Politics
Politics
Posted on Sep 11, 2017
Is careerism still plaguing the military? Do we have a problem or has the military figured out how to keep the right people?
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This essay, updated in 2011, describes what the author calls "careerism," and links it to psychopathy and toxicity in the military. He quotes, "Maj. Michael L. Mosier posits in Getting a Grip on Careerism in Airpower Journal how military sociologists theorize that the idea of a higher calling has diminished as institutional values deteriorate. While institutional values deteriorate, careerists exhibit traits of psychopathy replacing the higher calling with ambitions of personal gain and unaccountability." Do we still have this problem? I just came out of the War College and saw some of this in the Pentagon, but are we doing a better job now than we were in 2011? Are we making the change that needs to be made...for the right reasons?
https://www.sott.net/article/228036-Careerism-and-Psychopathy-in-the-US-Military
https://www.sott.net/article/228036-Careerism-and-Psychopathy-in-the-US-Military
Toxic Leadership
Leadership
Military Career
Politics
Edited >1 y ago
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TL/DR: There is a grain of truth, but unfortunately, the article is utter crap.
Quite simply, if we are in a profession where people try to make a career of it, especially when their ability to do so relies on the positive regard of higher ups, you will have careerism. That's careerism with both its negatives and its positives.
If you have a field where average is substandard, you are gonna have problems. A center of mass eval [sorry still think old terms... "Highly Proficient" now??] LITERALLY means average. Ask yourself how well an Officer who is routinely rated average will do. The publication of board AARs really helps with this exercise. And then keep in mind that we have this weird world where "only" 49% can be above average... reinforcing that average is substandard.
Now review the last several years of tighter promotions and RIFs of various types. It is literally insane to expect Officers to act against their own interests on any sort of routine basis. This is where somebody trots out "the hard right over the easy...." Which is all good, but anything that requires an individual to sacrifice themselves and their family on the altar of the institution is likely not sustainable. What you will get instead is perverse incentives in the system acted upon. Especially with the historic "20 or nothing" retirement plan.
The best you can really expect, going back to agency theory (not the non-existent part that says "pay executives more") and attempt to align individual incentives with institutional priorities. This is where the Army fails more often than not, IMO. You learn very early that "You can love the Army, but the Army will never love you." As a practical matter, you learn early in your career that you need to devote a fair amount of attention to protecting your interests from the grind of the machine.
I can trot out dozens of examples of this, as can every other military person I know. To decry careerism is really to insist that people routinely act against the interests of themselves and their families. This will always fail in the long run. Someone might gut it through a particular assignment doing so (and I know I have, without complaint), but not for 20+ years... Higher callings are all well and good, but I still have an obligation to protect and provide for my family.
OK, so with that rant over, a few comments on the actual article. First, I think what he calls "careerism" is actually at least 2 different things. The first is learning the political skills necessary to thrive in a large, bureaucratic institution made up of people. See my comments above. To expect lack of adaptive organizational behavior where adaptive organization behavior is required for success is logically silly.
The second really addresses the so-called revolving door from military service some combination of federal service and/or military-industrial and/or lobbying/policy influence. On this, I can only say that it is eminently logical for a person to gravitate towards a post-military career where they have cogent reasons to believe that they will do well & fit in. All the better if they already know a lot about the industry and know many of the relevant players and rules of the game. *I* personally have no interest in that area post military. Then again, I am 1) a reservist and 2) despise DC and everything about it and 3) don't travel in the circles that would make me valuable in such a role. And as far, as agency theory goes, I fully reserve the right to change my mind at any instant if a great opportunity should come my way.
To the extent that the second is a problem (I think it is, but the article hasn't made the case, IMO), this is an area where wise application of the principles of Agency theory should come into play. Perhaps a new retirement rule that states if you work for any defense contractor with over $100MM of government contracts, your military retirement is suspended for that time period. Don't know that that's the right answer, but it's better than saying "Well gosh, retired Generals should just go play golf, because I find it more convenient."
