandhlwana Mountain. Durnford and Pulleine died on the southern slope with men of the 24th, Natal Police and Natal Carbineers. Younghusband's C Company fought at the north end and one of their number climbed to a cave up on the slopes. The rest made a mad charge into the Zulu mass and were cut to pieces. The man in the cave managed to hold out until evening, probably the last man to die.
The Fugitives The British/Colonial forces suffered 1,300 deaths. There were 78 fugitives who escaped the carnage at Isandhlwana and survived:
Durnford's no.2 Column
Lieutenant W F D Cochrane, 32nd Regiment (staff)
Mr Hamer (civilian transport officer)
Rocket Battery, 4 men - Bombardier G Gough RA, Privates H Grant (1/24th), W Johnson (1/24th), J Trainer (1/24th)
Captain W Barton NNH
Lieutenant Charles Raw NNH
Lieutenant V Vause NNH
Lieutenant A Henderson NNH
Lieutenant H D Davies NNH
Captain C Nourse NNC
Captain W H Stafford NNC
Captain D M Smythe NNC
Lieutenant W Erskine NNC
Colonel Glyn's no.3 Column
Captain E Essex, 75th Regiment (staff)
Captain A C Gardner, 14th Hussars (staff)
Lieutenant L H Smith-Dorrien, 95th Regiment (transport)
Mr J A Brickhill (civilian interpreter)
Lieutenant H T Curling RA
9 men of N Battery, 5th Brigade RA
Bandsman Bickley, 1/24th
Bandsman Wilson, 1/24th
11 men of no.1 Sqn Mounted Infantry - Sergeant P Naughton (2/3rd), Corporal J McCan (1/24th), Privates E Evans (2/3rd), J Edwards (2/3rd), J Gascoigne (2/3rd), D Whelan (1/13th), S Wassall (80th), T Westwood (80th), H Davis (1/24th), W Parry (1/24th), J Power (1/24th)
Natal Mounted Police, 9 men - Trumpeter Stevens, Troopers Sparks, Hayes, Collier, Kincaid, Eaton, Shannon, Doig, Dorhill
Natal Carbineers, 7 men - Troopers Muirhead, Fletcher, Edwards, Barker, Grainger, Tarboton, Sidthorpe
Newcastle Mounted Rifles, 7 men - Trumpeter Horne, TroopersBurne, Moodie, Walsh, Brown, Berning, Parsons
Buffalo Border Guard, QM McPhail and 4 men - Troopers Lennox, Adams, Adams, Stretch
Lieutenant J Adendorff NNC
Lieutenant W R C Higginson NNC
Lieutenant T Vaines NNC
Sergeant-Major Williams NNC and 2 NCOs
Lieutenant G F Andrews, Natal Native Pioneers
Conductor Foley
Smith-Dorrien's Story
The most famous of these survivors was Horace Smith-Dorrien who became a general in World War 1. He wrote an account of the battle, and his escape. He talked about Lieutenants Melvill and Coghill who famously escaped with the Queen's Colour of the 1st Battalion 24th, but were killed by Zulus. His account adds to the controversy over the award of the Victoria Cross to these officers:
"...I jumped on my broken-kneed pony which had had no rest for 30 hours, and followed it, to find on topping the nek a scene of confusion I shall never forget, for some 4,000 Zulus had come in behind [Isandhlwana Mountain] and were busy with shield and assegai. Into this mass I rode, revolver in hand, right through the Zulus, but they completely ignored me. I heard afterwards that they had been told by their King Cetshwayo that black coats were civilians and were not worth killing. I had a blue patrol jacket on, and it is noticable that the only 5 officers who escaped - Essex, Cochrane, Gardner, Curling and myself - had blue coats. The Zulus throughout my escape seemed to be set on killing natives who had sided with us, either as fighting levies or transport drivers.
"After getting through the mass of Zulus busy slaying, I followed the line of fugitives. The outer horns of the Zulu army had been directed to meet at about a mile to the southeast of the camp, and they were still some distance apart when the retreat commenced. It was this gap which fixed the line of the retreat.
"Again I rode through unheeded, and shortly after was passed by Lieutenant Coghill wearing a blue patrol and cord breeches, and riding a red roan horse. We had just exchanged remarks about the terrible disaster, and we passed on towards Fugitive's Drift. A little farther on I caught up Lt Curling and spoke to him, pointing out to him that the Zulus were all round and urging him to push on, which he did. My own broken-kneed transport pony was done to a turn and incapable of rapid progress.
"The ground was terribly bad going, all rocks and boulders, and it was about 3 or 4 miles from camp to Fugitive's Drift. When approaching this drift, and at least half a mile behind Coghill, Lieutenant Melvill, in a red coat and with a cased Colour across the front of his saddle, passed me going to the drift. I reported afterwards that the Colour was broken; but as the pole was found eventually whole, I think the casing must have been half off and hanging down. It will thus be seen that Coghill and Melvill did not escape together with the Colour. How Coghill came to be in the camp I do not know, as Colonel Glyn, whose orderly officer he was, was out with Lord Chelmsford's column.
"I then came to Fugitive's Drift, the descent to which was almost a precipice. I found there a man in a red coat badly assegaied in the arm, unable to move. He was, I believe, a mounted infantryman of the 24th, named Macdonald, but of his name I cannot be sure. I managed to make a tourniquet with a handkerchief to stop the bleeding, and got him halfway down, when a shout from behind said, 'Get on man, the Zulus are on top of you.' I turned round and saw Major Smith RA who was commanding the section of guns, as white as a sheet and bleeding profusely. In a second we were surrounded and assegais accounted for poor Smith, my wounded MI man, and my horse.
