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President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu are murdered during a coup by dissident generals of the South Vietnamese army.
In the early afternoon hours of November 1, the dissidents seized key military installations and communications systems in Saigon, secured the surrender of Nhu’s Special Forces, and demanded the resignation of Diem and Nhu. The president and his brother first believed the attack to be the opening of a countercoup engineered by Nhu and General To That Dinh, who controlled nearly all forces in and around Saigon, but Dinh had joined the insurgent generals.
Diem was unable to summon any support, so he and Nhu escaped the palace through an underground passage to a Catholic church in the Chinese sector of the city. From there, Diem began negotiating with the generals by phone. He agreed to surrender and was promised safe conduct, but shortly after midnight he and his brother were brutally murdered in back of the armored personnel carrier sent to pick them up and bring them back to the palace.
President Kennedy, who was aware that the generals were planning a coup and had sent word that the United States would not interfere, was nonetheless shocked at the murder of Diem and Nhu. Few in South Vietnam shared his surprise, though, as Diem had been very unpopular, particularly with the Buddhists. In fact, many in Saigon rejoiced at his death. The Soviet newspaper Izvestia expressed satisfaction at Diem’s end while asserting that, “…new American puppets have come to power.” U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge called the insurgent generals to his office to congratulate them and cabled Kennedy that the prospects for a shorter war had greatly improved with the demise of Diem and Nhu.
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In the early afternoon hours of November 1, the dissidents seized key military installations and communications systems in Saigon, secured the surrender of Nhu’s Special Forces, and demanded the resignation of Diem and Nhu. The president and his brother first believed the attack to be the opening of a countercoup engineered by Nhu and General To That Dinh, who controlled nearly all forces in and around Saigon, but Dinh had joined the insurgent generals.
Diem was unable to summon any support, so he and Nhu escaped the palace through an underground passage to a Catholic church in the Chinese sector of the city. From there, Diem began negotiating with the generals by phone. He agreed to surrender and was promised safe conduct, but shortly after midnight he and his brother were brutally murdered in back of the armored personnel carrier sent to pick them up and bring them back to the palace.
President Kennedy, who was aware that the generals were planning a coup and had sent word that the United States would not interfere, was nonetheless shocked at the murder of Diem and Nhu. Few in South Vietnam shared his surprise, though, as Diem had been very unpopular, particularly with the Buddhists. In fact, many in Saigon rejoiced at his death. The Soviet newspaper Izvestia expressed satisfaction at Diem’s end while asserting that, “…new American puppets have come to power.” U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge called the insurgent generals to his office to congratulate them and cabled Kennedy that the prospects for a shorter war had greatly improved with the demise of Diem and Nhu.
SSG William Jones Samantha S. Maj William W. 'Bill' Price COL Mikel J. Burroughs Cynthia Croft LTC Stephen F. ] Alan K. SGT John " Mac " McConnell LTC (Join to see) Maj Marty Hogan SCPO Morris Ramsey SPC Douglas Bolton Lt Col Charlie Brown Sgt Randy Wilber MSgt John McGowan Cpl (Join to see) PO3 John Wagner PO3 Bob McCord SGT Jim Arnold SPC Margaret Higgins
Diem murdered during coup
Posted from history.comPosted in these groups: 
Vietnam War
American History
Military History
Office of the President (POTUS)
Vietnam War American History Military History Office of the President (POTUS)
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This film documents the events surrounding the coup that overturned the Nguyen Van Thieu regime in Vietnam. Scenes examine the Catholic / Buddhist struggle, ...
Thank you for reminding us my friend SP5 Mark Kuzinski about the November 1, 1963 assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dihn Diem in the last few weeks of JFk's administration. The US had supported the freely elected President Ngo Dihn Diem but didn't like the way he ran his country especially in regards to treatment of religious groups.
I had to chuckle at the idea that JFK was shocked when Diem was killed. From my study of history I have learned that John Fitzgerald Kennedy was corrupt in many ways. "President Kennedy, who was aware that the generals were planning a coup and had sent word that the United States would not interfere, was nonetheless shocked at the murder of Diem and Nhu."
One of ironies from hindsight is that 21 days after Diem was assassinated in his nation, JFK was assassinated in his [our] nation in Dallas, Texas. For JFK his assassination ensured he would be loved and revered in death with his many egregious acts glossed over.
Images:
1. 1963-11-01 slain Ngo Dinh Diem captured by unnamed US official;
2. This August 24, 1963, cable ('cable 243'), drafted by Roger Hilsman and sent to US Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., suggests, "If, in spite of all your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved."