"For a sizable majority - about 20 percent" -- I couldn't let that line remain unremarked. Someone needs to review the definition of majority.
As for a the "paradox of power", where it is claimed that all the "noble" motives that advanced someone in their early career are thrown away and "baser" motives adopted, I would counter that they seem to have very rose colored glasses when looking at the lower ranks of the Officer corps. especially those who get promoted "on track." It is much more accurate to say that the institutions in question (I can only talk to the Army) select for those who display the allegedly unwanted behaviors. Quite simply, to hop up the the Boyd quote on careerism (which I think is a lot more sound than the Author's own), the military selects for those who aggressively market themselves. The quiet professionals get more work. The guy who makes sure all his accomplishments get on his evals gets the ACOMs an the promotions.
Moreover, the bad behaviors that the these senior leaders exhibit (impulsive, rude, reckless, etc), which are often true, is well explained by the Bathsheba syndrome (since you just did AWC, I won't trot that out again, but it is one area that I think they nailed). This is a real problem that the institution desperately needs to address, though it is a very hard one, as the people who should come up with the solution tend to be the ones who don't see it.
Placing our highly circumscribed and lockstep procurement process at the feet of careerists is a red herring as far as I am concerned. Do some milk the system for all it's worth? I'm sure they do. But as you'll remember from the HTAR classes, the procurement process - as decreed in US Code as well as policy at every level is a lumbering beast, designed to take decades, and required to be done in lockstep. I am honestly surprised we ever get anything that is still relevant out of it. It needs to be trashed and rebuilt from the ground up. But to complain about the players at the rigged game seems disingenuous to me.
The "remaining silent" complaint raises my eyebrow every time it comes out, from "Dereliction" to this article's comments about Bremmer. Especially as we are lectured in the same breath about "the unequal dialog" and the "supremacy of civilian control" and how we have to "be non-partisan and support the NCA." And, of course there is the ethic of "give your advice in private, but support in public." However, it seems in certain, special circumstances the expectation is for Officers to commit ritual suicide, but do it in a way to doesn't undercut or question civilian leadership in the least little bit. I can support one side or the other of the contentions, but not both. And in this case, the author is stating that the PROPER course would have been for senior Officers to disobey legal orders from a competent authority....
(For the record, I am strongly of the opinion that senior Officers should state their opinions on the record. There should also be a tradition of resigning in protest, which there is not. These opinions gave me many "remedial" lectures both from SGLs and seminar-mates when I went through AWC...). I did state my opinion about disbanding the Iraqi Army at the time, but I was a non-mobilized NG CPT and nobody cared.
And as far as "network consultants", it appears that the author's issue is "they aren't saying what I KNOW they should!!!!" In other words, they disagree with him.
Anyone who thinks that the 4 stars are the ones running foreign policy is seriously deluded. Also, this claim tracks poorly to either known reality or the author's own claims elsewhere in this article (i.e. Bremmer) about being too self-interested to speak truth to power and refuse lawful orders from civilian authority.
It is interesting when he states that the "one" important change is that Officers are more religious than their civilian peers, unlike decades ago. I think it would be more correct to say that their civilian peers are less religious. I haven't seen the stats, but I would be willing to bet a review of same would find that in this by-nature conservative (in the social sense) institution has just about the same % of religious people has it has for the last 100+ years. What has changed is the pool of people who look to the military as a potential career or calling. Smaller pool, same demographics. Except, I would also argue (and if I didn't have to get to work soon, would actually look it up), that the Officer corps comes from a much more generally middle class background than it did 50 years ago.
