Posted on Sep 25, 2015
"Exclusive: 50 Spies Say ISIS Intelligence Was Cooked"
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From: The Daily Beast
More than 50 intelligence analysts working out of the U.S. military’s Central Command have formally complained that their reports on ISIS and al Qaeda’s branch in Syria were being inappropriately altered by senior officials, The Daily Beast has learned.
The complaints spurred the Pentagon’s inspector general to open an investigation into the alleged manipulation of intelligence. The fact that so many people complained suggests there are deep-rooted, systemic problems in how the U.S. military command charged with the war against the self-proclaimed Islamic State assesses intelligence.
“The cancer was within the senior level of the intelligence command,” one defense official said.
Two senior analysts at CENTCOM signed a written complaint sent to the Defense Department inspector general in July alleging that the reports, some of which were briefed to President Obama, portrayed the terror groups as weaker than the analysts believe they are. The reports were changed by CENTCOM higher-ups to adhere to the administration’s public line that the U.S. is winning the battle against ISIS and al Nusra, al Qaeda’s branch in Syria, the analysts claim.
That complaint was supported by 50 other analysts, some of whom have complained about politicizing of intelligence reports for months. That’s according to 11 individuals who are knowledgeable about the details of the report and who spoke to The Daily Beast on condition of anonymity.
The accusations suggest that a large number of people tracking the inner workings of the terror groups think that their reports are being manipulated to fit a public narrative. The allegations echoed charges that political appointees and senior officials cherry-picked intelligence about Iraq’s supposed weapons program in 2002 and 2003.
The two signatories to the complaint were described as the ones formally lodging it, and the additional analysts are willing and able to back up the substance of the allegations with concrete examples.
Some of those CENTCOM analysts described the sizeable cadre of protesting analysts as a “revolt” by intelligence professionals who are paid to give their honest assessment, based on facts, and not to be influenced by national-level policy. The analysts have accused senior-level leaders, including the director of intelligence and his deputy in CENTCOM, of changing their analyses to be more in line with the Obama administration’s public contention that the fight against ISIS and al Qaeda is making progress. The analysts take a more pessimistic view about how military efforts to destroy the groups are going.
The large number of analysts who complained to the Pentagon inspector general hasn’t been previously reported. Some of them are assigned to work at CENTCOM, the U.S. military’s command for the Middle East and Central Asia, but are officially employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The complaints allege that in some cases key elements of intelligence reports were removed, resulting in a document that didn’t accurately capture the analysts’ conclusions, sources familiar with the protest said. But the complaint also goes beyond alleged altering of reports and accuses some senior leaders at CENTCOM of creating an unprofessional work environment. One person who knows the contents of the written complaint sent to the inspector general said it used the word “Stalinist” to describe the tone set by officials overseeing CENTCOM’s analysis.
Many described a climate in which analysts felt they could not give a candid assessment of the situation in Iraq and Syria. Some felt it was a product of commanders protecting their career advancement by putting the best spin on the war.
Some reports crafted by the analysts that were too negative in their assessment of the war were sent back down the chain of the command or not shared up the chain, several analysts said. Still others, feeling the climate around them, self-censored so their reports affirmed already-held beliefs.
“While we cannot comment on the specific investigation cited in the article, we can speak to the process. The Intelligence Community routinely provides a wide range of subjective assessments related to the current security environment. These products and the analysis that they present are absolutely vital to our efforts, particularly given the incredibly complex nature of the multi-front fights that are ongoing now in Iraq and Syria,” said Air Force Col. Patrick Ryder, U.S. CENTCOM spokesman. “Senior civilian and military leadership consider these assessments during planning and decision-making, along with information gained from various other sources, to include the insights provided by commanders on the ground and other key advisors, intelligence collection assets, and previous experience.”
