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Mission Command- It's not about Widgets !
Part IV of the Mission Command Series on http://www.ProDev2Go.wordpress.com !!
The topic of mission command as a War Fighting Function (WfF) tends to quickly move towards "things" and away from Leaders. The Flux Capacitor is not going to win the next war; People win Wars. Mission Command as a WfF uses the operations process to enable decisions by the Commander. There are four focus areas that we have found helpful when organizing a unit to conduct distributed mission command in training or combat: First, the Commander must articulate the fight at echelon. The Brigade will identify the enemy's defeat mechanism, develop a plan to accomplish that end, and synchronize the WfFs to enable the battalions' mission accomplishment. Second, we must design and articulate the mission command structure in order to put the right people in position (Mobile, Tactical, and Main Command Posts) with clearly identified roles and responsibilities in the Security, Close, and Deep fight. The Brigade's tactical command post will focus on the close fight led by the Deputy Commander. The TOC, led by the executive officer, will focus on the deep fight and our planning effort. The mobile command group will position itself with the main effort to enable the commander's situational understanding for decision-making during the battle. Third, Identify the means of communicating information between echelons and between command posts. The common operating picture for the brigade will be JCR. All Systems will feed that medium and units will follow the prescribed procedures...exactly. Finally, we must refine systems to turn said information into understanding that allows the commander to make decisions. The commanders critical information requirements. Leaders that can clearly inculcate these four focus areas within their formations will enable human based mission command with or without the Flux Capacitor
Be Sure to Follow ProDev2Go by clicking this link http://www.ProDev2Go.wordpress.com ! Let us work to make your professional development easier !
Image Credit
http://www.surplussales.com/microphones-audio/MicroAudio-2.html
http://isource.com/2010/11/17/into-back-to-the-future-style-time-traveling-yes-theres-an-app-for-that/
Part IV of the Mission Command Series on http://www.ProDev2Go.wordpress.com !!
The topic of mission command as a War Fighting Function (WfF) tends to quickly move towards "things" and away from Leaders. The Flux Capacitor is not going to win the next war; People win Wars. Mission Command as a WfF uses the operations process to enable decisions by the Commander. There are four focus areas that we have found helpful when organizing a unit to conduct distributed mission command in training or combat: First, the Commander must articulate the fight at echelon. The Brigade will identify the enemy's defeat mechanism, develop a plan to accomplish that end, and synchronize the WfFs to enable the battalions' mission accomplishment. Second, we must design and articulate the mission command structure in order to put the right people in position (Mobile, Tactical, and Main Command Posts) with clearly identified roles and responsibilities in the Security, Close, and Deep fight. The Brigade's tactical command post will focus on the close fight led by the Deputy Commander. The TOC, led by the executive officer, will focus on the deep fight and our planning effort. The mobile command group will position itself with the main effort to enable the commander's situational understanding for decision-making during the battle. Third, Identify the means of communicating information between echelons and between command posts. The common operating picture for the brigade will be JCR. All Systems will feed that medium and units will follow the prescribed procedures...exactly. Finally, we must refine systems to turn said information into understanding that allows the commander to make decisions. The commanders critical information requirements. Leaders that can clearly inculcate these four focus areas within their formations will enable human based mission command with or without the Flux Capacitor
Be Sure to Follow ProDev2Go by clicking this link http://www.ProDev2Go.wordpress.com ! Let us work to make your professional development easier !
Image Credit
http://www.surplussales.com/microphones-audio/MicroAudio-2.html
http://isource.com/2010/11/17/into-back-to-the-future-style-time-traveling-yes-theres-an-app-for-that/
Army
Leadership
Command Post
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 9
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Some days, I think we should just go back to simple terms, Sun Tsu had it right some 2000 years ago and we just keep rewriting his principles over and over, but not really coming up with anything other than babble speak. While we are identifying their "defeat mechanisms," what do you think they are trying to do? Most likely if they are a first world power, the same damn thing. So who get to it first, is, in Vegas speak, the odds on favorite. Or as Sun Tsu would have said " “Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
1 He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
2 He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
3 He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
4 He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
5 He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.” The Art of War
1 He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
2 He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
3 He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
4 He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
5 He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.” The Art of War
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A flux capacitor and a hand mike? You Sir, are awesome. Great share as well. Mandatory viewing for our junior leaders.