Ugh, speaking of which, I will have to leave off critique of the article here, as there is so much crap crammed into it. In closing, this article does an active disservice to the discussion of the Profession of Arms. I am highly critical of a lot of how the military is run & the perverse incentives we have in our system, and have made many posts on this site about changes I think would make it better. My most "popular" post has to do with bringing back the specialist ranks, but I have another post basically arguing for the end of up or out on the Officer side, allowing the career CPT of MAJ. Both allow from greater institutional knowledge, without the need to "kiss the ring" to get the almighty ACOM. I've argued for the end of mandatory PCS all the time, limiting ACOMs to perhaps 10% (exceptional people should be... exceptional), as well as breaking the lockstep promotion process - allowing stronger performers to be promoted earlier (and not just "earlier" of BZ, when they are promoted AFTER all the zone people, and likely no more than 6-9 months earlier than their average peers - But basically doing away with the concept of YGs and instead promoting based on actual performance). However, all of my recommendations have a theme of making organizational incentives align with the behaviors we claim we want. This author argues that Officers should commit career suicide in ways that are guaranteed to ruin their lives, make it impossible to provide for their families, and get called disloyal to civilian authority - likely by this same author.
Quite simply, if we are in a profession where people try to make a career of it, especially when their ability to do so relies on the positive regard of higher ups, you will have careerism. That's careerism with both its negatives and its positives.
If you have a field where average is substandard, you are gonna have problems. A center of mass eval [sorry still think old terms... "Highly Proficient" now??] LITERALLY means average. Ask yourself how well an Officer who is routinely rated average will do. The publication of board AARs really helps with this exercise. And then keep in mind that we have this weird world where "only" 49% can be above average... reinforcing that average is substandard.
Now review the last several years of tighter promotions and RIFs of various types. It is literally insane to expect Officers to act against their own interests on any sort of routine basis. This is where somebody trots out "the hard right over the easy...." Which is all good, but anything that requires an individual to sacrifice themselves and their family on the altar of the institution is likely not sustainable. What you will get instead is perverse incentives in the system acted upon. Especially with the historic "20 or nothing" retirement plan.
The best you can really expect, going back to agency theory (not the non-existent part that says "pay executives more") and attempt to align individual incentives with institutional priorities. This is where the Army fails more often than not, IMO. You learn very early that "You can love the Army, but the Army will never love you." As a practical matter, you learn early in your career that you need to devote a fair amount of attention to protecting your interests from the grind of the machine.
I can trot out dozens of examples of this, as can every other military person I know. To decry careerism is really to insist that people routinely act against the interests of themselves and their families. This will always fail in the long run. Someone might gut it through a particular assignment doing so (and I know I have, without complaint), but not for 20+ years... Higher callings are all well and good, but I still have an obligation to protect and provide for my family.
OK, so with that rant over, a few comments on the actual article. First, I think what he calls "careerism" is actually at least 2 different things. The first is learning the political skills necessary to thrive in a large, bureaucratic institution made up of people. See my comments above. To expect lack of adaptive organizational behavior where adaptive organization behavior is required for success is logically silly.
The second really addresses the so-called revolving door from military service some combination of federal service and/or military-industrial and/or lobbying/policy influence. On this, I can only say that it is eminently logical for a person to gravitate towards a post-military career where they have cogent reasons to believe that they will do well & fit in. All the better if they already know a lot about the industry and know many of the relevant players and rules of the game. *I* personally have no interest in that area post military. Then again, I am 1) a reservist and 2) despise DC and everything about it and 3) don't travel in the circles that would make me valuable in such a role. And as far, as agency theory goes, I fully reserve the right to change my mind at any instant if a great opportunity should come my way.
To the extent that the second is a problem (I think it is, but the article hasn't made the case, IMO), this is an area where wise application of the principles of Agency theory should come into play. Perhaps a new retirement rule that states if you work for any defense contractor with over $100MM of government contracts, your military retirement is suspended for that time period. Don't know that that's the right answer, but it's better than saying "Well gosh, retired Generals should just go play golf, because I find it more convenient."
"For a sizable majority - about 20 percent" -- I couldn't let that line remain unremarked. Someone needs to review the definition of majority.
