Posted on Aug 7, 2016
The Evolution and Implementation of the Logistics Officer Corps
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[From my 2012 Army War College Strategy Research Project...]
It has been four [now eight] years since the Secretary of the Army created the [Logistics] LG branch, and now is the right time to reflect on this new branch. How did the logistics community get to where it is today? Has the Army's implementation of the LG branch gone as planned? Has the advent of the LG branch created any unintended consequences? If so, what are they, and what has been their impact? Should the Army address these unintended consequences, can they be corrected, and what is the next logical step?
The Army’s implementation of the LG branch in 2008 was not an end state, but rather the latest milestone in an ongoing evolutionary process to improve how best to sustain our fighting forces and develop our logistics leaders. The implementation required detailed planning that was able to capitalize on an impressive body of scholarly work by officers who spent the previous decade contemplating if and how best to establish a logistics officer corps. The implementation plan was able to capitalize on earlier evolutionary changes such as the dual-track [Functional Area] 90 Logistician Program that provided multifunctional experience to officers at a time when new tactical formations placed a greater demand on logisticians having a breadth of experience across all logistics functions. The revised Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course [CLOAC] and later Captains Career Course [CLC3] similarly provided timely multifunctional skills and education to a generation of captains. With the Army’s modular transformation adding additional FA 90 positions to the force structure, and with [Combined Arms Support Command] CASCOM converting more and more functional positions to FA 90 positions, logistics officers were ready and waiting for change by the time the Army implemented the LG branch.
However, the implementation had some unintended consequences. Due to vague initial implementation guidance the personnel requisition process created an environment where career managers lost visibility of logistics positions that required functional skills and experience. The Army’s FY 2012 change to DA PAM 611-21 solves this problem provided personnel requisitions display the newly established functional logistics Secondary Qualification Indicators, and units recognize the functional requirements as annotated on their authorization documents. [In the four years since this paper and identification of this issue, HRC still only creates 90A00 (vice 90A88, 90A91, and 90A92) positions, ignoring the MTOE and TDA authorizations for hundreds of functional OD, QM and TC specific positions]
Another unintended consequence is that some unit commanders now view all logistics officers as multifunctional and regularly employ basic branch OD, QM and TC lieutenants in positions for which they have no institutional training. The [Sustainment Center of Excellence] SCOE can solve this problem by revising the program of instruction of each of the OD, QM and TC Basic Officer Leader Courses to ensure lieutenants arrive at their first duty assignment with an elementary understanding of all the logistics functions.
Finally, TRADOC and the SCOE would better serve the logistics officer corps if they redesigned the Army’s premier logistics university to provide advanced degree-awarding programs as was originally articulated 45 years ago at its inception.
LG branch implementation has been successful, widely accepted, and provided great benefit to the Army. There is always room for improvement, and the history of the evolution of how we sustain our fighting forces indicates that more change is yet to come.
[you can download and pdf and read the full paper here...]
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561851
It has been four [now eight] years since the Secretary of the Army created the [Logistics] LG branch, and now is the right time to reflect on this new branch. How did the logistics community get to where it is today? Has the Army's implementation of the LG branch gone as planned? Has the advent of the LG branch created any unintended consequences? If so, what are they, and what has been their impact? Should the Army address these unintended consequences, can they be corrected, and what is the next logical step?
The Army’s implementation of the LG branch in 2008 was not an end state, but rather the latest milestone in an ongoing evolutionary process to improve how best to sustain our fighting forces and develop our logistics leaders. The implementation required detailed planning that was able to capitalize on an impressive body of scholarly work by officers who spent the previous decade contemplating if and how best to establish a logistics officer corps. The implementation plan was able to capitalize on earlier evolutionary changes such as the dual-track [Functional Area] 90 Logistician Program that provided multifunctional experience to officers at a time when new tactical formations placed a greater demand on logisticians having a breadth of experience across all logistics functions. The revised Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course [CLOAC] and later Captains Career Course [CLC3] similarly provided timely multifunctional skills and education to a generation of captains. With the Army’s modular transformation adding additional FA 90 positions to the force structure, and with [Combined Arms Support Command] CASCOM converting more and more functional positions to FA 90 positions, logistics officers were ready and waiting for change by the time the Army implemented the LG branch.
However, the implementation had some unintended consequences. Due to vague initial implementation guidance the personnel requisition process created an environment where career managers lost visibility of logistics positions that required functional skills and experience. The Army’s FY 2012 change to DA PAM 611-21 solves this problem provided personnel requisitions display the newly established functional logistics Secondary Qualification Indicators, and units recognize the functional requirements as annotated on their authorization documents. [In the four years since this paper and identification of this issue, HRC still only creates 90A00 (vice 90A88, 90A91, and 90A92) positions, ignoring the MTOE and TDA authorizations for hundreds of functional OD, QM and TC specific positions]
Another unintended consequence is that some unit commanders now view all logistics officers as multifunctional and regularly employ basic branch OD, QM and TC lieutenants in positions for which they have no institutional training. The [Sustainment Center of Excellence] SCOE can solve this problem by revising the program of instruction of each of the OD, QM and TC Basic Officer Leader Courses to ensure lieutenants arrive at their first duty assignment with an elementary understanding of all the logistics functions.
