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Much ink has been spilled and angsty activity has unfolded over the last 5-10 years around defense innovation. Indeed, we have witnessed this seemingly histrionic behavior through steering committees created; new small business websites launched; new policies established; new DoD innovation offices stood-up; commissions formed; task force reports published; think tank articles tweeted; and LinkedIn selfies backgrounded by nitro coffee bars, bean bags, and swag unleashed into our social media feeds.
And yet (and perhaps unsurprisingly), the Department of Defense continues to operate in a paradigm of “business as usual” – from the way it writes requirements, to the way it acquires new technology. Why?
Some say the problem is culture – if DoD culture, and that of the national security apparatus writ large, changed from one of risk-aversion to risk-taking, innovation would flourish.
Ohers argue the problem is the acquisition process and incentive structure – if acquisition officers had best practices – a playbook, if you will – for navigating the byzantine defense bureaucracy coupled with the right incentives, more innovative technologies would be acquired.
Still others suggest the problem is financial – if the DoD established large funds and, simultaneously, acted as a venture capitalist, more innovative companies and technologies could better enter and sustain in the defense market.
And still others argue that the problem is bureaucratic – if DoD innovation offices had more the authority and resources, it could significantly increase the entry of new technologies into the DoD.
The problem with these arguments is they assume adjusting the “ways and means” of defense innovation is sufficient – that a risk-liberated bureaucracy, a more “enlightened” DoD culture, a more regulatory savvy acquisition officer, and a well-resourced “DoD venture capitalist” would understand how a particular technology would support the strategic “ends” of the United overall defense policy and strategy.
Those who make these arguments are not wrong. We must make the above-mentioned changes. However, these arguments fail to fully contemplate the more institutional and strategic nature of the defense innovation problem. Defense innovation is not, in-of-itself, a culture, incentives, financial, and bureaucratic problem. Defense innovation is, at its core, a policy and strategy problem – a problem of connecting technology to overall U.S. policy and strategy objectives.
Indeed, the critical question for defense innovation is: To what end?
My observation working around the defense innovation space over the last 5 years is that very few defense “innovators” know anything about U.S. policy and strategy. They do not understand the policymaking process. They have never been exposed to the Joint Staff’s strategy planning. And they have never been engaged in the challenging process of statecraft. And near-to-none have done all three.
Many working in defense innovation fashion themselves as technologists. They tend to be captivated by gee-whiz or “cool” technology. In the end, this group merely acquires technology that is disconnected from a validated policy and strategy problems. Others are bureaucrats frustrated by the slowness of the defense bureaucracy who believe “innovation” is an act of heroism that requires going around or undermining the DoD bureaucracy. In the end, this group simply expends precious political and social capital that could be used in more impactful ways.
Meanwhile, Joint Staff planners have real capability gaps in their operational planning for US policy and strategy objectives that continue to go unaddressed by DoD innovation offices. Over time, these unmet gaps dial up the long-term, strategic risk for the United States and its allies.
Joint Staff planners can only plan against what is real – in other words, what is fielded, tested, and distributed at scale for warfighting. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff, supported by the service chiefs, have not only a duty-bound obligation – but also a legal obligation – to plan against what is real for the protection of the U.S. homeland and overall policy objectives set forth by the President and other senior civilian leaders. They cannot plan against “gee-whiz,” untested, and powerpoint-deep technologies.
And yet, the Joint Staff desperately needs technological capability to create asymmetries on the battlefield and extend the capability of legacy platforms in the fight. By filling capability gaps in their operational planning – and even extending U.S capability through technology – not only would the United States be able to deter and defeat our adversaries in this modern warfighting context, but perhaps, most importantly, provide decision-space to the President.
Deterrence and decision-space for our senior leaders is critical because our adversaries are constantly colluding and creating dilemmas for the United States. The one thing that China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran can all agree on is they know we can’t do it all. And they are right.
The President’s ability to choose to defend Taiwan or decisively execute the Korean Peninsula operational plan through culmination – or do both at the same time rather than having to exercise strategic decision-points to go directly to the negotiating table but more than likely on the enemy’s terms – is directly connected to our ability to meet these Joint Staff capability gaps with innovative, tested, and scaled technology.