Two of the officials who spoke to The Daily Beast said that analysts began airing their complaints in October in an effort to address the issue internally and only went to the inspector general when that effort failed. Some of those who complained were urged to retire, one official familiar with the report told The Daily Beast. Some agreed to leave.
In recent months, members of the Obama administration have sought to paint the fight against ISIS in rosy hues—despite the terror army’s seizure of major cities like Mosul and Fallujah.
“ISIS is losing,” John Allen, the retired Marine general charged with coordinating the ISIS campaign, said in July.
“I am confident that over time, we will beat, we will, indeed, degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL,” Secretary of State John Kerry said in March, using the government’s preferred acronym for the group.
“No, I don’t think we’re losing,” President Obama said in May.
Yet a growing group of intelligence analysts persisted with their complaints. For some, who have served at CENTCOM for more than a decade, scars remained from the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq, when poorly written intelligence reports suggesting Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, when it did not, formed the basis of the George W. Bush administration’s case for war.
“They were frustrated because they didn’t do the right thing then” and speak up about their doubts on Iraq’s weapons program, the defense official told The Daily Beast.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/09/exclusive-50-spies-say-isis-intelligence-was-cooked.html
More than 50 intelligence analysts working out of the U.S. military’s Central Command have formally complained that their reports on ISIS and al Qaeda’s branch in Syria were being inappropriately altered by senior officials, The Daily Beast has learned.
The complaints spurred the Pentagon’s inspector general to open an investigation into the alleged manipulation of intelligence. The fact that so many people complained suggests there are deep-rooted, systemic problems in how the U.S. military command charged with the war against the self-proclaimed Islamic State assesses intelligence.
“The cancer was within the senior level of the intelligence command,” one defense official said.
Two senior analysts at CENTCOM signed a written complaint sent to the Defense Department inspector general in July alleging that the reports, some of which were briefed to President Obama, portrayed the terror groups as weaker than the analysts believe they are. The reports were changed by CENTCOM higher-ups to adhere to the administration’s public line that the U.S. is winning the battle against ISIS and al Nusra, al Qaeda’s branch in Syria, the analysts claim.
That complaint was supported by 50 other analysts, some of whom have complained about politicizing of intelligence reports for months. That’s according to 11 individuals who are knowledgeable about the details of the report and who spoke to The Daily Beast on condition of anonymity.
The accusations suggest that a large number of people tracking the inner workings of the terror groups think that their reports are being manipulated to fit a public narrative. The allegations echoed charges that political appointees and senior officials cherry-picked intelligence about Iraq’s supposed weapons program in 2002 and 2003.
The two signatories to the complaint were described as the ones formally lodging it, and the additional analysts are willing and able to back up the substance of the allegations with concrete examples.
Some of those CENTCOM analysts described the sizeable cadre of protesting analysts as a “revolt” by intelligence professionals who are paid to give their honest assessment, based on facts, and not to be influenced by national-level policy. The analysts have accused senior-level leaders, including the director of intelligence and his deputy in CENTCOM, of changing their analyses to be more in line with the Obama administration’s public contention that the fight against ISIS and al Qaeda is making progress. The analysts take a more pessimistic view about how military efforts to destroy the groups are going.
The large number of analysts who complained to the Pentagon inspector general hasn’t been previously reported. Some of them are assigned to work at CENTCOM, the U.S. military’s command for the Middle East and Central Asia, but are officially employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The complaints allege that in some cases key elements of intelligence reports were removed, resulting in a document that didn’t accurately capture the analysts’ conclusions, sources familiar with the protest said. But the complaint also goes beyond alleged altering of reports and accuses some senior leaders at CENTCOM of creating an unprofessional work environment. One person who knows the contents of the written complaint sent to the inspector general said it used the word “Stalinist” to describe the tone set by officials overseeing CENTCOM’s analysis.
Many described a climate in which analysts felt they could not give a candid assessment of the situation in Iraq and Syria. Some felt it was a product of commanders protecting their career advancement by putting the best spin on the war.