3. 1962 Ngo Dinh Diem
Back to Diem assassination from millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/diem-coup
"The US government saw South Vietnam's autocratic ruler, Ngo Dinh Diem, as a bulwark against Communism. But Diem was far from an ideal partner: Suspicious of anyone but his immediate family, he often frustrated American policy makers. But his success dealing with internal threats gave many hope that he would prove to be a reliable ally, so the United States invested time and money in supporting his regime.
This August 24, 1963, cable ("cable 243"), drafted by Roger Hilsman and sent to US Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., suggests, "If, in spite of all your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved."
By 1963, however, the Kennedy administration faced a dilemma. After government forces cracked down on Buddhist monks that spring, Kennedy pressed Diem for reforms. Instead, Diem imposed martial law, and special forces directed by his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, launched raids against Buddhist pagodas. When rumors of a possible coup began to spread in August, many in the administration wondered whether the United States should acquiesce, or indeed support the plotters. Others dissented, seeing the regime, with all its faults, as the best path to success against the southern Vietnamese Communists—derisively labeled the Viet Cong—who were supported and directed by the North Vietnamese. Inside South Vietnam, those seeking to overthrow the regime contacted US officials to ensure continued American support.
In this August 26, 1963, conversation, the president discusses Diem and Nhu with senior national security officials.
(President Kennedy): If we're unsuccessful here, and these generals don't do anything, then we have to deal with Diem as he is, and Nhu as he is. Then the question, what do we do to protect our own prestige and also to make it- see if we can have this thing continue on successfully? Do you have any thought about that?
(Roger Hilsman): It's pretty horrible to contemplate, sir... I- Nhu is basically anti-American. I- there's an element of emotional unstability here, I think. I think our position will be increasingly difficult. But also, and most important, is that everyone in the field, and here, too, agree with them; that what you will have in the wake of the desecration of the pagodas and everything is a drifting away of these key, cadre fellows in the army, and that the situation will rapidly worsen.
(Dean Rusk): Mr. President, I think that the choice we have to make there is that unless there's a major change in Diem and Nhu's approach to this whole internal problem, is to look at the fact that we're on the road to disaster, and whether we'd rather take it by our choice, or be driven out by a complete deterioration of the situation in Vietnam, or move in such forces as would involve our taking over the country. And... so most of those are the big decisions we have to make. I don't think we have-
(Edit.)
(President Kennedy): Let's... do you have any- I think we ought to get- following along with what Secretary McNamara says. It seems to me we ought to send a message down to Lodge and Harkins on these... I don't think we ought to let the coup... maybe they know about it, maybe the generals are going to have to run out of the country; maybe we're going to have to help them get out of there. Still, that's not a good enough reason to go ahead, if we don't think the prospects are good enough. I don't think we're in that deep, but I'm not sure the generals are. They've been probably bellyaching for months, so that I don't know whether they're- how many of them are really up to here. So I don't see any reason to go ahead, unless we think we got a good chance of success. So I think we finally have to put it on Lodge and Harkins to tell us whether they-
(Edit.)
(Frederick Nolting): Isn't our real sanction here for whether or not we continue U.S. support? And, uh, it would seem to me that one way of posing this question is whether we should tell Diem, or, alternatively, the generals, that we could not continue U.S. support, except under certain modified, different circumstances of government. I must say it seems to me that the proper attitude, action of the U.S. government under any situation would be to tell the chief of state this directly. We could tell him at the same time, that is, if... which won't be news to him, that the majority of his military leaders feel the same way... and ask him what he wants.
(President Kennedy): Of course if we- we're not really in a position to withdraw. If he doesn't accept, then we- for us to go through with that would be pretty hard, wouldn't it... withdraw our assistance, and pull out Americans?
(Dean Rusk): I think the stakes are very high here. If you- when you make that move and fail, then you have to be ready to expect that he will throw you out.
Energy for the coup fizzled in late August, and the Kennedy administration resigned itself to working with Diem, pressuring him to make a series of political, economic, military, and social reforms that were designed to improve the counterinsurgency effort. But by late October, President Kennedy was again grappling with the possibility of a coup and what the United States should do about it. His advisors were divided. At a late afternoon meeting on October 29, Kennedy heard several opinions, clearly summarized in a memorandum of the conversation.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested, "We should caution the generals that they must have the situation in hand before they launch a coup."
"Secretary McNamara," recorded the memo, "asked who of our officials in Saigon are in charge of the coup planning."
Attorney General Robert Kennedy expressed his doubts about breaking with Diem:
Averell Harriman, undersecretary of state for political affairs, "said it was clear that in Vietnam there was less and less enthusiasm for Diem. We cannot predict that the rebel generals can overthrow the Diem government, but Diem cannot carry the country to victory over the Viet Cong. With the passage of time, our objectives in Vietnam will become more and more difficult to achieve with Diem in control."