"With the help of my revolver and a wild jump down the rocks, I found myself in the Buffalo River, which was in flood and 80 yards broad. I was carried away, but luckily got hold of the tail of a loose horse, which towed me across to the other bank, but I was too exhausted to stick to him. Up this bank were swarming friendly natives, but I only saw one European, a Colonial and Acting Commissariat Officer named Hamer, lying there unable to move. I managed to catch a loose horse, and put him on it, and he escaped. The Zulus were pouring in a very heavy fire from the opposite bank, and dropped several friendly natives as we climbed to the top.
"No sooner had I achieved this than I saw that a lot of Zulus had crossed higher up and were running to cut me off. This drove me to my left, but 20 of them still pursued for about 3 miles, and I managed to keep them off with my revolver.
"I got into Helpmakaar at sundown, having done 20 miles on foot from the river, for I almost went to Sandspruit. At Helpmakaar I found Huntley of the 10th who had been left there with a small garrison, and also Essex, Cochrane, Curling and Gardner, from the field of Isandhlwana, all busy placing the post in a state of defence. We could see that night the watchfires of the Zulus some 6 miles off, and expected them to come on and attack, but we knew later they had turned off to attack Rorke's Drift.
"I at once took command of one face of the laager, and shall never forget how pleased we weary watchers were when, shortly after midnight, Major Upcher's 2 companies of the 24th, with Heaton, Palmes, Clements, and Lloyd, came to reinforce. These two companies had started for Rorke's Drift that afternoon, but had been turned back to Helpmakaar by Major Spalding, a staff officer, as he said Rorke's Drift had been surrounded and captured, and that the two companies would share the same fate. Luckily his information proved to be wrong."
Melvill and Coghill
Nevill Coghill reached the river first, and spurred his horse into the fast-flowing water. When he reached the other bank he looked back and saw the mounted Teignmouth Melvill plunge in with the Colour. His horse was shot and the rider clung to a rock, calling on another officer in the river, Higginson, to help. But the Colour was swept away. Coghill saw all this and was about to ride into the river to help Melvill and Higginson. At that moment his horse was shot too, and Coghill fell into the water. He reached the rock and all three men managed to get to the Natal side of the river. Once on the other side Higginson went to find a horse as the other two were exhausted. Before he could get very far he realised that Melvill and Coghill were being attacked and he could do little to help. There is some question about who actually killed them, the suggestion being that they were finished off, not by the Zulus who had been chasing them, but by Africans on the Natal bank. The Zulus could have shouted to these men that they would suffer reprisals if the two officers were not killed.
They were killed on the day of the battle, 22nd Jan, but the bodies were not discovered until 4th Feb, by a British patrol. They were half buried in a makeshift grave, not in the condition depicted by Alphonse de Neuville's 'Last Sleep of the Brave'. The other de Neuville painting, 'Saving the Queen's Colour' is also erroneous in showing the two men riding together. As Smith-Dorrien points out, the two officers did not ride together, so Coghill's reason for leaving the battle was not to save the Colour. The VC awards were not granted straight away because there was no provision for posthumous awards at that time. When, in 1906, it was decided to give the VC to heroes who had died in the course of their brave action, the medals were sent to the families of the two officers, gazetted on 15th Jan 1907.
The Zulu Advance on Rorke's Drift, 22nd Jan When the Zulu impi was mobilised and made its approach on the camp at Isandhlwana, the 'right horn' travelled further west along the plateau and split into two. One half curved around the west side of Isandhlwana mountain to meet up with the left horn so that the British would be encircled. The other half of the right horn was instructed to pursue the fugitives that were expected to head for the Buffalo River. These Zulus belonged to four regiments of the Undi corps, raised by King Mpande and commanded by Cetshwayo's brother Dubalamanzi:
Ndlu-yengwe 1,000, aged 28 (bachelors)
Udloko 3,000, aged 40 (married)
Uthulwane 1,000, aged 45 (married)
Ndlondlo 900, aged 43 (married)
The Ndlu-yengwe pursued the fugitives to the drift that became known as Fugitive's Drift, then crossed the river 2km upstream. The rest crossed at a point further up, almost due east of the Rorke's Drift station. It is thought that some of the men were diverted to loot other buildings on the Natal side of the river so that the force that attacked the station was between 3,500 and 4,000. There was never any plan to carry out this attack, it was really a spontaneous decision on the part of Prince Dubalamanzi who disobeyed his brother's orders not to cross into Natal.
The Defenders
When No.3 Column entered Zululand on the 11th Jan, B company of 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment remained at Rorke's Drift to defend the stores and the hospital. There were also officers and men of other units and about 30 patients in the hospital.
The dawn light showed many dead warriors lying around the station and at 7am the surviving Zulus gathered at the west end of the Oskarberg looking as if they might have one more onslaught, but they turned and went home. The Zulus were mostly middle-aged men and they were also very tired, hungry and thirsty. The casualties in the garrison were 15 killed, 2 mortally wounded and 7 badly wounded. They counted around 350 dead Zulus in the vicinity but many more were found later, and those that were wounded were not likely to have effective medical care. At around 8am the garrison was relieved by the Chelmsford's force which had spent the night at Isandhlwana and set off before dawn. Russell's Mounted Infantry were the first on the scene and were a very welcome sight for the defenders.
Eleven men were awarded the Victoria Cross in this action. This reflected the way in which news of the Defence of Rorke's Drift was received by the Queen, her government, and the general public. The disaster at Isandhlwana plunged the nation into a great depression but Rorke's Drift lifted their spirits. It also raised morale in Natal. If the Zulus had over-run Rorke's Drift they would have thought themselves invincible and wreaked havoc in the colony.
A memorial stands on the battlefield of Isandhlwana to pay tribute to the men of the 24th Regiment who died on 22nd Jan 1879 both at the battle there and at Rorke's Drift."
Zulu War
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