Finally, TRADOC and the SCOE would better serve the logistics officer corps if they redesigned the Army’s premier logistics university to provide advanced degree-awarding programs as was originally articulated 45 years ago at its inception.
LG branch implementation has been successful, widely accepted, and provided great benefit to the Army. There is always room for improvement, and the history of the evolution of how we sustain our fighting forces indicates that more change is yet to come.
[you can download and pdf and read the full paper here...]
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561851
Command Post
92A-Officer: Quartermaster Officer
88A: Transportation Officer
91A-Officer: Ordnance Officer
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 3
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I attended QM OAC in '84 as a voluntary RA branch transfer from FA. One thing I noticed is the non-combat arms peers weren't prepared to be maneuver or fires S-4s or BDE staff. The secondary identifier is critical to get the right knowledge and experience into staff slots in combat units. Likewise it is just as important in getting the right knowledge into depot and TDA support slots.
Bottom line, experience is just as important as knowledge. Just picture a Maj who grew up as an IN LT, FSB Co CD-R, BDE S-4 and a MSB SPO going to a slot that was 90% GSers and had no combat or training mission. At the same time take a Maj who was TDA in depots or Corps Support Commands all their time. Would they be the first choice BDE Task Force S-4 or FSB SPO?
Bottom line, experience is just as important as knowledge. Just picture a Maj who grew up as an IN LT, FSB Co CD-R, BDE S-4 and a MSB SPO going to a slot that was 90% GSers and had no combat or training mission. At the same time take a Maj who was TDA in depots or Corps Support Commands all their time. Would they be the first choice BDE Task Force S-4 or FSB SPO?
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Sir, I think the unintended consequences are that MCoE is now advocating and SCoE is doing quite frankly nothing in terms of developing tactical Logisticians. The trend today is to put Infantry or Armor CPTs in as the FSC Commander. The SPO of MG Wentz's and LTG Perna's day is foreign to today's BSB CDRs and there is no synergy from the BDE 4/ SPO down to the FSC/ BN S4 level.
If you could I would recommend visiting NTC during TD 06- 10 just so you could appreciate the utter confusion of logistic doctrine and execution from a Divisional perspective.
If you could I would recommend visiting NTC during TD 06- 10 just so you could appreciate the utter confusion of logistic doctrine and execution from a Divisional perspective.
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COL Sam Russell
LTC (Join to see), thanks for the response. If true, that is a stunning and deeply discouraging trend. I certainly didn't see that in my time as a BSB Cdr in the 4/10 BCT. Not only were the FSC commanders loggies that I selected, when not deployed they were rated by me, and when deployed, the BCT commander would forward their OERs to me for input before he signed. The SPO and the BDE S4 were the two stud log iron majors in the brigade, and everyone knew it.
Do you think LTG Perna and/or MG Williams are aware of such a trend?
Do you think LTG Perna and/or MG Williams are aware of such a trend?
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LTC (Join to see)
We briefed Gen Perna in 2013-14 about the trend and I failed to have SCoE leadership (GO and SES level) address it. I don't have good hair and I am extremely frank and direct in discussing issues and solutions. Gen Wyche published a paper on FSC support/command relationship but MCoE leadership brushed that off since they control the BCT doctrine and SCoE's focus is on the CSSB and the enterprise.
1st AD started the trend with an Armor Officer as the BSB SPO. It was an interesting experiment. It failed in my opinion but it was successful to the 1AD leadership. One ex: while at a LOGSYNC mtg I had to the SPO that the BCT was Black on CLIII P and critically low on turbo shaft. This did not concern the SPO at all, nor the CW4 Sr. Maint Chief in the mtg. The next day they were moving IIIP via rotary assets. I think a FA90 would have done better.
I think or know that our leaders today that were under the system you described above cannot imagine or what to know the problems with today's FA 90 branch.
Again, I'd recommend a visit to NTC to see for yourself the issues. I could be way off on my assessment but I know I'm not. Then pay a visit to Fort Lee and especially the folks at FID. You will then see two armies. One in the dirt making it happen. And another one in cubicles with FOB logisticians making future decisions that harm the BCT.
1st AD started the trend with an Armor Officer as the BSB SPO. It was an interesting experiment. It failed in my opinion but it was successful to the 1AD leadership. One ex: while at a LOGSYNC mtg I had to the SPO that the BCT was Black on CLIII P and critically low on turbo shaft. This did not concern the SPO at all, nor the CW4 Sr. Maint Chief in the mtg. The next day they were moving IIIP via rotary assets. I think a FA90 would have done better.
I think or know that our leaders today that were under the system you described above cannot imagine or what to know the problems with today's FA 90 branch.
Again, I'd recommend a visit to NTC to see for yourself the issues. I could be way off on my assessment but I know I'm not. Then pay a visit to Fort Lee and especially the folks at FID. You will then see two armies. One in the dirt making it happen. And another one in cubicles with FOB logisticians making future decisions that harm the BCT.
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COL Sam Russell
LTC (Join to see), I will start some queries with a few connections. Do you mind if I mention your name, or would you prefer to be annonymous?
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