However, this continued disconnect between Joint Staff capability gaps and what the defense innovation offices anemically acquire may have even graver consequences. It risks another Task Force Smith. But this time a Task Force Smith for the digital age in which not only are military units unequipped and unready for the fight they face – but also the public. Modern warfare holds the potential to be completely zero-sum in nature and the public is its center of gravity.
Connecting technology to policy and strategy objectives is the singularly most important innovation issue facing the DoD and our national security writ large. I would offer three ways we can build towards connecting technology and our strategic needs.
First, we must fill the capability gaps in Joint Staff planning by re-orienting the mission of DIU towards directly filling those gaps. We must also re-orient the mission of the service-based innovation entities in the DoD to work for DIU in acquiring those service-specific innovation needs to meet the innovation portion of the military services force-providing role.
Second, as policymaking colleagues of mine have noted to me, we must not only have “oplans” (operational plans) for warfighting; we must also have “oplans” for the business of war. What legal waivers would the SECDEF have to exercise in the lead up to a high-end war with the likes of China? Under what timeline do senior leaders at the DoD need the defense base to ramp up? And what capacity and capability do senior leaders at the DoD need the defense base to provide in the first hours, days, weeks, months, and years of a high-end warfare fight?
Third, we must have “oplans” for the public. Our enemies see our public as the center of gravity of our long-term competition and any high-end fight. The government must build trust with the American public and scale a modern mobilization of society to work on critical problems that would support U.S. policy and strategy.
In the final analysis, it should be noted that we have been wrong 100-percent of the time in predicting the next war, as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided as a sage reminder to West Point cadets in a speech in 2011:
"When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more — we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged."
Yet, war has already started. Indeed, as Fiona Hill has suggested: “The West is already embroiled in World War 3…but has failed to notice it.”
We do not need to predict the future. The future is now. Therefore, the key question for defense innovation is:
Is that future ours or theirs?
Alex Gallo is the author of “Vetspective,” a RallyPoint series that discusses national security, foreign policy, politics, and society. Alex also is a fellow with George Mason University’s National Security Institute, an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and a US Army Veteran. Follow him on Twitter at @AlexGalloCMP.
And yet (and perhaps unsurprisingly), the Department of Defense continues to operate in a paradigm of “business as usual” – from the way it writes requirements, to the way it acquires new technology. Why?
Some say the problem is culture – if DoD culture, and that of the national security apparatus writ large, changed from one of risk-aversion to risk-taking, innovation would flourish.
Ohers argue the problem is the acquisition process and incentive structure – if acquisition officers had best practices – a playbook, if you will – for navigating the byzantine defense bureaucracy coupled with the right incentives, more innovative technologies would be acquired.
Still others suggest the problem is financial – if the DoD established large funds and, simultaneously, acted as a venture capitalist, more innovative companies and technologies could better enter and sustain in the defense market.
And still others argue that the problem is bureaucratic – if DoD innovation offices had more the authority and resources, it could significantly increase the entry of new technologies into the DoD.
The problem with these arguments is they assume adjusting the “ways and means” of defense innovation is sufficient – that a risk-liberated bureaucracy, a more “enlightened” DoD culture, a more regulatory savvy acquisition officer, and a well-resourced “DoD venture capitalist” would understand how a particular technology would support the strategic “ends” of the United overall defense policy and strategy.
Those who make these arguments are not wrong. We must make the above-mentioned changes. However, these arguments fail to fully contemplate the more institutional and strategic nature of the defense innovation problem. Defense innovation is not, in-of-itself, a culture, incentives, financial, and bureaucratic problem. Defense innovation is, at its core, a policy and strategy problem – a problem of connecting technology to overall U.S. policy and strategy objectives.
Indeed, the critical question for defense innovation is: To what end?
My observation working around the defense innovation space over the last 5 years is that very few defense “innovators” know anything about U.S. policy and strategy. They do not understand the policymaking process. They have never been exposed to the Joint Staff’s strategy planning. And they have never been engaged in the challenging process of statecraft. And near-to-none have done all three.