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COL (Join to see) Sir, your post tuned me the postings your linked WordPress page (I assume yours). That’s good stuff.
Developing the mission command structure during MDMP is an important part of COA Dev. Your description of the TAC v. TOC v. Mobile CP is slightly intrigues me. When moving forward, who manages operations at the ISB and at what point is the TOC at the ISB moved forward? ISB to TAC to TOC, if you will. I imagine what you describe is ABCT-centric, as all vehicles feed into the COP through JCR. I have zero experience in an ABCT, so I am just curious for the peek behind the curtain as to how/why it is like that. I have typically seen structure like this (JFE-centric for the 82nd): ISB (DCO), TAC (CDR), TOC (XO). I imagine this depends on the operational environment (permissive v. semi-permissive v. non-permissive), but for the sake of conversation, lets assume non-permissive.
Additionally, you discuss placement of the Commander with the main effort. An often hotly debated topic at lower echelons, why do you personally choose to be with the ME? I frequently advise CDRs and PLs to place themselves where they can best C2 and provide assets for all formations, often not with the ME. While this was normally the case many years ago, in today’s information driven environment, I feel they need to be where they have the most situational awareness that enables the C2 process. I am currently in a dismounted reconnaissance formation. Understanding the capabilities and limitations of our communications equipment is key during our TLPs at the Troop level as tools like the JCR are not readily available nor are they common to all platoons. Therefore, in my limited view of operations, placement is critical as we lack common-to-all systems to facilitate mission command.
I would appreciate any feedback you can provide. This stuff intrigues me, I love getting different perspectives; it's great development for me.
Developing the mission command structure during MDMP is an important part of COA Dev. Your description of the TAC v. TOC v. Mobile CP is slightly intrigues me. When moving forward, who manages operations at the ISB and at what point is the TOC at the ISB moved forward? ISB to TAC to TOC, if you will. I imagine what you describe is ABCT-centric, as all vehicles feed into the COP through JCR. I have zero experience in an ABCT, so I am just curious for the peek behind the curtain as to how/why it is like that. I have typically seen structure like this (JFE-centric for the 82nd): ISB (DCO), TAC (CDR), TOC (XO). I imagine this depends on the operational environment (permissive v. semi-permissive v. non-permissive), but for the sake of conversation, lets assume non-permissive.
Additionally, you discuss placement of the Commander with the main effort. An often hotly debated topic at lower echelons, why do you personally choose to be with the ME? I frequently advise CDRs and PLs to place themselves where they can best C2 and provide assets for all formations, often not with the ME. While this was normally the case many years ago, in today’s information driven environment, I feel they need to be where they have the most situational awareness that enables the C2 process. I am currently in a dismounted reconnaissance formation. Understanding the capabilities and limitations of our communications equipment is key during our TLPs at the Troop level as tools like the JCR are not readily available nor are they common to all platoons. Therefore, in my limited view of operations, placement is critical as we lack common-to-all systems to facilitate mission command.
I would appreciate any feedback you can provide. This stuff intrigues me, I love getting different perspectives; it's great development for me.
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COL (Join to see)
1sg - Great questions and comments. So glad we have Incredible NCOs like you in our Army ! First on the Commander- He /She needs to position themselves where they can feel, taste, and smell the battle in my opinion. This in 99% of the cases is not the TOC. ME or SE or at a particular vantage point is Commander dependent.
Yes this presumes BDE OPS during Decisive Action. The ISB would fall under the next higher commander generally. The TOC is FWD controlling the shaping fight and the Planning effort. The TAC is controlling the close fight and communicates directly with the Battalions. While The Commander travels in a MCP to position where he/she can best make decisions.
As far as JCR- Just needs to be a Common Picture. But I'm tracking JCR coming soon to a Light TOC/Tac near you.
If that doesn't answer your questions let me know !
