Learning to See – In an Age of Constant, Continuous Crisis

The first two decades of the 21 st century can be characterized by a singular word: crisis.

From September 11th , 2001, to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the 2008 housing and financial crisis, to nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea, to COVID-19, to the more recent wars in Ukraine and Gaza, to a potential conflict in the South China Sea with China; constant, continuous, interconnected, and global crises have become the hallmark of our time.

Also notable has been our inability to adequately respond to these ongoing crises. Constant, continuous crisis has exposed a critical flaw in our institutions – a “failure to see.”

How often have you heard the following: “there was a failure to connect the dots.” Or how about former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ well-known quip: “the United States has a perfect record in modern times in predicting when and where future outbreaks of war will occur – it always gets it wrong.” And who can forget the now infamous line from the 9/11 Commission Report: “The most important failure was one of imagination.”

We have a “failure to see.” The central nature of the “failure to see” problem is one of discernment – an inability to recognize and act on interconnections and do so rapidly. And there is no more guilty party in this failure than our institutions.

Our institutions undergird our political system and our social fabric. Our institutions provide anchor and stability in society. Indeed, our institutions – both public and private – play a critical role in sustaining our country and society. Accordingly, when our institutions fail, countries fail; societies fail; and political systems fail.

The unfortunate truth is our institutions do not have a good track record. They over-index on reactively responding to crisis; they then under-index; and when all hope seems to be lost, they, from time to time, finally get it right. But it only comes after significant – sometimes unrecoverable – damage is done. In a rapidly changing world, such a sinusoidal approach is not only insufficient for the modern world – it is suicidal.

Our institutions have “failure to see” because they rely on rule-based, linear models designed to address discrete, defined, and known events – so-called “known knowns.” They are not designed for discernment – the ability to see known unknowns much less unknown unknowns.

This is a problem because unimagined challenges and unforeseen problems leads to livelihoods lost, life savings evaporated, and, in the most extreme case, death.

Therefore, the central issue of our time is not necessarily the problems we face, it is whether our institutions – from the government to large corporations – can respond to constant, continuous, often unforeseen crises.

To thrive in this environment, institutions must adopt a new way of seeing – one that not only contemplates the integrated nature of crises but also navigates such crises through metaphors, narratives, and frames that enable the integration of complex and seemingly disconnected information.

The good news is we have dealt with interconnected, complex crises before. In the more than 20 years since 9/11, the United States transformed much of our national security apparatus, intelligence community, and law enforcement. There was a recognition that we need to “learn to see” to get ahead of the next crisis. Out of this came new agencies, new information sharing rules, new technologies such as drones, and new ways to understand complexity.

This is not to say these changes have led to success. Quite the contrary, much of these changes remain insufficient to the need. So, how can our institutions further adapt and learn to see? It starts with developing learning-oriented models, frames, and approaches.

My PhD dissertation investigated the 20 years since 9/11. As I reviewed the scholarship of policy perspective and decisionmaking during crisis, I recognized that we do not often pair these two concepts together. In the real-world, politicians on the campaign trail have a policy perspective on various issues. They are often asked what they would do in certain circumstances. But they are not often asked how they would actually make choices – particularly within the context of crisis.

Instead, both our political leaders as well as our country’s business leaders running large institutions seem to rely on their going-in perspective – their gut feel – rather than a developed framework or worldview.

This is a problem because a leader’s policy perspective tells us almost nothing about how they would actually act during crisis when their assumptions about the world are no longer valid.

An understanding of how political and business leaders would go about making choices within the context of crises would tell us a lot more about what they would actually do.

Leveraging the scholarship around policy perspective and decisionmaking during crisis, I created what I term the “Policy Profile Code” This “code” encompasses four profiles, which provides us insight into potential worldviews of a leader running an institution.

This framework categorizes crises into four distinct profiles, each requiring a tailored response:

 The Commander: This profile is for crises that demand immediate, authoritative action such as natural disasters or security threats. Institutions must act swiftly and decisively to mitigate immediate damage and stabilize the situation.

 The Prosecutor: This profile addresses systemic failures needing comprehensive investigation and accountability such as financial scandals or corruption. These situations require in-depth scrutiny, legal action, and policy changes to address root causes and restore public trust.

 The Negotiator: This profile is for crises involving complex stakeholder interactions that need mediation and negotiation such as community or social conflicts. Effective resolution requires navigating diverse interests and finding common ground.

 The Doctor: This profile focuses on long-term, persistent issues needing sustained intervention such as healthcare reform or environmental challenges. These crises demand ongoing effort, systemic reform and a strategic vision for long-term solutions.


By adopting this framework, societal institutions could move beyond a one-size-fits-all approach and tailor their responses to the specific nature of each crisis. Institutions that can accurately identify and apply the appropriate profile will be better equipped to effectively address the challenge.

Constant and continuous crisis will remain the central, defining characteristic of our time. Traditional rule-based institutional systems are inadequate for this new reality. The critical challenges of our time demand a new way of seeing.

By embracing metaphors, frames, and narratives, institutions will be better able to not only connect the dots…

But also see.



Dr. Alex Gallo is a US Army Veteran and author of “Vetspective,” a RallyPoint series that discusses national security, foreign policy, politics, and society and highlights the analysis of thought-leaders, policy analysts, and scholars. Alex is a Senior Vice President with NobleReach Foundation. He also serves as a fellow with George Mason University’s National Security Institute and an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. Follow him on Twitter at @AlexGalloUSA.