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From "The National Interest"
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-has-much-bigger-cyber-problem-its-hands-12012
America Has a Much Bigger Cyber Problem on Its Hands
North Korean agents. Russians. Disgruntled employees. Hacktivists. Whoever really orchestrated last month’s cyberattacks against Sony may be beside the point. That’s because a growing chorus of security experts is revealing the most significant flaw in the U.S. government’s defense against future cyberattacks: an utter lack of credibility.
The doubters are not Internet trolls, but many of the world’s leading cyberspecialists who share their views in tightly guarded e-mail lists. Their trust in the U.S. government matters because they will be crucial allies in future cyberconflicts, where the stakes will be far higher than the delayed release of a comedy like The Interview. From identifying and responding to serious attacks to finding ways to collaborate with industries (such as enabling law enforcement access to encrypted iPhones), the goodwill of the private sector is vital to U.S. national security.
The government’s response to the Sony attack represented a tipping point for this goodwill, which was already in short supply after the Snowden leaks and CIA torture report. Now, it’s at an absolute nadir, which makes America ill-prepared to face down the next—and potentially much more dangerous—cyberattacks.
Many technical experts began fairly early on to question the evidence available connecting the attacks with North Korea. Parts of the hackers’ message suggested their native tongue was Russian, rather than Korean—raising the specter of Moscow’s involvement. Others argued that malicious employees at Sony itself were the most likely culprits.
The information-security community regularly chats about attribution issues. But what was truly remarkable was the level of distrust leveled at the U.S. government. ...
[EDITORIAL COMMENT:- When the soldiers don't trust the generals the army tends to fall apart. Is it time for some significant soul-searching INTERNALLY to see why "The People" are starting to believe that America is a land of "government of the people, by the incompetent/dishonest/self-aggrandizing, and for the elite" rather than a land of "government of the people, by the people, and for the people"? Mr. Roosevelt said "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." and he was right - but today the mantra is "The only thing we have to fear is whatever we tell you to panic about today (and loss of profits, of course)."]
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-has-much-bigger-cyber-problem-its-hands-12012
America Has a Much Bigger Cyber Problem on Its Hands
North Korean agents. Russians. Disgruntled employees. Hacktivists. Whoever really orchestrated last month’s cyberattacks against Sony may be beside the point. That’s because a growing chorus of security experts is revealing the most significant flaw in the U.S. government’s defense against future cyberattacks: an utter lack of credibility.
The doubters are not Internet trolls, but many of the world’s leading cyberspecialists who share their views in tightly guarded e-mail lists. Their trust in the U.S. government matters because they will be crucial allies in future cyberconflicts, where the stakes will be far higher than the delayed release of a comedy like The Interview. From identifying and responding to serious attacks to finding ways to collaborate with industries (such as enabling law enforcement access to encrypted iPhones), the goodwill of the private sector is vital to U.S. national security.
The government’s response to the Sony attack represented a tipping point for this goodwill, which was already in short supply after the Snowden leaks and CIA torture report. Now, it’s at an absolute nadir, which makes America ill-prepared to face down the next—and potentially much more dangerous—cyberattacks.
Many technical experts began fairly early on to question the evidence available connecting the attacks with North Korea. Parts of the hackers’ message suggested their native tongue was Russian, rather than Korean—raising the specter of Moscow’s involvement. Others argued that malicious employees at Sony itself were the most likely culprits.
The information-security community regularly chats about attribution issues. But what was truly remarkable was the level of distrust leveled at the U.S. government. ...
[EDITORIAL COMMENT:- When the soldiers don't trust the generals the army tends to fall apart. Is it time for some significant soul-searching INTERNALLY to see why "The People" are starting to believe that America is a land of "government of the people, by the incompetent/dishonest/self-aggrandizing, and for the elite" rather than a land of "government of the people, by the people, and for the people"? Mr. Roosevelt said "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." and he was right - but today the mantra is "The only thing we have to fear is whatever we tell you to panic about today (and loss of profits, of course)."]
Posted in these groups: 
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National Security Politics
Posted >1 y ago
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Let me tell you a story...
