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This series focuses on the transition from Company Grade To Field Grade Officer.
If you want to hurt Soldiers – Plan Poorly
Late information crushes Soldiers, Leaders, and organizations. As a Major you are responsible for the dissemination of timely and accurate information. Why is this so hard? How do we fix this common problem? Use these simple time lines and the attached Plan to Plan and you will no longer hurt our most precious asset- Soldiers. Many preach 1/3 : 2/3 but that is really for short notice planning efforts. At ProDev2Go we suggest using the 9:6:4:13 rule within a Division. Division must publish it’s orders nine (9) months prior to execution, Brigade six, Battalion four, and the Company at 13 Weeks. This allows each level to properly resource training and follow the eight step training model. Make no mistake this is difficult and if every level isn’t on board the Company and our troopers suffer greatly. Some are hesitant to publish without complete information along these timeliness. The unit below you would rather have what you know now than wait for perfect information late. Stick to this timeline and FRAGO the plan as additional clarity is gained. To assist you in this effort use the Plan to Plan found Below. Take a Draconian approach to adhere to these planning windows and you will not only become more effective, but will take care of our Soldiers.
Remember to follow ProDev2Go on Wordpress and receive these posts directly in your email.
If you want to hurt Soldiers – Plan Poorly
Late information crushes Soldiers, Leaders, and organizations. As a Major you are responsible for the dissemination of timely and accurate information. Why is this so hard? How do we fix this common problem? Use these simple time lines and the attached Plan to Plan and you will no longer hurt our most precious asset- Soldiers. Many preach 1/3 : 2/3 but that is really for short notice planning efforts. At ProDev2Go we suggest using the 9:6:4:13 rule within a Division. Division must publish it’s orders nine (9) months prior to execution, Brigade six, Battalion four, and the Company at 13 Weeks. This allows each level to properly resource training and follow the eight step training model. Make no mistake this is difficult and if every level isn’t on board the Company and our troopers suffer greatly. Some are hesitant to publish without complete information along these timeliness. The unit below you would rather have what you know now than wait for perfect information late. Stick to this timeline and FRAGO the plan as additional clarity is gained. To assist you in this effort use the Plan to Plan found Below. Take a Draconian approach to adhere to these planning windows and you will not only become more effective, but will take care of our Soldiers.
Remember to follow ProDev2Go on Wordpress and receive these posts directly in your email.
Posted in these groups: 
Maj
Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC)
Leadership
Planning
Command Post
Maj Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Leadership Planning Command Post
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 5
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Where I believe the process goes wrong is the inculcated notion that plans must be "perfect" and complete at the time of issue. Any grunt will tell you how long a plan survives contact.
My solution is both simple and doctrinal - ISSUE A WARNING ORDER as soon as the mission statement and Commander's Intent is drafted. What this does is allow subordinate organizations to do parallel planning on the big items - initiating necessary movement, suspending or reducing distracting activities that conflict, and knowledge of timelines for key benchmarks in execution.
The commander and/or staff can surely issue changes or (gasp) a second WARNO once some facts are known and the commander determines a COA as the MDMP process develops the facts and assumptions.
It isn't hard, but the Army in many organizations stinks at this.
I was a part of the process from beginning to end a few years ago for an NTC rotation. In this, there were certain givens that were known quantities, and the big unknowns were generally logistical and signal support in nature. The BCT got hung up hard in those issues, even though the rail load/ unload and concept of signal support was barely a blip anywhere two echelons below and not much really for their maneuver squadrons save the one that was the most outlying.
What happened was they got really hung up in "solving" these even though they only affected where two retrans sites were and timetables at RSOI back in the RUBA. The WARNO went to the squadrons on a Friday, and while the squadrons were absorbing that, the Brigade went straight into developing the OPORD on Monday, knowingly changing pieces of execution, but not issuing WARNO 2 or an update to WARNO 1 until the OPORD went out over a month later. The result: all sorts of time wasted at the battalion level unnecessarily. The staff was so wrapped up in trying to please their boss that they lost track of the end users.
And it was wholly preventable.
My solution is both simple and doctrinal - ISSUE A WARNING ORDER as soon as the mission statement and Commander's Intent is drafted. What this does is allow subordinate organizations to do parallel planning on the big items - initiating necessary movement, suspending or reducing distracting activities that conflict, and knowledge of timelines for key benchmarks in execution.
The commander and/or staff can surely issue changes or (gasp) a second WARNO once some facts are known and the commander determines a COA as the MDMP process develops the facts and assumptions.
It isn't hard, but the Army in many organizations stinks at this.
I was a part of the process from beginning to end a few years ago for an NTC rotation. In this, there were certain givens that were known quantities, and the big unknowns were generally logistical and signal support in nature. The BCT got hung up hard in those issues, even though the rail load/ unload and concept of signal support was barely a blip anywhere two echelons below and not much really for their maneuver squadrons save the one that was the most outlying.