On November 1, those evaluations became moot as a group of Vietnamese army officers, led by General Duong Van Minh, assassinated Diem and Nhu. On the morning of November 2, McGeorge Bundy read reports of the coup to the president.
On November 4, Kennedy recorded his thoughts on the Diem coup into a Dictabelt (complete with punctuation).
[This recording has been edited to remove an impromptu visit from the president's children, John Jr. and Caroline.]
Eighteen days later, the US president himself would be felled by an assassin's bullet on the streets of Dallas."
Death Of A Regime (1963)
This film documents the events surrounding the coup that overturned the Ngo Dihn Diem regime in Vietnam. Scenes examine the Catholic / Buddhist struggle, and the celebratory feeling amongst the people following the coup. Footage includes an interview with President John Kennedy and Madam Ngo Dinh Nhu's comments after the coup.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OewhlYeU2fo
FYI COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. LTC Ivan Raiklin, Esq. Capt Seid Waddell Capt Tom Brown SFC William Farrell SSgt Robert Marx SSgt (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SGT John " Mac " McConnell SPC (Join to see) Maj Marty Hogan PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SP5 Robert Ruck SCPO Morris Ramsey SGT Michael Thorin SPC Margaret Higgins SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL
I had to chuckle at the idea that JFK was shocked when Diem was killed. From my study of history I have learned that John Fitzgerald Kennedy was corrupt in many ways. "President Kennedy, who was aware that the generals were planning a coup and had sent word that the United States would not interfere, was nonetheless shocked at the murder of Diem and Nhu."
One of ironies from hindsight is that 21 days after Diem was assassinated in his nation, JFK was assassinated in his [our] nation in Dallas, Texas. For JFK his assassination ensured he would be loved and revered in death with his many egregious acts glossed over.
Images:
1. 1963-11-01 slain Ngo Dinh Diem captured by unnamed US official;
2. This August 24, 1963, cable ('cable 243'), drafted by Roger Hilsman and sent to US Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., suggests, "If, in spite of all your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved."
3. 1962 Ngo Dinh Diem
Back to Diem assassination from millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/diem-coup
"The US government saw South Vietnam's autocratic ruler, Ngo Dinh Diem, as a bulwark against Communism. But Diem was far from an ideal partner: Suspicious of anyone but his immediate family, he often frustrated American policy makers. But his success dealing with internal threats gave many hope that he would prove to be a reliable ally, so the United States invested time and money in supporting his regime.
This August 24, 1963, cable ("cable 243"), drafted by Roger Hilsman and sent to US Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., suggests, "If, in spite of all your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved."
By 1963, however, the Kennedy administration faced a dilemma. After government forces cracked down on Buddhist monks that spring, Kennedy pressed Diem for reforms. Instead, Diem imposed martial law, and special forces directed by his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, launched raids against Buddhist pagodas. When rumors of a possible coup began to spread in August, many in the administration wondered whether the United States should acquiesce, or indeed support the plotters. Others dissented, seeing the regime, with all its faults, as the best path to success against the southern Vietnamese Communists—derisively labeled the Viet Cong—who were supported and directed by the North Vietnamese. Inside South Vietnam, those seeking to overthrow the regime contacted US officials to ensure continued American support.
In this August 26, 1963, conversation, the president discusses Diem and Nhu with senior national security officials.
(President Kennedy): If we're unsuccessful here, and these generals don't do anything, then we have to deal with Diem as he is, and Nhu as he is. Then the question, what do we do to protect our own prestige and also to make it- see if we can have this thing continue on successfully? Do you have any thought about that?
(Roger Hilsman): It's pretty horrible to contemplate, sir... I- Nhu is basically anti-American. I- there's an element of emotional unstability here, I think. I think our position will be increasingly difficult. But also, and most important, is that everyone in the field, and here, too, agree with them; that what you will have in the wake of the desecration of the pagodas and everything is a drifting away of these key, cadre fellows in the army, and that the situation will rapidly worsen.
(Dean Rusk): Mr. President, I think that the choice we have to make there is that unless there's a major change in Diem and Nhu's approach to this whole internal problem, is to look at the fact that we're on the road to disaster, and whether we'd rather take it by our choice, or be driven out by a complete deterioration of the situation in Vietnam, or move in such forces as would involve our taking over the country. And... so most of those are the big decisions we have to make. I don't think we have-
(Edit.)
