Requiem for Strategic Deterrence – Is war with China Inevitable?

Image: Fiona Hill, arrives to testify before the House Intelligence Committee on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC.

Election Night 2022 did not fail to disappoint as the fluidity of our domestic politics were on full display.

The pre-mortems during the home stretch of the 2022 mid-term elections projected significant losses for the Democrats, including potentially losing control of both chambers of Congress. Yet, Democrats had a much better night than anyone expected with critical wins in Senate races in Pennsylvania, Nevada, Arizona, and New Hampshire and key governor races such as Katie Hobbs’ victory over Kari Lake in Arizona. Republicans, for their part, realized crucial victories in both Ohio with the election of JD Vance to the US Senate and Florida with Ron DeSantis’ the 20-point gubernatorial victory – notable given future importance of Ohio and Florida in the 2024 presidential race.

While the 2022 mid-term elections may have served as a domestic political test for the viability of Democrats’ and Republicans’ future electoral prospects and domestic political messages, an equally important political test looms on the horizon, which may well come before the next election cycle in 2024.

That political test is whether the on-going competition with China will evolve into a war. Such a conflict would not only test our political leaders but also the future of the international order – as former National Security council official, Matt Pottinger, recently stated: “A war [with China] would fundamentally change the character and complexion of global power.”

To better understand the potentiality of war with China, we must begin by investigating the paradigm within which leaders in the United States and China are making moves and shaping the strategic environment.

Dexter Filkins recently reported in the New Yorker that China is now subsuming fleets of civilian ferries and other civil watercraft into its military command structure. These civilian crafts, thought to be in the thousands, join a Chinese Navy described in a November 2022 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report as the largest navy in the world.

In fact, the November CRS report estimated the Chinese navy included more than 355 naval platforms – from surface combatant ships, to submarines, to aircraft carriers, to amphibious ships. The same CRS report projected that China’s navy would grow to “420 ships in by 2025 and 460 ships by 2030.” For comparison, the US Navy currently has 294 ships. CRS projects the US Navy “battle force” may only have 290 ships by Fiscal year 2030.

China’s enlargement of its navy comes as its army continues to conduct exercises, organize staging areas, and practice amphibious landings just across the Taiwan Strait. These steps by China’s military become particularly concerning when one considers the strategic context within which these Chinese military exercises and activities are occurring.

Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently noted a strategic shift by Chinese Communist Party leadership: “China had made ‘a fundamental decision that the status quo was no longer acceptable and that Beijing was determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline.’” While Chinese Communist Party leadership may have made this strategic shift, actually effecting “reunification” is a much different and larger task.

Xi, the President of China and leader of the Chinese Communist Party, finds himself in a strategic dilemma. An invasion of Taiwan would, without question, levy significant costs on China. But Xi cannot back down given his view that the status quo with respect to Taiwan is no longer tenable.

Given this strategic dilemma, China may well be attempting to find alternative pathways to changing the status quo vis-à-vis Taiwan. That is why we are seeing China test the United States and Western allies through unprofessional engagements against our military aircraft and forcing our naval vessels to change course.

Chinese Communist Party leadership is trying to find ways to upturn the status quo – either through effectuating a casus belli or exploiting any weaknesses they discern in our resolve. China will likely also employ intelligence and information operational means to change the status quo with Taiwan.

This is why this moment so dangerous.

This also suggests the United States is stuck in a strategic dilemma with respect to Taiwan. Just as China cannot live with the status quo, the United States cannot live with the China’s version of the future for Taiwan.

Moreover, if the United States appears overly distracted by domestic political issues (as discussed at the outset of this piece), if the United States lacks the resolve to support Taiwan’s ability to defend itself, if the United States or its allies are provoked by China’s actions and escalate; these may provide openings for Xi to act against Taiwan.

What’s more, China has likely assessed the United States will is bounded in how far it will go with sanctions. Chinese Communist Party leadership is also likely noting the calls to pull back on US military aid to Ukraine, suggesting a lack of resolve by the United States to provide military support in the context of a prolonged conflict.

This suggests we are not operating within a paradigm of strategic deterrence with China. Rather, it would appear we are operating within a paradigm of strategic escalation. Operating in this paradigm means war not only could happen – rather, there is an increasing probability it will happen. Pottinger goes on to outline the costs in any future conflict:

“Once engaged, a fight would be difficult to control. If leaders on either side began to believe that they were losing, they could feel pressure to escalate; China might attack Americans overseas, and the United States might intensify attacks on the Chinese mainland. Countries throughout the region, and perhaps the world, would be forced to decide whether and how to join the fight.”

The most dangerous future is one in which Xi mis-reads the strategic environment and makes a bold move against Taiwan. In this scenario, Pottinger explains:

“An open confrontation would have enormous implications…If China loses, it could lead to the collapse of the Party and the end of Xi. If Taiwan falls, we are in a different world, where the tide of authoritarianism becomes a flood.”

Therefore, the strategic question for the United States remains: Is war inevitable? If it is, we must change our posture by vigorously and actively preparing for war, providing robust security assistance to Taiwan, and acting to shape the way in which any version of war would unfold. But, in doing so, it risks making war unavoidable. That’s when you know strategic deterrence is dead.

Indeed, former National Security Council official, Fiona Hill, argues we are already engaged in World War III with Russia.

Perhaps we already are with China as well.


Alex Gallo is the author of “Vetspective,” a RallyPoint series that discusses national security, foreign policy, politics, and society. Alex also is a fellow with George Mason University’s National Security Institute, an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and a US Army Veteran. Follow him on Twitter at @AlexGalloCMP.