What happened was they got really hung up in "solving" these even though they only affected where two retrans sites were and timetables at RSOI back in the RUBA. The WARNO went to the squadrons on a Friday, and while the squadrons were absorbing that, the Brigade went straight into developing the OPORD on Monday, knowingly changing pieces of execution, but not issuing WARNO 2 or an update to WARNO 1 until the OPORD went out over a month later. The result: all sorts of time wasted at the battalion level unnecessarily. The staff was so wrapped up in trying to please their boss that they lost track of the end users.
And it was wholly preventable.
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SSG (Join to see)
Excellent comment 1SG (Join to see) May I add also that some individuals also love to feel important and withhold information for banalities?
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1SG (Join to see)
SSG (Join to see) - In this case, it was the Brigade XO but I don't think he was being vindictive to the subordinate units, he was attempting to train the staff. I'll buy that to a point, but it really did give the Squadrons some real issues 30 days out from execution of movement that would have been greatly mitigated if they'd have issued a second WARNO when changes to unload became necessary. They knew the change was needed almost immediately after issuing the WARNO when they got feedback from Fort Irwin, but hadn't truly nailed down the solution until much later. Even with this knowledge, the squadrons were continuing to plan against bad timetables because the brigade didn't issue a retraction of that piece or a warning that it was changing.
Even after they'd fixed it in the plan, organizational inertia and a little Murphy's Law still resulted in chaos at the railhead.
Even after they'd fixed it in the plan, organizational inertia and a little Murphy's Law still resulted in chaos at the railhead.
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Col Coffman, I must say...anymore of this outside the box thinking of making times and not screwing those below you...just might hurt your chance at promotion!! Haha, I obviously jest. This was something we even tried to get pushed more into the doctrine side while I was at DOTD for the aviation proponent. But the issue becomes perfectionists along the chain that refuse to send partial info. I talked to so many in the field that were experiencing that bottleneck at one or two spots.
Personally, I think the push needs to be from top down. Division ensure Bde meets their timeline. Bde ensure Bn, etc, etc...
But that's just my two cents. Give me a grid, freq, and name...I'm good.
Personally, I think the push needs to be from top down. Division ensure Bde meets their timeline. Bde ensure Bn, etc, etc...
But that's just my two cents. Give me a grid, freq, and name...I'm good.
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Sir: You've presumably been in the Army for about 22-30 years. Have you ever actually witnessed a unit follow the 9:6:4:13 rule? While use of this timeline would be great in an ideal world, in my short time in the Army, I can't recall a time when a division-level unit with which I served had much clue about what it would be doing 9 months out, and this compounded the inability of brigade/battalion to publish guidance of any sort more than a handful of weeks or months in advance. Units may have thought they knew what they'd be doing 9 or 6 months or 4 months out, but what they actually ended up doing when 9/6/4 months passed rarely if ever ended up being what they planned for (meaning the orders for what they ended up doing came quick, fast, and in a hurry immediately prior to execution). Companies publishing orders 13 weeks out? Does this actually happen anywhere in the Army? So, while the 9:6:4:13 rule briefs well, it doesn't seem to pass a "reality-check."
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COL (Join to see)
MAJ J - In short, yes. Witnessed it 1st hand as a CPT in our Sister Squadron. I adopted it when I commanded at each level and it works well, but you are correct-- The truth changes and if any echelon doesn't follow the model the lower unit must make greater assumptions to meet the time line. I try to fix my small part of the Army and make it the best I can.
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MAJ (Join to see)
Sir: Good stuff! My experience in infantry units as a junior officer (1ID, 2001-2005) and as a company commander (1st ID, 2005-2008) was that, at the battalion and company levels, we generally received basic info on upcoming training, operations, and missions, more around a couple weeks or months out vs. the expanded timeline you discuss. (Examples: brigade-level deployment notifications, one within 4 months or so of the deployment date, one within three months of the deployment date--where despite being a light infantry brigade and with "the Surge" in Iraq announced, the brigade commander was convinced we'd be an air assault brigade, so refused to allow us to maximize wheeled vehicle training and heavy weapons training--company training deployments on a couple days' notice). My experience since 2008 as a FAO is for some big things (annual meetings or the like), I'll know 8 or so months in advance, but most things beyond a 10 or 14-day window are just unknown. As you note, this drives an enormous amount of assumption, which is never ideal.
Maybe the Big Army has slowed down a bit now and maybe there's a bit more stability. In 1AD, how far out do brigade commanders sign company training schedules? 13 weeks?
Good luck fixing your small part of the Army!
Maybe the Big Army has slowed down a bit now and maybe there's a bit more stability. In 1AD, how far out do brigade commanders sign company training schedules? 13 weeks?
Good luck fixing your small part of the Army!
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