War on Terror
War on Terror
Posted on Mar 16, 2017
Building Partner Capacity with the Peshmerga - Modern War Institute
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"As important as what was happening in the Peshmerga training camps is what was not happening. Despite being ten weeks long, like the US Army basic combat training, the training in the KRG differs by being more focused on marksmanship, small-unit tactics, and close-order drill, and less on indoctrination. There were no yelling drill instructors in evidence, which makes sense given that the primary instructors were from another country and culture. The Kurds have been rightfully lauded for their high morale and esprit de corps, so indoctrination might not be as important for them as for, say, the Iraqi Security Forces. The focus on skills, rather than indoctrination, was an example of a good adaptation to the different needs of the partner."
Building Partner Capacity with the Peshmerga - Modern War Institute
Posted from mwi.usma.edu
Foreign Forces
Foreign Aid
Kurds
War on Terror
Posted 7 y ago
Responses: 1
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Mist Interesting and Informative...
..."... What are the final takeaways from this discussion of building partner capacity? First, a little bit of training can go a long way with a motivated ally like the KRG; with unmotivated allies, like the Afghan government, a lot of training can be ineffective. Second, programs need to be tailored to allied capacity and not based on mirror-imaging; giving an ally a weapon system that won’t have ammunition in six months (or will be surrendered to the enemy) does no one any good. Third, recruits should be screened for quality just as they are in the United States. This is necessarily complicated by low access to education in some partner countries and the lack of a translated testing instrument; still, aptitude and educational screening can be a powerful tool for our partners, just as it is for us.... "...
..."... What are the final takeaways from this discussion of building partner capacity? First, a little bit of training can go a long way with a motivated ally like the KRG; with unmotivated allies, like the Afghan government, a lot of training can be ineffective. Second, programs need to be tailored to allied capacity and not based on mirror-imaging; giving an ally a weapon system that won’t have ammunition in six months (or will be surrendered to the enemy) does no one any good. Third, recruits should be screened for quality just as they are in the United States. This is necessarily complicated by low access to education in some partner countries and the lack of a translated testing instrument; still, aptitude and educational screening can be a powerful tool for our partners, just as it is for us.... "...
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