When I was operations officer at a strategic communications center, we were in the process of developing an automated system (computer) to replace the teletype machines. Autodin was already in place with computers directing data traffic between commands around the world, but the messages still entered the system on punch paper tapes and exited in hard copy.
NSA wasn't happy about what we were doing because computers emitted huge amounts of RF signals that could be monitored outside our tunnel, and they demonstrated this weakness to us many times. For example, we had to remove all extraneous wiring that could act as an antenna including a television antenna wire that connected a TV in the commanders office to a TV antenna mounted on a telephone pole outside. Okay, that one's obvious. How about the toilet we had to remove from a bathroom next to the computer room (and dig up several feet) of the sewer line to it, because it was transmitting signals to connecting sewer lines outside. (An NSA team took us to a point where they had connected a wire to a sewer line and were monitoring secure traffic in the black).
NSA had a saying in those days: "If I can do it, Ivan can do it."
Do I have to explain that?
Of course, we have much more than "Ivan" to worry about these days.
Then there was the issue with human leaks. Almost everything that passed through my hands marked "Secret" and "Top Secret" quickly ended up in the NY Times. It seems that members of Congress loved to show off to their friends just how well-connected they were.
Let's not forget the misapplication of security. Political materials were classified, not because of their strategic value, but rather because of their potential for embarrassment. Thus, we spent a lot of effort protecting things that got in the way of protecting militarily important things.
Oh, and how about the idiot colonel who called me one day to complain about a garbled portion of a Top Secret message and insisted on reading the clear portion of it on an unsecure line. I hung up on him three times prompting him to come to my tunnel and give me a good ass-chewing.
There's much more to this story and I doubt that it has changed that much in the past 40 years. Certainly, with the proclivity of this Administration to invite members of hostile nations and groups to participate in important government agencies (as if Roosevelt had invited Gestapo agents), why bother with security?
When I was operations officer at a strategic communications center, we were in the process of developing an automated system (computer) to replace the teletype machines. Autodin was already in place with computers directing data traffic between commands around the world, but the messages still entered the system on punch paper tapes and exited in hard copy.
NSA wasn't happy about what we were doing because computers emitted huge amounts of RF signals that could be monitored outside our tunnel, and they demonstrated this weakness to us many times. For example, we had to remove all extraneous wiring that could act as an antenna including a television antenna wire that connected a TV in the commanders office to a TV antenna mounted on a telephone pole outside. Okay, that one's obvious. How about the toilet we had to remove from a bathroom next to the computer room (and dig up several feet) of the sewer line to it, because it was transmitting signals to connecting sewer lines outside. (An NSA team took us to a point where they had connected a wire to a sewer line and were monitoring secure traffic in the black).
NSA had a saying in those days: "If I can do it, Ivan can do it."
Do I have to explain that?
Of course, we have much more than "Ivan" to worry about these days.
Then there was the issue with human leaks. Almost everything that passed through my hands marked "Secret" and "Top Secret" quickly ended up in the NY Times. It seems that members of Congress loved to show off to their friends just how well-connected they were.
Let's not forget the misapplication of security. Political materials were classified, not because of their strategic value, but rather because of their potential for embarrassment. Thus, we spent a lot of effort protecting things that got in the way of protecting militarily important things.
Oh, and how about the idiot colonel who called me one day to complain about a garbled portion of a Top Secret message and insisted on reading the clear portion of it on an unsecure line. I hung up on him three times prompting him to come to my tunnel and give me a good ass-chewing.
There's much more to this story and I doubt that it has changed that much in the past 40 years. Certainly, with the proclivity of this Administration to invite members of hostile nations and groups to participate in important government agencies (as if Roosevelt had invited Gestapo agents), why bother with security?
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COL Ted Mc
CPT Jack Durish Captain, It hasn't changed since then. In fact it probably hasn't changed since Hammurabi was a Lance Corporal. Did I think that it was ever going to change? Not a chance. In my opinion "counterintelligence" is very frequently more about "damage control" than it is about "damage prevention" ESPECIALLY when there isn't an actual "hot" war going on
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