Some reports crafted by the analysts that were too negative in their assessment of the war were sent back down the chain of the command or not shared up the chain, several analysts said. Still others, feeling the climate around them, self-censored so their reports affirmed already-held beliefs.
“While we cannot comment on the specific investigation cited in the article, we can speak to the process. The Intelligence Community routinely provides a wide range of subjective assessments related to the current security environment. These products and the analysis that they present are absolutely vital to our efforts, particularly given the incredibly complex nature of the multi-front fights that are ongoing now in Iraq and Syria,” said Air Force Col. Patrick Ryder, U.S. CENTCOM spokesman. “Senior civilian and military leadership consider these assessments during planning and decision-making, along with information gained from various other sources, to include the insights provided by commanders on the ground and other key advisors, intelligence collection assets, and previous experience.”
Two of the officials who spoke to The Daily Beast said that analysts began airing their complaints in October in an effort to address the issue internally and only went to the inspector general when that effort failed. Some of those who complained were urged to retire, one official familiar with the report told The Daily Beast. Some agreed to leave.
In recent months, members of the Obama administration have sought to paint the fight against ISIS in rosy hues—despite the terror army’s seizure of major cities like Mosul and Fallujah.
“ISIS is losing,” John Allen, the retired Marine general charged with coordinating the ISIS campaign, said in July.
“I am confident that over time, we will beat, we will, indeed, degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL,” Secretary of State John Kerry said in March, using the government’s preferred acronym for the group.
“No, I don’t think we’re losing,” President Obama said in May.
Yet a growing group of intelligence analysts persisted with their complaints. For some, who have served at CENTCOM for more than a decade, scars remained from the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq, when poorly written intelligence reports suggesting Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, when it did not, formed the basis of the George W. Bush administration’s case for war.
“They were frustrated because they didn’t do the right thing then” and speak up about their doubts on Iraq’s weapons program, the defense official told The Daily Beast.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/09/exclusive-50-spies-say-isis-intelligence-was-cooked.html
Posted in these groups: 
ISIS
Intelligence
ISIS Intelligence
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 16
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Intel drives ops. But politics drive Intel. Unfortunate fact. "...In truth lies victory..."
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Unfortunately, this is a age-old problem within the military. Especially with civilian leaders creating unrealistic goals or denying the facts of the situation. Useful and valuable intel is twisted for a political goal. The other issue I see is the quality of intel that we receive. While DOD is spending millions in ISR, we are not getting a great return because we spend little on real intel, human intelligence (HUMINT). Electronic Intel is valuable and can be a life saver on the battlefield, but it lacks the global picture that actual boots on the ground can provide.
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The infusion of raw intelligence data and or intelligence information, in the production of a finalized distributable intelligence product for national level consumers, warrants some adjustment of facts and figures based upon corroborated intelligence information amongst multiple intelligence sources. Defense Intelligence Agency is respectfully one source of intelligence information amongst many. Defense Intelligence Agency's collected intelligence information, is subject to review by intelligence community senior leadership, prior to infusion in a finalized national level intelligence product. More than 15 agencies and departments comprise the United States intelligence community. Of the more than 15, some maintain three and four dimensional intelligence collection capabilities resulting in more accurate assessments of enemy dispositions than Defense Intelligence Agency can acquire. Adjustments of official assessments are normal and necessary in the production of more accurate assessments. I recommend the Intelligence Collection Managers course for DIA analyst followed by a security awareness course of instruction and or seminar. Intelligence analyst personal opinions, although noted, are not at all times necessary in the production of finalized intelligence products for national level consumers. corroborated facts are necessary in the production of finalized distributable intelligence products for national level consumers.