(President Kennedy): Let's... do you have any- I think we ought to get- following along with what Secretary McNamara says. It seems to me we ought to send a message down to Lodge and Harkins on these... I don't think we ought to let the coup... maybe they know about it, maybe the generals are going to have to run out of the country; maybe we're going to have to help them get out of there. Still, that's not a good enough reason to go ahead, if we don't think the prospects are good enough. I don't think we're in that deep, but I'm not sure the generals are. They've been probably bellyaching for months, so that I don't know whether they're- how many of them are really up to here. So I don't see any reason to go ahead, unless we think we got a good chance of success. So I think we finally have to put it on Lodge and Harkins to tell us whether they-
(Edit.)
(Frederick Nolting): Isn't our real sanction here for whether or not we continue U.S. support? And, uh, it would seem to me that one way of posing this question is whether we should tell Diem, or, alternatively, the generals, that we could not continue U.S. support, except under certain modified, different circumstances of government. I must say it seems to me that the proper attitude, action of the U.S. government under any situation would be to tell the chief of state this directly. We could tell him at the same time, that is, if... which won't be news to him, that the majority of his military leaders feel the same way... and ask him what he wants.
(President Kennedy): Of course if we- we're not really in a position to withdraw. If he doesn't accept, then we- for us to go through with that would be pretty hard, wouldn't it... withdraw our assistance, and pull out Americans?
(Dean Rusk): I think the stakes are very high here. If you- when you make that move and fail, then you have to be ready to expect that he will throw you out.
Energy for the coup fizzled in late August, and the Kennedy administration resigned itself to working with Diem, pressuring him to make a series of political, economic, military, and social reforms that were designed to improve the counterinsurgency effort. But by late October, President Kennedy was again grappling with the possibility of a coup and what the United States should do about it. His advisors were divided. At a late afternoon meeting on October 29, Kennedy heard several opinions, clearly summarized in a memorandum of the conversation.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested, "We should caution the generals that they must have the situation in hand before they launch a coup."
"Secretary McNamara," recorded the memo, "asked who of our officials in Saigon are in charge of the coup planning."
Attorney General Robert Kennedy expressed his doubts about breaking with Diem:
Averell Harriman, undersecretary of state for political affairs, "said it was clear that in Vietnam there was less and less enthusiasm for Diem. We cannot predict that the rebel generals can overthrow the Diem government, but Diem cannot carry the country to victory over the Viet Cong. With the passage of time, our objectives in Vietnam will become more and more difficult to achieve with Diem in control."
On November 1, those evaluations became moot as a group of Vietnamese army officers, led by General Duong Van Minh, assassinated Diem and Nhu. On the morning of November 2, McGeorge Bundy read reports of the coup to the president.
On November 4, Kennedy recorded his thoughts on the Diem coup into a Dictabelt (complete with punctuation).
[This recording has been edited to remove an impromptu visit from the president's children, John Jr. and Caroline.]
Eighteen days later, the US president himself would be felled by an assassin's bullet on the streets of Dallas."
Death Of A Regime (1963)
This film documents the events surrounding the coup that overturned the Ngo Dihn Diem regime in Vietnam. Scenes examine the Catholic / Buddhist struggle, and the celebratory feeling amongst the people following the coup. Footage includes an interview with President John Kennedy and Madam Ngo Dinh Nhu's comments after the coup.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OewhlYeU2fo
FYI COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. LTC Ivan Raiklin, Esq. Capt Seid Waddell Capt Tom Brown SFC William Farrell SSgt Robert Marx SSgt (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SGT John " Mac " McConnell SPC (Join to see) Maj Marty Hogan PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SP5 Robert Ruck SCPO Morris Ramsey SGT Michael Thorin SPC Margaret Higgins SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL
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Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D.
I have written on this before. So true - The enemies of Diem killed the hope God had given Vietnam and thus suffered they fate of their actions. Unfortunately, we also were dragged into the quagmire and paid a terrible price as a result of President Kennedy, Atty General Kennedy and the Secretary of State agreeing to the removal of the only freely elected President of Vietnam, President Diem. They administration even guaranteed in writing they would not interfere or punish those involved in the the removal of Diem. (Note: VP Johnson did not agree!)
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Amazing the dynamics at that time- never a dull moment and always some back stabbery going on. Morning Mark
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Lt Col Scott ShuttleworthSGT Gregory Lawritson SGT Jim Arnold SSgt Brian BrakkeCMSgt (Join to see) LTC (Join to see) MSG Frederick Otero SSG David Andrews SCPO Morris Ramsey PO1 William "Chip" Nagel TSgt Joe C. Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. LTC Greg Henning PO2 Rick Fox Lt Col Charlie Brown Sgt Albert Castro Samantha S. CPT Scott Sharon PO3 Craig Phillips SPC John Waisman
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