Posted on Dec 19, 2023
The 9/11 Parable: What Can Israel Learn from the United States’ Post-9/11 Counterterrorism Experience?
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In the wake of the horrific and devastating attacks by HAMAS against Israel, some have drawn comparisons, likening it Israel’s 9/11. The United States underwent a transformation of its counterterrorism strategies following 9/11. In much the same way, Israel may well now face the formidable challenge of reassessing its approach to counterterrorism following the October 7th terrorist attack.
What can Israel learn from the post-9/11 experience of the United States?
The evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policy in the post-9/11 era provides valuable insights for Israel in this moment. My research as part of a PhD dissertation into the development and evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policy during the 20 years following 9/11 revealed four distinct "profiles for policymakers engaging in counterterrorism: The Commander, The Prosecutor, The Negotiator, and The Doctor. Bush, Obama, and Trump respectively adopted the first three policymaker profiles. Notably, none of the post-9/11 U.S. presidents adopted The Doctor profile. Why?
The Doctor is the most complex of the four profiles to implement because it calls for the contemplation of the maximum amount of information with the most open decisionmaking mindset. A policymaker who is a “Doctor” relies on iteration to identify the root cause drivers of the terrorism threat and then develops a policy solution. The challenge with this policy approach is it takes time and, thereby, could be perceived as indecisive – a less preferable image for political leaders during a crisis. All the while, The Doctor must manage the need for closure in society regarding the terrorist event, which is extremely difficult particularly given the horrific nature of terrorism as we witnessed through HAMAS’ October 7th terrorist attack.
But if The Doctor can be effectively implemented, it holds the promise of decisively addressing the terrorism because any response would be based on more complete information than was available in the days and weeks following the terrorist attack. This is a critical difference between The Doctor and the other policy profiles because they tend to quickly and immediately move to closure often based on incomplete and even inaccurate information.
During the Bush Administration, we witnessed the negative effects and risks of reflexively bending to the immediate need for closure and making decisions based on incomplete and inaccurate information. My research categorized the Bush Administration as a “Commander” – aiming to swiftly resolve the crisis of 9/11 by responding based on the information available in the immediate aftermath but not the after-action review. Although this approach seemed to be the right path in the crisis moment given the horrific aftermath of 9/11, it proved less effective over time. Indeed, rapid decisions based on incomplete and inaccurate information – spanning from the Bush to Obama administrations – resulted in multiple conflicts that had the effect of reducing nation-state and regional stability – not enhancing it – as well as the proliferation, geographic expansion, and evolution of terrorist groups and their jihadist ideology.
The experience of the The Commander approach to counterterrorism suggests effective counterterrorism policy certainly includes curtailing the immediate threat – but goes beyond that.
Effective counterterrorism entails preventing the cancer of terrorism from expanding and destabilizing nation-states and regions. This why a “Doctor” is needed for counterterrorism. The Doctor treats the cancer (terrorism) but is simultaneously mindful of not killing the body (nation-state and regional stability).
Following the October 7 th attacks, adopting The Doctor would entail recognizing the cancer of Iran and its network of proxy organizations and addressing them systematically and precisely. It would also acknowledge that counterterrorism efforts must extend beyond the immediate response to prevent the emergence of new extremists. The Doctor would also not lose sight of opportunities to structurally change the context through measures such as normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel even in the face of the immediate crisis.
The United States and Israel should consider adopting The Doctor approach to counterterrorism at this pivotal moment to guard against re-learning the lessons of 9/11. Because it is through these lessons that a more stable future for the Middle East and beyond can be achieved.
Alex Gallo is the author of “Vetspective,” a RallyPoint series that discusses national security, foreign policy, politics, and society. He is a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs at Leiden University and a fellow with George Mason University’s National Security Institute and the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Alex is also an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and a US Army Veteran.
Follow him on Twitter at @AlexGalloCMP.
What can Israel learn from the post-9/11 experience of the United States?
The evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policy in the post-9/11 era provides valuable insights for Israel in this moment. My research as part of a PhD dissertation into the development and evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policy during the 20 years following 9/11 revealed four distinct "profiles for policymakers engaging in counterterrorism: The Commander, The Prosecutor, The Negotiator, and The Doctor. Bush, Obama, and Trump respectively adopted the first three policymaker profiles. Notably, none of the post-9/11 U.S. presidents adopted The Doctor profile. Why?
