Posted on Aug 16, 2024
Learning to See – In an Age of Constant, Continuous Crisis
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The first two decades of the 21 st century can be characterized by a singular word: crisis.
From September 11th , 2001, to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the 2008 housing and financial crisis, to nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea, to COVID-19, to the more recent wars in Ukraine and Gaza, to a potential conflict in the South China Sea with China; constant, continuous, interconnected, and global crises have become the hallmark of our time.
Also notable has been our inability to adequately respond to these ongoing crises. Constant, continuous crisis has exposed a critical flaw in our institutions – a “failure to see.”
How often have you heard the following: “there was a failure to connect the dots.” Or how about former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ well-known quip: “the United States has a perfect record in modern times in predicting when and where future outbreaks of war will occur – it always gets it wrong.” And who can forget the now infamous line from the 9/11 Commission Report: “The most important failure was one of imagination.”
We have a “failure to see.” The central nature of the “failure to see” problem is one of discernment – an inability to recognize and act on interconnections and do so rapidly. And there is no more guilty party in this failure than our institutions.
Our institutions undergird our political system and our social fabric. Our institutions provide anchor and stability in society. Indeed, our institutions – both public and private – play a critical role in sustaining our country and society. Accordingly, when our institutions fail, countries fail; societies fail; and political systems fail.
The unfortunate truth is our institutions do not have a good track record. They over-index on reactively responding to crisis; they then under-index; and when all hope seems to be lost, they, from time to time, finally get it right. But it only comes after significant – sometimes unrecoverable – damage is done. In a rapidly changing world, such a sinusoidal approach is not only insufficient for the modern world – it is suicidal.
Our institutions have “failure to see” because they rely on rule-based, linear models designed to address discrete, defined, and known events – so-called “known knowns.” They are not designed for discernment – the ability to see known unknowns much less unknown unknowns.
This is a problem because unimagined challenges and unforeseen problems leads to livelihoods lost, life savings evaporated, and, in the most extreme case, death.
Therefore, the central issue of our time is not necessarily the problems we face, it is whether our institutions – from the government to large corporations – can respond to constant, continuous, often unforeseen crises.
To thrive in this environment, institutions must adopt a new way of seeing – one that not only contemplates the integrated nature of crises but also navigates such crises through metaphors, narratives, and frames that enable the integration of complex and seemingly disconnected information.
The good news is we have dealt with interconnected, complex crises before. In the more than 20 years since 9/11, the United States transformed much of our national security apparatus, intelligence community, and law enforcement. There was a recognition that we need to “learn to see” to get ahead of the next crisis. Out of this came new agencies, new information sharing rules, new technologies such as drones, and new ways to understand complexity.
This is not to say these changes have led to success. Quite the contrary, much of these changes remain insufficient to the need. So, how can our institutions further adapt and learn to see? It starts with developing learning-oriented models, frames, and approaches.
My PhD dissertation investigated the 20 years since 9/11. As I reviewed the scholarship of policy perspective and decisionmaking during crisis, I recognized that we do not often pair these two concepts together. In the real-world, politicians on the campaign trail have a policy perspective on various issues. They are often asked what they would do in certain circumstances. But they are not often asked how they would actually make choices – particularly within the context of crisis.
Instead, both our political leaders as well as our country’s business leaders running large institutions seem to rely on their going-in perspective – their gut feel – rather than a developed framework or worldview.
This is a problem because a leader’s policy perspective tells us almost nothing about how they would actually act during crisis when their assumptions about the world are no longer valid.
An understanding of how political and business leaders would go about making choices within the context of crises would tell us a lot more about what they would actually do.
Leveraging the scholarship around policy perspective and decisionmaking during crisis, I created what I term the “Policy Profile Code” This “code” encompasses four profiles, which provides us insight into potential worldviews of a leader running an institution.
This framework categorizes crises into four distinct profiles, each requiring a tailored response:
The Commander: This profile is for crises that demand immediate, authoritative action such as natural disasters or security threats. Institutions must act swiftly and decisively to mitigate immediate damage and stabilize the situation.
The Prosecutor: This profile addresses systemic failures needing comprehensive investigation and accountability such as financial scandals or corruption. These situations require in-depth scrutiny, legal action, and policy changes to address root causes and restore public trust.
The Negotiator: This profile is for crises involving complex stakeholder interactions that need mediation and negotiation such as community or social conflicts. Effective resolution requires navigating diverse interests and finding common ground.