As for a the "paradox of power", where it is claimed that all the "noble" motives that advanced someone in their early career are thrown away and "baser" motives adopted, I would counter that they seem to have very rose colored glasses when looking at the lower ranks of the Officer corps. especially those who get promoted "on track." It is much more accurate to say that the institutions in question (I can only talk to the Army) select for those who display the allegedly unwanted behaviors. Quite simply, to hop up the the Boyd quote on careerism (which I think is a lot more sound than the Author's own), the military selects for those who aggressively market themselves. The quiet professionals get more work. The guy who makes sure all his accomplishments get on his evals gets the ACOMs an the promotions.
Moreover, the bad behaviors that the these senior leaders exhibit (impulsive, rude, reckless, etc), which are often true, is well explained by the Bathsheba syndrome (since you just did AWC, I won't trot that out again, but it is one area that I think they nailed). This is a real problem that the institution desperately needs to address, though it is a very hard one, as the people who should come up with the solution tend to be the ones who don't see it.
Placing our highly circumscribed and lockstep procurement process at the feet of careerists is a red herring as far as I am concerned. Do some milk the system for all it's worth? I'm sure they do. But as you'll remember from the HTAR classes, the procurement process - as decreed in US Code as well as policy at every level is a lumbering beast, designed to take decades, and required to be done in lockstep. I am honestly surprised we ever get anything that is still relevant out of it. It needs to be trashed and rebuilt from the ground up. But to complain about the players at the rigged game seems disingenuous to me.
The "remaining silent" complaint raises my eyebrow every time it comes out, from "Dereliction" to this article's comments about Bremmer. Especially as we are lectured in the same breath about "the unequal dialog" and the "supremacy of civilian control" and how we have to "be non-partisan and support the NCA." And, of course there is the ethic of "give your advice in private, but support in public." However, it seems in certain, special circumstances the expectation is for Officers to commit ritual suicide, but do it in a way to doesn't undercut or question civilian leadership in the least little bit. I can support one side or the other of the contentions, but not both. And in this case, the author is stating that the PROPER course would have been for senior Officers to disobey legal orders from a competent authority....
(For the record, I am strongly of the opinion that senior Officers should state their opinions on the record. There should also be a tradition of resigning in protest, which there is not. These opinions gave me many "remedial" lectures both from SGLs and seminar-mates when I went through AWC...). I did state my opinion about disbanding the Iraqi Army at the time, but I was a non-mobilized NG CPT and nobody cared.
And as far as "network consultants", it appears that the author's issue is "they aren't saying what I KNOW they should!!!!" In other words, they disagree with him.
Anyone who thinks that the 4 stars are the ones running foreign policy is seriously deluded. Also, this claim tracks poorly to either known reality or the author's own claims elsewhere in this article (i.e. Bremmer) about being too self-interested to speak truth to power and refuse lawful orders from civilian authority.
It is interesting when he states that the "one" important change is that Officers are more religious than their civilian peers, unlike decades ago. I think it would be more correct to say that their civilian peers are less religious. I haven't seen the stats, but I would be willing to bet a review of same would find that in this by-nature conservative (in the social sense) institution has just about the same % of religious people has it has for the last 100+ years. What has changed is the pool of people who look to the military as a potential career or calling. Smaller pool, same demographics. Except, I would also argue (and if I didn't have to get to work soon, would actually look it up), that the Officer corps comes from a much more generally middle class background than it did 50 years ago.