The Doctor is the most complex of the four profiles to implement because it calls for the contemplation of the maximum amount of information with the most open decisionmaking mindset. A policymaker who is a “Doctor” relies on iteration to identify the root cause drivers of the terrorism threat and then develops a policy solution. The challenge with this policy approach is it takes time and, thereby, could be perceived as indecisive – a less preferable image for political leaders during a crisis. All the while, The Doctor must manage the need for closure in society regarding the terrorist event, which is extremely difficult particularly given the horrific nature of terrorism as we witnessed through HAMAS’ October 7th terrorist attack.
But if The Doctor can be effectively implemented, it holds the promise of decisively addressing the terrorism because any response would be based on more complete information than was available in the days and weeks following the terrorist attack. This is a critical difference between The Doctor and the other policy profiles because they tend to quickly and immediately move to closure often based on incomplete and even inaccurate information.
During the Bush Administration, we witnessed the negative effects and risks of reflexively bending to the immediate need for closure and making decisions based on incomplete and inaccurate information. My research categorized the Bush Administration as a “Commander” – aiming to swiftly resolve the crisis of 9/11 by responding based on the information available in the immediate aftermath but not the after-action review. Although this approach seemed to be the right path in the crisis moment given the horrific aftermath of 9/11, it proved less effective over time. Indeed, rapid decisions based on incomplete and inaccurate information – spanning from the Bush to Obama administrations – resulted in multiple conflicts that had the effect of reducing nation-state and regional stability – not enhancing it – as well as the proliferation, geographic expansion, and evolution of terrorist groups and their jihadist ideology.
The experience of the The Commander approach to counterterrorism suggests effective counterterrorism policy certainly includes curtailing the immediate threat – but goes beyond that.
Effective counterterrorism entails preventing the cancer of terrorism from expanding and destabilizing nation-states and regions. This why a “Doctor” is needed for counterterrorism. The Doctor treats the cancer (terrorism) but is simultaneously mindful of not killing the body (nation-state and regional stability).
Following the October 7 th attacks, adopting The Doctor would entail recognizing the cancer of Iran and its network of proxy organizations and addressing them systematically and precisely. It would also acknowledge that counterterrorism efforts must extend beyond the immediate response to prevent the emergence of new extremists. The Doctor would also not lose sight of opportunities to structurally change the context through measures such as normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel even in the face of the immediate crisis.
The United States and Israel should consider adopting The Doctor approach to counterterrorism at this pivotal moment to guard against re-learning the lessons of 9/11. Because it is through these lessons that a more stable future for the Middle East and beyond can be achieved.
Alex Gallo is the author of “Vetspective,” a RallyPoint series that discusses national security, foreign policy, politics, and society. He is a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs at Leiden University and a fellow with George Mason University’s National Security Institute and the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Alex is also an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and a US Army Veteran.
Follow him on Twitter at @AlexGalloCMP.
International Relations
Government
National Security
Terrorism
Edited 5 mo ago
Posted 5 mo ago
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Thank you for sharing your insights. I see the Global War on Terror, still ongoing of course, in light of the great philosopher/general Sun Tzu: One hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skillful. Subduing the enemy without battle is the most skillful. The Tao of Terror, as it were, requires your "Doctor" approach, but also a combination of the most effective aspects of Commander, Prosecutor and Negotiator. But the end result must be total annihilation of the enemy - the final principle of war, the one most ignored. The one suggested by Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., at the end of WWII, the one that got him killed. We lack effective leadership in this regard, and there are forces at work that would rather see perpetual conflict than a permanent solution. Us military folks know how to plan, execute and then succeed in battle. But all battlefields are multilayered now, and success seems more and more simply surviving because there are forces out of our control which influence victory conditions, which seem fluid. A "win" today is tomorrow's "defeat." Information changes. Intelligence is never 100 percent accurate. The enemy and civilians are indistinguishable. We need to adjust our expectations. As long as political influences deter or change sound military goals, we will never win, which is again, the goal of influences out of our control. When political and military goals are the same, we win. When they are different, we fail. Winning on the battlefield is one thing, winning the peace is another. But we run around trying to reinvent a wheel that's fine just the way it is: Post WWII, the Marshall Plan WORKED. 78 years after the end of WWII, sworn enemies of the US are now some of the most prosperous and peaceful in the world, not despite the US, but because of us and the Marshall Plan. Germany, Japan and Italy, et al, were rebuilt. Where is the Middle East Marshall Plan? Read T.E. Lawrence and you'll have your answer. 50 Muslim majority countries can't get out of their own way to deal with super regional problems, such as Gaza. Now it's Israel's turn.
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What can they learn from us? At present: what not to do in order to effectively defeat and annihilate an adversary. Go back to WWII and right before Korea: maintain logistical superiority and openly show disrespect to the adversary (not so much the European theater but the Pacific).
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