The Doctor: This profile focuses on long-term, persistent issues needing sustained intervention such as healthcare reform or environmental challenges. These crises demand ongoing effort, systemic reform and a strategic vision for long-term solutions.
By adopting this framework, societal institutions could move beyond a one-size-fits-all approach and tailor their responses to the specific nature of each crisis. Institutions that can accurately identify and apply the appropriate profile will be better equipped to effectively address the challenge.
Constant and continuous crisis will remain the central, defining characteristic of our time. Traditional rule-based institutional systems are inadequate for this new reality. The critical challenges of our time demand a new way of seeing.
By embracing metaphors, frames, and narratives, institutions will be better able to not only connect the dots…
But also see.
Dr. Alex Gallo is a US Army Veteran and author of “Vetspective,” a RallyPoint series that discusses national security, foreign policy, politics, and society and highlights the analysis of thought-leaders, policy analysts, and scholars. Alex is a Senior Vice President with NobleReach Foundation. He also serves as a fellow with George Mason University’s National Security Institute and an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. Follow him on Twitter at @AlexGalloUSA.
From September 11th , 2001, to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the 2008 housing and financial crisis, to nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea, to COVID-19, to the more recent wars in Ukraine and Gaza, to a potential conflict in the South China Sea with China; constant, continuous, interconnected, and global crises have become the hallmark of our time.
Also notable has been our inability to adequately respond to these ongoing crises. Constant, continuous crisis has exposed a critical flaw in our institutions – a “failure to see.”
How often have you heard the following: “there was a failure to connect the dots.” Or how about former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ well-known quip: “the United States has a perfect record in modern times in predicting when and where future outbreaks of war will occur – it always gets it wrong.” And who can forget the now infamous line from the 9/11 Commission Report: “The most important failure was one of imagination.”
We have a “failure to see.” The central nature of the “failure to see” problem is one of discernment – an inability to recognize and act on interconnections and do so rapidly. And there is no more guilty party in this failure than our institutions.
Our institutions undergird our political system and our social fabric. Our institutions provide anchor and stability in society. Indeed, our institutions – both public and private – play a critical role in sustaining our country and society. Accordingly, when our institutions fail, countries fail; societies fail; and political systems fail.
The unfortunate truth is our institutions do not have a good track record. They over-index on reactively responding to crisis; they then under-index; and when all hope seems to be lost, they, from time to time, finally get it right. But it only comes after significant – sometimes unrecoverable – damage is done. In a rapidly changing world, such a sinusoidal approach is not only insufficient for the modern world – it is suicidal.
Our institutions have “failure to see” because they rely on rule-based, linear models designed to address discrete, defined, and known events – so-called “known knowns.” They are not designed for discernment – the ability to see known unknowns much less unknown unknowns.
This is a problem because unimagined challenges and unforeseen problems leads to livelihoods lost, life savings evaporated, and, in the most extreme case, death.
Therefore, the central issue of our time is not necessarily the problems we face, it is whether our institutions – from the government to large corporations – can respond to constant, continuous, often unforeseen crises.
To thrive in this environment, institutions must adopt a new way of seeing – one that not only contemplates the integrated nature of crises but also navigates such crises through metaphors, narratives, and frames that enable the integration of complex and seemingly disconnected information.
The good news is we have dealt with interconnected, complex crises before. In the more than 20 years since 9/11, the United States transformed much of our national security apparatus, intelligence community, and law enforcement. There was a recognition that we need to “learn to see” to get ahead of the next crisis. Out of this came new agencies, new information sharing rules, new technologies such as drones, and new ways to understand complexity.
This is not to say these changes have led to success. Quite the contrary, much of these changes remain insufficient to the need. So, how can our institutions further adapt and learn to see? It starts with developing learning-oriented models, frames, and approaches.
My PhD dissertation investigated the 20 years since 9/11. As I reviewed the scholarship of policy perspective and decisionmaking during crisis, I recognized that we do not often pair these two concepts together. In the real-world, politicians on the campaign trail have a policy perspective on various issues. They are often asked what they would do in certain circumstances. But they are not often asked how they would actually make choices – particularly within the context of crisis.
Instead, both our political leaders as well as our country’s business leaders running large institutions seem to rely on their going-in perspective – their gut feel – rather than a developed framework or worldview.