Ugh, speaking of which, I will have to leave off critique of the article here, as there is so much crap crammed into it. In closing, this article does an active disservice to the discussion of the Profession of Arms. I am highly critical of a lot of how the military is run & the perverse incentives we have in our system, and have made many posts on this site about changes I think would make it better. My most "popular" post has to do with bringing back the specialist ranks, but I have another post basically arguing for the end of up or out on the Officer side, allowing the career CPT of MAJ. Both allow from greater institutional knowledge, without the need to "kiss the ring" to get the almighty ACOM. I've argued for the end of mandatory PCS all the time, limiting ACOMs to perhaps 10% (exceptional people should be... exceptional), as well as breaking the lockstep promotion process - allowing stronger performers to be promoted earlier (and not just "earlier" of BZ, when they are promoted AFTER all the zone people, and likely no more than 6-9 months earlier than their average peers - But basically doing away with the concept of YGs and instead promoting based on actual performance). However, all of my recommendations have a theme of making organizational incentives align with the behaviors we claim we want. This author argues that Officers should commit career suicide in ways that are guaranteed to ruin their lives, make it impossible to provide for their families, and get called disloyal to civilian authority - likely by this same author.
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COL (Join to see)
Holy-dissertation, Batman. I thought I was loquacious. Very well thought out, as usual COL Vincent Stoneking. I can't believe you brought up HTAR. I'm having small seizures. This article is part of a book, "Assignment Pentagon: How to Excel in a Bureaucracy." It's meant to prepare the reader for the strange world that is DC civil-military "enriched." I think it's meant to provide the reader with an eye-opener about the possible dark-side of the force which is present throughout the halls of the puzzle-palace. In that sense, I don't see it as all bad. While I concur with your statements about personal interest and recognize that we can't expect someone to act counter to that, if we are an institution that values selfless service...what are we really saying? I will not be getting a Brigade Command. I'm on the alternate list and that's where I'm going to stay. That is directly tied to my inability to filter information that is harmful to my career (but, in my opinion truthful and necessary to be said) and the way in which I present that information. Now...I'm still a Colonel for some reason, so it's worked out, but I'm not going to go any further. I've been told that by a couple of GO's. As far as the majority of folks, I think you are right. We've also been taught to argue a position until a decision is made, but that's where I ran afoul of a couple of bosses. They were not accepting of argument, logical or not prior to a decision. That's where "better" officers than I excel because they know when to shut their pie-hole. I...unfortunately...do not. It's a principle thing. I think that's what he's getting at here. We've lost principle. Maybe we've never had it and it's always been a mythical thing in the military. Something we aspire to and tell ourselves we have that separates us from the civilian world. On the grander scale, the CIV-MIL relations at the senior levels require more input from military officers. The old thought process is that we provide best military advice and then await instructions. The civilian leadership provides direction and then they get out of our way. That doesn't happen, so it's up to professionals in the art and science of war to stay involved in the discussion of policy and execution. There has to be political understanding of the environment to do that, so we do need senior officers who can navigate DC properly. They don't have to sell out to do so. While the idea of resigning in protest is courageous, it flies in the face of your comments about self-interest. Resignation, as you know, is more than retirement. It's turning down all benefits from retirement. Not likely to happen now days.
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COL Vincent Stoneking
COL (Join to see) - Unfortunately, the whole "selfless service" thing tells me that someone came up with a catchy slogan without really thinking it through. Don't get me wrong, I can buy into "service before self" (which is very different in that it acknowledges that self is in the list), and many similar formulations. But if what we really value is selfless service in some platonic sense, why do we pay people? why do we offer retirement? Shouldn't people Army for free? Where's the selflessness in getting paid? It is, in my mind, one of the many glib myths we feed ourselves rather than doing the hard work of actually running a gigantic organization competently. See also "everyone is a leader." Basically, we are saying "it's a broken system. Sacrifice yourself so that it can look good to outsiders."
I agree that, from a certain angle, resignation in protest appears to fly in the face of self-interest. But that is only is we define self-interest in a certain way, in this case focused on money and rank. IF self-interest also includes acting in a way that is congruent with one's values, AND the issue is big enough, I could see a totally self-interested case in resignation. I tell you what, if 4-Star General Bob held a press conference and said "I cannot support our current policy of $THING, I believe that it will fail and get a lot of good Soldiers killed in the process. I cannot in good conscience continue to support the chain of command above me in this matter. I have therefore tendered my resignation effective today." I would sit up and take notice. Obviously, it would have to be a BIG value to counter the financial impacts, but that would kinda be the point.
