Is the concept of the Infantry Battalion Task Force viable and necessary in the Active Army?

Well if we look back to the Regimental Combat teams such as the 5th RCT or the 7th RCT all these Regimental teams had all the slices; sappers, arty, med, etc. They also fought well (see Korean War) killing beau coup Chinese; much to the CHICOM's chagrin I am sure. I digress. What this concept of the BN Team is another Legion of Merit for somebody. The BLUF is: All thru history, the rifle company takes the beating and every commander and his flesh peddler throughout that history has sat around trying to figure out a way to reconstitute the rifle companies. Everyone remembers Eisenhower in 1944 trying to flesh out the rifle battalions at the cost to AAA BN's and even 'cooks". What we have here is an attempt to cover up the fact we do not have enough men with rifles and bayonets. Period. The COS of the Army the last few years has been a disgrace by not offering his resignation publically to the Senate in order for the public to see what is being done to our military. Old Fat Ray has allowed some of the most combat bloodied GO's in our history to be"RETIRED". His company grade officers with patches on the right shoulder and most significantly our hard bitten combat experienced NONCOMS are being shoved to the curb. The BCT I guess it will be called is a pipe dream. As previously mentioned all those slices must train with each other over and over. There is not enough MFP 2 money available. The SENATE probably does not know that MFP 11 money is not for training military aged Syrians...We are all so F word

Poorly.
In our drive to "task force organize" and "modularize" everything, we are losing sight of the fact that there are minimum densities that are needed both for effectiveness AND efficiency. The only way to be truly effective as a SEPARATE IN BN TF is to be in a CONSTANT training cycle as well as have dedicated slices of (what once on a time were) DIV resources - which means you have a great deal of waste in resourcing.

Of course, I said similar things in 2004/5.... So I'm probably wrong...

A few thoughts:
- There are several reasons at the strategic level to do or not do something. All lead to compromise solutions and not optimal solutions. A few examples are below. BLUF is that we should not just be looking at the IN BN TF as a current fight issue. We also need to be looking to the future and what might/will happen.
- Current fight. Argues against an IN BN TF because it is outside the Army's BCT centric doctrine and organization.
- Reversibility. The Army shrinks and grows over the years. We are shrinking now. I can not tell you when we will grow again but history tells me that we will grow again. It is harder to grow a BCT from nothing than it is to grow a BCT from an IN BN TF seed corn. Look to history. How was the 101st Airborne created? Not from scratch but from cadre from the 82nd Airborne. Keeping an IN BN TF in Alaska and Benning therefore allows for today's decision to more easily be reversed in the future.
- Risk. Several ways to look at risk but a few are COCOM perspective, operational domain perspective, and probability and severity perspective. With Russia flexing its muscle again, should the US really not have ground forces in Alaska at this time? If we do not, how does that impact our ability to shape, deter, defeat? Argues for keeping something.
- Hollow Army vs full readiness. Current CSA guidance is to not have a hollow Army and to achieve as much readiness as we can. Not saying this is wrong but there is an argument to be made that we should have less than fully manned organizations that we can use as the seed corn to regrow the Army when, not if, we have to.