Yes this presumes BDE OPS during Decisive Action. The ISB would fall under the next higher commander generally. The TOC is FWD controlling the shaping fight and the Planning effort. The TAC is controlling the close fight and communicates directly with the Battalions. While The Commander travels in a MCP to position where he/she can best make decisions.
As far as JCR- Just needs to be a Common Picture. But I'm tracking JCR coming soon to a Light TOC/Tac near you.
If that doesn't answer your questions let me know !
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1stSgt (Join to see)
1SG (Join to see) , you get today's award for most acronyms in a post. But since I am interested in what you are saying i will google them all.
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1SG (Join to see)
COL (Join to see) - Sir you answered my questions, thank you. But that now led to a few more, if you have the time:
1. While forward in a MCP, do you delegate COA decision to your DCO or XO, or just find a way back? Assuming Adobe connect isn't available, we could use JCR, but I have to assume product overload. My question gears towards, how do you ensure operations are nested towards the common purpose, though a function of your S3, how do you check during planning, prior to execution?
2. The brigade I'm in utilized WfF 'Chiefs'. BEB-Protection, BSB-Sustainment, CAV-Intel, etc. What are your thoughts to this model? I've seen pros and cons. While it ensures unity of effort, in my opinion it removes the Commander from his 'fight'.
3. I'm the 1SG for a dismounted recon troop. We pride ourselves on shaping and reporting on the brigade's next fight. We like to say we are >72hrs ahead of the brigade, responsible for actions in the security zone (again this is all JFE-modeled). If you were my BDE CDR, would you want the reporting to go direct to your S2 shop, or though the WfF Chief, the CAV's S2. Who would have the responsibility to paint that picture for you? To me, it seems like an unnecessary middle man. But I acknowledge I might be missing something.
Just curious your thoughts sir.
1. While forward in a MCP, do you delegate COA decision to your DCO or XO, or just find a way back? Assuming Adobe connect isn't available, we could use JCR, but I have to assume product overload. My question gears towards, how do you ensure operations are nested towards the common purpose, though a function of your S3, how do you check during planning, prior to execution?
2. The brigade I'm in utilized WfF 'Chiefs'. BEB-Protection, BSB-Sustainment, CAV-Intel, etc. What are your thoughts to this model? I've seen pros and cons. While it ensures unity of effort, in my opinion it removes the Commander from his 'fight'.
3. I'm the 1SG for a dismounted recon troop. We pride ourselves on shaping and reporting on the brigade's next fight. We like to say we are >72hrs ahead of the brigade, responsible for actions in the security zone (again this is all JFE-modeled). If you were my BDE CDR, would you want the reporting to go direct to your S2 shop, or though the WfF Chief, the CAV's S2. Who would have the responsibility to paint that picture for you? To me, it seems like an unnecessary middle man. But I acknowledge I might be missing something.
Just curious your thoughts sir.
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Gotta love the flux capacitor. Good article about command therory, but I still think that they are focusing on us vice the enemy. Find the enemy weakness and destroy it.
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SSG(P) (Join to see)
1stSgt,
That's why we use Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, ATP 2-01.3 (or MCRP 2-3A)
That's why we use Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, ATP 2-01.3 (or MCRP 2-3A)
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Sir,
My previous assignment was instructing Armor Officers and NCOs at the Army Reconnaissance Course. During my time there I spent countless hours explaining the WfF and how they relate to the operations process and mission analysis and planning. I had a difficult time instructing our junior leaders in this aspect of the course, because of their lack of understanding of the WfF (whether from A-BOLC or NCOES); also linking the WfF to combat power with leadership and information. My students often viewed these things as conceptual, and in turn, never placed much weight to them.
I spent over four years at Ft Bliss, with MG [then COL] Twitty as my Brigade Commander (4/1 CAV). If I could make a recommendation, it would be for you and him to relay my observations to MCoE Commander, MG Miller, to have foundational courses in all Maneuver branched BOLC and ALC place more emphasis on the WfF and how they apply to every operation/mission at every echelon. I believe this will better prepare those officers and NCOs to lead effective platoons within the commander's intent, while utilizing all available resources.