Your examples from your career make the point, but I can play topper on that. In my THIRD year in an assignment, I suddenly became incompetent (as in "Below COM, Do not retain"). Due to my specifically not wanting to hang out with my new boss and his crew and drink at Hooters following drill. Note here: It wasn't even DISAGREEING with the guy in this case. Just not fawning over him. That evaluation ended "I am therefore recommending that this officer NOT be retained in the national guard." (kept the capitalization as in the original) Had the timing of that O3 evaluation been even a little different, it would have clearly ended my career. [As it was, it was several months late, after I had moved into a new assignment, though working in the same building. They attempted to sneak it through with a "Soldier unavailable to sign" and with the "no comments submitted" box checked as well. The only reason I was able to submit my comments to it was that the CWO who ran the state personnel shop saw me on other business and said something along the lines of "I get why you didn't sign, but why didn't you rebut?!!" to which I replied "huh?" Luckily this was BEFORE the eval left the state.]
For the record, yeah, I was that guy in seminar. ;-) The Army is a great organization, but there is a lot that is broke, that we need to fix - a lot of it based on using slogans instead of thought (slogans are easier, I'll grant...). To cause more flashbacks, yes I think we need to stop lying to ourselves.
I agree that, from a certain angle, resignation in protest appears to fly in the face of self-interest. But that is only is we define self-interest in a certain way, in this case focused on money and rank. IF self-interest also includes acting in a way that is congruent with one's values, AND the issue is big enough, I could see a totally self-interested case in resignation. I tell you what, if 4-Star General Bob held a press conference and said "I cannot support our current policy of $THING, I believe that it will fail and get a lot of good Soldiers killed in the process. I cannot in good conscience continue to support the chain of command above me in this matter. I have therefore tendered my resignation effective today." I would sit up and take notice. Obviously, it would have to be a BIG value to counter the financial impacts, but that would kinda be the point.
Your examples from your career make the point, but I can play topper on that. In my THIRD year in an assignment, I suddenly became incompetent (as in "Below COM, Do not retain"). Due to my specifically not wanting to hang out with my new boss and his crew and drink at Hooters following drill. Note here: It wasn't even DISAGREEING with the guy in this case. Just not fawning over him. That evaluation ended "I am therefore recommending that this officer NOT be retained in the national guard." (kept the capitalization as in the original) Had the timing of that O3 evaluation been even a little different, it would have clearly ended my career. [As it was, it was several months late, after I had moved into a new assignment, though working in the same building. They attempted to sneak it through with a "Soldier unavailable to sign" and with the "no comments submitted" box checked as well. The only reason I was able to submit my comments to it was that the CWO who ran the state personnel shop saw me on other business and said something along the lines of "I get why you didn't sign, but why didn't you rebut?!!" to which I replied "huh?" Luckily this was BEFORE the eval left the state.]
For the record, yeah, I was that guy in seminar. ;-) The Army is a great organization, but there is a lot that is broke, that we need to fix - a lot of it based on using slogans instead of thought (slogans are easier, I'll grant...). To cause more flashbacks, yes I think we need to stop lying to ourselves.
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When hasn't the military had an issue with careerism? Some of its most cherished leaders have reveled in it. MacArthur, Eisenhower, Marshall, Haig, and McCain to name a few. Some of these are cherished icons. Some not so much.
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LTC Trent Klug
COL (Join to see) - Here's the issue for me, sir. If everyone in the Army says they picking senior leadership wrong, then where is the "putting their money where their mouth is"? Name one Colonel (Captain) or above in any of the services who has stood up and said enough is enough? The silence is deafening. Either that, or the gag order from the JCS is one order that's never been violated.
