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Two recent, interesting articles. One from The Atlantic, one from Salon (and I'll acknowledge the bias of Salon from the get go, so no one needs to spend time attacking the source; The Atlantic, though, is, as they say, "of no party or clique."
Do you agree the US win-lose record since 1945 is 1-4? Do you agree that the US loses wars precisely because it is so powerful? Why haven't Eisenhower's warnings about the military-industrial complex led to any sort of meaningful controls on the DoD budget?
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/america-win-loss-iraq-afghanistan/394559/
http://www.salon.com/2015/05/16/the_dwight_eisenhower_lesson_america_forgot_partner/
Do you agree the US win-lose record since 1945 is 1-4? Do you agree that the US loses wars precisely because it is so powerful? Why haven't Eisenhower's warnings about the military-industrial complex led to any sort of meaningful controls on the DoD budget?
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/america-win-loss-iraq-afghanistan/394559/
http://www.salon.com/2015/05/16/the_dwight_eisenhower_lesson_america_forgot_partner/
USA
Iraq
Afghanistan
Politics
Vietnam War
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 189
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MAJ (Join to see) I think there are several points that strategists routinely leave out when looking at our results post-WWII.
1. What were we trying to do in Korea and Vietnam? I contend that we were only trying to stop the spread of communism. Would it have been nice if we would have been able to march into Pyongyang and Hanoi, sure, but it was implausible due to a different style of warfare.
2. The Cold War was a huge win for the U.S. and Western Society, and people can claim all day long it was due to the economic fight that we gave the USSR, but I will say that it was part of the master strategy. D.I.M.E. I believe throughout the entire Cold War the Economic portion of DIME was always a huge capital E, while the Military portion of DIME fluctuated as needed between a lowercase m and uppercase M as needed.
3. With the success that our conventional military had in Desert Storm, we convinced the rest of the major world powers not to mess with us in a conventional fight. Think about it, Saddam Hussein had the 4th largest Army in the world at the time and we beat him in 100 hours. Why would anyone want to fight us conventionally again?
4. We have long doubted the ability of insurgent groups to share information and to be learning organizations. They are and we pay because of it. Where did the Somalis learn to shoot down aircraft with RPGs? There is evidence that the Somalis had Mujahedeen that had fought against the Soviets in Somalia in the time between the end of the Soviet-Afghan War and 1992-1993 that showed them how to use our technology against us.
Just my rambling thoughts.
1. What were we trying to do in Korea and Vietnam? I contend that we were only trying to stop the spread of communism. Would it have been nice if we would have been able to march into Pyongyang and Hanoi, sure, but it was implausible due to a different style of warfare.
2. The Cold War was a huge win for the U.S. and Western Society, and people can claim all day long it was due to the economic fight that we gave the USSR, but I will say that it was part of the master strategy. D.I.M.E. I believe throughout the entire Cold War the Economic portion of DIME was always a huge capital E, while the Military portion of DIME fluctuated as needed between a lowercase m and uppercase M as needed.
3. With the success that our conventional military had in Desert Storm, we convinced the rest of the major world powers not to mess with us in a conventional fight. Think about it, Saddam Hussein had the 4th largest Army in the world at the time and we beat him in 100 hours. Why would anyone want to fight us conventionally again?
4. We have long doubted the ability of insurgent groups to share information and to be learning organizations. They are and we pay because of it. Where did the Somalis learn to shoot down aircraft with RPGs? There is evidence that the Somalis had Mujahedeen that had fought against the Soviets in Somalia in the time between the end of the Soviet-Afghan War and 1992-1993 that showed them how to use our technology against us.
Just my rambling thoughts.
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MAJ (Join to see)
Thanks for sharing. Your points on DIME are spot-on. Where's that strategic outlook now, in the post Cold War era?
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LTC (Join to see)
I believe that the I has almost become perpetually capitalized, and that is not a good thing in my opinion. With the growth of non-nation state actors, I believe that we have to use DIME as a 4 piece Yin/Yang model to help the nation states in the area that we want to operate to have the legitimacy, without it we are going to continually be stretched to the maximum capacity and I fear the capital M that we have been using is going to slowly erode.
