Should every soldier be required to deploy?

I think it's not a bad ideal, Because of what's happening all around this world and dose give the active duty some relief.

Well stated Sir! One has to remember that someone has to stay in the rear with the gear so mot everyone will have the opportunity to be deployed.

I don't know the exact numbers sir, but I estimate at least 1/3 of the current force has not deployed as the effort has tapered off over the last 2 years. Barring another major operation against ISIL or similar groups in the near future, attrition of those who have deployments will continue to increase while at the same time new soldiers will also grow.
Using deployment as a primary consideration for promotion does not serve the best interest of the forces.

I deployed to the first gulf war having been trained during The Cold War mindset. There were a few very senior soldiers who were in 'Nam, Panama, and Grenada but the vast majority of my fellow soldiers did not have any deployments.

I should note that I am talking about combat deployments that the general population might be called for and not spec ops deployments

I know what you mean, SFC Squires. We lose our edge as we promote, transfer, retire or get out. I have not been in a combat zone in almost 6 years. it is a perishable skill if the knowledge we use no longer the same or not used at all. Hopefully, our new soldiers will get the experience in training and exercises that do its best to keep the edge up. I feel our peace dividend will not last long because the USA is in its fiscial austerity and refit mode and sequestration and changes to retirement talk will make our forces less professional and less dedicated and they will not stay in for the sake of saving $2 billion a year when some of our weapons platforms that are questionable cost about $300 million each and may not be needed this soon or as many when our soldiers are a better bang for the buck or using existing platforms are just fine. I am talking about the F-35 jsf vs keeping the A-10 WARTHOG.

Good question

CW4 (Join to see) Chief, I deployed with a lot of sh*tbags. They were sh*bags before they deployed, they were sh*tbags during deployment, and they were sh*bags after deployment. I know you said “average” but deployment isn’t a magical professional development program.

SSG (Servicemember) - That listing actually doesn't surprise me at all. I know that we have all kinds of operations going on regularly around the globe. In fact, I don't even debate that point. My point was that we simply don't have the deployment capacity to ensure that every soldier deploys.

COL Ted Mc - they tend to follow solid recommendations. Where I see stuff go south in our food chain is when a "great idea" turns into "how do we replicate this success everywhere?"
That's how you get moments of brilliance like "girl's schools" all over Afghanistan or those moronic solar-powered streetlights.
Those of us on the ground get ordered to find places to execute specific projects, as opposed to recommending initiatives that further an aim and working the staff to get approval and funding.
The funding tends to be the big zoo where staff try to reuse existing ideas that were approved instead of doing the legwork necessary to execute something new and different.
It was and often is the bane of my existence.

1SG (Join to see) - First; The "liberals" always come up with "good ideas that should work". This is met by the "conservatives" coming up with "old ideas that used to work in totally different circumstances".

Both approaches to planning and "solutions" tend to screw up regularly.

I'm a pragmatist. If it works in practice but doesn't work in theory it's a good idea and if it works in theory but doesn't work in practice then it's a bad idea.

COL Ted Mc - I'm an analyst. If it works in practice, how can I refine it and make it more effective? How can I better exploit this initiative to garner greater effect? That is where I really make my money.

1SG (Join to see) - First; I think that the basic mind-set difference is the difference between wanting to "improve the way that something that works works" and wanting to "change something that works into something that should work".

The first allows for a fall back position while the second doesn't.

Agreed. I've never understood deployment dodgers...

Depends on the MOS! But if he or she has that need....find a MOS where you can be deployed

SFC Michael Hasbun, if I was a firefighter and never had to put out a fire, I would be happy. That does not diminish the fact that I was a fire fighter

SFC Kenneth Hunnell I'd say it kinda does...

COL Ted Mc- very true Sir, I was reading in my CGSOC lesson last night about Napoleon and his Grand Armee losing its edge by professional soldiers leaving and conscripts coming in. Finesse replaced by sheer numbers and the effectiveness of his army slowed down and he started to lose battles, in part, because the armies were over-used and exhausted.