This is a problem because a leader’s policy perspective tells us almost nothing about how they would actually act during crisis when their assumptions about the world are no longer valid.
An understanding of how political and business leaders would go about making choices within the context of crises would tell us a lot more about what they would actually do.
Leveraging the scholarship around policy perspective and decisionmaking during crisis, I created what I term the “Policy Profile Code” This “code” encompasses four profiles, which provides us insight into potential worldviews of a leader running an institution.
This framework categorizes crises into four distinct profiles, each requiring a tailored response:
The Commander: This profile is for crises that demand immediate, authoritative action such as natural disasters or security threats. Institutions must act swiftly and decisively to mitigate immediate damage and stabilize the situation.
The Prosecutor: This profile addresses systemic failures needing comprehensive investigation and accountability such as financial scandals or corruption. These situations require in-depth scrutiny, legal action, and policy changes to address root causes and restore public trust.
The Negotiator: This profile is for crises involving complex stakeholder interactions that need mediation and negotiation such as community or social conflicts. Effective resolution requires navigating diverse interests and finding common ground.
The Doctor: This profile focuses on long-term, persistent issues needing sustained intervention such as healthcare reform or environmental challenges. These crises demand ongoing effort, systemic reform and a strategic vision for long-term solutions.
By adopting this framework, societal institutions could move beyond a one-size-fits-all approach and tailor their responses to the specific nature of each crisis. Institutions that can accurately identify and apply the appropriate profile will be better equipped to effectively address the challenge.
Constant and continuous crisis will remain the central, defining characteristic of our time. Traditional rule-based institutional systems are inadequate for this new reality. The critical challenges of our time demand a new way of seeing.
By embracing metaphors, frames, and narratives, institutions will be better able to not only connect the dots…
But also see.
Dr. Alex Gallo is a US Army Veteran and author of “Vetspective,” a RallyPoint series that discusses national security, foreign policy, politics, and society and highlights the analysis of thought-leaders, policy analysts, and scholars. Alex is a Senior Vice President with NobleReach Foundation. He also serves as a fellow with George Mason University’s National Security Institute and an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. Follow him on Twitter at @AlexGalloUSA.
Policy
Foreign Affairs
VetSpective
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 11
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I can agree with much of what you said.
My only difference is:
"constant, continuous, interconnected, and global crises have become the hallmark of our time."
I believe that is true of the entire existence of the human race, from the time we formed tribal states.
My only difference is:
"constant, continuous, interconnected, and global crises have become the hallmark of our time."
I believe that is true of the entire existence of the human race, from the time we formed tribal states.
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SPC Joel Quey
I'm not sure how global and interconnected the crises were before we had mass public transportation, but you are 100% correct about us having constant, continuous crises for all of human history. And those crises were often more dire than what we face now (for a whole host of well-documented reasons).
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Maj Bruce Miller
The real difference between historical conflicts and world conflicts today is technology. Human nature hasn't changed. The way by which we deal with international conflict has hugely changed with the changes in weaponry, communications and transportation.
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CPT Alex Gallo I like the framework - simple and easy to follow. I don't see a moral component in your summary posted here...is there one? And if so, how would it apply to each profile you describe? I'm not trying to start a your truth-my truth food fight...just I don't believe any leadership approach will work well for long without a moral compass to help guide it.
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MAJ Montgomery Granger
The Army values set a moral and ethical foundation for military decision making: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage (LDRSHIP). It's a good start, but it has to be practiced, analyzed and then improved upon or maintained throughout the institution. Since our military is civilian led, the DoD needs to have a similar code.
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Our institutions fail because they are politically based instead of needs or purposed based. Over time, the bureaucrats and technocrats who run these institutions become further and further detached from reality and data driven decision making. Figuring out the most likely enemy action or reaction requires reality-based analysis, and reason-based assumptions. This is all part of the military planning model that seems to escape DoD civilian planners and leaders. The second Obama administration was famous for having only ONE cabinet member with any military experience or background, and that one member was often disinvited or ignored when it came to world view decision making. The idea that theorists can make the best multi-polar real world crisis decisions is both fool hearty and dysfunctional. This method of decision making has led to exacerbated and embarrassing decisions, such Obama's "red line in the sand," Benghazi, calling ISIS the "JV Team," withdrawing from Iraq just when things were under control, Joe Biden's debacle in Afghanistan, and many others. You've heard: "Right person for the right job?" Well, too often, our institutions put the wrong person in the wrong job. I like your analysis, now, how do you implement it? Hooah!