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I would say the problem is a shifting in ideologies. In World War II there were clear parameters set for victory. We were waging a war against an alliance of nations. Thus the parameters were the successful defeat of said nations. These clear goal statemetns allowed us to push forward with objectives. The problem we face now, is that our wars aren't being waged against principalities but principles (or a lack thereof in my opinion). A microcosm approach to understanding the difference would be such: World War II would be comparable to any well designd five paragraph order. Clearly defined paramaters for what equated to mission accomplishment as stated earlier. Our current "wars", however, are more like when that new OIC steps on deck and makes these vague sweeping policy statements about how he has an open door policy and he is there to make sure we are all taken care of. No real clear direction or delineation...just these vague conceptual notions. When you are fighting a war where the end game is nothing more than some perceived theoretical model dreamed up with no real empirical backing...you can't EVER claim victory. Summation: It's not that we lost these wars...it's that we never won them. It may seem like semantics, but the difference is glaring.
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MAJ (Join to see)
You're on to something, here. The US very clearly lacks a coherent, defined strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, for the counter-ISIL fight, and for a host of other activities for which the force is being employed.
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SECDEF Robert Gates, in his book DUTY, points to Iraq and outlines a major problem. Like the dog who caught the car, now what do we do with it?
The plan appeared to be that the grateful people of Iraq, and the Middle East would welcome us, and form a democratic government that just loved us.
In Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq the military mission of breaking things, and defeating enemy forces,within the limitations placed on us,was done. The transition to unconventional warfare, and nation building,at the same time, is the task that has the greatest chance of failure. Victory,at some point is dependent on the citizens of those nations, and its leaders. It has to be something they want, and are willing to fight for.
We underestimate the opposition, their intelligence, willingness to fight, and take huge numbers of casualties.
A culture that understood warfare, and nation building was Rome. A nation would bow to their demands or face complete destruction.
In our culture the military, and political goals are defined by our elected representatives. Breaking things, and nation building, at the same time, in places we begin to understand in the rear view mirrors, does not work well for us.
As for the military industrial complex,it appears to be working against us. As per SECDEF Robert Gates the focus was on the procurement of the next high tech weapons systems, for the next war, rather than the needs of our forces in Iraq, and Afghanistan.
The plan appeared to be that the grateful people of Iraq, and the Middle East would welcome us, and form a democratic government that just loved us.
In Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq the military mission of breaking things, and defeating enemy forces,within the limitations placed on us,was done. The transition to unconventional warfare, and nation building,at the same time, is the task that has the greatest chance of failure. Victory,at some point is dependent on the citizens of those nations, and its leaders. It has to be something they want, and are willing to fight for.
We underestimate the opposition, their intelligence, willingness to fight, and take huge numbers of casualties.
A culture that understood warfare, and nation building was Rome. A nation would bow to their demands or face complete destruction.
In our culture the military, and political goals are defined by our elected representatives. Breaking things, and nation building, at the same time, in places we begin to understand in the rear view mirrors, does not work well for us.
As for the military industrial complex,it appears to be working against us. As per SECDEF Robert Gates the focus was on the procurement of the next high tech weapons systems, for the next war, rather than the needs of our forces in Iraq, and Afghanistan.
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I think not having GEN George S. Patton, Jr. with us is the main reason we lose wars. All joking aside though, this is what I think:
1) Overconfidence, our biggest enemy. For instance, we routinely dismiss the Taliban as being 'stupid' yet they have managed to decrypt our UAV feeds.
2) Our leaders failing to do a thorough mission analysis. This ties into overconfidence as well.
3) Thinking that democracy and the American way of life works everywhere. In Iraq we made a problem worse; we took down Hussein to install a democracy. $6T and over 200,000 casualties later, we got ISIS instead. Also, how many more terrorists did we create with that invasion? Lesson: in the Middle East, only the strong leaders survive.
4) Thinking that money or technology guarantees victory. For example, we have the most expensive voice/data intercepting technology in the world, but there's one problem: our enemies know this and operate on standing orders, minimizing electronic communication.
1) Overconfidence, our biggest enemy. For instance, we routinely dismiss the Taliban as being 'stupid' yet they have managed to decrypt our UAV feeds.
2) Our leaders failing to do a thorough mission analysis. This ties into overconfidence as well.
3) Thinking that democracy and the American way of life works everywhere. In Iraq we made a problem worse; we took down Hussein to install a democracy. $6T and over 200,000 casualties later, we got ISIS instead. Also, how many more terrorists did we create with that invasion? Lesson: in the Middle East, only the strong leaders survive.
4) Thinking that money or technology guarantees victory. For example, we have the most expensive voice/data intercepting technology in the world, but there's one problem: our enemies know this and operate on standing orders, minimizing electronic communication.