Let's face it. There are an awful lot of very senior O6's who want that star (and junior generals who want more of them) and are keeping their mouths shut hoping to get them. I understand it from a human standpoint. I also understand it from a military standpoint. But lets face it, there aren't very many who are willing to rock the boat to effect that change. Sure they'll talk about it in the classroom, but it never gets mentioned once the door opens to the world.
That's why the damn reflective belt hasn't died an ignominious death. That's why we have to have a "roll up your sleeves" ceremony. If senior leaders won't speak up against stupid "good idea fairy" suggestions, what hope do we have of changing the way senior leaders are selected?
Let's face it. There are an awful lot of very senior O6's who want that star (and junior generals who want more of them) and are keeping their mouths shut hoping to get them. I understand it from a human standpoint. I also understand it from a military standpoint. But lets face it, there aren't very many who are willing to rock the boat to effect that change. Sure they'll talk about it in the classroom, but it never gets mentioned once the door opens to the world.
That's why the damn reflective belt hasn't died an ignominious death. That's why we have to have a "roll up your sleeves" ceremony. If senior leaders won't speak up against stupid "good idea fairy" suggestions, what hope do we have of changing the way senior leaders are selected?
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COL (Join to see)
LTC Trent Klug, I think that's pretty close to the problem. Everyone is willing to talk about the subject academically, but there is little done about it. Even when GEN Odierno was trying to modify the process for promotion, his guidance to the boards was the same. Very rarely did it change for promotion to Colonel. I haven't looked at the guidance to the boards for GO's. There are a lot of studies going on. There has been a lot of discussion about "broadening." Unfortunately, from my foxhole after 23 years, there are two types of broadening. There is the broadening for the select few and then broadening for the masses. The select few spend multiple tours polishing apples for GO's. They are supposedly learning through osmosis. Meanwhile, in the same command, there are officers with their oars deep in the water, rowing like hell and truly learning how the system works. Now I know every one of the guys on the Brigade Command list for combat arms, through personal contact or reputation, and they are all good. I am hopeful that we are getting to "right." I also think that the system perpetuates itself. There is nepotism, despite our efforts to weed it out. There is still careerism. I am hopeful that some of the measures we are discussing in the school houses are going to make it into the process for selecting senior leaders. Tactical success does not create strategic leadership. Unfortunately, that's the only measure we use to determine our selection.
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LTC Trent Klug
COL (Join to see) - And please don't think this is just a knock on the Senior Officers. There are many Senior NCO's (CSM's, Sgt. Maj.'s, CMSgt's, and MCPO's) who are just as vocal behind closed doors who then clam up once they can be viewed by the world.
Its amazing how the Army went years without having to have a "change of responsibility" ceremony.
Its amazing how the Army went years without having to have a "change of responsibility" ceremony.
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COL (Join to see)
I think I've said before in multiple locations on here that I think change of responsibility ceremonies are a waste of time...not a fan.
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COL (Join to see) -I actually have the book that the image depicted above is titled from. Ironically the book is titled "When Psychopaths Go To Work". Thanks for the share.
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COL (Join to see)
"Snakes in Suits." "When Psychopaths Go To Work," is the subtitle. Hare and Babiak. I did my study in the War College on the prevalence of psychopathy in Army senior leadership. It really requires more in-depth study, but I would doubt that it would get sponsored the way it would need to be.
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COL (Join to see)
Hare's original work on the subject is less reader friendly, but much more scientific in its approach. Robert Hare's psychopathy test is still used today, though the DSM does not list psychopathy as a diagnosed condition, it is a subordinate of anti-social personality disorder. So is sociopathy and the two are often confused. I started looking into it because of the focus on narcissism recently and its links to toxicity. Turns out that psychopathy is often confused for narcissism as well. You may think someone is a narcissist, when they are actually a functional psychopath. Interesting study for the military.
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