Posted on Sep 6, 2021
Putting the “War” Back in War Colleges | City Journal
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For those who have taken ILE/CGSOC/AOC and SSC/War College... What changes would you recommend?
I know we should at least spend a few days going over an after-action review on what NOT to do in the latest SNAFU/Fiasco fostered by President Biden's Administration (National Security Advisor, DOS/DOD) lack of planning and The Joint Chiefs of Staff lack of push back concerning this preventable failure in Afghanistan.
I am so damn pissed over this avoidable failure and it looks like the Generals and the President just ignored the after-action review from the pullout of Iraq,
, the pull out of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.
I went to the Command and General Staff Officer Course Common Core Course in 2015 to 2016. I graduated as a Major and was Promoted in 2018 to LTC.
I think we spent too much time learning this:
DOTMLPF is defined in the The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System, or JCIDS Process. The JCIDS process provides a solution space that considers solutions involving any combination of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF).
Though we did go over discussions about the Suez Crisis of 1956, the review of the archaic Order of Operation Torch, learning about some clausewitz, we probably should have had more emphasis on warfighting skills. So I didn't take the Advanced Operations Course nor the Army War College, maybe some of you can fill me in on if you disagree or agree with this article?
I also took the reserve component course and not the active-duty course and that may be completely different? Your thoughts, please!
I know we should at least spend a few days going over an after-action review on what NOT to do in the latest SNAFU/Fiasco fostered by President Biden's Administration (National Security Advisor, DOS/DOD) lack of planning and The Joint Chiefs of Staff lack of push back concerning this preventable failure in Afghanistan.
I am so damn pissed over this avoidable failure and it looks like the Generals and the President just ignored the after-action review from the pullout of Iraq,
, the pull out of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.
I went to the Command and General Staff Officer Course Common Core Course in 2015 to 2016. I graduated as a Major and was Promoted in 2018 to LTC.
I think we spent too much time learning this:
DOTMLPF is defined in the The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System, or JCIDS Process. The JCIDS process provides a solution space that considers solutions involving any combination of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF).
Though we did go over discussions about the Suez Crisis of 1956, the review of the archaic Order of Operation Torch, learning about some clausewitz, we probably should have had more emphasis on warfighting skills. So I didn't take the Advanced Operations Course nor the Army War College, maybe some of you can fill me in on if you disagree or agree with this article?
I also took the reserve component course and not the active-duty course and that may be completely different? Your thoughts, please!
Putting the “War” Back in War Colleges | City Journal
Posted from city-journal.orgPosted in these groups: 
Military EducationILE StudentILE Instructor
Army War College
Fort Leavenworth
Military EducationILE StudentILE Instructor Army War College Fort Leavenworth
Edited 4 y ago
Posted 4 y ago
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Not only put "war" back into the topics of discussion but also focus on leadership. The Army is terrible at leadership and often does things that make me question what the heck they were thinking. Focus on leadership at BN-DIV echelon and have it focused on your respective branch vice as a whole. The Army also does a terrible job within leadership schools and they focus WAY too much on writing reports and administrative tasks vice being competent at your MOS related position.
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I second this opinion. In my latest NCOES DL there was a single section on styles of leadership, and nothing on making descisions in combat. Yet we covered Army history, Army MWR, Morals and other things I didnt find important enough to remember.
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From the ground level, one glarring problem stems from SITREPs. I got to see what the roll ups from my SITREPs turned into. My "truth on the ground" detailed SITREP got boiled down to having little to no worthwhile details after they went up my chain of command. So stuff like "LN's report signifigant nightly insurgent activity IVO grid 12345678, and likely weapons cache @ bldg 1234" was boiled down to "insurgent activity in the AO." Then details like "entire IP station believes their station commander is working with the Insurgets" were completely ommitted.
There is a massive gap between the "every Soldier is a sensor" and command.
If we are to believe that "no one for saw Afghanistan falling in 11 days" we should understand there is a massive communications problem. None of the Soldiers I have spoken with since I was last there has said anything other than "as soon as we leave they will crumble." Yet the brass always reported that we "were turning a corner in the fight."
Documenteries such as "this is what winning looks like" highlighted both our failures and the failures of the ANA as well as the massive corruption of the Afghan government and military.
It is my assessment that the failure was not due to some lack of training, but a systemic problem in both how we report information and what our senior leaders do with that info, as well as willfull ignorance of the truth on the ground from our civilian leadership.
There is a massive gap between the "every Soldier is a sensor" and command.
If we are to believe that "no one for saw Afghanistan falling in 11 days" we should understand there is a massive communications problem. None of the Soldiers I have spoken with since I was last there has said anything other than "as soon as we leave they will crumble." Yet the brass always reported that we "were turning a corner in the fight."
Documenteries such as "this is what winning looks like" highlighted both our failures and the failures of the ANA as well as the massive corruption of the Afghan government and military.
It is my assessment that the failure was not due to some lack of training, but a systemic problem in both how we report information and what our senior leaders do with that info, as well as willfull ignorance of the truth on the ground from our civilian leadership.
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