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I'll go straight ILE on you = "War Is Merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means" - Carl von Clausewitz
>>>So, if a country goes to war with unclear or ever changing political objectives, it is not possible to "win" the war.
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means" - Carl von Clausewitz
>>>So, if a country goes to war with unclear or ever changing political objectives, it is not possible to "win" the war.
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CPT (Join to see)
MAJ (Join to see) Very good, Sir. I am looking forward to ILE so that I can learn a thing or two like you.
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MAJ (Join to see)
There are lots of good quotes on the subject:
Ultima ratio regum. (The final argument of kings)
– Inscription on french cannons, on order of Louis XIV
CANNON, n. An instrument employed in the rectification of national boundaries.
– Ambrose Bierc
Do not forget your dogs of war, your big guns, which are the most-to- be respected arguments of the rights of kings.
– Frederick the Great
God fights on the side with the best artillery.
– Napoleon Bonapart
Ultima ratio regum. (The final argument of kings)
– Inscription on french cannons, on order of Louis XIV
CANNON, n. An instrument employed in the rectification of national boundaries.
– Ambrose Bierc
Do not forget your dogs of war, your big guns, which are the most-to- be respected arguments of the rights of kings.
– Frederick the Great
God fights on the side with the best artillery.
– Napoleon Bonapart
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To answer the question with a phrase: it's because we don't report the truth. If you counterbalance the glowing after action reports and operational summaries of a few years ago with the reality of today, you know that something big is amiss. I was just thinking about this earlier today driving to work. The shit that fills the correspondence we file is sometimes large enough to fertilize a hectare of land.
It seems to be inculcated in our society and our military culture, these days, to dress things up, for lack of a better choice of words, instead of relaying the unvarnished truth. If you're saying whatever you think your audience wants to hear, whether that audience be your boss, the media, your CG, whomever, you are doing everyone, including yourself, an injustice and perpetuating an already-lingering and prevalent problem: dealing in bullshit and masking reality.
Both of the referenced stories bring up plenty to chew on and ruminate about. I don't think ISIS or Iran are world threats, at least not yet. But I have thought and do think of China and Russia as ascendant and resurgent world threats, respectively. That attitude, less the much-ballyhooed 'pivot to Southeast Asia', is all but obfuscated by the borderline-hysteria surrounding terrorists, riots and whatever crisis that sells the most column inches is at the moment.
When and if we go to war against China, and I think we will, there will need to be a categoric round turn made in our thinking and our business practices if we have any hope of prevailing. I frankly hope I'm dead before armed hostilities begin with the Chinese, because that's where I think we're headed if we don't make some tough choices soon and it will probably require a major cataclysm to really drive the point home.
Where can we start? By reporting the TRUTH, no matter how badly it hurts.
It seems to be inculcated in our society and our military culture, these days, to dress things up, for lack of a better choice of words, instead of relaying the unvarnished truth. If you're saying whatever you think your audience wants to hear, whether that audience be your boss, the media, your CG, whomever, you are doing everyone, including yourself, an injustice and perpetuating an already-lingering and prevalent problem: dealing in bullshit and masking reality.
Both of the referenced stories bring up plenty to chew on and ruminate about. I don't think ISIS or Iran are world threats, at least not yet. But I have thought and do think of China and Russia as ascendant and resurgent world threats, respectively. That attitude, less the much-ballyhooed 'pivot to Southeast Asia', is all but obfuscated by the borderline-hysteria surrounding terrorists, riots and whatever crisis that sells the most column inches is at the moment.
When and if we go to war against China, and I think we will, there will need to be a categoric round turn made in our thinking and our business practices if we have any hope of prevailing. I frankly hope I'm dead before armed hostilities begin with the Chinese, because that's where I think we're headed if we don't make some tough choices soon and it will probably require a major cataclysm to really drive the point home.
Where can we start? By reporting the TRUTH, no matter how badly it hurts.
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MAJ (Join to see)
Lying in the military is common, Army War College study says
Two professors found that untruthfulness is 'surprisingly common in the U.S. military even though members of the profession are loath to admit it.'
