Posted on Nov 8, 2015
Is Obama’s Special Operations Policy: Useless and Dangerous?
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Is Obama’s Special Operations Policy: Useless and Dangerous?
RP Members what do you think about POTUS and his use of the Special Forces
The Man Behind the Curtain
Perhaps someday, when administration insiders pen their memoirs and historians get to cull Obama’s emails, more definitive judgments can be made about the rationale behind the president’s calls as commander-in-chief. Until then, it’s worth musing on his motivations—if only to suggest dark paths that the next president would do well to avoid.
No respectable historian will find much to admire in the president’s legacy as foreign policy and national security leader. Still, they may well bicker for many years over why he does what he does.
The White House recently announced that special operations forces are going into harm’s way in Syria. That choice may be one of the defining moments historians seize on to understand the Obama way of war.
http://dailysignal.com/2015/11/06/obamas-special-operations-policy-useless-and-dangerous/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AXI2pmpbH_k
What to make of this decision? For starters, dispatching a small number of special operations forces into Syria to help handle ISIS is hardly a game changer.
Special operations forces are called “special” for a reason. In part, the handle reflects that these troops have special training and equipment, and conduct unique military missions. Their impact, however, is also considered “special.” They deliver a unique “temporary” advantage, whether it’s rescuing hostages, hunting SCUDs, training a freedom fighter, or taking down a terrorist. A special-ops “mission accomplished” delivers either a quick and passing win (like getting bin Laden) or an essential preparatory act for a larger campaign (such as harassing Japanese supply lines in Burma during World War II before the Allied counteroffensive).
RP Members what do you think about POTUS and his use of the Special Forces
The Man Behind the Curtain
Perhaps someday, when administration insiders pen their memoirs and historians get to cull Obama’s emails, more definitive judgments can be made about the rationale behind the president’s calls as commander-in-chief. Until then, it’s worth musing on his motivations—if only to suggest dark paths that the next president would do well to avoid.
No respectable historian will find much to admire in the president’s legacy as foreign policy and national security leader. Still, they may well bicker for many years over why he does what he does.
The White House recently announced that special operations forces are going into harm’s way in Syria. That choice may be one of the defining moments historians seize on to understand the Obama way of war.
http://dailysignal.com/2015/11/06/obamas-special-operations-policy-useless-and-dangerous/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AXI2pmpbH_k
What to make of this decision? For starters, dispatching a small number of special operations forces into Syria to help handle ISIS is hardly a game changer.
Special operations forces are called “special” for a reason. In part, the handle reflects that these troops have special training and equipment, and conduct unique military missions. Their impact, however, is also considered “special.” They deliver a unique “temporary” advantage, whether it’s rescuing hostages, hunting SCUDs, training a freedom fighter, or taking down a terrorist. A special-ops “mission accomplished” delivers either a quick and passing win (like getting bin Laden) or an essential preparatory act for a larger campaign (such as harassing Japanese supply lines in Burma during World War II before the Allied counteroffensive).
Posted in these groups: 
Office of the President (POTUS)
Policy
Special Operations
Foreign Policy
ISIS
Office of the President (POTUS) Policy Special Operations Foreign Policy ISIS
Posted 9 y ago
Responses: 9
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We often jump to conclusions with situations we might not fully understand - because we do not have all the information, while I am guilty of this at times as well....I challenge you to consider a different perspective. Try this on and see if it fits: what if, just if, our POTUS made the decision under the guise of train and advise but (without telling the world) he is really putting eyes on the target of Russia moving Iranian weaponry/nuclear materials to Syria....what if? So, while we might not be "read in", we often lend our opinions to things we might not really know much about....do I want our operators out there in harms way, hell no - it could be my son out there, and I do not want him exposed to unnecessary threat.
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COL Mikel J. Burroughs
CSM Michael J. Uhlig That is a great point and different perspective - great response!
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SSG (Join to see)
Pres.Obama Blaming Bush of Iraq Crisis
[August 9, 2014] Q Mr. President, do you have any second thoughts about pulling all ground troops out of Iraq? And does it give you pause as the U.S. -- is i...
I don't trust POTUS capabilities of reading and understanding intel. From "the police acted stupidly", through the "I said I would go after Bin Laden if we had a clear shot at him, and I did" all through it was a "video" excuse.
Why don't we hold him accountable? What ever happened to "No Boots on the ground" and now all the excuses of Iraq, and how is not now his fault. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JzAorl8OIXY
Why don't we hold him accountable? What ever happened to "No Boots on the ground" and now all the excuses of Iraq, and how is not now his fault. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JzAorl8OIXY
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We've seen ample evidence that sending in our regular light infantry forces into areas where they don't know the customs or languages is just a really good way to get many of them killed and wounded without advancing vital U.S. Interests.
I just put the bottom line first.
it is a difficult problem for the United States. It is a mess made by the Bush Administration. They threw their hands up in 2007, remaining bereft of ideas then as they had been throughout their ill-conceived adventure in Mesopotamia.
The mess we have now was predicted by such disparate prophets as Dick Cheney (in 1994) and Jim Webb.
Cheney for some reason changed his mind. It is instructive to quote Senator Webb.