LTC Stephen Conway - Major; Those who don't have any real military experience seldom realize that the troops are NEITHER expendable nor easily replaceable.

To quote an old friend of mine "War is an auction and troops are the currency you bid with. The highest bidder ALWAYS wins. Unfortunately for military planners, there are Pounds, Dollars, Marks, Rubles, Pesos, Yen, Francs, and a host of other currencies, each with their own value and with values that change from day to day, so that a winning bid today may well be a losing one tomorrow.".

During WWII, the US military's own studies showed that troops could only remain "in combat" for 180 days before becoming (essentially and statistically) "spent". The Iraq/Afghanistan situation was one where there were (essentially) no "rear lines" and so the troops were "in combat" for the entire time that they were "in country".

Six months is right at the limit of statistical effectiveness.

Unfortunately you also have to consider the casualty calculation rule that says that it is amongst the "newbies" and "short timers" that you can expect elevated levels of casualties (along with decreased levels of effectiveness).

In WWII the troops COULD be taken out of "combat" but still retained close enough to the line of battle that they didn't lose the awareness of the fact that they were going to be going back into battle AND where they still remembered WHY they were being trained. Sending a soldier back to Dubuque for six months after a deployment and then expecting that they will be as effective when they get called up a second time shows why Marijuana should be legalized (to prevent the mass incarceration of the vast majority of military "planners" because of the fact that they are driving to work stoned).

LTC Stephen Conway -
His earlier strategy was to have columns of troops just march over outnumbered enemy positions and it worked for a time. After he took enormous casualties, the new conscripts could not handle this type of strategy and many broke and ran rather than die. He had a good thing going, but didn't realize that human resources, especially veterans are hard to replace. Enjoy the CGSOC.

LTC John Wilson - Colonel; Considering that the effective range of the muskets being used in Napoleon's day was 50 yards (being generous) and the acceptable rate of fire was one round every 20 seconds and that the command "Aim" wasn't even used (the command was "Level"), a column could expect to take ONE "effective" volley between the time that they came into effective range and the time they marched the 150 feet needed to "close with" the defenders, Napoleon's TACTICS weren't in the least bit unsound (wasteful possibly, but unsound - not a bit).

What the Infantry had to worry about was the Artillery and the Cavalry.

Of course, there wasn't any where near the number of guns available as there were muskets and the rate of fire for the Artillery was about the same as it was for the Infantry BUT the Artillery could engage at about 1,500 yards (assuming that they got lucky enough to run into an opponent who gave them that chance), but (after the first couple of grazes the troops could actually step out of the way of an oncoming round shot - so column advances weren't all that silly in that case.

Of course, where a column advancing was surprised and got taken in the flank by Cavalry before they could form square - then things got REALLY dicey. After that the Cavalry might just as well go back to the closest inn and have a beer.

The French never quite managed it, but the British could actually maneuver a square (admittedly very slowly and riskily). However the Brits never quite caught on to the French "l'ordre mixte" so the honors are about equal.

As far as Napoleon's STRATEGY was concerned, it was to exploit mobility and (essentially) "interior lines" to the maximum. It worked very nicely as long as he had "interior lines" to exploit and as long as his armies were capable of mobility. Unfortunately for him, the French "Grande Armée" simply didn't have either of those once they set off for Moscow.

It was the loss of the "Grande Armée" that gutted the French military and not the battle tactics as the chart above shows. (The brown arrow is the trip TO Moscow, and the black arrow is the trip FROM Moscow.)

Well said CSM. Have a Happy new Year. thanks for your service.

You tried sir, that's all you can do. My boss in 2006, a Brigadier General, was pulled shortly before our ship to Iraq for a Norwegian Admiral in a joint billet at MNSTC-I under then LTG Martin Dempsey. Not a happy camper. He did manage to work his way into Afghanistan as a Major General two years later though.

Thank you for your service.