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CPO Greg Frazho
As a further corollary to what I submitted last year, consider this: General Sherman was a big proponent of total war, and he was in fact criticized for his scorched-earth policy. In his own words, "I want to make Georgia howl." He did, and South Carolina got it even worse. What was his goal? To piss those people off? If so, mission accomplished, and I get the idea there's still lingering animosity about that even though it happened 150 years ago. No, his goal was to eliminate the will of the fighting man and his family to continuing making war against the Union. They destroyed a lot of property, they lived off the land and essentially raised hell across those states. But ultimately, distatestful to civilized folk though it may have been, it worked. Something you may not know is that just after the war ended on the Eastern Front, they had a big review of the troops in D.C. The Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, wanted to shake hands with Uncle Billy, but the latter refused. "I don't shake hands with government clerks."
Our politicians, and frankly some of our uniformed leadership seem, at best, reluctant to engage in total war, i.e., all's fair in love and war and damn the consequences. I'm not advocating that position. What I am saying is, the combination of career bureaucrats (less a few former service members), who have very little to no front-line experience, in conjunction with a culture that seems to almost abhor the fact we have a fighting force (and that's what it's there for, guys) and the gotcha politics of self-destruction AND a zero-defects mentality have created a very risk-averse atmosphere within that thing known as the National Command Authority. And it's carried over to DoD and filtered down the ranks. Very few people are willing to risk their reputations or their careers on something as uncertain as sustained, let alone protracted, conflicts in Asia. Additionally, the saying about amateurs discuss tactics, professionals discuss logistics, is very relevant to this debate.
But to get back to total war, how do we prosecute such a war without it turning into a completely unfettered free-for-all? Indoctrination of our warrior ethos at all levels. We, the military, the DoD, us knuckle-draggers, if you will, are in business for one thing and one thing only: the elimination or neutralization of our opponents. That is to say, killing other people in a declared or undeclared conflict, although the former helps a little. We'll take if if we can use it, but the most base level of our existence is, in fact, the destruction of our opponents, or at least the neutralization of their will to keep fighting. Conversely, though, we have to keep in mind what our first-ever commander-in-chief said: "When we assumed the soldier, we did not lay aside the citizen." So we can be lean, mean killing machines (to coin a phrase) on the one hand, and yet we must be civilzed when we're not doing that on the other hand. That's a very difficult balancing act. But we've gotta start somewhere. Maybe we can take a cue from the guys returning from the Crusades: one of the first things they did was pay penance and ask forgiveness for all the killing they did, despite the fact they felt they had a mandate to do just that.
Our politicians, and frankly some of our uniformed leadership seem, at best, reluctant to engage in total war, i.e., all's fair in love and war and damn the consequences. I'm not advocating that position. What I am saying is, the combination of career bureaucrats (less a few former service members), who have very little to no front-line experience, in conjunction with a culture that seems to almost abhor the fact we have a fighting force (and that's what it's there for, guys) and the gotcha politics of self-destruction AND a zero-defects mentality have created a very risk-averse atmosphere within that thing known as the National Command Authority. And it's carried over to DoD and filtered down the ranks. Very few people are willing to risk their reputations or their careers on something as uncertain as sustained, let alone protracted, conflicts in Asia. Additionally, the saying about amateurs discuss tactics, professionals discuss logistics, is very relevant to this debate.
But to get back to total war, how do we prosecute such a war without it turning into a completely unfettered free-for-all? Indoctrination of our warrior ethos at all levels. We, the military, the DoD, us knuckle-draggers, if you will, are in business for one thing and one thing only: the elimination or neutralization of our opponents. That is to say, killing other people in a declared or undeclared conflict, although the former helps a little. We'll take if if we can use it, but the most base level of our existence is, in fact, the destruction of our opponents, or at least the neutralization of their will to keep fighting. Conversely, though, we have to keep in mind what our first-ever commander-in-chief said: "When we assumed the soldier, we did not lay aside the citizen." So we can be lean, mean killing machines (to coin a phrase) on the one hand, and yet we must be civilzed when we're not doing that on the other hand. That's a very difficult balancing act. But we've gotta start somewhere. Maybe we can take a cue from the guys returning from the Crusades: one of the first things they did was pay penance and ask forgiveness for all the killing they did, despite the fact they felt they had a mandate to do just that.
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Why do we lose wars? This is a fallacy at best! The days of destroying an entire nations infrastructure are gone for the most part. Generals sitting around in a box car or on the deck of a battle ship to sign a treaty are long gone. The absolute destruction of an entire people would be decried by the rest of the world.