Many working in defense innovation fashion themselves as technologists. They tend to be captivated by gee-whiz or “cool” technology. In the end, this group merely acquires technology that is disconnected from a validated policy and strategy problems. Others are bureaucrats frustrated by the slowness of the defense bureaucracy who believe “innovation” is an act of heroism that requires going around or undermining the DoD bureaucracy. In the end, this group simply expends precious political and social capital that could be used in more impactful ways.
Meanwhile, Joint Staff planners have real capability gaps in their operational planning for US policy and strategy objectives that continue to go unaddressed by DoD innovation offices. Over time, these unmet gaps dial up the long-term, strategic risk for the United States and its allies.
Joint Staff planners can only plan against what is real – in other words, what is fielded, tested, and distributed at scale for warfighting. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff, supported by the service chiefs, have not only a duty-bound obligation – but also a legal obligation – to plan against what is real for the protection of the U.S. homeland and overall policy objectives set forth by the President and other senior civilian leaders. They cannot plan against “gee-whiz,” untested, and powerpoint-deep technologies.
And yet, the Joint Staff desperately needs technological capability to create asymmetries on the battlefield and extend the capability of legacy platforms in the fight. By filling capability gaps in their operational planning – and even extending U.S capability through technology – not only would the United States be able to deter and defeat our adversaries in this modern warfighting context, but perhaps, most importantly, provide decision-space to the President.
Deterrence and decision-space for our senior leaders is critical because our adversaries are constantly colluding and creating dilemmas for the United States. The one thing that China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran can all agree on is they know we can’t do it all. And they are right.
The President’s ability to choose to defend Taiwan or decisively execute the Korean Peninsula operational plan through culmination – or do both at the same time rather than having to exercise strategic decision-points to go directly to the negotiating table but more than likely on the enemy’s terms – is directly connected to our ability to meet these Joint Staff capability gaps with innovative, tested, and scaled technology.
However, this continued disconnect between Joint Staff capability gaps and what the defense innovation offices anemically acquire may have even graver consequences. It risks another Task Force Smith. But this time a Task Force Smith for the digital age in which not only are military units unequipped and unready for the fight they face – but also the public. Modern warfare holds the potential to be completely zero-sum in nature and the public is its center of gravity.
Connecting technology to policy and strategy objectives is the singularly most important innovation issue facing the DoD and our national security writ large. I would offer three ways we can build towards connecting technology and our strategic needs.
First, we must fill the capability gaps in Joint Staff planning by re-orienting the mission of DIU towards directly filling those gaps. We must also re-orient the mission of the service-based innovation entities in the DoD to work for DIU in acquiring those service-specific innovation needs to meet the innovation portion of the military services force-providing role.
Second, as policymaking colleagues of mine have noted to me, we must not only have “oplans” (operational plans) for warfighting; we must also have “oplans” for the business of war. What legal waivers would the SECDEF have to exercise in the lead up to a high-end war with the likes of China? Under what timeline do senior leaders at the DoD need the defense base to ramp up? And what capacity and capability do senior leaders at the DoD need the defense base to provide in the first hours, days, weeks, months, and years of a high-end warfare fight?
Third, we must have “oplans” for the public. Our enemies see our public as the center of gravity of our long-term competition and any high-end fight. The government must build trust with the American public and scale a modern mobilization of society to work on critical problems that would support U.S. policy and strategy.
In the final analysis, it should be noted that we have been wrong 100-percent of the time in predicting the next war, as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided as a sage reminder to West Point cadets in a speech in 2011:
"When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more — we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged."
Yet, war has already started. Indeed, as Fiona Hill has suggested: “The West is already embroiled in World War 3…but has failed to notice it.”
We do not need to predict the future. The future is now. Therefore, the key question for defense innovation is:
Is that future ours or theirs?
Alex Gallo is the author of “Vetspective,” a RallyPoint series that discusses national security, foreign policy, politics, and society. Alex also is a fellow with George Mason University’s National Security Institute, an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and a US Army Veteran. Follow him on Twitter at @AlexGalloCMP.
Innovation
Technology
VetSpective
Edited 1 y ago
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