This is from 2002:
"Other than the flippant criticisms of our "failure" to take Baghdad during the Persian Gulf War, one sees little discussion of an occupation of Iraq, but it is the key element of the current debate. The issue before us is not simply whether the United States should end the regime of Saddam Hussein, but whether we as a nation are prepared to physically occupy territory in the Middle East for the next 30 to 50 years. Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade and stay. This reality was the genesis of a rift that goes back to the Gulf War itself, when neoconservatives were vocal in their calls for "a MacArthurian regency in Baghdad." Their expectation is that the United States would not only change Iraq's regime but also remain as a long-term occupation force in an attempt to reconstruct Iraqi society itself.
The connotations of "a MacArthurian regency in Baghdad" show how inapt the comparison is. Our occupation forces never set foot inside Japan until the emperor had formally surrendered and prepared Japanese citizens for our arrival. Nor did MacArthur destroy the Japanese government when he took over as proconsul after World War II. Instead, he was careful to work his changes through it, and took pains to preserve the integrity of Japan's imperial family. Nor is Japanese culture in any way similar to Iraq's. The Japanese are a homogeneous people who place a high premium on respect, and they fully cooperated with MacArthur's forces after having been ordered to do so by the emperor. The Iraqis are a multiethnic people filled with competing factions who in many cases would view a U.S. occupation as infidels invading the cradle of Islam. Indeed, this very bitterness provided Osama bin Laden the grist for his recruitment efforts in Saudi Arabia when the United States kept bases on Saudi soil after the Gulf War.
In Japan, American occupation forces quickly became 50,000 friends. In Iraq, they would quickly become 50,000 terrorist targets."
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2006/09/jim-webbs-2002-op-ed-against-invading-iraq
"Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade and stay."
It is not necessarily a thing that President Obama, or anyone, can fix.
Put our regular infantry units in Syria or back in what used to be Iraq and they will just be targets again. President Obama deserves a lot of credit for avoiding an avalanche of bad advice so far.
Walt
I just put the bottom line first.
it is a difficult problem for the United States. It is a mess made by the Bush Administration. They threw their hands up in 2007, remaining bereft of ideas then as they had been throughout their ill-conceived adventure in Mesopotamia.
The mess we have now was predicted by such disparate prophets as Dick Cheney (in 1994) and Jim Webb.
Cheney for some reason changed his mind. It is instructive to quote Senator Webb.
This is from 2002:
"Other than the flippant criticisms of our "failure" to take Baghdad during the Persian Gulf War, one sees little discussion of an occupation of Iraq, but it is the key element of the current debate. The issue before us is not simply whether the United States should end the regime of Saddam Hussein, but whether we as a nation are prepared to physically occupy territory in the Middle East for the next 30 to 50 years. Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade and stay. This reality was the genesis of a rift that goes back to the Gulf War itself, when neoconservatives were vocal in their calls for "a MacArthurian regency in Baghdad." Their expectation is that the United States would not only change Iraq's regime but also remain as a long-term occupation force in an attempt to reconstruct Iraqi society itself.
The connotations of "a MacArthurian regency in Baghdad" show how inapt the comparison is. Our occupation forces never set foot inside Japan until the emperor had formally surrendered and prepared Japanese citizens for our arrival. Nor did MacArthur destroy the Japanese government when he took over as proconsul after World War II. Instead, he was careful to work his changes through it, and took pains to preserve the integrity of Japan's imperial family. Nor is Japanese culture in any way similar to Iraq's. The Japanese are a homogeneous people who place a high premium on respect, and they fully cooperated with MacArthur's forces after having been ordered to do so by the emperor. The Iraqis are a multiethnic people filled with competing factions who in many cases would view a U.S. occupation as infidels invading the cradle of Islam. Indeed, this very bitterness provided Osama bin Laden the grist for his recruitment efforts in Saudi Arabia when the United States kept bases on Saudi soil after the Gulf War.
In Japan, American occupation forces quickly became 50,000 friends. In Iraq, they would quickly become 50,000 terrorist targets."
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2006/09/jim-webbs-2002-op-ed-against-invading-iraq
"Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade and stay."
It is not necessarily a thing that President Obama, or anyone, can fix.
Put our regular infantry units in Syria or back in what used to be Iraq and they will just be targets again. President Obama deserves a lot of credit for avoiding an avalanche of bad advice so far.
Walt
Jim Webb's 2002 Op-Ed Against Invading Iraq
Jim Webb isn't by any means perfect, as Tim Russert revealed in his interview with Webb and George "Macaca" Allen...
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LTC (Join to see)
Do you think if we went in with the same mentality and ROE we used in WWII that the outcome might have been different?
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Capt Walter Miller
LTC (Join to see) - In Iraq?
The German and Japanese people didn't react to seeing US troops the way the Iraqis did. How the Iraqis reacted - was predictable and predicted.
Recall that in Germany it was feared that a "Wolf's Redoubt" was being set up where the die-hard Nazis would fight on unconventionally. That would have been a mess too.
Walt
The German and Japanese people didn't react to seeing US troops the way the Iraqis did. How the Iraqis reacted - was predictable and predicted.
Recall that in Germany it was feared that a "Wolf's Redoubt" was being set up where the die-hard Nazis would fight on unconventionally. That would have been a mess too.
Walt
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He's putting our special forces troops in jeopardy for not giving them adequate support. The rules of engagement are either muddy or tie the hands Of our brave special operators
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