My previous assignment was instructing Armor Officers and NCOs at the Army Reconnaissance Course. During my time there I spent countless hours explaining the WfF and how they relate to the operations process and mission analysis and planning. I had a difficult time instructing our junior leaders in this aspect of the course, because of their lack of understanding of the WfF (whether from A-BOLC or NCOES); also linking the WfF to combat power with leadership and information. My students often viewed these things as conceptual, and in turn, never placed much weight to them.
I spent over four years at Ft Bliss, with MG [then COL] Twitty as my Brigade Commander (4/1 CAV). If I could make a recommendation, it would be for you and him to relay my observations to MCoE Commander, MG Miller, to have foundational courses in all Maneuver branched BOLC and ALC place more emphasis on the WfF and how they apply to every operation/mission at every echelon. I believe this will better prepare those officers and NCOs to lead effective platoons within the commander's intent, while utilizing all available resources.
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COL (Join to see)
SSG Ruth- You are a great member of our Army team it is evident. Our Army is great because of superb NCO Leaders. WfFs are vital to our capabilities. We all must continue to grow and understand our Doctrine. Thanks for your comment !
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What I find interesting in this article (which I have read before) is that while he says people win wars not things, two of his four focus areas are things. ADRP 6-0 defines Mission Command as, ". . .the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0). Mission command calls for leaders with the ability to build a collaborative environment, the commitment to develop subordinates, the courage to trust, the confidence to delegate, the patience to overcome adversity, and the restraint to allow lower echelons to develop the situation." I know that Mission Command replaced Command and Control as a WFF but what this author describes is more C2 than talking about how units exercise initiative. Perhaps that is in one of the previous three parts of the series and if so, please let me know.
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What this should read is:
1. Appoint somebody to be in command.
2. Come up with new acronyms for everything.
3. Put in request for new camouflage pattern. (That will be filled after this war is over, but before the next one)
4. Come up with ROEs that will insure only the enemy is safe.
5. Find a spot to put the Air Force and the super huge PX, Starbucks, and KFC so that they are just far enough out that an airstrike is always 30 minutes too late.
6. Turn over country as quickly as we can before any government stabilization of said country.
7. Scratch head and wonder why we can't combat the corruption from within the government.
8. Tie the hands of troops on the ground from combating the corruption.
9. Throw tons of money at corruption problem.
10. Wonder why corruption is getting worse.
11. Not understand why the locals are supporting the enemy because of corruption.
12. Spend more money training and equipping local army and police.
13. Shake head in disgust when all equipment and personnel end up with the enemy.
14. Put somebody else in command.
15. Repeat 2-14 every 10-15 months.
16. Pack up and head out in the middle of the night with no exit plan.
17. Leave all equipment behind for the enemy.
18. Show back up a year later still with no plan.
19. Get attacked with same equipment that was left behind.
20. Go home and get out of military and hope our sons and daughters can do a better job.
1. Appoint somebody to be in command.
2. Come up with new acronyms for everything.
3. Put in request for new camouflage pattern. (That will be filled after this war is over, but before the next one)
4. Come up with ROEs that will insure only the enemy is safe.
5. Find a spot to put the Air Force and the super huge PX, Starbucks, and KFC so that they are just far enough out that an airstrike is always 30 minutes too late.
6. Turn over country as quickly as we can before any government stabilization of said country.
7. Scratch head and wonder why we can't combat the corruption from within the government.
8. Tie the hands of troops on the ground from combating the corruption.
9. Throw tons of money at corruption problem.
10. Wonder why corruption is getting worse.
11. Not understand why the locals are supporting the enemy because of corruption.
12. Spend more money training and equipping local army and police.
13. Shake head in disgust when all equipment and personnel end up with the enemy.
14. Put somebody else in command.
15. Repeat 2-14 every 10-15 months.
16. Pack up and head out in the middle of the night with no exit plan.
17. Leave all equipment behind for the enemy.
18. Show back up a year later still with no plan.
19. Get attacked with same equipment that was left behind.
20. Go home and get out of military and hope our sons and daughters can do a better job.
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