Before we used the bomb, the A bomb, the United States fire bombed Dresden and Tokyo with Napalm and Magnesium flares. The human loss was staggering; but it did break the will of the enemy to resist. The face of warfare changed after that, the term proxy war comes to mind where “minor conflicts erupt” and interested parties respond. Whereas the use of the A bomb was the Grand Final, of WWII, the world realized that war would never be the same. After that event the cost of open warfare between major nations could kill every man women and child on the earth! We now put out hot spots like a forest fires and wait for the next one to start: Proxy Wars.
The wars in Korea, Vietnam and the war on terror were and are proxy wars where a third party is used to advance an ideology, by a major nation or group. The first two of which were communism and the last a radical version of a religion; it so happens that radical Islam serves the interests of our former greatest enemy now called Russia, and China not far behind. So they stand by and do nothing even though they too have suffered from it as well.
Nations are no longer willing to stand up vast armies at great expense, both in terms of human lives and in money. Now wars are fought in third world locations to try and erode away and influence like a cancer or as a sucker punch like the attacks of 9/11.
The trick is to figure out who is your ally and who is not. The sooner the oil fields in Arab lands run dry the better! Enemy of my enemy is my friend; are they our friend, think about it.
MAJ Jeff Jager, Sgt Matthew Disher, 1SG Jerry Healy, CPT Ahmed Faried, MSgt Joshua Copeland, COL Jason Smallfield, PMP, CFM, MAJ Carl Ballinger, Capt John Cable, CPT Pedro Meza, LTC John G Shaw MBA, JD, SSG James J. Palmer IV aka "JP', MAJ Chris Ballard, LTJG Robert Myles,
Before we used the bomb, the A bomb, the United States fire bombed Dresden and Tokyo with Napalm and Magnesium flares. The human loss was staggering; but it did break the will of the enemy to resist. The face of warfare changed after that, the term proxy war comes to mind where “minor conflicts erupt” and interested parties respond. Whereas the use of the A bomb was the Grand Final, of WWII, the world realized that war would never be the same. After that event the cost of open warfare between major nations could kill every man women and child on the earth! We now put out hot spots like a forest fires and wait for the next one to start: Proxy Wars.
The wars in Korea, Vietnam and the war on terror were and are proxy wars where a third party is used to advance an ideology, by a major nation or group. The first two of which were communism and the last a radical version of a religion; it so happens that radical Islam serves the interests of our former greatest enemy now called Russia, and China not far behind. So they stand by and do nothing even though they too have suffered from it as well.
Nations are no longer willing to stand up vast armies at great expense, both in terms of human lives and in money. Now wars are fought in third world locations to try and erode away and influence like a cancer or as a sucker punch like the attacks of 9/11.
The trick is to figure out who is your ally and who is not. The sooner the oil fields in Arab lands run dry the better! Enemy of my enemy is my friend; are they our friend, think about it.
MAJ Jeff Jager, Sgt Matthew Disher, 1SG Jerry Healy, CPT Ahmed Faried, MSgt Joshua Copeland, COL Jason Smallfield, PMP, CFM, MAJ Carl Ballinger, Capt John Cable, CPT Pedro Meza, LTC John G Shaw MBA, JD, SSG James J. Palmer IV aka "JP', MAJ Chris Ballard, LTJG Robert Myles,
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MAJ (Join to see)
This whole concept if flawed, the days of total war are not gone nor will they ever be gone, it's the leading role of the United States as a Superpower that has put credible threat to any major country that attempted to use it. Since WWII there has never been a need for Total War, if Russia had invaded during the Cold War or if they remilitarize to a credible threat total war will be right back on the table. Nukes did not eliminate Total War they just set it up as a last resort.
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I think part of the problem is that we choose wars with no real goals, and now way to truly measure "winning". That said, we aren't "losing" per se, we just aren't winning in the classical sense. In the old days, we'd storm the enemy nation's capitol and force their leaders to publicly sign a document. Now, many of our enemies have no capitol to storm and leaders are diffused and decentralized.
Some wars are chosen for domestic reasons, really-- one guy or another wants to "look tough" on an issue, so they pick a bad guy that we can never completely defeat, yet is no threat to us, and let slip the dogs of war.
Some wars are chosen for domestic reasons, really-- one guy or another wants to "look tough" on an issue, so they pick a bad guy that we can never completely defeat, yet is no threat to us, and let slip the dogs of war.
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MAJ (Join to see)
Great point--so many of the things that the US does on the world stage are primarily or in part done for domestic political reasons.
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