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CPT Alex Gallo
Funny how your framework seems to parallel the leadership style of the former Soviet Union after WWII till the fall of the Berlin Wall. Same thing but different wording.
As to our institutions they seem to have done quite well during the past 248 years. We have declared War 11 times during 5 different conflicts and have fought many "Non Declared Wars" and yet our institutions have remained intact.
Given your Study was just a snapshot in time which in my eyes renders your conclusions irrelevant. Your data set is flawed since you are taking only about 8% of this Nations experience and promulgating a series of reforms. Quite the small sample size don'y you think. I cannot believe anyone would be making decisions based on so little data. Doing so exposes a serious flaw/s in any such work. Of course your Reforms that remind one of Soviet leadership after WWII.
You go on about "known knowns" as if they are some kind of determent to decision making in a crisis which frankly is not true. It is through crises that we expand our knowledge base which you call your known knowns. Without a crisis there is no learning. No increase in our knowledge base. No progress.
Of course of all people you should know that no plan ever survives it's initial implementation or first contact. You can develop the ultimate plan with well thought out contingencies and it will not survive its initial implementation.
You say something that I think is the silliest thing I've ever heard and that is: "Our institutions have “failure to see” because they rely on rule-based, linear models designed to address discrete, defined, and known events – so-called “known knowns.” They are not designed for discernment – the ability to see known unknowns much less unknown unknowns.
First off our institutions can only deal with situations/crises that they or another have already experienced due to our limited knowledge base. We cannot know the unknown as there is an infinite set of possible crises (decisions). Any decision, action or inaction no matter how inconsequential starts a cascading chain of possibilities.
I can't remember where I read this but it speaks volumes.
“The basic idea of Western science is that you don’t have to take into account the falling of a leaf on some planet in another galaxy when you’re trying to account for the motion of a billiard ball on a pool table on earth.”
Had you taken the time to read the following your work product would have been much better then what you present here.
The 6 Postulates of Quantum Mechanics.
Lorenz's paper on Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow.
Chaos: Making A New Science.
The Misbehaviour of Markets by Mandelbrot and Hudson.
Ray Bradbury’s A Sound of Thunder which is a must read. Think entropy and time.
Plus you must have an understanding of the Physics of Relationships when dealing with people.
Remember this All Models are False.
All Models are False.
.All Models are False
Now onto politics.
As former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neil said: All Politics is Local.
Any politician wishing to get elected must follow this one immutable political truth. Then you go on to say another silly thing and that is:
Instead, both our political leaders as well as our country’s business leaders running large institutions seem to rely on their going-in perspective – their gut feel – rather than a developed framework or worldview.
The "Gut Feel" is based on their accumulative knowledge acquired through education and life experiences. Life experiences is always the default go to in any situation as education will only produce additional crises. Also you cannot fit a crisis into a framework or worldview without causing additional crises as neither the framework or worldview takes in all of the infinite possibilities that can arise in a crisis.
All I can say CPT Alex Gallo is that your work is seriously lacking.
Funny how your framework seems to parallel the leadership style of the former Soviet Union after WWII till the fall of the Berlin Wall. Same thing but different wording.
As to our institutions they seem to have done quite well during the past 248 years. We have declared War 11 times during 5 different conflicts and have fought many "Non Declared Wars" and yet our institutions have remained intact.
Given your Study was just a snapshot in time which in my eyes renders your conclusions irrelevant. Your data set is flawed since you are taking only about 8% of this Nations experience and promulgating a series of reforms. Quite the small sample size don'y you think. I cannot believe anyone would be making decisions based on so little data. Doing so exposes a serious flaw/s in any such work. Of course your Reforms that remind one of Soviet leadership after WWII.
You go on about "known knowns" as if they are some kind of determent to decision making in a crisis which frankly is not true. It is through crises that we expand our knowledge base which you call your known knowns. Without a crisis there is no learning. No increase in our knowledge base. No progress.
Of course of all people you should know that no plan ever survives it's initial implementation or first contact. You can develop the ultimate plan with well thought out contingencies and it will not survive its initial implementation.
You say something that I think is the silliest thing I've ever heard and that is: "Our institutions have “failure to see” because they rely on rule-based, linear models designed to address discrete, defined, and known events – so-called “known knowns.” They are not designed for discernment – the ability to see known unknowns much less unknown unknowns.