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COL (Join to see)
Yes sir. Intelligence community senior leadership maintain national level priority intelligence requirements lists and intelligence requirements lists. PIR/IR. Defense Intelligence Agency's collected information is not at all times priority on the requirements lists especially when the information DIA is providing at the moment, has not been established as an intelligence information priority nor an intelligence information requirement. Within the intelligence community's vast collection management cycle, there exist vast redundancy. Intelligence information requirements are prioritized robustly. intelligence information found redundant and or not required, is sanitized. Information found unreliable can be deleted or qued for corroboration. Defense Intelligence Agency is an extraordinary intelligence collection agency and coexists alongside 15 additional extraordinary intelligence collection agencies.
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COL (Join to see)
When national level intelligence consumers are requesting the location and size of a building within an enemy compound, intelligence collectors are to report the location and size of the building. Additional information returned such as color, contents, and purpose are not required nor requested. The additional information can be maintained within intelligence analyst heuristic, relational, and chronological, databases subject to retrieval once the additional information is established as priority intelligence information requirements and or intelligence information requirements.
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COL Ted Mc
COL (Join to see) - Major; Does "Intelligence community ... information requirement." actually mean "We have a list of what we would like to know prioritized by how much we would like to know it and the DIA's information isn't always at the top of that list."?
Does "Within the ..., is sanitized." actually mean "Intelligence agencies are very widespread and frequently collect the same information from different sources, that information is sorted out and the unreliable information deleted."?
Does "When national ... nor requested." actually mean "Intelligence agencies only answer the questions that are actually asked."?
Does "The additional information can be maintained within intelligence analyst heuristic, relational, and chronological, databases subject to retrieval once the additional information is established as priority intelligence information requirements and or intelligence information requirements." actually mean "If we get more information than was asked for, we file it in case someone asks us for it (but we don't necessarily pay any attention to it)."?
Does "Within the ..., is sanitized." actually mean "Intelligence agencies are very widespread and frequently collect the same information from different sources, that information is sorted out and the unreliable information deleted."?
Does "When national ... nor requested." actually mean "Intelligence agencies only answer the questions that are actually asked."?
Does "The additional information can be maintained within intelligence analyst heuristic, relational, and chronological, databases subject to retrieval once the additional information is established as priority intelligence information requirements and or intelligence information requirements." actually mean "If we get more information than was asked for, we file it in case someone asks us for it (but we don't necessarily pay any attention to it)."?
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COL (Join to see)
As in any organization, certain information is required to accomplish the mission of the organization. DIA's collected Information is top notch information for DIA current missions, organizational purpose, and future objectives. Within the intelligence community, Information needed to satisfy immediate specific mission objectives is considered priority. The United States intelligence community responds to specific prioritized tasking. Information obtained by the intelligence community beyond current specific prioritized tasking, can be stored for future exploitation. Future exploitation includes the development of training aids and reference material such as the CIA fact book. The CIA fact book (ISSN 1553-8133; also known as the CIA World Factbook) is a reference resource produced by the Central Intelligence Agency with almanac-style information referencing the countries of the world. The official print version is available from the National Technical Information Service and the Government Printing Office. The CIA fact book provides a two- to three-page summary of the demographics, geography, communications, government, economy, and military of each of 267 international entities including U.S. Recognized countries, dependencies, and other areas of the world. The CIA fact book is further a conglomeration of facts, such as DIA's missing facts and figures, spilled from intelligence collection reporting and further exploited in a public document. The complaints from DIA analyst reference missing reported items is true but the missing reported items is information that could formulate a DIA world fact book. Collected open source information that equates to analytical opinions reference the demographics, geography, communications, government, economy, religion, socio-economic climate, and military of the targeted nation, and is not necessarily needed at all times. It is information redundantly retained within analytical databases throughout the intelligence community. It is further, information that is not immediately required to accomplish specific national objectives reference the targeted threat centers of gravity. Intelligence report products produced by senior intelligence community officials are not necessarily politicized to United States executive branch desires but are facts rounded up or down based upon the most accurate assessment. Further, in order to best defeat United States adversaries, United States adversaries must believe they are being defeated.
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