First off our institutions can only deal with situations/crises that they or another have already experienced due to our limited knowledge base. We cannot know the unknown as there is an infinite set of possible crises (decisions). Any decision, action or inaction no matter how inconsequential starts a cascading chain of possibilities.
I can't remember where I read this but it speaks volumes.
“The basic idea of Western science is that you don’t have to take into account the falling of a leaf on some planet in another galaxy when you’re trying to account for the motion of a billiard ball on a pool table on earth.”
Had you taken the time to read the following your work product would have been much better then what you present here.
The 6 Postulates of Quantum Mechanics.
Lorenz's paper on Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow.
Chaos: Making A New Science.
The Misbehaviour of Markets by Mandelbrot and Hudson.
Ray Bradbury’s A Sound of Thunder which is a must read. Think entropy and time.
Plus you must have an understanding of the Physics of Relationships when dealing with people.
Remember this All Models are False.
All Models are False.
.All Models are False
Now onto politics.
As former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neil said: All Politics is Local.
Any politician wishing to get elected must follow this one immutable political truth. Then you go on to say another silly thing and that is:
Instead, both our political leaders as well as our country’s business leaders running large institutions seem to rely on their going-in perspective – their gut feel – rather than a developed framework or worldview.
The "Gut Feel" is based on their accumulative knowledge acquired through education and life experiences. Life experiences is always the default go to in any situation as education will only produce additional crises. Also you cannot fit a crisis into a framework or worldview without causing additional crises as neither the framework or worldview takes in all of the infinite possibilities that can arise in a crisis.
All I can say CPT Alex Gallo is that your work is seriously lacking.
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I always hoped and imagined the "think tanks" and institutes are gaming out all possible scenarios and have contingency plans "in the cupboards" to break out when defecation hits the oscillating air mover:) Maybe I was being too optimistic as Dr. Gallo makes good points about getting blind sided a lot! Just read or watch The Looming Tower (book or movie) and one will see "upper management" was not listening to us "boots on the ground" types who saw that train coming down the tracks. Had they listened we would have been more prepared and might have avoided a lot of death and destruction.
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TSgt (Join to see)
The challenge with your thinking…from my experience and perspective…lessons learned are deemed worthless in the absence of conflict or chaos. As those who have experienced certain acts or events depart or take on new command, those lessons lose their importance in the handing over to ones who didn’t experience the lesson or loss. In those moments, especially in the absence of crisis, “leaders” often pursue ways to elevate themselves or make themselves stand out. Time and $$ spent on training for things that “have happened” have little value to them who don’t recognize the cyclical nature of humanity (perhaps cyclical because we don’t value what has happened). As a medical provider, I saw this each and everyday on active duty. Readiness was always sacrificed for the sake of a new namesake program or program of social popularity and quick to draw media attention. This was especially true in high visibility commands. For myself, it was only through moonlighting that I was made ready to go down range where “awareness training” had no impact on mission outcome or troops coming home. 15-18 years ago, it became very unpopular to call the out the obvious. WE took on the attitude character or “The Emperor’s New Clothes”. As long as we documented success, or at least never allowed for the opportunity to potentially demonstrate failure, we’ll…failure didn’t exist.
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I definitely feel like our institutions struggle to keep up with the fast pace of crises. It’s frustrating how they often just react instead of taking proactive measures. I really like the idea of having different profiles for crises; that could lead to better outcomes instead of trying to apply the same solution to everything. I’ve noticed that complex situations often get oversimplified, which just creates more problems later on. It’s clear that we need leaders who can adapt and think critically, rather than just going with their gut feelings, especially in times of uncertainty.
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CPT Alex Gallo Well thought-out and presented framework.
On the homefront, in people's personal lives. constant crises takes a toll it is more difficult to distance from and view objectively and dispassionately. A friend expressed it in this way about "constant, continuous, interconnected, and global crises":
"I love America and this love feels like being married to an abuser who harms your family and puts you down and says you don't matter, and you love them because you keep looking at the good parts and practice a lot of denial about the other side . . ."
On the homefront, in people's personal lives. constant crises takes a toll it is more difficult to distance from and view objectively and dispassionately. A friend expressed it in this way about "constant, continuous, interconnected, and global crises":
"I love America and this love feels like being married to an abuser who harms your family and puts you down and says you don't matter, and you love them because you keep looking at the good parts and practice a lot of denial about the other side . . ."
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